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PART FOUR 
SOVEREIGN INDONESIA STRIVES FOR .A NATIONA.L ECONOMY 

CHii.PT,.::li XVIII: AGiUCULTUJAL is1:H.T�S 
Rcstorotion of Estc.tcs -
Jlltl1ough rilost estnte opern.tors �.lrendy l1nd ::-.ccess to tl1eir properties 
' '  
lying in Dutch-occupied territories, before the transfer of sovereignty there 
hncl been little restoration of es·�c.tes in Re�Jublicc.n .:--rec.s. 'I'TJ1enty percent of 
them the RepulJlican Government estira,:,.ted could ue returned to production 
- ' 
quickly; perhnps forty perce11t, c:,_lti1ougl1 dCTanged, could be rohabilitc.ted; but 
the bn.lru1ce it reported to be in c.. state of co,ill)lete rui1 .
1 In line ·witl1 
existi11g policy Md agreen1ents (in iJnrticular Artie-le 1 of the R. T.c. Financia.l 
nnd Economic Agreement), beginning in 1950 the Indonesian Gover11r11ents undertook 
to permit the restoration of nlien estates -�o tl1eir proprietors unless these 
hnd been enemy nn.tionnls (Gerri1ans"., Ittliai--is, end J�pr.inese). I
t, was ncknowledge<" 
tl1nt estn.tes ;.vere an ir,1portmt source of bndly-needed foreign exch@ge, yet 
tl1e e stn.tes were nlso expected to re1Jlnce coloninl ?:)erso1 11el policies vrl.th nev1 
ones c:\ir,1ing at rcisi11g the stc..ndo.rd of livi11g of tl1eir era�:>loyees. 
The problem of restorntion 1..ras com1)licc..ted, hov1ever, by the occu1)ation 
of r,1nny estnte lands by the local poi:>ulntion--veterans ai1d ex-guerrillc.s as 
·well �s :permane11t ci vilinns ( a fE'.ct.or recognized i11 Sect.ion 3a of Article 1). 
Furtl1err11ore, tl1e RIS Government co11sidered utilization of estate lc.nd by the 
locnl 11opulation clurii1;:, the Japanese and Revolutionary periods to hnve been 
lawful. Since by 1950 it had become necessary to regul�rize the situ�tion, 
es:t)ecially if the originc.l l)roprietors still wnnted tl1e return of their estntes., 
1'1inister of Prosperity Djuanda annotmced that vrhere occupied estate lands 11ere 
returne1..l to their proprietors, tl1e settlers would be given other land or com-
Kementerian Penera.ngnn, Kabinet Republik Indo11esia, p. 66. 
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p�sation. 2 According to Minister of Interior Ide Anak Agung Gde Azung, ho,;,rever, 
where well-run farms had arisen, the Government would e1 denvor to transfer such 
lands to the fr.rmers nnd grant them hak milik (ownership rights). But if an 
occun�nt misused the land, otl1er c.1.ction would be necesseLry. Nevertl1eless, 
eviction 1r1oulcl only occur on tl1e basis of a decree by the appropriate autl1orities. 
Early in January 1950, the RIS Ministry of Prosperity drafted a set of 
instructions on restoration, in  1-1hicl1 the above principles r,.1ere included. 
Before puttinp: tl1em into operation, it decided to discuss tl1em ,;d th the 
c!ssociations of enterprises coi1cerned n.nd t he �.Dproprio.te state goverrunents. 
Ho�·.rever, two months later the agree111ent of the estate associations had still 
not been obtained, especially on gu2rnntees to be given lc.bor at the tiine of 
restoration. Accordingly, tl1e �-i nistry of prosperity left to tl1e tl. I. iiinistry 
of Agriculture the mnnn:�er,1ent of the restoration, to be acco1nplished gradually 
and tl1rough dealing directly 1-1itl1 tb.e individual estate !)roprietors. 4 
'lo facilitate the restoration, tl1e .:1. I. 1iinisters of Interior, Agriculture, 
and Labor by joint decree on 8 i-iarch 1950 authorized the establishment of e.. 
Pnnitia Pengembalian Perusah�an Perlcebunan l-iilil( Asing ( Pl.ii'i.A,---Alien Estates 
Restoration Commission) in each of the leadin� est�te areas, 1dtl1 the task of 
taking an inveutory of the estates and advising the respective governor, who 
then mir;ht grant the request of tl1e o-vmer to ins1Ject and/ or repossess his 
estate and fix the runoW1t of compensation to be �)aid by the oimer for r.iaintenance 
2. Letter of Djuanda of 17 l•Iay 1950 ii.1 reply to 1�1ochammG.d Taucl1id query, 
_?ertr-ntjaan Anggote dan Djawaban Pemerintcll, II, 68. 
3. Letter of 1-dn. Agung of 29 July 1950 in reply to r. query by Tauchid, 
ond reply on 5 Aug. 1950 to a query by Ahem �rnitn[_;-pradjD., Pertanjaan .Anggota 
dnn Dja1•1nban Pemerintah, II, 41-42, 45-46, 52-54, 
4. T�eply of 11in Djuonda to a query by Al1em Eri1ingpradja, 25 July 1950, 
Pertanjaan Jmggota dan Dja1,1aban .Pemerintah, II, 98-99. 
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of the crops and· bu�ldings during his absence. After the proprietors of 110 
estates an Java had been granted permission to return through this means, by · 
decree of Minister of Agricult�re Sadjarwo on 1 August agencies of the Depart­
ment of Estates--of which former minister I.J. Kasimo was Chief-�were set up 
in estate regione with the task of "assisting the Government to restore the 
productive capacity of estate export commodities to the pre-war status both 
quantitatively and qualitatively. 11 This task was to be effected by assisting 
operators in rehabilitating all estate enterprises, regardless of whether 
owned by the Government, aliens, or Indonesians, and by aiding organized 
efforts of Indonesian nationals to work estates which could no longer be 
operated by their original proprietors.5 
The ease with which &states"-were restored often depended upon such factors 
as: (1) the extent of damage to the estate 1 s real assets, which affected any 
decision to resume operations; (2 )  the availability of capital to the pro­
prietor expecially if the property had been heavily damaged; (3)  the extent· to 
which portions of estate lands had come under cultivation for foodstuffs· ·by · 
the local population; (4) the demands of caretaker organizations for compensa­
tion from the returning proprietor; (5) local bandit activity, sometimes cor­
related to the extent of squatting on th3 estate lands; and (6) local"- political 
opposition (usually so correlated) .  
In North Sumatra, the Restoration Commission was dispensed with since the 
largest estates union, Sarbupri, would not accept a seat on it. In Atjeh, 
which had forty-nine estates before .the war (none of mich had been returned 
to a proprietor by 1950) ,  moat were bein� operated at the time of the transfer 
�- Ibid.; �epublik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Timur, pp. 332-333. In
April Kasimo and Muda Dalam inspected estate conditions in East Sumatra on 
behalf 0£ the RIS House of Representatives. 
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of sovereignty by a regional organization called the Perusahaan Perkebunan 
Negara (State Plantation Enterprise). On 25 September �951, the first estate 
in Atjeh was restored to its legal proprietor, and within half"� year thirty 
had been restored. However, since the proprietors of half of these were not 
in a position to operate the- -estates themselves, they leased them out to pri­
vate persons, mostly Indonesians but also some Chinese. In 1952 at least 
five estates in Atjeh were still under the control of their kabupaten govern­
ment, which leased them out to private operators; this included three whose 
original proprietors renounced their rights since they could not pay the 
necessary compensation, and two whose original. proprietors had requested a 
postponenent of restoration. By early 1952 all fifteen estates in Tapanulj 
had been officially restored to their owners, although here too several were 
subsequently leased to Chinese.6 
In the leading estate area of East Sumatra, which before the war had 316 
estates-half of them for rubber--the great majority had already been restored 
to their proprietors during the N.S.T. period. A few in the highland areas 
were restored in 1951, but their proprietors--unable to operate them on an 
economical basis--leased them out to others. By 1952, 98 percent of t he rubber 
estates, 88 percent of the oil-palm estates, and 80 percent of the hard fiber 
estates were back in operation. However, half of the tobacco concession land 
had been returned to the state, several estates were closed down and others 
were merged together."? 
The tea estates suffered the hardest, relatively speaking, since one-third 
6. Re ublik Indonesia :  Pro insi Sumatera Utara, ffienceforth RI:PSW 
pp . 536- 39, - 9, 7.  The tjeh organization should not be confused 
with the P.P.N. (Pusat Perkebunan Negara), with headquarters in Djakarta. 




! 'f their plDnts hnd be{ n uproot<..�d durint'.) the J2r;nncsc: period r:, r1d ::111 sovc. nnc· 
f::ictor�v hn d b c 1..n  subs�·:qucntly l'-ft in ruins . Cons cqu,.·ntly by 19.52, onl:v 3cv\:n 
of th( sixt1::,cn t,cn c,st.::itcs in Sast Sumatrc1 were still in opcrati":n . IJur ir1�- tir1n t'· 
y(. !)r Ind ,-,r1csia11iz-:1·tion took plocc in this a t:riculturnl sector �t the expcns, ·  c,f:
the British. ThC' SU1nc1 tr::' Tea �st:� tcs Ltd .  ( of Lor1dor1) before thr- wc:1r hPd 
opcr::1t (  d six tc.� estates on 10, 000 hcctc1res of concession . l2nd in Simelungun . 
'ItlL:sc WEr( su.bsL•quently rr1c:r�;;.. d ir1to three r,stdtc s .  By 19.52 reduced lRbor 
productivity alonf:� 1-'J'ith cor1tinllt d clc:mands for w2r,:�: incre ases, the hi:;:h costs 
of ri.:?habilitetion, and the� dr,clinc in the worlG rac1rkc:t price rna dc- it impossible 
for the comrJany to 
J, 
:) profit . It conscq_uc0ntly borrowed from th(" Bank ODE•rn t,, at 
Industri bfcgDrar. Prosp1: cts, hnwc,rcr, contj_nul." d unfavorable. The compony was 
6oing further nnd further i11to debt -1s df.•m,1r1ds for social J:Jrovisions for the 
workers continued Etnd ill0;;al squattinG nn its lrnds incr,_ ,as c c1 . Thus, on 24 
July 1952 the com1=,·cr1y susp2ndc·d opcrAtions en the two cst?rtes then still 
working . itftcr rc•gion,:11 i;O,T< rnrncnt .i gt-::nci(:S propos•"d. tL0t the estates be 
opt�ratcd by thc- Govc rnmcnt--but on A sound cummerc iDl bcJsis, not as 8 soci.:;11 
ort-:;anization--thc compnny turned ov,- - r all its property to the B .  I .  H . ,  ivhich 
rroper1cd the factory on the 11iv1ardjani" tea cstc:te in December . The reconstructic .. 
bank then s,�t up thC' l.f .  V .  Pcrusahaan Perkebunan I·'1.1rdjani (t-1ardj ani EstRtc 
CompanJr, Inc . )  c1s  its wholly-ov-rned subsidiary, which thereby bc· camC' the l,�rf-; '.: :st 
Indonesic1r1 corporation opcroting csta tcs . 8 
8. Thiel . ,  p .  545; Ji.nt:.:1r:-, , 25, 28, 30 Jl1ly, 8 l�u(s •  19.52 ; Tobing, Surnatcra 
Utara, pp . 115-122 ; Bank Iridustri Negara, Report on the First . 5 Years o_f its 
F_.xistcnce, t)p . 16, 24. The B . I . N .  hr,ld Rp . l . J .  million in ,th,\ capitiil stock 
· ·of the l�Inrdj2ni compar1y �,nd had aclvanccd it Rp .11 . 5  milliop; . 
One local obsc• rver r�,portcd that thr. British Govc rnincrit l19d f)rohibited 
the transfer of British fur1ds to rchabili tatc these tea ,�stnt( s sin�e :t;r1e 
Cornmonweal th could all(:gcdly sell tecJ more chcoply to the Uni tcd Kint�dom than 
could Indcnc sia . Tobin !,, op . c it . ,  pp . 115-117 . 
- -
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Although no complete dat.:J on rc.JtorAtion of "uplnnd'; cst;;1tr0 s for other 
re Jions hAs be -: n publisl1c d, 0ppar,ntly few cst:itr)s i11 CcintrPl Sun1ritrc t-Jcrc 
restore d, partly b;--cause of thE shortag2 of availAble lcJbor, 9 but by 1951, 
fifty-five cst�t cs  in 0outh Sumotra were back in production.10 Most of the 
est,1tc-s in tlest Jc1va ( the s econd principal cst&tc ar, e )  resumed pi:-oduction, 
despite the banditry in ccrtuin rc- �ionso. Tl1e problem of squat;ting on 0.stnte 
lands to the extent of h3mpcrir1i; op,-.-r�t ions was �rco test in pt1 rts of the P & 
11 
n th pecia · cT Lands '1nd l· n  TJ·1· am1· s . I e S · 1 n ·is ric t t of J ·ogJckarta ,  none of th 
tobacco cstnte: proprietors resumed opcr :i tior1s althou6h thref. once e:xpresscd 
an interest to do so .  i�t the same time smallholder cultivation of tobacco 
expendect.12 ElsE:whcre in Central Jav�, much fricti0n between rctur11in;:, estates 
and local occupants WBS rcport, d :-it Bodjolali.13 
?1orr complt-tc d�ta is a�ailablc on the· st�tus of rr storation in East Java 
(the thircl.-r-1nkinl; e st:J t  · province, ) o. Of 264 upland cst.::itcs on r·rfpachts before 
the wc1r, 153 reportedly h2d been rcstorcd to th(ir own?rs by the end qf 1952. 
The lr!r(�e mAjority of those rrsotor0d unccndi tion-::lly before the tr:.:1nsfc-r of 
sovereignty ( half of them in Besuki) continued operating, although insecurity 
in ccrt:::iin areas forced 2 few subsequently to suspend operotionso. 11fter 
obtaining n provisionol pcnnit from the gov€rnor in 1950, twenty more (mostly 
9 .  Laporon Tahunan Sum-�tcra Tengah 1954, (Bukittingt�i:  Dj2watan Peneran�2n 
Propinsi Sumatera Tengah, 1954), pp . 145-153o. 
10 . R .I . : Propinsi �umoter2 Scl2ten, pp o 431-433o. 
11. R . I . : Propinsi Djawa Barnt, pp . 388-395; lleport by i1c;riculturc Committee 
to Parliament, 14 June, in Dewan Pcrwakilano. Rakjnt 11 . I . ,  Risalah Pcrundingan 
· /henceforth R.Po.7 - 1951, pp.o- 5065-5070o. 
12 . R . I . : Daerah Istimewa Jogjakarta, pn . 507-508 . Sec "Sug.:ir Bst3tes" , 
infr-1o. 
13 . Ji.�;ricultur0 Committee report, oo. cit .  
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in r1Ial<1n1;) were r�'·poss csscd by their prcprie>turs, but onl;y· thrcr.-: fcllo_1,1cd in 
1951 tnd nine (prir1c ipally in Kediri) in 1�52 . Other proprietcrs wl10 1 1.-. c:; 
prc-visionelly bcr n pcr1ni tted to inspect nnd reoccupy the ir est::➔ tE: s did riot 
reoccupy them by triE:' end of 1952, l .-:-1 r�tcly bE:causu no final -3�r€ cmcnt had b(� c  r1 
reachc·d on the amount of con1pc.:ns2tion to bf: pc�id the loc.11 ori-:.�nnizritions or 
population th<1t had bc,::n mnintrl ining the cst'.1tG• S  Jurir1,-?; the · interim. Tiorcov0r, 
. ..
npplic etions by proprietors to re turn to tl1irty c st� tr·s (mostly in • l <3lani:� rnd 
Kediri) rcmnincd und.c:r considt. ·ro tion with tho p4i,[ .fi. . ,  largely be-cause the 
demands for compensation wcr2 fcJr beyond wh?t the c- st3tc opcrc1tors felt nble 
to pay . In Dddi t ion, for thirty-two e- stAtc s the r<. WE: r• no r .. Guests at all . 
from proprietors for re storation. Jost u11re:storr. c t 'St,'! tC:s Wt!ich loc �l 
orLaniz.:.itions attempted to oprrate ( cspeci<!ll;y :;long the: southern tier ) were 
in an extremely depressed condition. 14 :Never theless, by :.ugust 1952, only 
six ncrccnt of the erfpacht area in East JavcJ _had been leg:Jlly Indonesianized.r1: 
Three years after tl1c transfer of  sovf.,reignty, over severity percent of 
the estates on the isl.::nds of JcJva and Sumatrc:i had been restored to their 
16ownersr. 
14. R. I. : Propinsi Djawa Timur, pp . 339-341, 425-431, 627-634; k._;riculturc: 
C£mmittee rc·port. op. cit . ;  I.J. Kasimo spc- ecl1, 19 I1ay, Ichtisar Parlem(n 
/henceforth I .P_.7 1952, pp . 412-414. Some conflict npp0.�rs in the datr compile •  
by the- provinc e:-
Of tho m�ny c1statc: s  occupied, t1uarde:dr., or worked by vc ter')ns nnd \.:x­
guerrillns, 9 hcd come under th€ jurisdiction of the Biro Rckonstruksi :j\fasionel 
( th€ veterans rchribilitation burenu) . 
15. R . I. : Propinsi Djawa Timur, p .  :.!.h2 . Out of a totc.11 erfpacht :1rG� in 
thE· province of 248,214 ha . ,  loc:Jscs for parcels cov€rinf; 2332 ha . h3d expired, 
1784 ha . h,:1d ber:n released by their lessees, 10,420 ha . had been bought up by
the Cbvcrnmcnt, ,�nd 46$ ha . he1d been · sold to Indonesians . 
16. B .  Natape:·rmadi, " Tiga Tahun PcmbAn{;.;1m2n Perkebunan 19.50-1952" , l1lm2nak 





Operator No . of estat(·S /1.rca in hectar1;;s 
PrivP:tc- propriltGr (restorl.d )  1140 2,014, 000* 
Pusat Perkebunan 1.Je . !Drri 40 47, 000 
Biro Rekonstruksi N3siona l 11 10, 000 
Loc a l  populnti0n, l3borers, 
cx-fi5htcrs 213, 000 
Status unknown (in insecure ;:irrn ;  
ur fActory and/or crops ruined) 249 209,000 
Tota l operating in 1941 : 2,493,000 
* inc luding severa l c los(d dowr1 1i�ir1 
because of insecure· conditions 
Source: l•Iinistry of Agriculture 
P.?.N .  i�o . 2 
' 
In thE:0 up lc1nd estn tc s f:ctnr, 11 Indo1.1.csiAnizn ti. ;n" in t.hl ��' r1c,r.1l �. r.1.s , -
. .1nJ socia 1izot . 1 
l
'"( t onk 1 1 ifit J · 10n .in pnr icu ar t p 1c� f0r s �v�nt��n 0st1tcs c �ss"· 
·-1 s furmer onemy property wht::n, ful lowin:_.: tht · transfer n1 s0vr.r ,_,ignty, th( ·
(t)uvernementsl,, ndbouwb.edrijven w.1s renamed Pus at PerkeLunan :Negara (P .P .  N .  -­
State Plantations Center, o:1 n��mc· borrOWl·l.1 from the or�anizcJticn set up in 
1946), 1nd former Vic(· 1·1Iinistcr Soksono t,_camc its dirc- c tor . The: :'lcquisiti•.-•n 
Jf thcst e:stri tcs virtunlly uouL l,  .. d the .:1mount of lar1d und0r (:st::� t(: cultiv3tic,n 
which W3S directly own0d by the Jovt::rnn1t"nt, makinf; tht: P.i-'l.N. the l�rgest 
· 18"rnountain estatE.· 11 organiz:3ti· ·n in the ccuntry. By 1952, a f.tcr '.mergir1g somt: 
17 . Stnte ownership of -3 c ert.!:!in corporntion in the 9f!,ricultur� l  sector 
led to a unique case . of de-socialization . In 1946 the Netherlands Indies 
Government had set up thr N .V. BataviP.sche Mode l Boerdcrij, cApita"lized at 
half r:i 1ni llion 5-ulden., as  a model dairy to test the raising of pcdit;r,_ cd 
mi lk cows· in the Djakart:l c limc1tc . The compAny encountered v?.rious h1rdships .
s o  th�t by latr: 1949 the· Cbvc rnmont was" c-onsidoring s0lling out. Fina l ly on
17 April 1950, the President authorized the snle  of its stock a� 25% of pnr
to �nother dairy believed to be owned by Indonc si;!ns". " Putusnn Prcsidcn RIS 
No . 153" , Berita-Ncgar2 RIS 1950, No. 27 . 
18 . Govf.-rnmcnt stcttemcnt, 25 Oct . ,  Dewan Perwakil::i n Rakjat Republik 
Indoncsi8, R .P.  1950, p .  2227 . 
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1c)f its srn:Jll�-r pr,. ,p,..>rtit . s, it was c :p< r:.' ting thirty-fi V( , st,· , t,, s .  ·.il1il1 . pl :1nr1i.r1 
ti·vc1tion of rice over 10,000 hLct0rcs . llt th-1 t tilnL , the ..' • .? .N .  employed 250 
st::�ff p0rsonncl 1r11... 30, 000 workc rs .19 
The P .P .N . ,  c1pcrating ur1dcr the Indisch\.. Bcdrijvcni,Jct ( I .B .v·J . --th1.. low 
r,. brulnting some of the fOVl.'t• rlffic:n.t' s er1tcrprisc-s ) ,  which �ll0W(:d a l;::irgt r� ' °'(irc: ,c,l,.. c, 
of autonomy and a separritc: budget for <;ov,· rruncnt c-ntorpriscs, rcgult�rly turned 
0vc:r net profits tc, -the State Trcnsury. i1.ltl1out�h it hnd various tr0ining 
projects for spec dir1� up th( I11donos ianizntion of its p, rsonncl, in view of 
th(• shortDgc: of Indor1c si,'jn technicians, it rctc.1ir1ed c=i r1umbc-r of Dutch st;:iff ·"
pi-. rsonncl .9r1d cst.Jtt m::in0 1�0rs .  
2° Consequently, nl thour1,h lnbor relations on 
? .? • N.  cst::i tes Wl .rt usually s:.1tisfactory, occasioriAl critic isms appe.'.':lr, d, :is· . 
wt1er1 the· S[.lrbupri (SOBS I) m0rnbcr in f'arlinrnf nt, h.hern Erninu,pr:1dja, iri mid-1952 
comploincd that thv GovE:,rnment opernt, d the ? .F . rJ . on ci profit bnsis nr1d th0n 
allegedly lost much of the profits by pnyint< large. bonuses t0 !Jlien 3drninistr:1t, 
::ind staff personnel . 21 
19 . Saksono Prr.rvlirc.,h1.rujo, "Sekec.lnr men�;cnai Organisr:isi  dan Us,sl1a : )us.:.1t 
;:'erkcbunan Negara" , AlmanGk ?ert·anian 1953, pp . 306-316. ThE ? . l' ·  .N .  estc}tes 
hnd under cultivntion 28, 580 hn . in rubber, 10, 004 ha . in oil ·pclms, 3900 ha . 
in tea, 1400 ha . in gutta-percha, 116l"hn . in coc0nut, 883 hD . in coffc ( ,  and 
860 hA . in cinchonA". 
The s0ventc:en tt enemy propcrty11 estates comprised 21,060 hr! . The status 
of three of them remained unsettled since not all of the ir stockholders had
been enemy nt=1tionals . Four other cstr-itcs which h-:icl bec-n tcrnpnrarily plaCfd·
under P .r . :N.  jurisdiction, were finally sold to private persons . 
20. Reply of Minister Djuonda to il.bdullah Jusuf query, 25 July 1950, 
?ertanjaan il-nggota dan Djawaban Pemcrintah, II, 76-7 7 .  
21. Speech, 19 May, I.?". 1952, p .  422 .  
The Wilopo Government poj;ntcd out ( on 3 June) that bonuses re pre S( ntc d
only about 5 pE-rcc nt of th( .pr_ofits which accrued to the State rind that the 
personnel c1ffcctEd h.� d to pay he;'!vy taxes to the StDte. Bonuses similar to 
those paid by other 0nterpris(:S were termed necossory to BttrDct the needed 
personnel . I.I- . 1952, p.  575 .  
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8L� in 1939". By 1951, th( numbt r h rJ ris <. n  to 46 (28 in �1st  JavD ) ,  with ctht:rs 
still un<lfrgoing rehabilitation. Ncvc-rthcless, thl prc,spr cts of rcstorinf th( 
upl:1ncl estc.Jtcs with pLrcnnir-1 crops h:-,d the problem of squattcrss--which nriturolly 
u.pl::i11d , st,Jtcs in gcnt·r3l csc8pLd the gri. atcst nuisance facing thl su6.1r cstate:s :· ·
willful dcstructi n of th1. crc,ps in th(· fi0lds". During tr1c first full •b 1 rowin · t, 
S(1 ason aftrr the tr �nsfL-r of sovereignty (1950/1951) over one-fifth of th' cant-
w�s stolen, ci(stroycd, or burnt down. The fnllowing year Bpproximr.itcly one­
sixth of the crop was s:i.rnil3rly :Jr stro�lcd--still n siZ('.l8blL 2mount. Scvcnty­
five pE'rcent of the cnn<.:.. on one st� tc--'1f'iocljopanggur1g" --was lost in this wnyf 
ir1 · 1951. In thr- face of such ccntinucd dr:·struction, the 3ovcrnment set up the:� 
Dano t•!olcs Tebu (Su�ar i'1olc,stati0n Fund) <1s 1 mutut�l insurance body . Grndually 
w�nton destruction declinect."22 
At the end of 1951, the Javnsch< Bnnk, th·. B3nk Industri Ncg�r.1, "nd thf' 
thrc,. m:1jor Dutch comrnc:rc i-91 b-1nks h.1d outst ·n<ling Rp . 352 . 6  million in cr-:- dits 
to forty-eight sugar •mills. Durin::; it� first yenr 0f opcr.1tinn ( 1951 ),  the 
new 6ovc.rnmcnt industriPl recovery bank (thl'.) B.I .N . )  financed 18 pcrcc1nt of th, · 
sug1r production. The next yc,r it accounte d for 25 percent, 1s the prospects 
did not look vC:ry invitin0 to alien hr.inks. Soon thr
. :a . I .N.  ht.i d bccornc the 
. . 
majority-stockholder of five. sug::ir mills, four of wl1ich ( including 11:1odjop3nggungn 
wer0 acquirr d from Dutch corporAtions. The fifth, 11 Krebct Baru11 , was undL rt2kc11 
22. Bank Industri Negarn,  op . c it . ,  pp ; 52-53; K�simc speech, I . � · .  1952,
p.  413; R . I . : Propinsi Djaw� Timur, pp. 333-335. 
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jointly ·. !ith N .  V. Kian Gv;an of Semarang, virhosc "Kro�t" mill south -.f . rAalang 
h�d b1..;vn ruin0d durinp the,, forti0c.  23 
Thv ronppoara11c0 of this last nrune v,as ir1dicati vo of .:1 11uvv d.vvclopment ir .. 
sugar cane cultivation. In l111ay 1952, Chief Kasimo of t.hv Dep�1.rtn10nt of Eotatcs ,  
doploring the destruction of cane crops, called f or coopuration on th0 basis 
of a " communit;/ of interests" bot1Neen thu sugar mills, fanner-lan�oldurs, and 
labor. Sundjoto (Parindra) , thG father of tho farmors 1 movom8nt, rocornrncnd0d 
a s;\'Stcm by ;,rhich ca110 ';-rould be cultivated by smallhold0rs and P;round by the 
lJ.rf;o mills . The 1Afilopo Govommer1t ropliud that a corrununit1-' of intor0sts v1as 
already buing sought in car10 cultivation. Thus smallholder production of sugar 
car10 ( virtually prohibited und(;r Dutch rule ) sk'.1rocketcd from 71 hectarus in 
195J to 24,031 in 1955. Most farrners found it profitable to sell their cane 
to n0.:1.rby mills for ;;rinding rather thar1 prcs�3ir1g it vri th thuir o-v;n equipment. 
Since on1..; of tl1e rnajor omallholder produ ction centi_;rs arose south of 1v'Iala11g 
noar tho situ of th0 old 11Krebe t" mill, v1hich vva[3 too far from mills in 
op0ration, Kian Gvran vvi th capital from th0 B.I.N. built its modvrn mill 
0xprossly for smallholdor cano ."24 
Ir� tho district of Jogjakarta, 1;7horo bofor0 th� Doprossion thorc r1ad b,J;__;n 
s6vontcGnosugar .mills"., tyn 'Of 1i1hich 
1tre:r:0"1 · r;till grinding at.:"-tmc outbruaklof 
World" War·.II, ·-byothc timoc.of tn<J - ;t·ran,cfor of sovercigntyeve:r;y rnill had beE.:n 
dismantled or burnt down. Un(icr these circumstance s and since estate 
companies had lost their conversion rights, they displayed little intorost i!1 
roos tablishing in the district. One did apply for and rec8ive a provisional 
p0rmit in 19Sl 
23 . Bank Ind11s tri llegara, op. cit. , pp. 16, 23-24; Financo C ommittee 
report ( read bJ1· Sundjo to),  26 lv'lay, I.P .  1952, p. 498; Antara, 14 Sept. 19S2. _,_-
Other B .I.N. sugar mills and thoir former 0Y1ncrs arc : "Tjukir " and 11Pagottan11 
(Coster var1 Voorhout & Coy. ) ,  11T jcpiring" (Natior1alo Ir1dustrie on La.r1dbouvir 
1tl.j . ) ,  and 11Ivlodjopanggung11 (Tiedeman & Van Korchom) . 
7o6 
to rcvpl.'h i'ts II Gor1d,:11r;;lipur" "  mills . But s1.r1c� it pr, f\.rr1...·J t.b.1t tht, f1rrrl< rs 
rais L c,anc �nu the r( fintd su�.�r be split between tr1em :incl tl1e rHill or1 .'°' .50: 50 
b,:isis, w.bi. r1..:)s the fonn• rs prc."fcrrc,d to rent out their lJnds to th1. mill, and 
the rcgionFil ��OVi rnmc·nt dPn1ondcd hAlf of the· company ' s  C[.lpit<1l stock, ncgo­
tiatinns brokL dowr1 th� next yc[lr. Since sm:--'llh0ldc r c1nt. : productic,n was 
incrc;Jsing, '  however, later in 1952 c1 commission decided th0t tht' r; cirin3l 
g0.vr-rnrncnt would build ri ne"T mill for such cc=inc. 25 The new mill rccamc 
such Pn issue among thl political p,:1rtj_cs in the Jc,gj,1knrtn r, .. • .iC'n�l · :ssc.mbly 
thr\t Sul tan Hamc-ngkoe Boct-1ono c:1rly in 1955 decided a gn inst th,_ r �ion[11 
govc rnrncnt I s prirticipe.ticn in the vcntur� • . .. fter confc rcnccs with the Ministt:.irs 
0f h�riculture ::ind of Economic .fiffairs, hl obtt�ir.tc:d the: Ccntrnl Government ' s  
1grcemcnt to finance the proj c·ct nncJ ::irrongcd for construction by nn F��st 
Gcrmnn conc"ern with experience i11 bc·ct su00r mills . 
26 
Whereas before• th1.: war only thrc , of 84 sug.:--r rnills in cper�ti0n were 
Il1donesinn-owncd (thcst.:· uf tht Surak3rta princ t: s ) ,  by 1955, wher1 54 wcr( in 
�)pl:ration, twelve' were own€'d by c C'mp8nics dornicilcJ in Inct0n<."·sio, which 
3cc0unted for about twenty p�rccnt of th� productior1. 27 
25. R . I . : Daer:1h Istimc-wn Jogjak[-lrt�, pp. 507, 528-529; llntor�, 31 .t�u1:; . ,  
19 Sept.,  22 Oct. 1952. 
26. In 1956 th<: ch<1 rtcr for P .  T .  ''t4adu Bnru11 W[;S drawn up 0nd cpprovcd, 
with the Sultan as  1'rcsidcnt �nd Mr . R. SOEB!tGJO Djojowidagdo, Chief of the 
Directoratr of P.statrs in the ,·1inistry of li.griculturc,  c1s  the board director 
appointed by the- Gove rnmcnt. The com-puny ' s semi-automr-itic mill r!t :··adokAn, 
11r'!adukismo",  whosr: mc1n;1 ::;cr w�s drawn from "Tasikm3du", w0s to grind smDllholdt r 
canr: from on <1re? serv, d before the WJr by 11p to four formr:r sug.Qr m ;_lls. Its
cost w.1s cstim,�tcd nt Rp . 170 million. Interview with S0losocmordjc1n, Ithace, 
17 1•1ay 1958 . 
Although officially 11.opc·nrd11 on 29 i'1ny 1958, the new mill wris unable to 
-comrnr·-ncc 1�rinding on schedule, ::is  n result of which much 0f the first yc,-1r 1 s
crop cithrr spoiled or hcd b:: to" shippc-d elsewhere". i'Jcw York Times, 19 hug . 1958". _ _
27. Bank Industri Nc_ :�r-:1, op. cit., p .  53 . 
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Debates over _Sugor Lnnd Rentals 
Continually ciftcr the trr.1nsf0r of s0 1,crt:,ignty ( as befort ) (Jli<.?n cst.,t t.  s 
rccc-iv·cd their shnr( of nttcntior1 from ;;orliament . Sugor estatc,s dr-:.-w tl1t.: 
1ttcntic,n of . ··arliament when Emer��c-ncy Low No. 6 of 1951 came up for r,1tificr-iti 
i1t the· beginnir1g of 19.50., the rcntGl of l3nds from tl1c rural population 
by su6or est3tcs was still governed by the l,:ind rc.r1tnl lows of 1918 (ns 
amended) . 28 These: provided th2t the.: respecti vc 11esider1 would set the rnini.tnum 
rcnt.11 r�tc for l,.,nds ir1 his r · iiur1 . Rentir1g wns to be volt1r1tBry . ii.lthough 
during the Dutch period., tl1r fnrmers were often induced to �ccept r,:1tes which 
tl·ndcd to be low, since 194.5 the demDnds of fc::rm: ·rs and such farmers orgnni"'." 
zations c1s the B .  T .  I .  wcr, VEry high, arid the Residc·ns be inf; pl.:lguc-d with ·"
such demends were• often unnblc to c-1ssure the SU£:°/:ir cst:=1tos sufficient land. 
1tn1en this stDtc of nffoirs continued into 1950 and ncgoti-Jti0ns bctwc . n mill 
opcr::itors r.111d farmers orp.:eniz;.-itions were oft!''.11 frui tlcss"., the Natsir Gov1":-rnm.ont 
decided to takl' rcmf:di1l acti()n, sir1ce it felt tbs t the- produc tic.n 0f sug:1r·
wns import:-1nt to both the people and th0 state.  l1ccordin�ly"., 0cirly in 1951 
it promulgated Finc.0r ��cr1cy Law iJo . 6 to cimc•nd tl1(' .1918 lnnd rcntnl lows 2nd 
centralize the authority to set 1-�nu r · nt,.!·l r,".l tc s in tht i:1ilinistcr of Interior 
( with the approv1l of the l'•Iinister of j�gricul turE: ) .  Lnrg,: ly as  3 conscqt1E.:ncc 
of this law, acrt· agc undQr cultivation by the sui:.;·!: r estates . ros(· sixty porccnt 
between 19.50 and 1951. 
Soon afterwards, the Cabinet submitted a bill to ��arliament to rntify the 
emergency law. J,.ccording to the Joint Report of Sections (Bahagian2 )., most 
28. Cf. Letter of RIS :t-Iinistcr of . .'rospcrity, dated 17 t1ay 19.50, in reply 
to Tauchid query, Fertan · ac1n b.ng ,ota dan D · awr,ban i\::mc rintah II, 68-69 ..". 
The land rental l-1ws were thG and Lease Ordir1ance and for the two principali t· 
on Java ) the " Vorstenlandsch Grondhuurreglcmcnt" . 
: .. . . ; 
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pcriodic.11 c ,11 (by two mt mbers) for nntionnlization of sugar mills. One 
su5gcstion was thrit vir· .. �in land should be provided to alien capi tn l, not farm­
land of the people . One suggested that the Gov( rnment consider the interests 
of the entrepr(·"neurs ,:Js well is  those of the f.::irmers". Lnother--ci ting from 
the Cbvcrnment' s "Clarification" to the emergency l::iw tl1�t it wa s intended as 
�, step in achicvin6 a 11community of interests" in the sugar industry--fc-lt 
th1t this could no-c bl. r. acl1cd be tv1c-en farmers .::1nd businessmen who 1llc �E: dly 
lc.1ok( J only for profits . And others propost:d that the n1inister first consult 
wi tri fnnnl rs organizations befor( sc:tti11g th(.- rental r-1 tE's . 29 
In reply to th( jcint rc-p0rt, Minister of hgrorian Affairs Cbndokusu"llo 
wrote : 
In th1.. opinion of the uovt:rnmcnt, th0rc is still cl func tion 
for lar1;r cntcrprisfs operc1ting with alien C<1pitn l in thP. soci.:�l 
Dnd econcmic sectors of our cc,untry, and they will continue to 
havr this func tinn so long as  nationPl c apitnl is still not organ­
ized so as to rPplace it. ThL Govr.rn�ent is confident th�t nationrl 
cnpital will b� so org�nized within the shortr st possib le period • 
• • • for the time being sugar and tcbacco c•states must still br 
opcrntcd by foreign c apital .  In view cf this fact the Gov,· rrnncnt 
does not agree • • •  th<1 t it is impossiblF for a "community of interr:sts 1
to b( formed in the Estate industl9"'J omon£; c;1pi tal, l3ndowners, 0nd 
' 
· 
labor . • • .  there· must be coopEr0tion between the 6roups possessing 
the three factor.s of production, frc� of the"· questicn of whether 
or not the proprietors are: alien, so that E:'ach may sh3re in the 
product • • • •  
�Jhile noting th,"'t f'Stn tE:s provide c li vclihood for thousands of workers cind 
th.1t their production was important tc th( community, hr cnllc-d the americhncnt 
to th�.: l(1nd rfntol laws "one of tht· Govc.rrnnent"' s Efforts to contro l est--·t ·  s 
cpe:rnt, d by foreign capital" . l�oting too th.:-:t rcnt.:il r<JtP.s would bv set ;1fter 
cunsultaticn with". the Office of Farmers �1ovr:mcnts (of  the Jv1inistry of .Agriculturl j 
29. "LapurRn Gabuni:;�n Bah:,gi,1n2 D.P.R. 11 , 28 l�ov. 1951, !,. j .  1952,. PP• 38-42 .  
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which maint:1 incd clos� r,.l· ·. tir.-ns with f·:nnt r (\r;:-;:.iniz� tinns, · Iinistcr Jon, .. :t:-kusura 
d0clArcd thn t the Gove"rnment could le:1 rn of the dc· sires of the ort=;riniz 1 tic.)ns 
without holdin� meetings which would be time-consuming with no t;uarantcc, ,· if 
results--as h�d been the c�se in the past.30 
The plenary s(�ssion c,f Farliament dcba tc.·d the bill on 6 Fcbrunry 1952. 
Each of the h!3lf a dozen sper:ikt� rs, SAVC one, gave qualified ,1pprov2l of the 
bill (committing the . · . K. I . ,  B . 'r . I. Ana MAsjumi) •. ;_ demnnd for a bosic 
r:igrarit::in lav1 W3S voicoc� by sE:verel. r1ocharnmad T1�UCI-IID (B.T. I . ) surveyed the 
i:·ffc:cts of the lnnd rcnt�l lc�ws ,:-1nd complained thc:1 t their foundt1"tior1s, which 
benefited giant capitnl by victimizinc the intt- r- . sts of the people, had not 
been removed by the 1mendmcnt. Besides allowin� 0stntr producti0n of sugar, 
he urged tha t thE"' Government foster sug2r production by the popul3tion. 31 
Two ·. ·". K . I .  members, s .  UtArjo and WJ.;.RDI Kusnn talis tr,1 , attacked f0r0.ign 
capitnl. Utarjo rcj c-c t,-.,d the Government' s  stn temcnt th::it cst� tes beriefitt<:::d 
tl1e community, and asserted thet they primnrily bc:nefi tt0-d their " colonio!ll 
masters, centered in thr· Netherlands" , allogin1� thnt compared to the profits 
tr[lnsferred abroad the revenue which the govf rnrnent collected from th<:?m . wns 
relatively small. vJardi could not comprehend why the gov12rnment f cl t tha t 
plant�tions still h�d to be ope-rated by alien capital since the Revolution 
had proved tha t Indoncsi::)ns could perform ony task well. He felt thGt while 
the Government prenchcd ,1 nc1tionc1l econorny, it always protected the interests 
of alien monopoly capit:'ll, which c0uld thrive only by exploitinf� the people. 
rr-Jc=irdi joined A.hem �rninhprAdja in .-::"ttacking the cnncept of a poter1tial 
JO . I.P. 1952, pp. Li3-l.ili . Since the Sukirn�n cabir1et cre a ted ;} s0p[' rat0 
n1inistry for agrarian affairs, the new minister rather tl1an the l1inister of
Interior br-came rr:sponsible for the bill. Go11dokusumo was R member of }? IR . 
31 . R.?. 1952, pp. 317-324. 
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n community i_11' ir1ttrests" .  In ii.hem' s view tht.:rl \.vllS :-- cc riflict uf int ere st t-=. ir1 
the sug3r industry, where tht· workE:r sought the hir;hr st possible wz.1 ·. , cs ( which 
influenced prouuc tion costs ) ,  the f:1rmer-landowner sou. ::ht the hiLhest possible· 
rent, c:?nd the business1n;:,n sought the highest possible profit (and if his capital 
c .1me from .1broad, he had to rc.mi t .�s large profits 3S pnssiblE:· ) .  In such a 
circumstance, he felt th,;lt the only community of intc-r.-:,st wos in the mill' s  
continued operation. He anticipntr d a "hannoniousn community of interest only 
if the mills were Indoncsir-1n stc1tc property, in which C[:lSE the Government 
would use the? profits in the intcrc· sts of the community . To 1rfardi the "community 
of interests" proposed by the Government w�s simply thnt c ,f the horse and 
coachman ."32 
�he potentially deleterious effect on the individual farmer whc rented 
out his land to the sugar estate drew a variety of reactions from f1arxist 
members. Utarjo expressed a fear that unemployment would rise sinc e there 
would be no industries to absorb them or that fanners who stayed and c ultivated 
estate c ane on their plots as sharecroppers would side with the mills in 
labor-managrmcnt disputes . Ahem, who considered that the nmendment favored 
the sugnr mills, worried that the increased rental income which was being 
realized would cause the fannc:r- to lose interest in productive work. Soemartcj(". 
(;� .S .  I.  ) also feared that high rentals would separate the farmer from his 
customary sourc e of income ( farmin�) .  He charged, r.iorf'over, that the Govern-
· ment while acknowledGing that such fanners might work on sugar estntes had 
failed either to mak0 provisions on behalf of cst�te seasonal workers or to 
32 . R .r:·1952, pp. 3Jl-3l2, 331-333,- 336:331 . Utarjo and li.hem"·were the
ones who had insisted that the Government consult with fanners"' ·"tn-gnhiiatlcne 
before setting rental rntes. Cf. R.:,) . 1952, pp. 314-315, 317, 330. 
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Dromote smallholder a ,sriculture .33 In effect, therE: was somt� vague cor1c t.-r11 
th,'.3 t foreign capit-:11 in the post-war period would possibly brinf Pb(;ut a 
prnlc-tariza"ti()n of thE: f;:1rmcrs whilt causing them t0 becomr, rc-nti0•r clnss · 1 
with excess leisure: � 
SARL-'iIN Reksodihardj0, rr:presentin1:� f✓Iinistcr Gondokocsoemo and himself 
for 1nany years Chief of the 1:;.grarian J�:ffairs Sec ticn, presentc d the Government 1 :  
rrply to the views cxprP.ssed in the (icba tf' . While declaring that the Govern-
1nent had to ort�aniZf' c1 national capit?l and p1"- rsonncl, whicl1 -�radually could 
rE=place  all ,;1lien op� r,g tions and become the prnduc tive means for building the 
people ' s  orosperity, he acknowledg0d that this t�sk would t�kc time •" . In the 
meantime the Govr--rnment had to rct�ulate the opPration of alien busin�ss in 
order tha t  they not exploit the weAlth of the Indonesian st3te And pcopl� as 
in the past but brinv, as much prosperity as possibl� in accord with the spirit 
'1f Article 38 of thf· Constitution . Current regulations ·were constructed so 
thn t  such businesses might obtain a small but commercially fair profit whil0 
the major pox,tion would come to benefit the public arid sc, that maximum transfer 
abroad would be avoided. He repeat, d that· the law undf�r considero ti0r1 1node an 
att3inment of a community of interests possible since regulations precludE• d 
exploitation while facilitatinb a balance between the shares of proceeds for 
the land-owners and thP capita lists. He sug__;estcd tha t the fact  per:. se the 
businessmen in this case were aliens should not affpct the matter, for there 
were many instances in o ther casPs of conflicts of interests where only 
Indonesians were involve d. Concf:rning discussions with farmers• org<1nizations, 
Sarimin notf:•d that some rC'cent discussions did not t',o . off well because' some 
persons of obscure background apparently intentionally prolonged them so that 
33. R .? .  1952, pp . 312, 317, 327-329, 340-3411. 
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no settlement was reached. ��evertheless, it hnd always been th( Gc)vernmC:.'nt I s  
policy to confer with all orGanizations wl1ich possessed central officers, :ir1d 
it would cr.ntinuc to do so.3 4  
Utarjo submittl'd an amendmc0nt which provided that the rr!t<::s would b�·! set 
by the i"Iinister of l\grarian J�ffairs (with the approval of th0 '.'1inister of 
A6riculturc) after hearinG the views of farmers orGaniza"tions.
35 Sarirnin 
r�plied that since in practice discussions were held ,,.,ith both farm€'rs"' 
organiza tions and the c-ntrcprcneurs, the Government would approve the am.endn1E:nt 
if the words "and {organizations of) entrepreneurs" were addEd in order that 
the regulation would be equitable . In this form the new s tn tut(: rcltifying 
the amend0d text of Emergency Law No. 6 of 1951 was approved by acclamation, 
except for the i1 . S . I. m<::mbcrs prcsent.36 
?ri vate Lands 
.i?robably the ont· type c-.f landhc,lding conccrn1.ni-:. 1.vhich tl1c.- consensus 
favorinCT abolition was most complete was the institution of the "priva te lnnds 11 
( tanah partikclir). Arising under the Dutch regime, it w�s .o lso lnrgcly ended 
by the Dutch both durinG the three decades followin� 1910 and durinb the prc­
fc,deral government period 1n 1949. Consequer1tly, wherr:as at the bcginnini:; of 
1 136,911.,
1910 there 'WO«'O 293 pr�va-tc lands: (le3 tWban and uo·· rura-1) co·ver.ing / • (;',;:} . 
34. R.F". 1952, pp. 343-349. Sarllnin was A member of the:" � . N . I. 
35. I.1�·. 1952, p. 52. Co-snonsors of the Utarjo amendment were Tauchid,
1\bulhaja t (f'ro�rE·sif ) ,  v-!ardi, and l1bdurochman ··wangsadikarta (Partai Tani 
Indonesia ). 
J6. R .? .  1952, pp. 350-354. Utarjo ' s  pnrting remark was n hope tha t the 
GovGrnmE,nt would gi vc the farmers"' rcprE_,lsentclti ves an op1.;c rtunity to have a
greater voice than th2t cf business rc-presc11t3ti ves "in order t0 �Pt a balance 
of voices". 11 { sic ) 
Becc?use riinister Cbndokusumo died on 6 :1arch, the new stc.1 tute was not
immediately put into effect. In the Wilopo Cabinet, where the Minister of 
Interior at�ain b0came the r0sponsible cabinet member (since the i1grar•ian 
itffairs portfolio was abolished) ,  it was promul�ated on 8 Aut,-ust 1952 as 
Statute No . 6 of 1952. 
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h<:· ctares on Jav.:-i, by thL' time uf the t:r·ansfer of sovereignty 142 private lands 
(109 urban and 33 rural)  covcrin1� only 29 ,32.3 l1cc·tares rcrnained.37 These 
fi/;UrES su�L;e:::;t that it was rt0 latively simp ler to r(purchasc the huge rural or  ·
11 a grarian" lands (usually fro1n corpuratior1s ) tt1an the"· usually small urban plots 
( 11sur.illy owned by <indi victuals or families ) .  
Dul:·ing tl1e ilIS perioJ, -the JcrV('rnm011t contir1uec.. buyir1c� back a0rariar1 
pri vatL: lands". JS During 1951, tl10 1J . V .  Jctvaschc ?0rticulierc Landerijen i•Iij. 
(-which had been the Governmc�nt ' s rc:purchas-ing agency in the thirties ) was 
liquidaved, 39 anu for the first tirne in twenty years some urban pri vAtc lands 
were bought back. 
Lands sr.:lecti_ ·d for early repurchase were those whose occupants had com­
plairied about burdensorne payments or which were needed by the govern'ilent for 
public works or low-c ost hou·sing. In general . the repurchases followed com­
pensation a��reemcnts nogotiatcd between the Government and owners in nccordancc 
with existing rcgul[1tior1s. }Iowever, after r1inety-six percent of a ll private 
l::.ir1ds had be(.::n rcpurcl1ascd in this manner, tl1ree Chinese owners of s ever1 
private lands covering 1618 hcctar0s in the city of Djakarta rC:jected the 
G::i\r,,,rnmt·nt ' s compensation offer . The Govcrnrnent, as  required by law (in order 
to �et a court ruling on the amount of compensation), then had to have a 
statu.te passed stating th2t these private lands needed to be return<?d to the 
State .4° 
37 . Annex to statement by Minister of Interior Mohammad ROEM, 13 Feb . ,  
I . P .  1953, pp. 183-187 . 
38 . Cf. lettE:r of ·trinister of Interior J:.1.gung of 29 July 19.50 in reply 
to Tauchid query, :2ert.anjc1an J.n�gota dDn Djawaban ;�'emerir1tal1, II, 41-44. 
39 . Governn10nt st?tement, 9 t'1ay, I • .  :'. 1952, p. 251. 
40. t1in. Roem stAtement , 13 Feb . ,  r . � .  1953, p. 180. -
.1rlia1nt..;'nt on 18 February 1953 quickly approvf. d tt-.. bill Authcrizir1, 
ir1 the public interest the rL purchase 0f the sE:·vcn Djakarta priv:i t c  l,·nds . 
Virtually all spcok< rs fc1·vorc d the bill, althoubh many of them thought tr1at 
it did not go f,qr enough Dnd that a bill for the rfturn cf !'.Ill rcmDinint.: 
privc1t,' l.1nds ought tc havE been submitted. 41 
Some ide:-J of th, ethnic and l0gal vnrif.'. tion ... mong th( priVD tL-l0nd· 
holcl(rs at tht. st.:1rt of 1953 may b 1.. glc-1 11ed from th( f ollow:j r.L;.; t9ble.  
-Table 36 :  :- :rivatc-Land Ownc rship rJn Jav3 by �thnic and  Le; __ ;3l C:itc £:o_E.ics,  1953·
No . of l�nds Legal form Ethnic grouE Remarks 
7 CorporAtion Chinese Not includinc cst0tcs 
7 II Dutch II 
1 II Lrtib II 
n 1127 Unspecified ; mostly realty companies 
7 " II Estntcs ( sorne Chir1c•s�", some Dutch) 
1 Tr3ding company Arab Unincorporated 
19 r-tisc .  organization Chinese Social, burial, etc.
"3 Arab " 
2 II Indonesion II 
1 II Dutch " 
29 , ri  vnt:- pr rsPns Chincs0 
It13 Arab 
4 II Dutch 
2 II IndoncsiAn 
II2 Unknown On0 cppeRrs Sl8vic 
5 Unspecific-cl In process of r· purchnsc 
Source :  l"(inistry of Interi0r 
.At that tim�: t he, l:: r�;e3t rcm1ining privc1tc-land h older W3S the Sin,2_ Jwan 
Lipkic foundatii )n, with 5c o9 hr:ct3rcs . The next seven l;"l r, �, - st hclders wcrr: 
also Chincse.42 
41. I • .? . 1953, pp. 172-188; see 11 TJndan;.(-unda11;-� 1,10. 6/1953" -:1nd its . .
Cl:::irificati0n. 
42. .Annex to tv:in . H.oem st tcrnr;nt, I • . "• 1953, pr; . 183-187". These C·hincse
landhold(rs included two f.�mili, .  s, on( ccmctc::ry association, and three r:.-statcs ' 
(the lc.1rgest of which was 1�· . v. Cultuur t·iij . "Ketang; un0.3n 1ivest" with 2632 hn . ) .  
The ninth l-1r;: €St 9ropf. rt)' was the : lcl Dutch su,; ar est-" t, , tr . 'J. Cul tuur Ff ij . 
HKcdowung-K.11r,1isrf djctl . 
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Although the Indonesianizatton of private lands in most cases"- meant that 
the Indonesian residents were given . hak milik rigl1ts to the plots where they 
resided," ." this was not the case in certain urban lands which the cities of 
Batavia, Semarang, and Surabaja had purchased • . In several instances the 
municipality had become the landlord and continued to collect �he re .nts. 43 
In May 1952 the Wilopo Cabinet announced a four-year plan for buying up . 
the remaining private lands.44 However, budgetary difficulties compelled the 
Government to cut its allocation for repurchases in• 1953 to only forty percent 
of the amount originally planned, and by 1954 the position of the State 1 s  
finances had deteriorated so badly that the private-land repurchase program 
was temporarily soolved. The status of the program at the time of the elec- . 
tions appears in the following table. 
Table 
t 
37: Repurchases of Private Lands by Indonesian Governments, 1950-1955 
Agrarian. lands. Urban lands 
Year Number Area (ha . )  Number Area (ha. ) ComEensation 
1950 5 6,081 -- -- Rp. 7031 750
1951 -- -- 3 362 3,135., 927
1952 2 1,796 2 204 7, 364, 460
1953 -- -- 4 2., 3,6.9 16.,086., 787
1954- -- -- 1 798 2 008,180
1955 -.. -- -- -- ., --
Total 7 7,877 Io 3,72009 Rp. 29,2991104 
Remaining 26 14., 353 99 3.,261.1 
Source: Ministry of Interior 
Ahem Erni�12!,adja Motions 
Throughout virtually the entire period under review, there recurred polit-
43. I.P.  1953., pp. 178, 181. Zainul Arifin" - ( Nahdlatul Ulama) protested 
against this system of municipality landlords. 
44. Min. Roem statement., 18 Feb. ,  I.P� 1953, P• 188. 
In the latter half of 1955 Mr. Jusuf Wibisono submitted a motion calling" · 
· · ·for the natio.nalization of the remaining private lands. The following year .
a bill was submitted to Parliament for abolishing private lands. 
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ical disputes involving alien upland estates, which were principally Dutch­
owned. In many of the estate areas which had temporarily returned to Dutch 
control, a special organization of estate guards, the Ondernemingswacht, had 
been set up by Decree of 11 December 1948 since there was a shortage of gov­
errunent police. These guards were frequently used to evict squatters and so 
cane to be considered by the population as a symbol of colonialism. Many of 
their members, moreover, allegedly had criminal records and collaborated with 
the guerrillas. Thus, in general they were a.n unpopular lot,"· but after the 
transfer of sovereignty, they still renained. Considering that there was .no 
need for maintaining the estate guards since the State Police could keep peace 
and order, the RIS Cabinet on 18 April 1950 decided that they should be liqui­
dated, and promulgated this decision by Presidential Decree No. 178 of 22 May. 
On 15 June, somewhat belatedly, Ahem Erningpradja (of Sarbupri), at the 
request of his union, submitted to the RIS House of Representatives a draft 
motion calling for the liquidation of the Ondernemingswacht. However, when 
the proposal appeared on the agenda eight days later, Chairman Sarto.no read 
a letter from Minister of Interior Agung citing the presidential decree, and 
discussion of the motion was postponed.45 
After the transfer of sovereignty, the time appeared ripe for labor 
strikes on pla.ntations as well as elsewhere. On the one ha.nd most large enter­
prises were busy in rehabilitation projects and anxious to keep costs at a 
minimum; and it is not improbable that many of their managers hoped that wages 
45. I.P. 1950, pp. 265-266,"- 270• Co-signers of the motion proposal were 
K. Werdojo, Iwa Kusuma Sumantri, Jusuf Wibisono, and Yap Tjwan B ing. 
In reply to Abdullah Jusuf 's  recommendation that the estate guards be 
liquidated, Minister Agung on 5 August explained tha t their disarming and 
rehabilitation was then taking place. Pertanjaan Anggota dan Djawaban Peme­
rintah, II, 47-50.
The next year another vestige of the Dutch retur.n was liquidated when 
the c. V. o. (formed in 1947) was terminated by Statute No- 21 of 1951. 
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would be kept at a rclativc-ly low level. On tl1e other hand, inany w0rkers, 
possibly ontic"ip<Jtinr� the millenium after c0mplete independenc E had br•en 
maintained and with the compulsions of austerity durinr,:, the revolution now 
rrmov·cd, demcnded major rises in wc:1 .,E�s . It is not improbable, too, that _ many 
Marxist politicians who had come to head labor unions hoped to force out alien 
operations by demandinr, huge wa"1->e incrEasE's while restricting labor producti vit�. 
The stage was thus set in mid-1950 for wh3t was to become the country ' s  
larcest strike in its history up to then. Sarbupri, claiming to represE?nt 
upland estate workers, submitted demands for wage. increases and threatened to 
strike unless they were accepted. The government-owned P .P . N .  approved the 
wagE- demands for its est,:1t es, but the Algemeen Lc1ndbouw· Syndicnat and affiliatE-} 
representing the upland E:StJtcs on Java and these in western and southern 
Sumatrc1 refuse.ct to nc1:;otiate unless Sarbupri revoked its pending strike order . 
The strike, nff0ctint� a rrportrd 700,000 workers, br:grin on 20 l1ugust, having·
been postponed until after the TJnitary Stat0 had been croatE: d .  Outgoint"; RIS 
·t1inister of Labor Wilopo critic ized l� .L .S.  for not acc epting a wage rise, while 
announc ing that he would do E·vcrything possiblP to end the dispute quickly in 
46the interests of the state". 
But a fortnight later, when the Natsir Cabinet was installrd, the strike 
still had not been settled. In Point 4 of the new cabinet 1 s pro r�rBm was 
rnentioned the goal of achievin.; concord between labor nnd m3r1a6emcnt. In 
explaining his new prot:ram to the new Parliament on 21 September,". Prim,e ·Minist( 
Natsir notE d. that n healthy working �tmosphere; between lnbor and manr;emc-nt was 
46. Cf. "Pemogokan Sl�RBUPRI11 , Ichtisar Indoncsio Sepekan (Djakarta ) ,  21
Aut�• 1950. The upland estatE::s for perennials on Java were represented by the 
Ji. .L.S . ;  the tobacco  estet0s in Besuki, East Java., by the Bond van Eigenaren 
van Besoekische Tab2ksondernemint ·,cn (BF.J3TO) ; and the f:stat0s in west and south -
Sumatra, by Z .1"1' .S .s .  
·,10 
, ss(· ntial to rc-c .- ·-nstruc til 1n in tht st:! te .
47 
111d :-1 member c,f thE. nev.r PBrliament, clraftl'd :1n0t.ber moticn which cit, c: nrticl1.:•s 
26 (3 )  And 28 of the Constitution and critic ized II lt3r. f nli<.·n ca ..::i t1l" for 
t.1kin� n st�nd in the: s�rbupri strike which w.1s injurious tc, the people -:ind 
st.1 tE· . The mot ion ur 6r·d the Jovr rnmcnt:: 
(1 )  to move quickly to ( · nd strained relations betwef:n labor and 
11 l;rr gc alien cnpit:ll11 in �eneral by scttint_t G proper minimum 
wage, nnd in the Sarbupri strike question, by fixing a miniL1UI11 
wage along the lines of the Sarbupri labor contract with the 
Government; a nd 
(2 )  together with labor r€pr0se11tativc-s, to makl· lc1bor rE:�"Ula tions 
which can 6.ruarantee proper working rela tions and a distribution 
of profits on the bDsis of equal value between manpower Rnd 
capital, in order"_ that efforts to increase produc tion for thF' 
prosperity of the mAjority of the pcoplf: can br· carried out. 48 
H. pr, 1visional scttlemc·nt wa s made and the strike suspended on 10 ScptE:mbcr, 
t.Jt f, •rt thr- motinn had been deb.s tr--d in Parliament. Acc0rdingly, the t( xt was 
r.- visp,_; som(-what. One of the f�c"tors listed in its prE:-amblc wris the innbility 
0f lar ;r alien C3pital thus far to frr , itself from colonial a ttitudes ond to 
,(ljust itsE:'lf to nc:w conditions. The clause referrinr : to SArbupri in pnrt 
(1 )  of th( body of th0 motil1n wns omitted, ;:ind it was urr�c d thn t the minimum 
We? Gt: b<0 set 1n �ccord with the promise in .Article 28 of the Cons ti tutior1. 49 
Debate on the l1hem Erningpradja motion in Parliament opcr1r:cJ on 23 September 
1nd continued on the twenty-fifth . Comi.1unist spe:nkcrs ott�ckeu fore ign capit:.il 
47 . R .P. 1950, 0 Po J6o. 
48 . I.P.  1950, p .  401. Co-sponsors of the motion wE:.rc Werdojo, ii.srarudin, 
i�bulhajat, (all of Front Buruh) ,  Siauw ( non-party) ,  t-ir . �. •Z .  11.bidin (P .S . I . ) ,  
�nd Tambunan (Parkindo ) .  
49 . I .P .  1950, p .  416. 
--
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And c :1llc·d thc lt . T .C . il�;rc·, rnt:nt its too l .  S
O Hot•Jevcr, Dr . Djaf1r Sir< , 1":r 
DL�?�•.i:LI (S.K . I . )  And llJSIHii� .Sosrosubroto ( '·) . K . I . )  t.hou1�ht the r�tcti:- · n s.hnul · · : 
,}f Lr1bor Prir1dji S0'8i.iOSO s:1w no r ason why dom stic l.1r1,.c c 1pi tn l should bf· · · 
considere d diffc"rer1t frc;Yi n lic·n capit.�11 ir1 tr1is m::itter ."51 h.hcrn 0r1d S00dijnnc 
l::i bor11 nr1d ,zi.1nt forei;.,::n c 1Jpitr-! 1, ·1nc; thv lAt t r:,r iinI) licd  th,:: gnvc-rnrn cnt wns 
sidi11;_� with cnpi tr: l .  52 To this l"Iinistcr Soc-roso rep lied thrt thr Ge) v._:rrnncnt 
w�is not neutr-11 in lobor-m;4n,1g .  rri,_ nt (lisputc·.s if it f t: l t thn
t. soc i.:11 justic(' 
was not bcin;� :;uarantE-: d .53·"
- i • <:.1 nd 1-velfcJr(:'. S5 
S .l·I . i�bidin (Pnrtni Buruh) ·-·nd Koesr1an (P  • .  d . I . )  .1nnounced. thnt their 
f:"lctions npprov,·d thE0 mc)ticn, the lritt1.: r facti()r1 -:1pprovir1r un the bAsis ,,f 
11collectivism" or "marhaenism" • 54 On · the: other h.:lnd, Fri ts Ll�OH ( ;-, • N .  I .  -
''fcrdcka ) snid the (1.-ivc:rnmc�nt n1ust br· democr�1tic :::ind h, -,lp r<1 is( thP li vr lihood 
,Jf ::i l l  labcr ( not just Sarbupri ) ,  ':r1d thr,t th( wRnts of tht'0 r-ntrcprc->neur 
worker we re c•ssc,ntia l ly the s,:nn :. --hap1)iness, prosperity, 
50. See spc,cches by SO:P.DIJOr,10 Djo JoprEi j itnc: (' :-:a rt ,9 i :'•lurba ), Dr. ii:lJJID,iliJ -ro 
l'jok;ronc�oro ( B . T . I . ) ,  ilr. Luat Dirt:fnr ( "People ' s. Soverc•ignty" factinn ) ,  :Jnd 
ilChmad Soemadi ( P . K . I . ) ,  I . P .  1950, pp . 545-550, 565-581 .-· 
51. I .P .  1Y50, pp. 492-495, 581-588, 632-635. 
52 . I.P . 1950, pp . 474, 545ff. • 
53 . I.P . 1950, pp . 597ff. 
54. I .P. 1950, pp. 588-595.  iLbi9ir1 cc,nsiderccJ 8� ;::i fair . r• turn to , 0r1tr; -. ·
prcncurs and fe lt tl1at surplus prc)fi ts shoul.u be" distributed ,3ffi0ll'. � the: 
cmploye0s, "nature", the c'1pit:ilists, cind thr m::-,_na;:_;e:rs . . 
Koesnnn dc,c"l�rcd thatr
. 
stnce neither -1 liE:n r10r dorn, s Lie large c .-::pit.� l woule. 
or1 its own accord cr, . . .�t(  good wc;rking relations, the Govr.rrnm.:·:,nt hncJ tc introduc
ler!.is l.1tinn to protc-�ct lribor • 
• 
55 . I .P .  1950, pp •" .562:-565 . . ' 
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\f;:1chmud L .  L.A T'JUB\ (.Masjur.ii )  :1na Kasi.mo eppos�11 the.. !:1ot ion for .f l -..iOrir it' 11.oor 
'>V,.: r th,: , , t ! tir,� cornmunity. Althour1h so�roso .'3.nnounc ... :d th!"1t tht: . 'ov;;:rr.un1.:.;nL did 
·not .ft:l;jl that Lllt..; r:iotion v1.:ts n•.;;Cussar:.v, it ntvertht..:lt".JS pas �•;ed 7h to 33, -;i1it.h 
support froru thre� parties 11u-ith 1r�1abt::rs ir1 the Cabin,�t."56 
On 23 October, a vvage .!3.greem8nt v.ras signed bljt'JH::c:n Sarbupri and th,_ A. L.  S • 
•�roup, and t·h·o days latt:r tht.: Natsir Cabinet receiv�d a votu of cor1.fidt.;":1c1:; at 
th� L nd of the lonp; de ba Lt.• ove r its program. 
Last Sumatra Land rrobl6ms 57 
In E:;VCI)-- estate region of Javn and Jumatra ti1 .... r\ .. 0 1v0 1·l; probl0n15 �.1ssoci:1.tcd 
· . ;ith th1..: rcstoratior. of e states to their original propri�tors. Ho·;•'8Vt:: r, tr1� 
q.J.1..,."Stion -,vttS 1nost complc::x in East Sumatra karesid�:nan, ·dtHJre sor.L of thl; factorE: 
ageravatinp th� situation ·:;er(; : .. , 
(-1) thb nature of the landholdings : iviost 0stat\;;s  ,. ,0rt on •:.l.P"ricultural 
conct:.:;;3sion:::; ,·rhich encornpasse d already �xist ing villaFi.1 s (inst0ad of on ._; rfpachtE 
cov...,rinp. virtually unoccupied land) . The eoncBssions had provided that the 
vi lla;?ers -tould be allowed four bouw per f arnil�, of la11d to cultivate ( tanah 
pcnungp;u) and la11d for villap;c expansion. The tobacco 0sta tu o in Langkat 
�tnd f.>eli-&:rd2r1g kabupatens, v1hich possess�d sor:e cxtre1nely f0rtile soils, 
practiced shifting cultivntior1, pl,�ntin� tobac"co 011 the sar110 plots 0111 . onct. 
i i :  n c:,rclc of r;:if!ht or nir1e ;/ears. By- 1950, hov1evcr, hardly 1001\.: than 2 • .5 
perc:unt of th€ tobc..cco e state concGssions were b0ing cultivate:d b;/ th� ostates.58 
56. I.P. 1950, p. 6).5. ( Viz., Parkindo, P. S .  I., and P. S .  1. I. ) 
57.  See RI :PSU, PP• 536-.558; Mochammad Tauchid speech before Parliamtnt, 
22 !11ay, I . P. 1953, pp. 570-572; Tobing, op.cit., pp. 53-70. 
58. RI:PSU, pp . 542-543; Tc1uchid speech, op. cit . ,  p .  5 70. The tobacco 
concessions covered 261,000 l1ectares. The most acreage ever plantf�d w'-4s 
approximately 26,000 ha. in 192 7  ( 10 percent ) .  By 1940 cultivation had dropped 
to 17,864 t1a .  (6 .8%) ,  a n::i in 1950 only 6992 ho. ( 2.  7%) was planted. In thE: 
followir1g years the �� crflage fell 0vcn further, purtly becu.use of the continued 
proble1n of land occup.1t ion an:i p:. , rtly bec,·."use of lt�bor problems . 
--
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The indigenous villagers in such regions were allowed to plant foodstuf.fs on 
fallow tobacco plots, the so-called tanah dJaluran, in lieu of permanent 
tanah penunggu. 
(2 )  The complexity of the population: Unlike other areas where the 
I •••. . 
problem of squatters was simply one of dealing with a relatively homogeneous 
local group, in East Sumatra at least three distinct categories of asli 
(indigenous ) Indonesians were involved: (a) the relatively indigenous farming 
population of coastal Malays and Sirnelu.ngu_n and Karo Bataks-... the so-called 
rakjat penunggu., who had rights to ta?ah pellu!!esu· ( tanah djaluran) J (b ) the 
Javanese who had arrived as estate contract labor before World War II; and (c) 
Sumatran farmers from Tapanuli (principally the Toba Bataks) and Atjeh, who 
migrated to East Sumatra after the transfer of sovereignty. There were al.so 
numerous persons of Chinese ancestry, including many t-otoks who had come 
before World War II as estate labor and their descendants--a number of whom 
might have become Indonesian citizens in the passive manner; in addition there 
were illegal immigrants who after World War II had crossed over from Malaya 
and tried to submerge themselves among the earlier Chin_ese residents by 
claiming that they--like many of the earlier arrivals-•had lost their pass­
ports -during the turmoil of the war and revolution. Since East Sumatra was a 
food deficit area, many of the Javanese and Chinese estate .workers had been 
induced to maintain ve.getable gardens to supplement their diet as they worked 
on the estates. Others had anbitions to cease working as estate labor and to 
become farmers in the irnmediate vicinity., although virtually no arable land 
outside of the estate and village farmlands was available. 
(3) Political rivalries: Not only were there the political parties and 
their associated farmers and labor organizations found also in other estate 
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areas, but correlated to the landholding and population factors and thus to 
geography were further political differences. The only constituent state on 
former Republik Indonesia territory throughout the period of RIS was Negara 
Swnatera Timur-N.s.T.--(State of East Sumatra) ,  which was supported by many 
of the actually indigenous East Sumatrans and m ich atterrpted to follow the 
letter of the law in regard to the restoration of alien estates. On the other 
hand probably the majority of the politically active in East Sumatra (within 
the karesidenan) were violently opposed to the N.s.T. and considered it a 
Dutch puppet, and many of their leaders launched campaigns designed to embar­
rass and obstruct the N.s .T. government and its estate policy. Since East 
Sumatra, unlike other major estate areas, had a sizeable Chinese population 
and since it was very accessible from Malaya, it was possible for nationals of 
a new foreign power, the People' s  Republic of China, to play a role in the 
estate problems. 
The immediate origins of the East Sumatra land problem were rooted in 
the forties. Many of the "squatters" ( a  number of whom had legitimately 
worked parcels of estate land during the Japanese occupation and Revolution) 
had been removed from estates during the Dutch occupation and N.S.T. period, 
·but' after the formation of RlS most of them streamed back."59 During 1949 a 
numher of estates in N.S .T. had reached an agreement with their laborers by 
which the estates instead of providing a food allowance in a time of fluctuat­
ing prices undertook to provide the workers with 1500 square meters of land 
apiece for a truck garden for the needs of their immediate families. However, 
in not a few cases the arrangement was abused, and estate workers often ex-
. . .
panded their truck gardens without permission to as much ·as 5Q(X) square meters 
59. Tauchid speech, op. cit. , P• 571. 
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( a  l1alf hectare)e neglected tr1eir plant,.,t ion t,,rork in order to devotP tl1et.1sel VPf·., 
to their gardens., a11d sold their vegetables to Chinese producee· ,nercl,ar1ts at 
prices cheaper than those of the local farrnerse. Tl1is state of affairs a11tago­
nized many of the really indi�enous fa�ners., v1ho "retaeliated" often by them­
selves occupying estate lands or expanding their far1ns tl1ere . (:fJ 
After the transfer of sovereignty, farmers organiz.ations--especially the 
ultra-nationalist and comrnunist ones--in their -prop·a ..:,anda campaign to bring 
about the collapse of the l.J .S .  T.  called on the population to II nationalize 
alien property"e a slogan which had been much used during the Revolution. ., 
Farmers were assured that if the Dutch were driven off, their estates would 
be divided among the settlers . Consequently settlements were encourabed to., 
fonn not only on the periphery of the estates but also some far inside., 
especially where stands of old palm and rubber trees had earlier been uprooted. 
This interior squatting had a crippling effect on estate operationse. The 
campaign was not limited to the estate area of Gast. Suma trae. 11 Land agents" 
represe11ting the more left-wing farmers organizations circulated throughout 
adjacent parts of Atjeh and Tanah Karo, but especially Tapanuli and ir1duced ., 
farmers · to sell their land and buy beautiful farn1lands in Deli from the· 
11 agents" , who, of course, had no title to  the property. Since few Batak 
farmers had very fertile farms follo1'1Ting a long drought many began movinr; ., 
onto the Deli tobacco lands .e61 
In an effort to halt the illegal land grabbin.g, Colonel 1'1aludin S TI,1BOLON, 
: . 
the Military Governor of North Sumatra, and Tenglru Dr. l1ANSUR, the "Wali 
. . : 
60. Tobing op. cit . ,  pp . 60-61, 65-66.., 
61. Tauchid �peech . op. c it . ;  Tobing, op . cit • pp. 57-59; RI:PSU, p .  552;., .,
?1ohd. Ersat Trunodjojo speech . 22 �'1ay, I. P. 1953, p .  576.., 
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1le6ara" of �ast Sumatra, issued a joint �rocla1nati:�n on 22 "iay 1950 threatenin.;., 
persons who illegally occupied estate land with prosecution and seizure of 
. their belongings . But the proclamation was not successful in deterring 
further squatting."62 
In :oreparation for the dissolution of i'J .S.  T .  into the Unitary Republic., 
a Unitary State Preparatory Commission for F.ast Sumatra was set up on 14 July 
19SO by decree of RIS Minister of Interior Agung.  On the twentieth, the 
Commission, headed by Sarimin Reksodihardjo, announced its Urgency 0rogram 
concerning preparations for bringing the 1'f .S . T .  into the Unitary Republic . 
Article 4 of the plan concerned acticn pertaining to agrarian and economic 
Problems: 
1 .  Determine the principles for char1ging the system of lar1d 
use throughout East Sumatra in an effort to end the present social 
and economic defects and to achieve the people' s welfare in the 
future, without forgetting the important position of the estate 
companies within the sphere of our State' s economic policy; 
2 ,  Plan the distribution, to fanners needin g  them, 0of· larrl ,
which have been and will be received back from estates". This
should be done in a fair and rational manner, taking into con-
sideration the principles referred to in paragraph l; 
3 .  Urge estate operators to be prepared to use part of their 
profits in the public interest, e .g .  by assisting in "welfare projects" , 
·such as a.raining marshes which may be made into sawah, developing . ---
irrigation,"· setting ·11p social projects for. farmers who are". given
land far from their place of residence, etc". 
For these purposes a connnission is to be formed consisting of 
·exper�s f�om ggJernment and business circles and farmer and labor 
organizations. 
, _______62 . RI: PSU, pp. 552-553 ; Tauchid, op. cit . ;  Tobing, op . cit. ,  p .  S9 • 
6) . RI:PSU., pp. 381-383 . In addition to Sarimin (P .N .I .  and Chief of the 
Agrarian Section in the Ministry of Interior ) the Preparatory Commission ( n . 0 •  
N.-K.S .T. ) included r-1r . ·;. •Iohammad JUSUF {mayor of ·: Iedan in . 1946, not · to be 
con"fused with the reviver of the 0 . K . I .  on Java in 1945) ,  ::1r. Soetan ; •ruhammad 
Ai:1Il� ( first Q)vernor for I�orth Sumatra ) ,  ano..Radjq Kaliamsjah SilJA GA (deputy .
·i:lali 1\legara of Bast Sumatra; ,;-1ho withdrew from· 'the ·"conunission ) .  
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During 31:.:!pteniber 1950 Sarimin, by then Acting i.:iovt::hrnor 01 i\forth JumatrL 
ucd representing the Central Government , reached an agreemer1t in principle i,I ith 
r.he Deli Plantehrsverteniging , the associD.tion. of thl: fivu Dutch t obacco estatt: 
companie:s 1r,1hich hnd concess ions covering 255,000 hectares.  The D. P. V.  indicated 
its readir1ess to renounce its rights t o  130,000 ha. of its concession la nds,  and in 
retLtrn the Governmc�nt agreed to grant propri8tary rights ( hak lJendD. ) for a maximum 
of thirty yf::ars in place of tht: c oncijssion over tht: r�::rnaining 125, 000 he:� . Th8 bulk 
of th1:., 130, 000 ha. which the Governm011t was to acquire, it intended to distribute 
to farrn8rs who had settled on c)StatE: lu.nd. 
Abdul Hakim, who .'.=1s u senior offic ial of thl-; tvlinistry of Int<;;rior wD s 
attached to Snrimin' s office, prepc:�red a plari of work i,,rhich involved u. ct::r1tr.:1l 
land affairs commiss ior1 nt Medan and �Jranch corn.miss ions in tl1c kabupater1s L1r1d t-Jhich 
.stip11l.: '.ted princ iples for the syste.rn of ll�r1d use throu_6hout t.::.Lst Sumr:.tra. The 
plar1, subsequently kno1r1n c.s the 11SariJnin Flan"h was c ornpleted on 26 Septornoor. ., 
Two d:1->rs lc:iter, Act ing Governor Sarimin issued a proclc'.iraat ion cr. .. llin�. on th�_; 
people to stop tnking over lands arbitrarily.h64 
The Pnnitia Urusan Tanah Pertanion (P. U.T . P. --Agricultural Land Affairs 
Commiss ion) was formed in October under 11UNA.R S:.;,stro P;-1midjojo, thEJ new 
government Coordinator for East Sumatra. Representatives of c0rt�.1 in f.� m1ers 1 
organizc.tions, among i-.rhich \ilJere those ·who had a vested ir1terest in th, 
illagal occupnt ions ( including sponsors o.::· 11larid .�:�g8nts
11 ) ,  and of Sarbupri wc rt. 
given sen.ts on the commission. If owevcr, for various reo.sons not thl; h.<·.st of 
wbicr1 W[LS [! luck of funds, thf� comraission ·was _ able to acco1nplish littl�h. . It 
obtainod a tonto.tive off;:;:r from AVROSh. to give up Ctpproxim:.:J.tcly 
64. RI : PSU, P• 5S3; Tauchid, op. cit .  Hakim ( ivJ:asjumi) had bL;2n thcJ l:ist 
Deputy Prime r1inister of the Republic of Indonesin at Jogjakarta. 
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200,000 ha . of unused land from concessions of member esta tes, but later 
A\!ROS decided to  wait until the Cbvernment had forrnulated a ne1,1 a ,l....r3rian law. · 
By proclamation of 2 January 1951, Coordinator !1unar decreed tl1e format·ion 
of the branch commissions, 1vith the task of examining the lands offered by 
the D .P .V. and to begin at once distributing them to persons who were entitled 
to receive them according to government regulations. At the same time, the 
decree of Residen Djaar of 1 May 1947, which a uthorized the distribution on 
a temporary loan basis of some estate lands to  persons needing it, was revoked."65 
On 25 January 1951 Abdul Hakim was installed as Governor of the Province 
of 1-Iorth Sumatra . The P .U .T.P. and its branches ceased activities vrhen the 
office of Government Coordinator for Rast Sumatra was abolished and land 
problems brought under the jurisdiction of the Agrarian Affairs Section of 
the Governor' s  Office . Rather than take action which might lack authority, 
the Governor felt that basic principles on agrarian affairs had first to be 
established by law through the Central Governrnent ."66 Since most farmers were 
not organized and since most of the 1rfarmers organizations" represented on the 
P.U.T.P.  were Communist-controlled and thus hardly in a position to facilitate 
a land settlement that would be satisfactory to all the parties directly 
concerned, it is unlikely that uovernor Hakim was enthusiastic about the 
ability of the P.U.T .P. to  work properly. 
That the nei-1 Sukiman-Suwirjo Cabinet might take some action in the land 
question i-ras indicated by its program. Part of Point Ti-10, which dealt "t-Tith 
6$ 0 RI:.PSU, pp . 409-410, 553-55 . Geraktani, B .T .I . ,  R.T. I . ,  Sekata,
Gabungan Persatuan Buruh Tani, and Gabungan Buruh Tani Tionghoa Sumatera Timur 
lfere farmers I organizations represented on the cornmission. 
66. Ibid.,  pp . 437, 555. 
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economic matters , announced that agrarian la"'r ¥\rould be revised in line r,1it.h 
the :i.nterest of thL: farmer. Alread;y· a draft statute on tl1e "Reorganizat ion 
of Ln.nd Utilization in East SwnQtra11 hc:i.d been drawn up, incorporotir1g the 
principles being follo111Ted by th8 Government in that matter, 67 nnd although it 
was not promulgated, the Government began efforts to  implement it . i· l owever, 
portending difficulties ahead was a report of the Agriculture Committee read 
in ParliamE;nt on 14 June 1951 calling for act ion in legaliz ing th<:; settle1nents 
on concession land. 
Finally, i11 reply to  Go·vernor Hakim' s  request for a d irective on action 
to ½e taken in tbe land .quE.:st ion, the ne1AJ Minister of I11terior ISKAQ Tjokrohad 
isurjo on 28 June 1951 issued a decree authorizing pro·visional measures pendir 
the promulgation of thE.:: draft law. The decree approved t he: arrangement with 
the D. P. V. , while r0scrving for th(; government the right to add further 
67 .Tl1e dr�ft law provided that the 860, 000 ha. of concLssion lar1d in
Ec:�st Sumatra would be d ivided ir1tq two p[;:rts .  · The estates would be guc1ranteec 
an area for a sufficient period rand id th sufficiently . strong,· right s :  On the 
other hand part of tho concession land would be used for smallholder agricultu 
,�nd members of the population would be g iven land ir.rith suffici. ntly broad 
property rights and other assistance in order that they might become prosperot. 
farmers .  Although the Central Government would supervise tr1e implement cit ion c
the law, the regional government would be delegated broad :J.uthority for th<;;
actual implementation. Cf. Goverrnnent Statement , 3 June, I . P .  1952, pp. 553-5
Apparently the Gov·ernment liad second thoughi;,s about submitting the draft
"stntute" immedic..tcly to Parliament for ratificc:ttion, for subsequGntly it was 
referred to as a draft "emergency law" , Despite tl1e change in status , it was 
still not immediatGly promulgated. 
68. Report read by Abdurochman Wangsadikarta ( Chairman of Agriculture 
Committee ) ,  R. P .  1951, pp. 5065-5070. The inspection trip from which the repo . 
was drawn up had been made in November 1950 by Ahem Erningpradja and I . B. P .  
Manuaba ( head of Petar1i, the P . N . I. farmers ' affiliate ) .  
1-'\.n ex-Pesindo leader, Sarwono S .  Soetardjo ( who rejoined tr1e P . K. I .  a mon 
later) proposed that such settlers be allowed to stay on these lands and that
the state take over estate lands at the end of their concession or distribute 
portions among the population. Speech, 2 June, R.P. 1951, p .  4576. 
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;conditions . It also authorized the Governor to det�rminc 1.hich cunc1;;;ss iuL 
..... . ., ...., • -v ' • . _.
lams would be turned over to the state--with the approv�ll 0f the t0br.1cco 
compDnies concerned--to complete within three months th...; task :;f s0l1:;ctir1g 
tbuse lar1ds, Hnd t,.J undertake distribution of such lands to t.hc f.:•.rm1.;rs". 
Following Minister Iskaq' s decrc)e, (Jovernor :Hakim on 15 August set up c:1 
Komisi Agraria Sumatera T imur ( East Sumatra Agrarian Commission) h0ad0d by 
fJlunar, to advise on implementation of tl1t:; decrt.;;c.  A Technical CommitteL of 
agric11ltural and cadastral experts ex2.mined the lri.r1ds th1:.:: D. P. V .  11[:s ready t0 
give up and prepared et map wr1ich dtlirr.ited the D. P. V. c oncessiori lands tc, bE; 
retained and thoso to bb turned over to tl1e State. Then ir1 his direct i--10 011 
28 Septbmber, the Governor of North Sumatra decreed tr10..t includ8d in the lands 
to be returned to the State were strips 250 mct1;:;rs wici(; on either sid8 of the 
two major highways through tht tobacco concession region as v-Jell '.lS· sawal) 
lands already in existence i;-:-1 t11e concessions, and lands of villagc�s a�d towns 
plus some for their potential expansion. Strips fifty meters wide on the 
banks of rivers and land around strips had to remair1 i.rooded or be reforested 
by the ustates for the purposes of cl:ecking erosion."69 
To administer the actual distribution of land, thG Kar1tor Penjelenggara 
Pemba.gian Tan-'lh ( K. P. P.  T. ) wns established by· decree of 1'1inister of Tr1tcrior 
Iskn.q 011 27 June in accord with the draft law on the reorganization 0f land 
69. "Ketetapan Gub6rnur Propinsi Sumatera Utara No. 36/K/Agr."11 , .28 Sept.
1951; cf. " Iapuran Komisi Penindjauan ma-salah pembagian tanah di Sumatera 
Utara 11· ( spGech by Ersat Trunodjojo),  21 May, I .P. 1953, p.  535; T auchid, op. cit .  
The Dewan Ekonomi dan Keuangan of the Central Government cor1sented to  allowir1g 
thE.\ D. P .  V. to decide upon most of the lands it would need, in consideration of 
the fact that the tobacco estntes ·were important t -.) the State ' s  finances .  
The directiv·e permitted tobacco estates to retain land along the highways 
where they already had buildings, roads , etc . It also provided that changes 
in designated lar1ds could bE; made after discussion with the tub,"lcco estate 
companies. 
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utilization. Residen 1'1uda SIB"F;GAR headed the ne1-r office, and Bupati I'1unar 
became his deputy. r.:ffective in November, the - regiona l govern111ent issued a 
"standfast" order, a l l owing old squatters workinr, estate lands to remain where 
they v1ere pending a settlement, but making any new squatting or expansion 
subject to prosecution . < <On 29 December 1951 a detailed guide for carrying 
out the distribution of land"< 1.ras completed, then amended on 11 February 195� . 
This provided that settlers on the former concession lands would be screened. 
Those who were determined to be genuine farmers were to be offered one hectare 
of sawah ( irrigated rice land) or t1-10 l1ectares of ladang ( dry farm land) in 
70 
the portions of the 130,000 ha . returned to the state. Rather tha n have the 
fa nners take their old shacks a long 1r1ith them to the nei-r settleinent sites, the 
Government offered them each a Rp. 300 indemnification; it promised transpor<­
tation to the ne1i-1 sites and preparation of the land there. Pla<ntation workers, 
who were called "Buruh < Tani La dang" (' B. f ... r:. .... --"Farm Laborers" ) 71 were to be 
., , < 
provided �rith 2000 square meters of land in the strips along the highway. The 
nei.1 farm sites for the r espect
<
ive settlers were to be determined through 
drawing lots . In an effort to help establish a healthy group of independent 
farmers, the Government promised< to grant ownership rights (hak milik) to thosE< 
who had proved themselves< through three harvests . The Goverrunent was to retair 
some s upervision for an additiona l  five years during which time the farmers 
70 .  I1. Yunan Nasution speech, 16 Illfay, I.P . 1952, p.  383 . This was the
third standfast order issu-ed 
<
in eighteen months". 
71. Persons with monthly incomes under Rp. 300 1i-rere considered to be B .. T . 1  
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could not mortgage or sell  their land ·without goverruner1t TJerr-1ission. 72 
Implementation of the land distribution pro::ram began on 15 '(arch 1952 
when the first drawing for farmlands took p lace at Ketjamatan K1-1a la ( Kabupaten 
Langkat). Beginning in April,  farmers were warned no longer to plant after 
the· current crops were harvested because they would be moved. Out o f  70,452 
families occupying the former tobacco concession lands, it was determined 
. that 30,915 families would have to be moved. By the end of February 1953, 
22,289 families had drawn lots for -nelv farm sites, and of this number, 9389 
families had a lready settled on their ne1i sites and 7987 far11ilies were then 
in the process of  moving. 11Jaiting to draw lots ·were 1291 families, while 
6635 families refused to draw them, being opposed to the existing rules for 
land distribution.73 
Although the great majority of farmers directly conc"erned were runenable  
to  acquiring permanent land rights at a pl·�ce__ other than where they were then 
ille1a l ly squatting, and many of them were satisfied with the moves that did 
take place, the land distribution program had more than its share of bugs . 
72. Statement by Minister of Interior Roem to Parliament, 21 May,  I .P .
1953, pp.- 544-545; " Lapuran Komisi 0enindjauan • • •" ,  pp . 535-536; Tauchid, 21?..•
c it . ;  RI: PSU, p .  556. In principle a l l  settlers, even those a lready on ex­
concession land turned over to the State were to d·raw lots. These might
detennine which of  severa l  farmers on undersized farms would move and which 
would stay and acquire land from the others. It was a lso possible for settlers 
to remain on their undersized homesteads and receive additiona l  plots e lse­
where . 
The rationa)-e fo.r tne fiv.€ years of Governrnent supervision a fter. hak 
·milik had been grantFd i-ras to. prevent farmers from becoming victimized by
the idjon system (the government promised that credits would be available) 
and t o  prec lude persons from acting as farmers and then selling their gifts o f  
land for speculative purposes . 
73 . RI:PSU, p .  556; i'lAIZm Achmaddyn ' s  speech before Parliament., 21 May, 
I.P. 195.),p .. 543; 11 Lapu.ran Komisi Penindjauan • • •  11. , p .  538 .  The huge majority 
(68, 311) of the farming fa1nilies on the concession land were II Indonesian 
nationals 11 • Althou ...;h the ba lance of t1-10-thousand non-Indonesian nationa l 
families was not identified, it may be assumed that these were mostly of
Chinese extraction. 
P• 577 . 
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· Rp . 25,000, 000 had nriginall;y bePn bud, ,· etPd fo�,., :he ryro ·r�-,�1 , but the 
steedily 1:.1orsrnir1 . )osition of the Renublic I s revenui:=-s necessi tr t r  cl that the 
alloce.tioJl bP relluced to Rp. 7,000,000, a11cJ during that first ,/P.,'3r or:ly 
Rp . 3, 000, 000 was actually provided by the Government, The - shortGge of funds 
meant tha t some new sites �.-Jere not cleared so  thoroug;·�ly as  some of the 
settlers wo1.ld have v1ished, that there were delays in procuring trans�ort.::,tion 
so that some farmers all re�dy to move had to wait around much longer than 
they had exp·ected., and that compensation beyond Rp. JOO could not be offered 
even when farmers left beh4%ld subs tantial houses . 'rJith its O\m sourc;e of · 
funds in jeopardy, the government was able to secure a couunitment from the 
D.P.V. to contribute to the program.74 
The situation--involving as it did-- (1) m6v-es off land legally recognized 
as the estate property of nationals of the former colonial power, and, ( 2 )  
concentration of authority for carrying out the l�nd distribution in the 
h.ands of a governor who 1..ras a member of the 1najor liberal political party 
and for whose actions there was no re�ional legislative body to chack-­
appeared to be an open invitation to radical political rivals · to eap.italize 
·on it. 1'ihere there had been non-political complaints · ·of farmers against 
moving and latent resentment against what appeared a t  tiines to be inflexibilit: 
on the part of the authorities ,  there 1ifere added threats aga·inst farmers who 
. .74• Cf. Roem, op . ci·t . ,  p .  c4c,7 7 "Lapuran K •·omis1. u· d · ·enin Jauan. . .  11 , op . · tci  • 
p .  539 .
Governor Hakim ·secured from the D .P. V. members a promise to c or1tribute 
Rp. 2,000.,000 for the needs of the :.'farmers to be moved. (C.£ •. �rt . 4 Sec . 3 of ·"·the P.P.i'.J .K.S.T.  Urgency Program)"." The money was to be us·ed-to bui];,cl: vi:lla1e 
halls, churches, mosques and other projec ts beyond the normal expenditures of
the government . In February -1952 . the ,f.irst".third of this sum was. t�ned over 
to the governor . Staten1ent by 'Minister 
On 11 September 1952, the D.P.V.
Antara, 13 Sept. 1952 •" . 
· ·Roern to Parliament, 22 May, I-P• 1953, 
• 
was liquidated, as it merged into AVROS. 
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intended to draw lots or who did not a 51"ee with certain political organizers . 
Farmers wer e  warned that if they gave up the land which they were fe nnin5, 
they would be betraying the Revolution and enriching Dutch capitalists. Sites 
ne1t1ly c leared and intended for resettlement were also ille6ally occupied. Such 
actions were complementecl by demonstrations, press campaigns, resolutions and 
motions to Parliament and to other iovernment offices."75 
In the meanwhile the Wilopo Cabinet took office . In his explanation of 
Point 2-b of his cabinet"1 s program which called for continuing efforts to 
change the agrarian system, Prime :·1inister �-,Jilopo declared that the Government 
would protect danaged estates so that their pre-war productive capacity might 
be restored and would settle disputes between alien estates and the surrounding 
farmin g  population on the broader basis of the interests of the state and 
nation."76 
During the debates in narliament over the program M. Yunan Nasution 
( tasjumi) · applauded the Government ' s  principle for settling such disputes. 
However, he urged quick distribution of land lest unwholesome political 
elements thrive on the issue". In repl:? to his request, 77 i·fr. 1.rJilopo provided 
the gist of the draft law to reorganize land utilization in �ast Sumatra, 
which specified that a lthough the Centra l C,overrnnent 1-1ould oversee the im­
plementation of the law, the regional (provincial) government would be given 
wide discretion in executing it . 78 This evoked the approva l of Parliament 
75. RI: PSU, ·p. 556-557;  Tobing, op. cit. ,  pp . 69-70; Roem statement.,
22 '1ay 19S3, op. cit. ;  Tauchid speech, op . cit . ,  p. 572 ; Antara"., 28 July, 3. --- ----
Oct. 19525. 
76. Statement"., 9 May, I.P.  1952, pp. 249-251. 
77. Speech, 16 ·,1ay, I ,P .  1952, PP• 382-383. 
78. I.P.  1952, pp. 553-554; cf. note 67 supr � .  
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me:rnber I .  J .  KPsimo (K[-ltholik)�-i1rl10 wos nlso Chi ef of the Deprirt:nent .of ·Rst:,te . 
who expressed sympathy for the provincial govemnent, 1-.Jh ich he sai d i-vas squ P.eZ( 
., 
rs to occupy as cnuch estate land as possiblr between (1)  those wanting the farnie
.
and ( 2 )  the Central oovernme11t., whi ch reportedly had not been provid i ng it witj 
79su fficient backing". However, , ;ohamad lfilH (Pilt from �ast Sumatr.a ), noting 
that the truly ind igenous- r esi dents had formerly been enti�led to four hectareE 
of concession land p er household , warned that with a d istribution of only two 
hectares the Government would ·not b� able to raise the farmer i nto the middle 
class as it i ntended .  80 The 'Jovernment stated i n  reply that no d i f.f:erentiatio1 
would be m ade i nvolving the regional or ig i n  of the farr.1ers concerned ."81 
Kasimo 1 s r emarks were prompted by an i nstructi on to Jovernor Hakim ·
sent on 26 ,_,1ay 1952 from the ;: Iinistry of Interior (signed by Secretary General 
·Sumarrnan), which took note of some of the di ffuculti es"confronti ng the land 
d istr ibution program and ur ged : (1 )  the removal of as i'ew fam"ilies as possibl; 
and--if that were really necessary--to not too d istant s ites which had been 
properly -pre··)ared ; ( 2 )  greater flexibility in allocating new lands; and (3)  
revision of the manner of d ivid i ng settlers i nto farmers and farm-workers, so 
' 
that anyone whq was then farming could be classi fied as a farmer regardless 
of his earli er occupation. 
Governor Hakim felt that this i nstructi on only made  his task more 
d ifficult ., esp eci ally s ince it was irrm1ed iately published i n  the new9papers _ . 
79. Spe ech, 6 June, I . P. 1952, p .  625. 
80. Speech, 6 June, I.P .  1952, ·p. · 620. Besides provid ing land , i'Ju h felt 
that planning and stud i es and agr i cultural technica:l assistance iv� neces·sary 
in  ord er to m ake the farmers prosperous . 
81. Keteran an d an Djai-raban Pemeri ntah atas Pro�ram Kabi net t-lilo o,
(Djakarta : Kementerian ener a ngan, 2 , p .  • 
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and inferences were  drawn that his earlier guide had been faulty; moreover, the 
instruction from Djakarta he  felt had  been based partly on some ·misinf'ormation .
82 
Subsequently the ne1.-1 :·1i nister of Int eri or Roem examined th e matter and issued 
a revised instruction .83 
Feeling that forceful measures were  required i n  places wh ere its program 
was being obstructed, the K .P.P.T. advised that police assistance mi gh� be 
u sed and, wh er e n ecessary, agitators be arrest ed. Th e estates began .to".clear ' 
l and with bulldozers i n  areas which th e government had consented tha�_: .,they 
retain., in preparation for the n ew tobacco crop . In some place,� wh ere the 
farmers .refused to gi ve up their farms on  sche dule and to mo ye, the cl earing 
went ah ead with police prot ection .  At Sitjanggang (Kabupaten Lan gkat ),  where 
a demonstration was staged to stop tl:1e 11pentraktoran 11 (lit". 1�tr actor_ing'' , or 
11bulldoz i n g'' ) ,  a number of the dernonstrators wer e fore ibly thrown off the 
land by the police , and th e l ands of 130 families wer e clear ed. 1'Jevertheless, 
attempts were still made to occupy est at e land clear ed for the new croµ. 
11Tractoring 11 became the new enemy in the minds of many farmers., and even those 
who were not required to move wer e  influenced by the propaganda of political 
agitator s i nto fearine that th eir l ands would be next to suffer that fat e .84 
Since earlier efforts to develop a p ineapple fiber and rami plantation and 
industry on some of th e concession land had been thwarted throu gh r epeated 
82. "Lapuran Komisi Penindjau an • • •  11 pp . 536-537.  ., 
BJ . Roem st atement ., 21 ; ray 1953, Of!• cit". p .  544. 
84. 11Lapuran Komisi Penindjau an • • •  1 1  p .  540 ; Roem sta tement, 21 ;:1Iay 1953 ., .,
op , cit . ,  p .  545. At two oth er vill ages the farmiands of as many dissenting 
farmers as those at Sitjanggang wer e bulldozed. 
•• 
�* • .. 
... . .. . � 
.. ._ . .. . .. · � �  • .  
· ~ · 
• N • 
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' , .... . : 
3 ._;lHi:... . · t · '6t"" t . b·{.,, .,) t;ill1:.;gal sq11atth.i.ng · .1r1 newly clc::.:,red land, c5S it is "�1\ )  .: 11{l("'r·.i · 1 i· ·1 -+1 d11,",.., ·. ;f 
. . .  
th0 p(Jl itical forces bt;h ind str0r1g opposit ion to clc::arir1g lr�nd fur t -.:0:..cc:0 
UJ'ldcr thcac ci.rc111!-Sta11ces the Sukertari,1t Bt;rsruiw. O�o.11isr.si Thni •uk 
.CO Cl$! it!  
. ' 
M�njele!!9aikan Soal To.nab Sumat(;rll �ara ( Joint Socratariat Ji' Farmersh' 
Organizations for s�Jlving the L-1nd Problum of Northh· Sumatra ) ' wr;s st,;t up by 
thosu farmersh' organizations which were led by Commu11ists and left-wing member: 
' .. . · · . 
. 1f the P. N .I .  ( who c ontrolled th2t party ' s  branch ir1 Ec:�st Sumat ra ) h. Darman , 
·Secretary ( �cneral :.>f the North Sumatra branch of Rulrun Tani Irrlonesia ( R . T . I . --
. tu,wJW' •,:
Indonesian Peasants Club, th8 P.K.rI./subsidiary) ,  bec ame chainnan of tr1e Joint 
S0crL:tariat, a.nd. .i.'1angarahon, officer in bot:r� the; R. T .  I .  and th0 G. T .  I .  (' whCJS(; 
f·Jortb Sumntra branch head was a P.K. I.  officer),  ·became s0cr0tary. Sakti, 
. ' 
Perti, and Petani were the other member organizat ions . The Joint Secret:iriat 
and its .member orga11izati0ns cunt inued demar1ding thett the old P. U.  T .  P.  and it�"3 
branches be reacthivttted and that they be g iven su2ts or1 it. They s ought 
audiences wj_th 1,jovernor Hc1.kim, 1,ir1:) refused t :::; l isten t .. .:, thoir demands . Then 
under tr1eir auspices a c onference ,Jf North SumRtran farmers was r1eld thr: ,ugh 
13 Janl1ary 1953, wh ich voted a lack of c0nfider1ee in tl1c policy carrit0d :)ut 
by Governor Hakim. ()r1e Df th1::; part icipating ,)rganizations vras th0 Gabungar1 
r :Bur.uh Tani T ionghoa Swnater-a, T imu.r: .( Cl1inese F'r:.rm-Lc1borersh1 As�ociation ::>f·-Eu.st .. .----------------·----- . . . . 
. . . . ...
Subsequently thG police commiss ioner at t1ed�r,i ch'a.:r-ged· �tl'tnt ._. · . . . 
, •. • :, • • : • . · '
Sumatrt1 ) . 
, ► 
_
' . ·.. • . • 
'Rp. 10,000 had been contributed by- Chinese; t .:n,.,a:rds tr1c: �J?fr��_cs 
. 
. . 
' •  
. ,.: . .
65. Tobing, o
S'i 
cit . ,  pp. 61-62 . F'or a 11e1i-1 f£1ct,:Jry for . .  i�:p_Iani1ed fiber 
estate, tl1e Deli f techa.ppij decided to invest l'leth. f .  10 million, which 
wo,1ld have been one of the few new foreign investmer1ts ir1 Indonesia. Altr1ougL
the plan hud bee11 arrproved by the .RIS Governm£?nt, as onE; parcel of' land aft€r 
another was cleared by the company, squatters moved on, vJhile th(� goverrune nt 






of the conference, but this the Joint Secretariat cieniect."86 
1t ivas in this exr:ilos i ve atmosphere that the Tandjung ,"·iora1,fa Incident 
occurred .  
°I'qndjung �1orar:a Ir1cident 
In line with the 19b9 es tate-laborer arrance1nFnt for ve•:;eta½le . :.arc.ie_n:::: ,·• 
• ' • J : ••.. · 
••• •. .. . 4 • • ••
during the N .S .T .  period several totok Chinese workers on an estate of the 
Senembah 1aatschappij"1 who had allegedly arrived in tl1e region as contract 
coolies during the inter-war period, were moved with their families from one 
oart of the concession to plots alongside the highway between Kilometer Posts 
24 and 25 in the ketjam.atan of 4'andjung : ·1orawa (Kabupaten Deli-Serdang) . 
Although at the time of the movP the Chinese estate laborers had submitted a 
list of eight demands to the estate company (coooPrning the plots, provision 
of building materials, foodstuffs for three months, etc . ), only a few were 
accepted .87 
By 1952 there "t-1ere ten such families of Chinese esta"te workers at  that 
site, part of Kampong Perdamaian ( Villa i?e of Peace ) .  But instead of the 
allowable total acreage of 1.5 hectares according to the 1949 arrangement, or 
even two hectares allowable under the December 1951 g,iide, the garde115 of the 
Chinese laborers covered six hectares . These truck gardens, lying as they 
• 
86. "Lapuran Komisi Penindjauan • • •  11. , p .  5J9; ·_Abd11Jl�h Jusuf' speech, 21 
:-fay, I.P.  12$J, p. 542 ; Sawrono s. Sutardjo speech, 21 i iay, I.P. 1953, p .  554;· 
cf. R!:PSu, pp .  510-Sll. · 
The Jo�t Secretariat �-1as larGely a regional counterpart of the r> . K .  I . ­
sponsored ·"f'eae&nui Front, .tiich was in the process of being established. 
-87. s .  Sard_jono speech, 2 2  : ,ray, I .P.  1953, p. 575 . A ketjamatan is 
roughly equi valent·: _to a to\mship . 
• 
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did within 250 meters of the highway, were designated to be relinquished by 
the estate .88 
·rn mid-June 1952, three months after the resettlement program had gotten 
under way, the agriculture office of the kabupaten applied to obtain five 
hectares for an agricultura l experimenta l farm and the inland fisheries office 
·applied for one hectare to be n1ade into a fish hatchery, both part of a model 
vil lage to be built in Ketjamatan Tandjurig tiorawa . It was recommended that 
land lying between Kilometer JR:>sts 24 and · 25 be used for these purposes. · 
Accordingly, loca l officia ls visited the site on 15 July and £bund it suitable 
for the proposed projects. Seeing that the Chinese settlers were about to 
p lant rice--this was three months after the gener�l warning  not to p lant new 
1crops �-.. the officia l s  told them not to p lant again after the rice .vas harvestec 
The rice having been harvested, and the agriculture office having asked that 
the land be 1nade availab le at once, the ketjamatan head visited the settlers 
on 17 December and reminded them that they were no longer permitted to p lant 
anything. ·The settlers were informed that land was being readied for them at 
either of two p laces in adjacent ketjarriatan and that each fa mily 1-Jas to get a 
ha lf hectare to rent. The offer was considere·d a fair one be·cause as squatter; 
(at least beyond the 1500 square meters earlier assigned) they would be 
occupying land with a legal status whereas formerly they had none . As a liens 
. .
they were not entitled eventua l ly to acquire land'"with hak milik; however, 
they would be a llowed to rent land.89 
88. Roem statement, 21 ::-'Iay 1953, op. cit . ,  pp. 545-547 . The ha lf hectar,
per family seems to have"· been a compromise between the l"· or 2 ha � provided for
Indonesian farmers ( sawah or ladang, respecti "ITely ) and the 0.2 ha. provided
for general estate l aborer� ..
89. Ibid. 
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The -settlers at Kampong ?erdamaian were organi zed by the Chinese Farm� 
Laborers Union, an officer of which mad e a complaint at the time of th e visit 
' 
on 17 December and announc ed that a written request would be submitted". On 
26 January 1953, the union ' s  Tand jung I·-1orawa branch sent a letter to the 
ketj amatan head on behalf of the ten Chinese famili es,  indic ating that th ey 
would be prep ared to move if ei ght requests were met . Pending a d ecision 
they would go on worki n g  the lands . And so, they planted soybeans". Th e 
ei ght IIrequests" --a revision of those submitted to the Senembah Ifi j. a few.· . : . . 
years earli er--includ ed demands that the new lands be cleared by tractor and 
_
ready for planti ng, that each fanily be granted p ermanent rights to at least 
one h ectare, that th e Government build new houses and a school at the new 
site, th at the Ck>vernment first allow th em to h arvest their (newly p��_nted )  
crop s before moving , and that th e Govermnent provid e them with provisions for 
at .least three months . After another meeting with the settlers on 4 February, 
attended by the union 's ketjamatan br anch chairman , the head of the __ ketjamatan 
go ve�nrnent offered to show them around a thi rd possible n ew �it� b�t the offer 
was not accepted . Accordingly, he reject ed the eight demand � and ord ered that 
the t en Chinese farmers vac ate and clear off the land they were occupyi ng by 
15 February.90 .. . . .. 
Still the ten families did not move • Consid ering their action an affront 
to. the prestige of the ��verru_nent and sinc e the agriculture offic e was pressing 
to obtain the land , the ket jamatan head brought along th e local police chief . . 
on 5 111Iarch , but they could still not get the settlers to agree to mo ve". Never-
.. . . . . . .
theless, i� i-1as decid ed to. go · ahead and clear th e s'ite for th e agricultural 
90. Ibid . ;  " Lapuran Komisi 0enind jauan • • • 11 ; pp . 537-538; Sard jono, op . cit". 
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experimental farm on 14 1-Iarch.91 
In the meantime , the local B.T . I., R.T.I .,  and th e Chinese Farm-Labor"ers 
Union began to make plans for a big demonstration., and they organized squads 
for such purposes as operating a public kitche�, maintaining guards, for 
strate gy, and for transportation . On Frid ay, the thirteenth, a demonstration 
"ras held around the small brid"6e connecting the land in dispute with the 
highway. The next d ay, .when the bulldozer arrived and attempted to cross the 
bridge , about a hundred Chinese farn1ers reportedly blocked its way, while many 
Indonesian farmers streamed over the disputed land showin g signs".of givi,ng 
mor al support to th e Chinese.  i'1any of the Indonesians were farmers on strip s 
along the hi ghway d esi gnated to be sub-divid ed for estate laborers, who had 
been led to belie ve that this attempted eviction and clearin g of  the land 
occupied by the ten alien families was mer ely a pr elude to further such action 
. . . . , 
towards th eir own farms--all alleg edly because of  greedy Dutch est at e operators .  
In view o f  the h eated atmosphere and the lack of  police prot ection, the !:clearin 
vJas postponed , and the tractor p arked along the high1-1ay. 92 
The local authorities were determined to proceed with ._the clearing of  the 
lands where the ten Chinese fa1nilies were squatting . Accordingly, they and 
police officers arri ved on .the scene on the morning of  the sixteenth • . Since 
the demonstration h ad continued over the intervenin g days, the number of 
armed policemen was raised from twelve to sixty. In the face of taunts from 
..
the Chinese, the bulldozer escorted by the police began to mak� its way across 
the bridge". One policeman carrying an automatic weapon went ahead to order 
91. Roem statement , 21 May 1953, op . cit . ,  PP• 546-5475. 
92 . Ibid . ;  Maizir Achrnaddyn ' s  speech , 11 �pr . ,  ;I.P. 1953, ·p .  49�; "Lapuran 
Komisi Penindjauan • • •  n ,  p .  542; s .  Sardjono"., op . cit . 
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the Chinese demonstrators back. Reportedly one ,of their leaders yelled "Come 
oii' \ · Let I s .. attack t" , and rushed". the policeman"., grabbing his weapon and knocking 
him over . · · !n the process all of the two dozen rounds in the maga.zine were 
discharged , killing four Chinese demonstrators and one Indonesian and injuring 
ei ghteen oth ers . Order was restor ed only after the other policemen shot into 
the air causing the demonstrators to retreat .93 
The t en Chinese families then moved , and the bulldozer cleared t�e six 
h ect ares without furth er distu rbance . During the subsequent police investiga­
tion, thirty-seven p ersons  were arrest ed --mostly Chinese totoks who had no 
valid immi gration papers--on charges of violating those sections of th e criminal 
cod e concerned with forcibly obstructing the public authoriti es from carrying 
out their duties ."94 
The "North Sumatra Land Distribution Problem" before Parli"ament ·
· R eaction to the Tandjun g · 1orawa Incident was immedi ate .  Th e Minist ry of 
Int erior sent a t eam headed by Djanu Ismadi to the scene to investigate the 
matter , 95 and the embassy of the People's Republic o f  China sent a consui .96 
Investigation by these t wo parties reflect ed the apparent fact that the 
incident h ad basicly resulted from a d ispute between a hand ful of alien Chinese 
former plantation workers who refused to move from land th ey were t emporarily 
allowed t o· farm, and the loc al government which".was responsible for overseeing 
93 . R eem st at ement , 21 l'1ay 1953., op.  cit • ., p .  547; "Lapuran Komisi Penin­
djauan • • •11 ; p .  539 . 
94. S. Sardjono,  op. cit � ;  Tangkas (i-Ied an ), 21 - Mar . 1953; :Oeq.oman (Djakart a ) , 
26 i-1ar". 1953; Dunning Idle IV, Indonesia Is Independ ent and Acti ve Foreign Policy, 
(Ph .D. thesis; Yale : New HaveL1, 1956), pp .. 341-342 . The Government lat er 
·announced that twenty famili e� . concerned were being deport ed to Co1nrn¥l1ist China. . ... .  . 
95 . Ant ara,. 2_3 :·1Iar_ . 1953 . 
. . . 
·96. Pedoman, 26 · ·Tar . 1953 .  
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the movt. and for arrangir1g thc1t the lands in qucsticn bL usLd for c1 rnc < \. l  
village .  Nuve;rthcless, th6 very next day the P.K . I .  East Sumatra branch, whos( 
m€mbers held the k€y positions in thE; Joint Secretariat, i ssutd 2 call tc 
"Unite to defend the farmE:rs I landl n 97 A delegation of thE- nE:wl�y establi shed 
Communist l�ont Persatuan Tani (F.P.T. --United Pe3sants Front), including 
Member of Parliament Sidik Kertapati (Chairman of Sakti ) ,  demandtc that Primo 
r1inistor Wilopo seE:: that tht:. "murders" werE stoppea."9 8 The T'Jational Council 
of SOBSI--which the P.K.I . was attempting to develop into i ts United L2bor 
Front and which happened to have been meeting at the time of the incident-­
attempting to shift the blame onto thE Dutch estate operators, issu€d a 
rosolution condemning the "tra.ctoring by colonial estate-opGretors protected 
by the armed apparetus of the Government" o.nd terming this a consequence of th( 
R. T. C. Agreement by 1..rhich the colonial system was being rcacti vc1tcd. 99 
Al though the problem of distributing land ir1 East Sumatra had continuall;y 
bGcn a subject of concern to somG membbrs of Parliament, not until after the 
Tandjung Mora1-.1a Incident did it find a place on the agenda of a plenary sessic-1 
of Parliament. 1\ delegation h0adE;d by Ersat Trunodjojo (llasjumi ) was SE.;nt to 
East Sumatra by the Interior nnd Information 2nd the Agriculture ComrnitteGs t<­
investigate the land problem there .  The secrotary of this inspr�ction team 
was Abdullah Jusuf (the only native of East Sumatra on the team) of the 
97. Cf. Ersat Trunodjojo rGmarks, 22 t1ay, I .  P .  1953, p. 576. 
98. Antara, 23 r,Iar. 1953. SDkti was a Jvlc1rxist org[1nization of f.g,rm­
laborers and po.or peasa11ts, pri.ncipally in 1:Test Je.va, infra • 
. ..• i 
99. Karsono �TERDOJO spe�ch, 21 11ay, I .  P. 1953, pp. 555-556.· SOBSI
·dcmandt·d that the tractoring and terroristi c  actions such as thE: arresting 
and shooting of farmers be stopped and that thE: victims be indemnified. 
'/42 
P. N. I . ,  whost.. NortL Sumatra brunch already in ()ctobl r haa announc�sd its .
disapproval cf !}ovcrnor Hakim ' s  administration and had called for suchs;; 
parliamcnta!"'J inv( stigation group. From 24 i'�arch until 6 April the. tc ,::un, 
which included Ta11chid and S. Sardjono (both of the B. T. I . ) and l"iaizir 
Achmaddyn' s  (Masjumi ),  intcrvicwc� officials, police, farmers, and farn 
organizations and made on the spot checks. 
On 31 1'·tarch the dcltgPtion m�t in liedc1n ·with rcpr(..scnt�ti vcs c • !-' 
vnrisous farm(:rs• orgc?.niszations. Ji group asst=;rtinf_?: thc1t it rcprLscnt<. ci 
"twenty-two �!orth Sumatran pE.;oplc ' s  org;1niszations ' ' subr.ii tttd thrct. 
prcposals : (1) Stop tractoring; ( 2 )  Form c1 lc1...nd ?of.fairs comrnisssicr1 Qn 
which farmers• crge.nizations would b.qvc su�ts; (3 )  Free persons apprch<:.ndl.'.d 
es a re sult of the. land problem. ItcprL,S€ntc:-tivcs o f  the Joint Socr0tariat, 
its 1n<:·.mbtr 0rgc1nizations, and thf.: Chinese :i'arrn-12.borers Union--thl; groups 
whi ch hnd held the fc1nncrss' conference i.n ,Januc?.ry, that had condemne d 
Governor Hakim--asscrtcd that thl,:r :;nuld not accE;pt the rt;gional 
government ' s  t<::.chnical plan for land distribution r:tr1d proposed :  (1)  Stop 
tr2ctcring; and ( 2 )  Form a joint commission to carry out land distribution. 
i,,:hen one of the members of Parliament asked if th€y had morE: spccifi.c and 
r 100positive proposals to offer, they admitted. that the) did not.
Sc-:vcral B. T. I . ,  R. T .I . ,  and Sakti local organizations rcfusE�d to 
follow their r<:�gional leaders and condemn the land distribution plc1n. 
Pasaribu of Goraktani (a  local farmerss' organi zation) stat€d that .shis 
100. "Lapuran Komisi Ponindjauan • • •  11, pp. 539-5L0, f1aizir, 11 li.pril 
1953, op. cit. , pp. L9L-L95. In r€ading the rep0rt to Pa.rl1 :unD11ts1 Ersnt 
Trunodjojo notEd the obvj.r111s �im�lit::1.r�ity �twe<>ri thf. two sEts of prcp< 1snls. 
1953 . 
orga11i zation did not think it  11ecessary to rnake chan ges in the plan . The 
s.T .I .I . (i11asjumi affili ate ) atreed, btlt suggested that the sum pai q. :_by the 
Governrnent 1r.rhen a family rnoved be raised �bove Rp.  300. 'Ihe se farmers I repre­
sen tatives felt that the d i stri bution profram should con tinue since rnany farmer 
, .. 
·were anxi ous to obtain le 6al property r i f: ht s as qui ckly as possible .
101 
The Parliamen tary inve sti bation (;roup by no mean s operated free of factior 
ali sm .  One member (Abdallah Ju suf) was condemned for beating tl1e f,roup  to East 
Sumatr� by three days, and makin� vi sits to various places whi ch the Pa!li amen ­
tary dele gation vi sited aftenrards ,  thus pre judicing the replie s iihich the 
delegation vJould li sten to. One member 1rras accused of trrgin g t l1e farmers to 
stay. lrhere they· were and keep the land they vrere workin g c3.nd of remarking 
publi cly d urin g  the inve stigation team vi sits that the Government appeared to 
be protecting fore ign businessmen instead of the farmers . And one 't.Jas reports 
to _have repeatedly asked squatters,  1 1Isn"1 t thi s land our property?1 1  To 1,rhich 
·
the inevitable reply 1vou ld be ," 11Stu-e , Pop."102 
On the other hand,  two members 'tiere accused of havin g borr0t•1ed money frorr. 
Gove rnor Hakim and of stopping off in Sin gapore enroute home .103 To thi s  chart,
ivJai zir replied that in vievr of the visit by the con sul of t he People ' s  Republi c. 
of China and hi s staff to Tandjung I•Iorawa after the in cident 1rJithout notifyin g 
the authorities, he and Trunod jojo had utili zed the opportunity enroute home tc  
. . 
stop in Sin gapore and follow up in forrnati on  on the ille gal entry of Commun ist 
Chinese into North Sumatra. Consul Gen eral S .  M. Razif confirmed that after 
Briti sh military operation s in I·ialaya, many Chine se Co:mmun�sts reportedly had 
101. 111apuran Komi si Pen ind jauar1. • • 11 ; i'iai zir, ll Apr . i953-, opoci t .  ,· .. •J· .. 
102. Ersat Trt,mod jojo , 2f i.\'iay 1953, op .cit.,  p .  577; cf� Antara, 23 1-'Jar . , .· · 
·sn1ugf: led then1Selves into i !ort}; Sumatra and into 1 ;est Kalimantan"., as vreli.
104 
J!Jhi le stil l  in r·iedan,  Abdul lal1 Jusuf 6ave an intervie·h' to the daily \-Jaspada., 
the local P.N.I.  paper, and a l lowed it to publish a telefraphic report he had 
sent to the P .N . I .  parliamentary faction . As chairman of the investigation group, 
Trunodjojo disapproved the interview, citing an agreement among the members not 
to nake separate intervie-i-rs, and condemning the sendinf of a report to one I s 
partj- vrhile he was performing an inspection task.105 To this Abdul lah· Jusuf 
denied that there l-ras any such agreement against separate intervievrs". His 
telegram he described as a report frorn himself in the capacity of a P .1\J . I .  
parliamentary faction member to his faction ."106 
·The inspection team of the ti-ro parliamentary committees finished its tour 
only one 1;1eek before Parliament vras scheduled to begin its quarterly recess·. 
Since it was customary for corn.rni.ttee inspection teams to dratv up their reports 
for submission to  their committee., · which· the�n oue •ti'.ne�r-uld submit �c-m­
mittee report to Parliament, and since the cor.-ir�ittees had not prepared a report"., 
wiany members were surprised to learn that on the afenda of the plenary session 
of Parliament on the evening of 10 Apri l i,ras the "Report of the Investigation 
Cocmission on the Land Distribution Question in North Sumatra"". Sjamsuddin 
St . l'iakmur ( non-party)"., chairman of the Interior and Information Committee· pro­
tested that n o  commission had been sent by Parliament to East Sumatra and 
recommended that the committee members first send their report to the committee. 
Trunodjojo a lso objected to the agenda. Hcn.rever; s.  Sardjono and Rangkajo 
Rasuna Said (non-party) cal led for immediate action on the land problem in East 
104. i-Iaizir Achrnaddyn"1 s speech; 22 Fay, �lb,-)9§$-� P.. 576• 
., 
105. _: rsat Trunodjojo · remarks, '·10 Apr.,  if.P:: 1"'91fl�1fl,a 490 
. ► 





Sumatra. F'inall;y·, it �ras er reed t hat the cor:rrnittees i: !ou.ld later r ·.ake a joint 
report.107 
tlcn-1ever , the next d ay, 11 Apr il, being the last d.a y before the recess, th( 
Interior and Aericultural Corm .. ittees, bein g unable to provide t heir report be­
fore t hen , agreed to "f.)ern1it t he inspect ion team to submit its report to the 
plenary session of Parli ament . Abdullah Jusuf then read a first draft of t he 
team ' s  report , t-1hich mentioned intervieivs made by the tearr1, cited docun1ent s 
referrinf:', to settlement of t he land problem, d i scussed varying results of t he 
resettlement pro�ram, and gave an account of t he Tand jung Mora"t"1a incident .108 
Althou2,h t hi s  tentat ive version was largely accepted in tl1e offic i al report 
later , it d id not treat all matters very thorout::,hly. Con sequently, i·,Ja.i zir 
Achrnaddyn I s supplemented it by describing the meet inr 1rrith t he farmer organ i ­
zat ion s  .on 31 IYiarch and notinr t hat many of the organi zat ion s  t here d id not 
apnrove the att ack on t he land d i str ibut i on program. He spelled out for t he 
first t ime in public the ei ght dernands of the ten Chinese families at Kampon g 
Perdamai an ,  an d provided a descript ion of t he prep arat ion s  for t he demon strat i c  
there by certain affiliates of the Joint Secretari at ,  a ccord in g to poli ce repo1 
. and t he team ' s  on-the-spot intervi ews.109 
After t he recess ,  the parliament ary calend ar d id not allow for d i scussion 
of t he East Sumatran land question unt il 21 i•iayo Ersat T·runodjojo, chairman 
of t he in vest i gat ion team, read t he tea.m' s offici al report --an exp anded and 
6rarnrnatically improved :vers-i on of t he one Abd ullah Jusuf had read plus some .
of the ii:rirormat ion - l1Iai zir had spoken about . It closed i:vith t he conclusion mad t  
. ( . - .107. . I.P. pp• 489-490 
108. I .P.  1953, pp.491-494. 
I.P . 1953, PP• 494-495. 
by the inspe ction t;roup on 15 i ra:y (i'iai zi r  1"1as not prese 11t ).--simpl:v that the 
distribution of land had not run  smoothly because": (1)  t he far1r,ers I or[ ani za­
t.ions rea.cted unfavorably to t l1e s ysteF.1 of land distribution , includin g, (a )  t he 
systerl of movinf: ,  (b) insuffi cient monetar:}r aid , ( c )  insvfii cient and unorran­
ized inforn�ation , and (d ) psycholog_i cal factors ; and ( 2 )  the payments determined 
by the central [Overrur..ent had not occurred sn1oothly •110 
The G·overnment '  s position in this matter 1·1as provided in a statement by 
Ninister of Interior Roem (lasjumi ) o Referrin g to t he confused sit uation the 
Governn1ent found itself confronted irith, in 1,1hi ch neither estate nor farmer 
could operate 1,1ell, he spoke of the Governme nt 's II grand plan " for solving this 
ma:tter by follm'1in g a mi.d dle course , 't·.rhi ch 1,rould allm.r estates to operate and so 
.. contribute to the developrnent of t he state and provide needed foreign exchange 
and at the same time provide ade quate land to fannE rs (r,1any of '\-1horri. had on"ce 
been contract coolies ) 1-J.:ith permanent property rir:. hts so t hat the-y vrould have 
an opportunity to develop a viable liveli hood". Termin"6 the Government"'s plan a 
prod uct of three cabinets , he impli citly called attention to the ,contribution 
of P. i\J . I .  le aders to it.• Terming t he plan for land distribution a radi cal step :
for the Government ,  1vhi ch in prin ciple had recogni zed .con cessi oos sin ce 1945, he 
de clared ttat if the re 1rrere some 1-rho felt that alien c_apital had to be expelled".,.. 
their views were". contrary t q  the Government 's poli cyo
111 
Con"cerning .the act ual irnplementation of the l_and distri bution pla_n ,  Roem 
described the Government 's efforts and intentions . "\ Ihile admitting . .t h�t there 
had been numerous s_hort cOillin[s i�, adln_inistering the resettlements , he declared 
t hat the plan vras basi cly sound and that many of the criti cisms against it had 
110. I.P. 1953, PP• 534-542. 
111. I.P. 1953, PP• 542-5450 
been exa§.gerated . In reply to the suggesti.on that the di vision of land had 
discrirr.inated in favor of the D.P .v., 112 Roern pointed to tl1e possibility of 
parallel interests--1-:rhi le the tobacco cornpanies needed dry lands, 1nost farmers 
1rranted lands that could be irrigated , and thus near streams . Declarin g that th(. 
differences between Governor Hakim and the Mini stry of Interior had"- been exagge1 . 
ated , Roem descri bed h.0v1. he endeavored to bring about improvements in the direc­
tives of both. He emphasi zed in reply to complaints about dra1"Jing. lots that if 
a group of farmers d esi gnated for resettlement .at. a ne1'IT site . would agree among 
themselve s  on i,rho 1,,rould get wich fa:nn-site., .the drairing of lots could be di s­
pensed 11ith. It was only necessary 1-,rhere the farn1ers themselve s could not ·
reach an agree.ment. Decrying the abuse poured on the term "tractor ing", he 
declared that if such land rras ready for tobacco planti -n f, and the occupants. 
stubbornly re-fused to move to other land provided for them, the Governrnent felt 
obliged to follow out its  plan •" . Roern next traced the developrnents leading up 
to the Tandjung Iviora-i-ra Incident--,-rhich the C·overnrnent declared that i t  seriousl .. 
regretted--and".asserted that in the face of the continued stubbornness of the 
Chinese settlers and their e xorbi tant -ei ght d eraaµds , the Government had no othe: 
course but to clear the six hectares for the government I s needs . He concluded 
by terming the matter one of principle: the Governmen t  did not consider it 
proper to revise the land distribution p lan, but 1,ras ready to iir:prove its 
implementati on--wi th help from the f�rmers and farmers '  organi zations .113 
112 . San1ono S. Sutard jo later ir,1plied that the Dutch head of the cadastre .  
office, which had made  ·the map dividin(: ;. up the concession lands, had been sub­
versi ve .  I.P. 19.53, P• 5.54 
113� I.P. 19.53, PPe 543-547 • Reviewing the ei ght demands,  hoem noted that 
there was even a reque st for tractori n g  (#J ) .  Concerni n f  point . 5, :: he, · -Qbserved : ·"
" So the Government must provide houses and a school for ali ensl 11 Concerning 
the action of the ten families, v1hich led to the Tand junr:: 1,Iorav1a incident, Roen. 
d eclared : . 11 It -i,1as improper for those Chinese aided by other". Chinese"· to ·oppose
the Government in such a way. 11 
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The de bate t hat foll m-red or1 21 and 22 1Jay 1953, durinf l!t1ich n ineteer1 
speakers expressed their viei:-,rs , soon gave evidence that at issue 1-ras no sirr1ple 
local problem .1-rith a mere two sides to it . The problem on the afen da had its 
own complex economic , ·sociological , and pol itical aspects . But besides pro­
vid ing a forum for these , the debate determined the fate of the Wilopo Gove rn­
ment , ,,rhich 1-ras principally a coalition of moderate P .i·I . I.  leaders, t he i·11a.sjlWJ.i, 
and · the P.S.I . For a perspe ctive of the events that 1-1e re quickly to follow:, '..it 
should be noted that the P.K.I . was endeavoring to build up a United Front 
opposed to  the 11compradore-bourgeois clicque 11 of Ind onesi ans i-rho ndefended the 
interests of imperi alism and served the interests of imperi alist capital."11114 
As a further step in reali zing  its United Peasants Front (F.P.T.), after pre­
parations with the pro-P.K.I . leaders in the B.T . I .  and Sakti , i-,ithin four 
months it would merge its R.T.I . into t he B.T.I . (the original post-war mass 
farmers organ ization on Java) o At the same time left -�ring leaders of the P .N·. I. 
then in effective control of that party had probabl y  consi dered that t heir 
prospects in the coming general elections would not be helped by cont inued •)". 
cooperation with the Mas jumi (the country's largest party) . Consequently 
t hey  failed to . back the P .N .I. prime minister and his cabinet on so many 
controversi al issues"·. i-1hich it had set out to settle that the proverbial IIice -box" 
(or "deep-freeze" ) was soon 1-1ell nigh burst ing with them o 
i'-lochammad Tauchid (leader of the pro-P .S.I. faction in the B. T .I . )  pre"­
sented a historical survey of the problem of land for estates and farmers in 
East Sumatra and the most c omplete listing of factors which could induce fanners 
to resist moving--psychological as 1-1ell as physical . He agreed with the 
. .
Covernment •s"- decision to provide sufficient farm-land and appreciated the need 
114. Cf• i:I.H. Lukman , "]:vfenud ju Front Persatuan" ., Bint ang Merah., VII (1951) .,_ 
PP• 57-59. 
to move settlers from q.yercrowded areas, but he called for careful prepa�ations 
,)!,.. ' 
to reduce the possible1 nardship on farme.rs.� Believing. that tobacco could be 
cultivated on a five... y�ar. rotation basis., he felt that the D .. P •. V •. could operate 
suitably on 7.5, 000 hectares. J1oreover, instead of hastily moving everyone off 
the tobacco lands at once, he felt the program could be extended over five 
years.115 
Surnartojo., speaking for the P .S.I . faction, stressed that the question was 
rnore than one of administering existing plans; there 1iiere also social and 
economic factqrs that had to be considered. A broad attack on the land proble� 
in East Sumatra 1trould include opening up opportunities in adjacent parts of 
Atjeh and Tapanuli., from "t-rhich farmers 1-1ere still st�eaming. He also called fc 
maximum government assistance to the farmers being resettled, in order that 
healthy ne,1 communities could develop. Assailing, the tobacco system of cultivc 
tion1 he remarked that in the old days planting one plot only once in several 
years had been the accepted system among many farmers, but vrith the growth in ·
population and resultant sparsity of good farmland, farmers had come to farm 
the same plot continually • . In vie"Trr of the changed conditions in East Sumatra 
from the time the concessions ,,rere first granted . to the tobacco estate:::;--the 
denser population and consequent shortage of .. arable land--Sumartojo suggested. 
that the tobacco estates too could abandon old-fashioned cultivation methods". 
vJith the use of fertilizers and n1odern farming methods, he thought the". system 
' . 
of rotation could easily be shortened to two or three years. The Deli �obacco 
then being cultivated was far less  than before the war; rnor.eQver1', tbe trend 
• • .,. • , • l ' . 
among the smoking population was Eraclually a1-1ay from cigars o Such factors, he 
. . . : -:·. ··..: .....;· 
felt, should be considered 1,-:rhen determining the size of reserve lands f.or the 
115. I.P. 1953, pp. 570-572. Tauchid felt that each year settlers needed 
to be removed only from the one-fifth of the estate land then scheduled for
tobacco cultivation. 
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t obacco estates". Realizing that the 1 1North Sumatra land problem" tvas not 
limited to the tobacco estates alone , he recommended that the Government 
immediately ascertain from the tree estate companies in Simelungun and .!sahan 
h ow  much land they '\<1ere i-1illing to cede , and pending the transfer of such land 
back to the State , h e  urged the Government to  forbid the tractoring of land 
being farmed by occupants on such estates .11
6 
A few members of Parliament were concerned about specific features in the 
land distri bution pro(ram in East Sumatra . Johan Paul SNEL (P.R.N .  and repre­
sentative of European peranakans) cited a clause in the K . P.P .T."· ruide to land 
d istribution ( dated 11 February 195a), which stat ed that : "The Government 
recogni zes the exist"ence of citi zens and 1 indi E,enous ' citi"zens . "  Although local 
officials were authori zed to distri bute directly land to indig enous citi zens, 
they had t o  refer the matter of non-indigenous citi zens to the K .P.P .T .  Charg­
ing that the past "colon ial discri mination"  had been replaced since the transfer 
of sovereignty ,:,-rith "national discrimination " ,  he urged the Government to end 
this practice at once and reprove the official responsible .117 
T1-10 East Sumatrans pleaded the case of the indigenous fa rmers, v1ho had 
the ri ght under the old concessions to farm on the fallmr tobacco plots, the 
"tanah penungg u" or 11d jaluran11 • i'"Iohamad NUH (PIR) protested that tvhen the 
estates asked the Governor whether these ri ghts of the indi genous population 
remained after the concessions were converted into hak benda property, they had 
been informed that the right to tanah penunggu had been abolished"--1...rithout 
g iving any ·juridical grounds . He read •a resolution from a conference of the 
116. I .P. 1953, PP• 552-554. Sumartojo also recommended that the remova l 
of settlers from tobacco land be synchroni zed with the periods of rotationo 
117 • I , P .  1953, Po 548. Snel also cited the discrimination in the dr3:ft. .
agrarian la�, where Indonesian citi zens of foreign descent would be".all0t-1ed 
property rights limited both as to t ime and area . 
----
Indonesi an · 11 pehunl [.u " r.>eople of North Sumatra", of  19 Apr i l  1,lh i ch :  (1) urr ed the 
Governor to resci nd the letter abol ish i n g  the "d jaluran"  . rule s ince i ts _ a bolit i 
1..Jould mean that rnany  persons no l onger woilld have a· plot"· to farm ; arid (� )  lU'ged 
that th e estate c omp an i es be ordered to turn over "d jaluran"11 land to the 
11penunggu n populat ion and pay con1p ensat i on. N gerad jai (a Karo Bata k 1-rith the 
Fraksi Demokrat ) supported these demands and protested the Government ruli n g  
that any Indonesian farmer 1-Jho had l i ved i n  East Sumatra six months "tvas ent itle (  
to receive land i n  the d istri but ion". He opined that the r i ghts of th e ind i ge n o  
residents would not be so n eglected and i nd iscriminate m i gration would not be 
allowed i n  other parts of the country.118 
J,i. Yu nan Nasut ion (a IvJandailin g Ba.tak 1-fh o had becorr1e JJlasjumi chairman for 
East Sumatra) crit i c i zed the parliamentary- committee report as sup erficial a nd 
called the Government-D.,P .v. agreement rat i fi ed by IIi n ist er - Iska q  the heart. of 
the matter, s ince it had led to the plan 1r h i ch - the Government l--Tas obli ged to  
carry out . He d eclared th at the Tand jung }1orawa Incident had no d irect bearinf 
on the general land problem in East Sumatra but d id have 11other aspects" wh ich 
. . 
were evident from the preparat"ions for the demonstration and the fact that onl) 
one of the d ead lras a local farmer.119 h e  Chinese ai Hov-rever, the posit ion of t_
Tand ju ng  11orawa was d efended by Sa:nvono s .  Sutard jo (P .K .I •., a Javan ese former 
118. I .Po 1953, PP• 548-550. Sumartojo and Yamin also spoke out for 
consider i ng  the penunggu rights o  
Th e indi genous farmers subsequently organ i zed the Badan .  Perd j�ngan Rakjat 
Penunggu Indonesia Sumatera Utara to fi ght- for th eir r i ghts . 
119. I.P. 1953, pp.• r SSl-S�. 
Pesi"ndo-' leader in Ea.st Sumatra) and s.  Sardjono (a leader of the pro-P . i\ . I. 
120faction":in  the B.T.I. ) .
The two Na.sjumi members of the inspection team defended the land distri­
bution plan for East Sumatra. j;1Jai"zir declared that any allegation that the 
program h ad broken dm,.1n was false and that he hi 1nself h ad 't·Tit nessed h en., much 
better off the farmers resettled were than many had alleged . He ch arged t hat 
the program was being  sabotaged by four groups who had vested interests in  see­
ing that the settlers objected to  moving : (1) specu]ators ;  ( 2 )  groups opposed 
t o  the R .T •.c.  policy and in:.plicitly endeavorin £. to scuttle it ; (3 ) certain  
aliens--specifically the Chinese Communists (cit ing the efforts of their 
officials to  protect unspecified interest s arotmd 'Iandjung l<iorawa, and charging 
that they were atte:rr.pt ing to p it the I ndonesian people ag.ainst their government ) ;  
and (4) groups hostile to the Governor of North Sumatra, such as the r1 embers of 
the Joi nt .Secretariat , which attempted to  force the governor out of office by 
blami ng all the undesirable aspects in the land distribut-ion on h im, even thou£_h 
his plan was an extension of that of the Central Government". Trunodjojo also 
referred to  the fish in g in troubled waters by certain groups.  He termed the 
associ ation of Chinese farm-],aborer union� basicly political (Communist ) and 
an extension of the foreign policy _or�ani zation of the People's Republic of 
120. I.P. 1953, PP• 554-5550 _ . .. . . . . . . .  . 
l1luhamma.d Yamin (non-party), ir1ho complained that the rel)ort cbhtained no 
final resolution,  sug rested that even if t:tJ,e Chinese settlers at Tandjung i'•Iora1r1a 
had entered the cou ntry illegally, they mi �ht have obt ained citi zenship through 
the p assive system . I .P w  1953, P• 551� 
/ 7$3 
China, and he cited instances of intimida
11 121" .organizations·e.
Sidik Kertapati i iotion 
tion of farrr.eers by certain II farmers r 
Political opposition to the C,overnr<1ent ' s position on the land distributior 
question ranged frorr: mild to extreme. T111To P .1,T . I. members , Abdullah Jusuf and 
Ida Bagus Putra MANUABA ( Chairman of Petani) asserted that the farmers involvec 
in the East Sumatran land problem objected not to moving but to the technical 
iriiplementation of the resettlernent program. The former asked that .the Govern­
ment act soon to s olve the problem on the tree estates t•rhere companies associat 
in AVROS were tractoring farmlands of the people under government and police 
protectiono122 
Abdullah Jusuf, Sarwono and Abulhajat ( United Pro�ressive s )  attacked the ., 
" stubbornness" of Governor Hakim, and Abulhajat l1anuaba.e and s.111. Abidin . · ., ., 
(Partai Buruh) questioned the propriety of the e;overnor• s  acceptance of funds 
frorn the D.P . V •123 -iJinister Roern interceded to object to .th� s,m�ri,ng of ,
G overnor Hakim ' s  name. He defended the contribution from DePoV.. as .benef:i,ttint ·e
the resettled farmers and reported that it was thoroughly accounted for.124 
1219 I.P. 1953., pp. 575-577. 
On the' other hand, Sardjono, charging tha.t the K . P .P.T.  had given Rpo35,0( 
to a certain farmerse' organization for buying seeds, inquired - 1-1hether only 
organizations which agreed with government policy could obtain such credit. 
I.P. 1953, P• 5750 . .
There might have been s ome question of the appropriateness of Sardjono's  
inquiry for while the Joint Secretariat denied that the January 19·53 farmerse' .,
conference had been financed 1ivith Chinese fundse,:, , it declared that, ope source oi 
funds had been the Central Government (which had donated Rpo5,000).  I.P"  19.53, 
p.  542 11  
122 . I. P.  1953, PPo 547-548. l'ianuaba submitted a list of five pertinent 
questions which he wanted the Government to aris't'1er. 
1230 I.P.  1953, pp o.548 554-555, 5740 Abidin condemned the presence of gu ., 
at Tandjung Morawa, declaring that the end desired could have been accomplished 
by tear gas. 
124. I.P.  1953, P• 577. 
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Abulhajat asserted that the !Jorth Sumatran authorities apneared to favor 
the estates ,,rhile i gnoring the revol ution ary--if not juridical--rights of the 
population . Sudi jono went further and charted that the_ c abinet 1-ras following 
a polic:y 1rrhich clearly benefitted alien capital to the detril'llent of the popula­
ti on. Partai I-iurba. called 0n the Gove:mrnent to cease forcible actions such as 
tractoring against the farm laborers.125 
But the strongest att ack of all on the [Overnment policy in East Sumatra 
was from Sidik Kertap ati (United Probressives, who was ch airman of Sakti )"o He 
tenned the Tand jung i-;iorawa Incident IIcold-blooded murder" of people who should 
h ave been defended,  an action of a crazed government , and a provocation"."tor 
re asons 11 smelling of tobacco and dollars" by a personal tovernment in }iedan"l)126 
K. Werdojo, on 21 May after reading a SOBSI resolution , made five proposals: 
(1) md tractoring of fann lands and c ancel the exist inL plan for solving the 
land problem in East Sur:ia.tra;  ( 2 )  Free persons arrested as a result of that plan ;  
(3)  Form a con·.mission for land settlement on 1,,rhich representatives from farmers t 
and other organi zations sit ; (h)  The Gove rnment should take steps t 0t-1ards its 
organs responsibile for the victims of the Tand jung  Iviora"trra incident ;". and (5) 
Provide sufficient aid to victi ms of th e incident .127 
In vi ew of the h eated d ebates ,  it crune as no surprise th at Just before the 
125. I.P. 1953, pp 4 555-556, 573-574. Both Sudi jono and Werdojo called on
the Government to submit a draft agrari an law. 
126. I .P .  1953, P• 573 . Counterin g  a eovernment statement that a local 
Sakti organi zat ion had supported the l and distribution plan ,  Sidik declared that 
the person involved h ad been kicked out of the organi"zation already month a before 
and called him a hired adventurer to fool the people . 
, . 
127. I .P .  1953, PP• ·556, 576? Ahem Erningprad ja, also of the SOBSI faction , 
made a series of proposals in the form of questions on matters covered by the 




sessi on on 22 i1ay closed ,  Sidi k Kertapati pr·esented a. moti on co-sp onsored by s. 
Sardjon o, Ahem Ernq.n gprad ja, han�kajo Rasuna Said,  and I zaak tliwoe LOBO (United 
ProGressives, and chairman of Permai ) ,  statin 6 t hat it 1--1as presented with the 
intention t hat farrners 1,rho had be en chased off by tract ors and intimi dated woulc 
be able t o  return t o  their fannlands . The proposed moti on dernanded t hat the 
I·i nister of Interi or : 
(1) Suspend the distribution of t he former estate l ands in East Sumatra;  
( 2 )  Cancel t he guide and all related instructi ons on the distri buti on 
of such l and ; 
(3) 
( 5) 
Revise t he mappin g  of t he DoP.V. concessi on land ; 
Form a corr.missi on t o  plan the distributi on of land in East Stunatra, 
on which representatives of t he farmers organi zati ons sit ;  and· 
Free i..rn.medi ately all persons detained in connecti on with land 
distri bution and farmer resettlement probleIT� and cease nmi arrests .  
· 
12l 
The Government was scheduled t o  reply t o  the debate on t he Rep ort of t he 
Investi gati on Commissi on on t he Land Distributi on Questi on in North Sumatra, 
including its vietr1s on the rnoti on proposed by Sidik Kertapati , but t he reply 
was never made , for on 2 June t he cabinet voted t o  return its mand ate . Instru­
ment al t o  t his decisi on "fl,Jas t he fact that Prime !�i:ini ster �Jilopo 1 s 0v1n party 
leaders refused to  back the G· overnment in its p olicy on land distri buti on in 
.East Sumatra , partly"because t he party' s N orth Sumatra branch had t hreatened 
. .
t o  secede if it were n ot supported in t his issue.  As t he Prime Minister indi-
cated in hi s letter t o  the chairman of Parliament,  11Even thou gh cooperati on 
1;.rithin t he Cab:inet itself can still pos si bly be continued in facin g current 
problems, it is evident that wit h  the present constellati on, t he Cabinet cann ot 
expect sufficiently large support from the parties which back it in t he 
Parli ament .n
129 
• '128. I,P. 1953, PP• 577-578. 
129. I ,P o 19.53, P• 625. Cf. Herbert Feith, The '\r-Jilopo Cabinet, 1952-19.53 :
A Turning Point in Post-Revoluti onary Indonesi a, (Ithaca; Cornell University 
·�iiodern Indonesia Project , 19�8), p .  155e The Oct ober 17t h  Affair,  :involving t he 
Army, had been an early principal issue put in the ice-box. 
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Durinf the latter part of the Wilopo administration , the Gove rnment 's "ice­
box'1 had �radua.lly become fille d 1.Jitrl t-1hat the Indonesi ans tenned 11fro zen 11 
(insoluble ) issues on 1--rhich it an d the P arli ament apparently· di d not see eye t o  
eye ,  often because the P .N . I .  faction would fail to support it . No one of these 
problems could by itself have broll€.ht the cabinet dm.m, but by the t ime the East 
Sumatran land dist ri bution problem 1-ras be in b consi dered in Parli ament , the ice­
•box l-ras filled. In the face of cont inue d  lack of support in P arli ament , the 
Cabinet had no other course than to resi gn o 
A�rarian Commission 
The need to revise ae:rarian legislation an d t o  fin d i1ays to  settle disputes 
bet1-1een estate operators an d squatters frorr. a1nong the surroundin g  popu]ation had 
held the attention of every cabinet to a greater or lesser degree since the 
fonnation of RIS.  The N atsir Government h ad expresse d its intention to  set up 
a state co1rJTri.ssion consisting of experts in the arrari an field an d representa-
tives of farmers an d labor organi zations, lihich was to advise the Government on 
agrari an problems and recommen d chan bes in afrari an lavrs •130 
In }farch 1951, a new Agrari an Conunission (Panitya Agraria )  was decree d, 
replacing the organi zati on set u p  in 19481. However, it was not until October 
that members were desi gnated. Sarimin Reksodihardjo ( Chief of the Agrarian 
Section of the Ninistry of the Interior) was appointe d  chairman , and Sadjarwo 
(Chief of the General Policy an d Planni ng Section of the Hinistry of Agricul-. . 
tu re ) ,  Vice Chai rman. Hot·rever, in the meantime ,  the Sukiman Cabinet h ad set up 
a 1fulist IJ' of Afrari an Affairs, in "tvhich Sarimin 11as the senior official un der 
the minister� Since the net-r ministry took over many of the functions assi �ned 
to  the Commission, it was not until after the formation of the .W:i,10�0 Cabinet , 
, . 
130. St atement ,- 11 Oct � ,  R.P"., 1950, p. 18000 
• 
lrbict1 dropped the A( rarian .t;.ffairs portfolio, that tbe. ALrarian Commission �..ras' 
�inally installed on 22 Au�"�st 1952 .131 
The i-1iddle Course: · Tauchid and Sinr,g,ih 
Although the Afrarian Affairs portfolio lJas not retained ( as- ·a 1neasure to 
simplify the administration ) ,  the 1 'ilopo Cabinet announced that efforts to re­
vise agrarian legislation would be continuede In the rr.eanvrhile, for"- a·ttendinfi 
to immediate problems a guide to be followed by the Government was ann ounced. 
In cases of conflict of interests bet1-reen alien enterprises and the local farm­
ing population, as has been noted, settlement on the broader basis of the 
interests of the state and nation 1r1as to be s ou[ ht. Besides efforts to 
11 dernocratize11 feudal landholdings, it i-ras announced tr..at e1"forts 1Jould be made 
to preclude the concentration of very extensive land holdings in the hands of a 
feiv, 1-!hich ,,,ould result in the oppressior1 of the economically weak by the 
econon1ically strong; more"over., extensive landholdini:,S already in existence would 
be so  reLulated as to avoid abuses or changed into 11 joint undertaking,s11 in line 
·'T•!ith the spirit of Art. 38 (1) of the Constitution.132 : 
:i:iocharnad Tauchid (B.T .I.  and P .S. I . ) ,  observing that the R. T . •c. Financial 
and Economic Agreement confirmed the return of 11historical rights" on lands to 
• 
capitalists, -declared that the farrr.e r did not think Indonesia independ�nt 1,rhile 
•
I • �. 
its land 1r1as still controlled by aliens. · Land disp:u.tes ··iri Java and East Sumatra 
·.,, . . . .. 
·he blamed on differences of interpretation .,of articles in the Agreement and the 
131. -ifPutusan Presiden N o. 3611 , 19 l_ar. 1951, 111\Jo. 21211•, 30 Oct. 19.51, and
· 
11 :No. 5211 , 10 Iviar. 1953 ; Antara, 23 Aut.• 1952. Seven of the co1;mission ' s  eight 
charter members were civil servants . The eighth, Ba.non, �-ras an ·offi·cet. of._ Petan 
(the P .N.I .  farmer ' s  subsidiary) . The chairman, like the norr.inating offidial 
(Minister Iskaq) 't-1as a P .N . I. mem'l:>�r.  In September 1952, 1-1hen six new membe.rs 
were ar)pointed, all save one 1r.rere·: civil servants . The exception, s .  Sardjono,
like the vice chai:nnan ,  was an officer in the B.T .I. 
132.  Statement, 9 May., I.P. 1952, P• 251. 
.. � 
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haste to put t..te11, i11t o effect. Cor1cerni11� the land sett ler, Tauchid advised 
that persons are not easily ordered to turn over land that they have occupied, 
and that the people were offended by the use of police and the army to drive the 
occupants off. To settle such problems, Tauchid offered a list of seven 
principles to fol l0t-1: 
1. land forms the livelihood of the Indonesian people;
2 .  land policy is aimed at the prosperity of thE people; 
3. land for the farmer; 
4.  citizens (without differentiating, bet1-reen 1-Thether or not indigenous) 
have a right to own land;
S. minimura and maximum limits should be put on the size of property;
6. land utilization should be regulated by statute, in harmony vrith the 
policy of prosperity for tl1e people; 
7 .  supervision of land utilization by the governments of autonomous
•regions". 
In implementing these principles, Tauchid prop osed that: 
1. a l l  "private lands" be purchased and turned over for smal lholder 
agriculture; 
2 .  and 3.  (abolition of feudal landholdings) ;  _ 
4.  eigendom and opstal ,LEuropean property riehtG/ of a liens to be 
cancelled; if Die owner becomes a citizen.,. he may hold the property 
as hak milik Jrndonesian private propertx/ vrith area limitations; 
S. horticultural erfpacht property rights of a liens to be cancelled; 
if the lease holder becomes a citizen, he may. hold the property 
with hak milik with area limitations; 
6. erfpacht lands n ot used according to  their". leases and violating 
the erfpacht law to be taken over by the Government and converted 
into farmlands;
7 .  erfpachts and concessions not to be extended, but to be taken up
when they expire; in compel ling circumstances when the public 
interests demand, they might be expropriated according t o  the 
opportunity provided by the .R.T . C .  Agreement; 
8. lands of expired erfpachts to  be taken over by the Government and 
converted into"- farmlands; erfpacht and concession lands not worked 
or neglected, to  be taken over and converted into farmlands; 
9 .  erfpacht and concession lands 1-rorked by the p opulation as farm and 
village"· land .since the Japanese .and �evolutionary periods �o remain 
.with the p opulation, i-rith coI}sideration given t o  lcµ1<;ls for". very .
important estate crops.; and
10. laws to  protect and ma-intain land, .t9 prevent erosion, etc. 
. . -
Tauchid, 11hile recognizing".that Indonesia stil l  needed to have exports produced 
- .
by a lien estates, said too much emphasis was being put on estates with alien 
' 
capital, and that more should be put an the production of such materia ls by 
159 
smallholders, for Ind"on. _esia could n ot d epend forever on alien capital.  �
33 
The \rJilopo a·"o.,r!:?.i;:pment ., pr �i �ing· that it ,,rould eive consi dera tion t o  
'Iauchtd."s principles ip. :t he basic a g_ _' : ; r�rian lav-r then being,  prepared , observed 
that ._ ;pills were almost ready t o  be submitted t o  Parliament on: (1)  a boliti on 
.of erfpa cht rights n ot utili zed a ccor9- .i nt  t o  t he" intent of t he Agrarian Lai-1 . . . 
of 1870; (2 )  a boliti on of erfpa cht r�gpts for small horti culture ; (3)  settle­
ment of t he problem of occupati on of estate land ;  (4 ) reorgani zation of land 
utili zation in East". Sumatra ; and (5) land rights for citi zens of fore· .ign 
descent .134 . 
Since on 3 September 1952 ., shortly after t he installati on of the Agrarian 
Commissi"on"., - -S?rimin ,,ras app ointed Governor of Sunda l(et jil and t he men1bership 
of t he commissi on 'trJas expanded"., Sil'JGGII-I Prapt odihardjo (Ac:ti n g  Chief o�f t he 
Agrarian Secti on )  was appointed . as  its net-J chainnan". As t he t op offi cia l  
t hen in t he a grarian sect or and a s  a moderate me�ber of t he P.N�I . and t hus 
in a p ositi on t o  determine agrarian p oli cy under the 11Ji lop o  a�il1ist.rati on ,  
his vi ews are of. more than in cidental importance . Sing gih r:eje cte ':i  the concept 
of those who interpreted Art"o 38 (J ) of the Constituti on t o  mean t hat a ll land . ' .  
wa s state property. Declarinf t hat II1d onesia had progressed .far .f:roi:n t he . . . ( . .  . . . . . . 
d o.rnein verklarin g  of t he 1870 Agrarian De cree issued .. by the • Dut ch,., he asserted . - . . . . . .  
that in modern Indonesia in whi ch every farmer wanted his 0trm property ' 
suffi ciently large for a proper living, and in 1:1hi ch the people 1rrould n ot 
l3J. Spee ches, 15 !"fay., 6 June"., I .P .  1952, PPo 351-352 614-615� Besides .,
noting t hat t he R.T .Co Agreement a uthori zed expropriati on ,  Tauchid menti oned 
that t he er�cht law itself provided f�� ca?9�llati on of a ll  or par� of
leases on .la s not worked .. . Ci', Tauchi �., · Bf.aealah ;Asrar:lao · ·. . . 
. . 134. Statement , 19 June 195�, Keterangan µan Dja,�ban Pemerin:t,ah". a�as 
.




acquiesce to the state I s robbinf. therr. of their ril hts, state II c ontrol" of land 
meant nothint Ii"iOre then authority to rel ulat"e the land.
135 
Singgih believed tr1at Indonesia should have a uniform syster,:. of land 
ownership--a 11r.1odern-national11 la1,T combinin[ the best features of the adat and 
i··estern systems of la,-:r r, 1:hile reflectin&; the spirit of the Indonesian nation . 
s·uch a land la1-r v1ould guarantee and guide the interests of the largest £_ roup 
(the farmers ) ,  1-rhile opening up opportunities to the state and the people for 
increasin� the nation ' s  production, wealth, and standard of living.  Thus 
concerning hak milik, Singgih ur[ed. that several rnatters be rec"ulated by la11 
t o  avoid arbitrary action either on the part of the individual landholder or 
on the part of the comrnunity"·{whether it be the extended family, village, or 
state) . Frorn this, he conclude:d that farms had to have maximum and rninirnuro 
areas, but determined on an ad hoc basis accordinf to the type of crop and soil 
and the location of the farm.136 
If Indonesians were eventually to replace alien businessmen, thought 
Singgih, national capital and businesses had to be developed, and although the 
G overnment had to tuard a[ainst national capital bec omin� the rr.onopoly of a 
few Indonesians, it was still the responsibility of all the people to organize 
such national capital .  Nevertheless, alien estates usin[ rnuch capital ( thus . 
those 1-rhich the state or Indonesians themselves 1r1ould be unable yet to operate) 
or emoloyin( many ,: •orkers (and providin[ therr1 'l,Iith a livelihood) 1..rere still 
important . However, Singgih advocated for the successor t o  the erfpacht a 
135. Singgih Praptodihardjo, Sendi-sendi Hukum Tanah di Indonesia ( 2d ed. ;  
Djakarta: Jajasan Pembangunan, 1952), pp. 23-2&. 
136. Ibid. ,  PP• 77-82, 86-93, 122-1230 Singgih noted that d�ring the
period of transition, e:?·istinf at_rarian laws usually had sufficient provisos 
to brinf an end to the more objectionable features . 
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guide by which could be determined area and geographical lin1itations and a 
shorter term. other estates"., he -suggested, might be operated by tr1e s:t,a,te 
itself or transferred to the people or operated as "joint undertakings11 b:'l 
the Government and the people.137 
A more complex problem., Singgih felt-, i;,ras that inv.olving land ri�hts of 
citizens who under the Dutch-created land lavJs were considered .as non-natives 
and thus aliens prohibited from- acquiring rnany types of landholdings. Declar­
ing that the Government had ·"to detennine its attitude on. this complex matter, 
he advocated transitional regulations under ,,rhich such "new citizens" would 
be allowed to use propert.y for a limited period of about five years., after 
vrhich their rights would be converted to permanent hak.. milik. 
138 
___ .___. -
1/Jhen the Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet took of:fice in August · 1953_,. part of itt 
program called for revising agrarian legislation 11 in harmony lJi-th the int·erests 
of the farmers and urban population. u Thus a I11Iinister for Agrarian Affairs was 
appointed, whose primary task -i-ras to make ready a basic land l��r. Pending its 
completions., which was expected to take a long time., the Government announced 
a guide for settling several problems in the immediate future. These included 
efforts to end vast accumulations of" land in the hands of a few persons (in.
137. Ibid. , PPo 35-36, 82-85. Singgih personally preferred a 25-year
term for new erfpachts with a 15-year extension if requir�d for rehabilitation.
Concerning the rights of aliens to possess land (other than estates ) in
Indonesia., he· advocated a principle of qualified reciprocity in �..Jhich area and 
geographical limitations i1ould prevail. 
138. Ibid�, PP • 124-129. Singgih said that objections by many indigenous
citizens to extending equal land rights to citizens of foreign descent 1-1ere
only partly founded in fact•" . He obs,erved that 'tvhereas D�tch-Indos held the·ir
citizenship on a rather solid basis (having actively and unreservedly chosen
Indonesian citizenship) and had assinp.lfo1,te.d 1�rith �indigeµcn�s"-�itizens, many. _
Chinese-Indos were duai nationals"., "'hav'ing only"· .passively . acquired Indonesian
citizenship (like the Arab-Jndos ) ., and maintained a separate community. He"· 
observes also that there was no certainty that those acquiring extensive land­
holdings, thanks to their nei-r I·ndonesian citizenship1 might not later"give up· 
such citizenship. 
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order to conform ·uith t he spirit of Arts .  26 and 38 of the Constitut ion), and 
[�iving attention to  t he interests of the farming and urban populat ions irhen 
provi(1_inc opportunities to  al ien capital for partic ipat :ing in d evelopin g the 
country' s economy.139 
Subse qu€ntly, the Government announced that . i.11 princ iple it had n o  objec­
tion to the continuat ion of plantation enterprises on land 1rrith existing 
erfp achts, although the t erm would be shortened and the contracts would have 
to be brought in line v1ith Indonesia Is economi c poli cy• Thus estat es on 
erfpacht land could ·only be continued if: (1)  they were important to t he 
producti on process and could not so far, or only i,,ith d ifficulty, be managed 
by the population_ itself, and (2 )  were  not detrimental to the interests of t he 
populat ion. Enterprises vrhich did not meet these cond it ions t-1ere warned to  
bring themsel ves in l in e  wit h  t hem as qu ickly as possible o Concernin5 t he 
matt er of foreign personnel raised by Kasi.mo,  t he Government d eclared t hat it 
desired t ha�"· Indonesian experts eventually occupy most posit ions on t he· staff 
and management of such estate ent erprises , and am1ounced t hat implement at ion 
of such a plan"-was ·then taking place."140 
State Commission for East Sumatra Estate Lands Distributi on 
1"1it h the fall of t he 1,Iilopo Cabinet , the systemat ic solut _"_io!1 o!-'_ t he land 
distri bution problem in · Ea.st Sumatra, l-Jhich had aroused expectations of a long"• 
·range settlement, began"to sl ow d mm, and a few· months lat er t he forceful 
Governor liakim ,,ras replaced . The ne1,1 Ali Sastroamid jojo Cabinet announced 
139. Statement , 25 Aug .,  I.P .  1953, P• 722-723. 
140Q St atements, 2, 10 Sept". ,  I.P. 1953, PP• 788, 830-831. In r eply t o
Sakinnan1s suggest ions that t he Gove rnment g ive empty lands , includ in g  former 
estat e lands no long er cult ivat ed , to farmers wit h insuffic ient land , the 
Govermnent announced its agreement in principle, but declared t hat it had to  
be very careful in such"-d istribution e I oP• 1953, P• 777. 
• 
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that the proble1n 1.s1as one: of four inherited from the oast cabir1et whi ch it  
would endeavor to sclve.  To sc:.ek i1nprove.ments taking into consideration tt1E:: 
interes ts o r  tbt people and the s tate, a State Cornmission composed of thcsE: 
&.i'fected was to be set up. The Commission would make investigations and report 
back recommendations to the Central Government within two :rnonths. Ivleanwhile, 
settlers who agreed to resettlement would continue tc bE- moved to new land.s,  
and thos€ who had not moved cnly because they wer€ not satisfied with the land 
offered the1n would be offered new sites, The s tatus o.f the other settlero who 
did no t wish to move would awai t a decision based on the:. Commission ' s  report. 
I t  was also annot�nced that land would only be distributE:d to ci tiz0ns of 
Indonesia and that the Tandjung Morawa incident would be settled according to 
law. 1L1 Two days later, or1 27 August, the i..;entral Government catled Medan to 
s top the bulldozing of settlers ' farms and razing o f' their dwellings--another 
so-called "standfast. 11142 
In reply to thE GovernmGnt s tatement, Mohamad Natsir (Masjumi ) obsLrv�d 
that thi s  land problem had be,en the cause of the do�mfall of th(; �Jilcpo Cabinet . 
wr1ich was not prepared to carry out the demands of thc-; opposi tion .for r6cor1-
sid€ring the land distribution principles, suspending thE removal of settlers,  
and freeing those involved in the Tandjung Morawa incident. CoH1paring the new 
25 Aug. , I .P. 1953, p. 727.  The guige for 
th6 sta te commission included such points· as : where . . villages and sawahs had
developed before 19$0 on land designated for tobacco estates,  such areas 
would be removed from thG estate concessions; if areas vacated by farmers were 
not at one€ utilized by the tobacco estates, the former occupants could st.ill 
get crops from them; wi thin the limits of the s tat€ 1· s financial capaci ty the 
Rp. JOO payrnents to farmers wot1ld ce supplemented wi. th"_ farm tools, transport 
would be improved, and better preparations would be �ade on land for re­
settlements. The Government implied that th€ commission ' s  invEs tigation of 
th6 land mapping might lead i t  to make a new contrac t  later concer·ning the 
area of' land which had to bb returned to the Government. 
141. Government statement, 
142 . Gov8rnrnent s tatement r8ad by Mohamad Hanafiah, Mini"ster of
Agr;:irian Affairs . 2r;  Aue-. 19t;h. I . P. 19SL.. PP. 890-891. 
C overruncnt I s announ ced intent ions 1--Tith those dernan ds, he  noted on ly a listing 
of ways to improve tr1e implementation of tl1e previously exist inf., course . Th us, 
he declared, "The mounta in has given birth to a mouse .11:llJ.J IJI. Yunan I'Jasution , 
in referen ce to the statement that a commission would be set up to make 
in vesti&ations, 1-1ondered whether tr1e Government had ever read the report sub­
mitted by its own delegation headed by Djanu Ismadi.144 The Government did 
not answer this, but it did report that out of 35,425 families wh ich had to 
move , 28, 744 had declared their read iness to move , and of these 21,215 had 
already moved . It also noted that there rema ined a problem of a bout 60JOOO 
faznilies of illegal occupants on 200,000 he ctares (out or- the- 600;000· .held by 
members of AVRC6),  wh ich had to be returned to the Government .145 
Two mont hs later the State Cormnission for East Sumatra Estate Lands 
Distribut ion Affa irs was decreed into existence .  Hm,rever,  another four months 
passed before its members, cha ired by Residen Subakti Pusponoto of the I'JJ:inistry 
of the Interior, were officially a ppointed . Since the cha"irman shortly a fter-
1--rards beca me  ill, Vice Cha irman Singgih ( of the 1-'1in istry of Agrarian Affa irs ) 
became its head .146 
The new Connnission was :installed on 10 March 1954. N ine days later 
1113. Speech ,  28 Aug. ,  IoPo 1953,  p .  7360 
l.44. Spee ch ,  29 Aug . ,  I.P. 1953, P•  749. 
145. Govermnent Reply, 2 · sept . �  I.P. 1953, P• 794. The text cited the 
figures on settlers as "persons", not "families" . 
146. 11Keputusan Presiden R .I .  No.  19511 , 17 Nov. 1953, and "No .  6311 ,. 
5 l1.ay 1954; I.P. 1954, pp . 890-891. One section of the commission consisted 
of 3 representatives of farmers"' organizations ,  l from the P.P.N., and 2
representatives of private entrepreneurs; and one section consisted solely 
of 6 representatives of farmers"1 organ izations.  The delay in appointin g  the 
members was caused by the d ifficulty in select ing the representatives of the 
farmers ' organizationso  
·16S 
Governor S. fl. Arnin of North Sumatra issued his 11 standfast11 order. This pro­
vided that occupation of estate lands occu!'..ing prior to 27 Aurust 19.53 would
'• 
be settled by ·the ne-t•J' State Commission in line lr7ith instructions given it by 
the liinistry of Agrarian Affairs on 5 l.iarch 1954. In effect this .raeant post­
ponement of any such solution until the Central G overnment issued in�tructions 
on the basis of proposals from the State Commission. However, persons involved 
in new occupations or expansion of old ones .occurring after 27 August 1953 were 
considered to have violated the standfast and were given one week to move to 
places specified by the regional -governments or suffer the consequences. At 
the request of a Communist labor leader the deadline was postponed .-until 20 
April. Still a rr1onth passed vrithout moves by the violators, most . of 1-1hom were 
associated with the groups in the Joint".Secretariat of Farmers Organizations 
for Solving the Land Problem of North Sumatra. en the day of the deadline, 
as the regional government was considering action to take, the Joint Secretaria · 
ringleaders assembled at the Governor i s offices and announced that the farmers 
could be moved beginning the next day. Accordingly, to facilitate the moving 
. ' 
through 26 1-'Iar the - nBupati Hanafiah Commission" 1-1as set up, vrhich included 
four persons from organizations in the Joint Secretariat •" .A third category 
of squatters--those who newly occupied estate": lands after 20 April-�was turned 
over to the police for action.147 
147. Antara, 21 Apr. 1954; l'11inister Hanafiah statement, op� cit. 
Tne first request for postponement of tl;le d�adline for moving the :
second category squatters came from the head of an organization called 
Koperasi Ikatan Pekerd{a (,,'.Jorkers Cooperative League: ) t Abdul Xarm M.s.$ 
who had reestablished he P.K.I. and set up SOBSI il1 North Sumatra during 
the Revolution. The following year Xarim and G ov • .Amin both ran in the 
general elections on the 11Angkatan Baru Indonesia" .ticket. 
Bupati Teuku Hanaf i.ah ·is not"· t o  be confused with Vti.nister Mohamad 
Hanafiah. 
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In the ·"meantime, although the �tate Commis"sion"·"reported increased mutual 
understand:ing among its members, little else 1-1as accomplished during its two­
month tenn, and so it 1r1as extended until 10 August 1954. Because of the 
social, economic, and political ramifications of the land problem in East 
Sumatra, its 1-1ork was sl0t,1ed down. Nevertheless, in .August it 1-1as able to 
present & preliminary report with recommendations for distributing land of 
tobacco and other estates". Rather than seeking a solution ccncerned solely 
"Tith the subject of land, it sought one which also considered social and 
political factors and the interests and possibilities for development of the 
surrounding region. It approved the willingness of estate operators to return 
part of their lands to the Government, recommended a registration of the 
settlers which would differentiate bet't-1een those actuall y living as farmers 
and those havmg other livelihoods, and called for removals made according 
to orderly plans, preceded by necessary preparation of the land and taking 
into consideration the interests of the estate operators.148 
More Attempts to Solve Land Disputes 
Although the East Sumatran land problems had been attracting the most"·". 
attention, it was estimated that by mid-19.54 80,000 of some 200, 000 hectares 
of estate · land on Java were siJniJarly occupied by the local populatione149 
Efforts tm,a-ard settlement of land disputes through seekmg agreement bet1-1een 
the parties concerned seldom led to satisfactory results. Since most estates 
-• • • M 
were on n1otmtainous land, improper use of l-Jhich brought erosion .. hazards, since 
irregular use of estate land delayed reconstruction of a branch of production 
148. Minister Hanafiah statement, opocit., pp . 891-8920 
1490 Tambahan Lemba.ran-Negara R&I� No" 594, (1954) o !'lost squatting on 
Java occurred in the ka.:residenan of Kedir:l, r•Jalang, and Surakarta, l-rhere 
23, 0001 20,000, and J.L,ooo hectares were occupied by 13,000, 8000, and 
7000 families, respectively. 
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admittedly important for the State at that time, and because several disputes 
and disturbances endangering the public order had occurred in such areas, the 
Government determined to take. more emphatic steps to'li"rards a solution of the 
problem. It decided on measures with a two-fold goal : (1) to give a legal 
status to occupants of estate land". so that they would have an opportunity to 
improve their standard of living; and (2) to give estates which were important 
to the country an opportunity to continue their operations. According�y, the 
Government, having heard the advice of its commissions on land problems, on 12 
June 1954 issued an emergency law for settlement of the problem of the use of 
estate land by the population. The new law authorized the Minister of Agrarian 
Affairs to arrange for the local authorities to hold discussions with estate 
operators and representatives of the settlers in regions designated by him. If 
agreement between the parties was reached, it was to be published in a joint 
decree of the Minister of Agrarian Affairs and four other ministers. If no 
agreement were reached, on the recommendation of the local authorities the five 
ministers would determine a solution by joint decree, taking into consideration 
the interests of the people concerned, those of the population of the surround­
ing regions, and the position of the estate in· the country's  economy. The arer. 
of estate land to be given over to the State for redistribution, and the compen­
sation therefor, were to be specified in the joint decree. Violators of the 
terms of the joint decree and persons who squatted on estate land after the 
date of the law were subject to fines and jail sentences.15° 
The new emergency law, on the one hand, gave legal recognition to the 
status of occupants of estates "t-rho arrived before its promulgation, pending a 
settlement for which it provided". On the other hand, it was given teeth in a 
150. "Undang2 Darurat No. 8/1954". 
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. . . 
· provisio11 that v:i ol, :tors t�<.;t..ici prost-cutLd �,nd subj&ct tc evic"tion followin�.t:L 
: .a, {judicial ruling of vinlc:tion . Prf;Viously; · a StparatL juclfcment orcil ririg 
eviction had bcGn r�quir€d. Tht teeth, howtv€r, were not very sharp, for the 
J'ines wer·e a maximum of Rp. 500 and tht jail tcnn thrEE mon ths, and nc1'r 
squett.ers ·c c,ulo not be im.incdir,tLly €victed. A s  r rt.sult, squatting orrarrizcd 
-by �,cvcral political "fr. rmE.rs"' organi znticns '' rcsu.rnc. d on <l large scale, 
s, ;��JlLi'11f:,11tt:d cy unorganiztd occupatj on � 
In t.hL cHrly fiftit:-s,  while smr:llhold1;,r ou tput c ,f  c.stf!.tL- products 
·st16\-1l-d i mpnrtant in(:rcr\2l:;s over thb prE:-war pericd, ltgi tirntzed Ind( nosian-
ization of  €stc::tt ar.ricr:ltur� was rE::lc?.tivE:ly limi ted to · thE P.P.N . , Bank"· 
· Iitclustri Negara subsidiaritS ( sc, veral of which Wf rE joint enterprises w:ith 
rt sident c:1.110 foreign capital ) ., and e. hflndful of r 1:.lP..tiv(;ly srn.:111 privc:ttly­
::ownt.:d 0stat6s .  l,Jher<;. legi timc'l.tt transfer o .f possession tcjok plac,: ,  it  
appeared that the grtater part of the sal(.,S or sub-lettir1g by Dutch compr:mcs 
had gon� to Chincse.151 Of course a r�latively larg� number of €states still 
-lay in . various conditions of  nt::glect. YGt alien estate agriculture"· still- • 
.played an important,  if less dominant, role in the country' s  economy, and at 
:tht:· · timt. of thL t;lections its outlook did not se€m on the · surface too for-
boding, for the.rt were still important elements of the Indonesian cormnunity 
interested in assuri.ng that estates remained in production and contributE:d 
their sh2rc to tl1b Indonesi�n nc1tional product. Despi te harassmEnts in 
ce:rtain :r;e�i.ons ,- thE. arE-a cf t..StE:t6 land. restored to cultivation on Javr..". 
by 195L. ·had risen to about sixty-four perc�n.t nf tht 1940 area and 
151. John Paul Meek, The Govc�nment anq �conomic Dev6lopment in · 




that ot1tside Jave (p rincipally on Sumatra) to 77 p ercent •" Altho11gh most of . 
these estates h ad already been restored before th e establishment of th e lTnitar:y 
Republic, as App endix A shows, there t1ere still increases in area brought under 
cultivation of  approximatel1r nine and 18 perc ent, resp ectively, for the four 
,rear s fol�o,1ing. 
Neverth eless, the existence of  ali en est ates "ras vecy much a public . :],$su e • 
.nespite the vast str etch es oi� vir gin terri tor�, in Indonesia wh ere Indones�an 
. . . :..,. .  
government, cooperative., syndicalist ., or private est ates could conc eivaqly be 
1 ·  •. 
·established, there ,ias relatively little organized sentiment" for creat�n� .suoh. 
new fields of produ ction. Political actio11 v-ras directed., .instead, at the alien 
estates already existing--especially those with long-term proprietary rights . . ' 
·By 19:55 "private lands" ( not limited to th e rural sector) . were only ai vestige., 
of their pre-war size and were on the verge of extinction. Th e conc ensu.s of 
legitimate actions as reflected in Parliament and the Agrarian Affairs institu­
tions,  appeared to favor repl acing agricultural c oncessions vrith leases, and 
long-t"erm leases with those of shorter terms". Th e new leases would stipulat e  
extensive social obligations"o 
But wh ereas it is not inconceivable th at most Indonesians would h ave been 
contented with limiting the area, term, and other rights of  alien estates in 





elections brou ght ill bodings for th e potential future existence of alien 
estates, for certain organizations wh.ich thrived on creating and enlarging clas f  
differences were consolidating their action. 
I n  September 1953 follo1,ving the stage of th e Communist "lJnit ed Peasants 
Front""., the pro-P.K .I . leaders of  the B •. T eI.  voted to merge t-Ji th the R.T .,I., 
(the P.K .I. su bsidiary wh ich did not recognize private property and which h ad 
-------------
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as its goal a "people"'s democracy" for Indonesia) •
152 
!lost of  the other demo­
cratic farmers ' l eaders had long since left the B.T .I �, and as a consequence 
··of  thP. merg er,  the moderate socialists led b°IJ Tauchid withdrew and set up their 
01-rn Gerakan Tani  Indonesia ( G.T .I .--Indonesian Farmers }1ovement ) o153 
Also in September 1953, Sidik Kertap ati ( Chairman of  Sakti),  whose United 
Progressives had ·won the defense portfolio for l'ir. Iwa Kusuma Sumantri in the 
Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet , withdrew his motion , declaring that most of  its 
demands had been taken over by the new Goverrnnent ."154 However, Sakti, an org an-
·"ization of  farm-laborers and poor p e asants principally in West Jave, itself 
contained a variety o f  l ess sophisticated Communist ' factions, inclu ding some 
·close to Partai Mur ba and Acoma (the Young Commu nist Lea gu e ) .  Consequ ently, 
although Sakti was united in feeling that Indonesian farmers could only prosper 
if the land of  "alien and Indonesian landlords" vras seized and distributed "to 
the farmers who work it",155 dissatisfaction with the withdrawal of the Sidik 
. .
motion plus opposition to merging in a P .K .I .-dominated organization meant that 
almost another two years elapsed before Sidik was able  to bring his rump Sakti­
P.K .I". into the B�T1.I. in June 1955. 
152_0 Almanak Pertanian 1953, P •. 133; ,! .  Po 1955, pp � 32,:. 950 According to.the new BeT c .l o program ., the poor and landless farmers had to be freed from the 
exploitat ion o f  landlords and commi�s�on ag ents and had to attract the medi� 
:_ ;farmers over to their side while neutralizin g  the rich farmers"l> 
· · .- 153 0 Almanak Pertanian 1954, p .  147. The G.T e.I . declared that it 't-Tas 
ba sed on democracy and had a goai of  raising the standard of  living of the
Indonesian farming popul ation in order to cooperate with other groups"· to
organize a society free  from exploit ation • .  
1540 Spe�ch., 7 Sept • ., I .P. 1953, PP• 812-8130 
155c Cf. Sidik K ertapati, Untuk Persatuan dan Memperluas _ Perdjuangan Tani, 
(D�akarta:  B.T �I • ., I955) c Sakti had been founded in Djakarta in Decem ber 1949
larg ely from the Lasjkar Rak.iat of  1,Jest Java., which Sidik had headed ("-µnder the 
·name "Andu · Sidik11) e . .  Unlike the pro-P.I{oI •  parties 1r1hich had earlier backed the 
Lingg ardjati Agreement along with the P.K.I.  (consenting to the restoration o f
alien estates ) ,  the \1Test Java Lasjkar Rakjat had consistentzy opposed such 
return"., 1-rith arms as well as propagandao 
1$6. 
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Of course there had been both legitimate and illel itimate action to 
restrict the area of alien estates , start:ing ,1ith tl1ose portions that had never 
been cultivated and those on l-lhich settlements had moved. But the goal of those 
peasant groups 1,;hicl1 often came fo:n·1ard as the pri1:1e-movers for such peripheral 
acquisitions appeared to be the ultimate annihilation of all alien estates .  At 
the same time, the largest of the 1nany estate union federations were dominated 
by xenophobic Communist factions, which favored expropriation if not outright 
conf'iscation of alien estates by tne State. l·iean1r1hile, G·"overnrnent policy in 
this very complex matter had often seemed ambiguous, and executi·on of that 
policy had been ineffectual. Thus, ·"despite the series of standfasts, illegal 
Indonesianization flourished as a form of anarcho-syndicalism."- By the time -of 
the elections, a solution of the land problems on Java and Sumatra was st,il.J 
far from attainment.156 Consequently, there vias evidence that although a 
period of only five years had elapsed bet·ween the transfer of sovereignty and 
the general elections, the life expectancy of alien estates had been reduced 
by a far greater amount. 
Affairs, 
See Karl J. Pelzer, 11The Agrarian Conflict in East"- Sumatra" , Pacific 
XYJC (1957 ) ,  157-159. By 1957 approximately half a million persons
,-rere reportedly squatting on 114, 250 ha. of estate land. 
CH.� I-'Tlli XIX: �.;AHUFACTURING 
By 19.50, most 1-a.rg<.;-scalt,; and mediwn-sized ir1dustrilS ( by l nu0nLsia11 
s 1,ar1ciaras) wt:r<.; still thos£ opt.::ratLcl by· Dutch and Chinese comJ:Janics, 
I'(;SpLcti vely . Although su >SE.:qucntly, all plar1s for "industrialization" ano 
"Indon�sianiza ti.on" de:votcd much space to tht.sc industrial sectors, new 
investm�nts in medii..un-siz�d industri8s remained far·"below th� n�cct and 1.n 
large-scale indus�rits wore extremely f8w. 
Mohammad Hatta, returning frora the Round 'fa ,)lE.. Cunf(;rcr1cf-� in late 19l.i9, 
had forecast that the FIS economic policy would givL attbntion to th0 osta blisb­
Jnt:;nt of new industriE:s .1 Under his su'>sequent administration with IJjuanda 
as Minist€:-r of Prosperity, how�vGr, little."· attention was givc,n to new industrit: .. 5 
as t.:mphasis was placed on high-priority i terns such as rcs,toring past productim 
( �Spbcially on l. S  ta tcs) and facilitating the Oi... vE.:lopmcnt of an Indoncs1.a11 
import, rs I cla5s. One reason cited by 1'-iinistcr Djuanda for thb lack of 
emphasis in this S8ctor was thG shortage of for0ign uxchange for - machintry for 
new factories . 2 E.ven ai'tcr tht:. announcement of a �100,000,000 line of crbdit 
from the Export-Import .:ank of \-iiashington .. for the " de_velopm<;;;nt of' the 
,: . -. . . .
Indontlsian national ( Conoiey-" , far fewer projects involving nC;w industries 
wcr� drawn up than for agriculture, transportation, and public works .3 
1 .  Statement in Bangkok, 13 Nov. 19u9 . 
2. Rt-.:ply by liinistcr .ujuanda to qua-., by Yamin in ParliamC:;nt, 23 Mar. 
1950, RIS Dewan P Lrwa.ki.lan Rakjat, P crtanjaan An, .gota dan Djawaban P1...m£:.:rintah,r, pp. e2-BS. 
3 .  Reply b.'/ Djuanda to query by Lrningpradja, 23 :t-'Iar. 1950, ibid. ,  pp. 
85-87 . Some manufacturing equipment projected under the line of credit was
intended to aid agriculture, e . g .  machines for rehabilit2ting ostate factories 
and a new factory to produc e fertilizer. See letter by Djuanda in reply to 
a query by !1ochamad Tauchid,  17 iray 1950, ibid. , II ,  p. 71.  
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Industrial rehabilitation continued to be financed largely through foreign 
banks. However, Government funds, channeled through the Bureau for l.inan.cing 
Reconstruction of the Ministry of Finance, were also applied, especially in 
restoring sugar mills.4 
After the Natsir Cabinet took office, with Dr. Sumitro :hjojohadikusumo 
as Minister of Trade and Industry, it announced plans far establishing a 
development company to be- capitalized at Rp. 200,000,000.5 It also announced 
that an industrial plan was being drawn up to give priority to industries 
manufacturing: (a) textiles; (b) agricultural and household implements and 
general consumer goods; ( c) products processed from local raw materials; and 
(d) building materials. 6 
During the debates in Parliament over the cabinet•  s program; Mr. Harmani 
. . 
(PIR) urged that the i'ormation of mixed enterprises by alien capital and 
Indonesians be encouraged an'd applied to factories which had not by then been 
restored. He urged that Indonesians acquire .51 percent of · such col.JlPanies, 
using money borrowed ·a·t low interest rates from the Bank Negara Itido.nesia. 7 
- . 
Mr. Tadjuddin Noor (also of PIR) eJq>ounded .at length his· views on the · 5r: 49 
ratio i'or mixed enterpriaes and recommended that it be applied also to the 
Governmente' s  proposed development oorporation. 8 
,. 
4. Bank Industri Negara, Repo:rt on the- Fi;rst S Years of its E;x:istence , ' · · · 
ffienoeforth, B. I.N. Report?, p. lO. · 
I , . I. 
S. Statement of Goverrunant Policy., 21 Sept. 1950., Risalah Perup.dj,ngap 
19$0, pp. · 339...340. The initial capital was to come from .Rp; 25,000,ooo·5in 
government credits. Most of the balan® was expected to be s·ought through
sellin.g bonds on the open market. 
6. Ibid. , P• 356, 
7, Speech., 29 Sept. �.1P. l.950, PP• 782, 786. 
8. Speech, 4 ·o·ot.· ., R. P. 1920, PP• l41S-lli20. Noor suggested that t.he 
nA•-cr01 nT'lmon +. �t'\ffln!lTl,_r f a  l".Anit.i:11 i,.nnl n ho i n,-.'t-i�tlc,on t.n 'h.!)1. f.' !l n -4 1 1  -i nn -roi,n -l J:i h o  
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The Government, in reply, promised as part of its endeavor to strengthen 
the people 's  econonzy-, to stimulate the establishment of large-scale productive 
enterprises with Indonesian capital. As a concrete example of such Indonesian­
ization it cited the granting of licenses to seventeen Indonesian "newcomers" 
to set up rubber remilling plants ( in  a sector dominated by Chinese capital) .  
However, alien capital was also to be allowed to participate in large-scale 
production, subject to conditions that would guarantee the peopl e's  welfare. 
It followed from this that there was still a need for a 11marriage" of alien 
and Indonesian capital so long as this did not lead merely to the use of the 
Indonesian name as a front or injure the State."9 
The 51: 49 ratio for new mixed industrial enterprises, which had been 
stipulated by the former Republic of Jogjakarta, had the approval of the new 
Government of the Unitary Republic. Accordingly, during an official trip to 
liestern Europe , Minister Sumitro reportedly secured the agreement of four 
Eur_opean companies (three Dutch and one Swedish) to establish branch plants 
in Indonesia in cooperation with an Indonesian Goverruoont agency under this 
ratio."lo 
Economic Ur�ency Program 
. , ' 
' .
During Swnitro"1 s incumbency an Economic Urgency Program drafted by the 
Directorate of Trade and Industry (under Dr. Saroso) was prepared, and in 
April 1951 it was published. It provided a provisional guide, pending its 
formalization in a statute, under which the Government could control the 
9. Government reply ll Oct. , R.P. 1950, pp. 1828-1830, 1835. 
10. Van Oorschot, De Ontwikkel:in van de Ni verheid in Indonesi�, p.  119;
Indonesian Review, I (19 l ,  -37. he Swedish company ope" , ted a paper
mill; the Dutch companies: a wire and cable plant (Nederlandse ,Draad on Kabel­
fabriek of Del:rt) ,  a bicycle factqry, and a textile mill. Despite the pro­
mises, there was no speedy establishment of the branch plants. 
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establishment of n�w cnt1.;rprisl s .  I t  provided that thu GovcorruncrrL had to have 
a dominant control of new "key i.ndus tric,s 11 , ir1cludir1g oLfunsu plEt11ts , ' .1as.i c 
chemical industriuso cement plantso po1.JLr plantso1 l1a tt)r1Jorks , and trar1sport., ., 
enterprises.  This was to hL: assu1 0_. c !  by Go·,,E::rnmr.ont participation in at le:ast 
fi ft;y-pcrccnt of the capital and two-thirc;s of the p1·c-.. fGrrcd shares ,  \-JJ. th a 
majority on the board of directors . The balancG in one case would '1E; in pri ,,at 
I r1conesian hands , and a " third part�y" ( aliens) would suryc.: · undor n1anagcrncr1t­
eontrac ts to provide technical s ,J.J)Cr\,iosior1 of the construction� to manage , and 
to train Ir1aoncs1ans for ll;ading posi.t,ions in th0 0r1tcrpriseo. In a second 
case,  a " third party" might joir1 private lr1donLsians in minority participation, 
11but his function ·would s till b0 limited to manag6r.
'The Economic Urgency Prograrri allowed foreign capital a more acti vc role 
ir1 "nonessential" industries . fiure too a further di vision was possi blc. 
lNhcre private Indonesian in ter1..:st ir1 such factories was in reality or potent­
ially great, a mixed enterprise 1riight be set up so long as IndonL-sians 
acquired a majority of the stock (including prefcrr�;d shares )  and of the 
s1.�ats on the board of directors, wit� ·tht Gov0rnmc:nt sLrving as temporc=iry 
. .. .. . .' 
fir1ancicr 11 to bridge any possible gaps"o. The corporation charter would 
provide f'or th€;! gradual transfe r of shares from 2,li0n stockholdLrs to 
I r1doncsians and would require alien ffit.,mbcrs to train an I 11dor1esl.an staff. 
\;Jht..re private Indonesian capital C:;isplay_c;d no interest, alien capital cou�d 
invest within th0 framu1A1ork of the; f_; cr1L;ral economic plan. Such companies too, 
horJ8VC.:r ,  would·  hav0 to be i-rilling to accept e ventual I r1doncsian stock 
participation and staff personnel or to trai11 Indo11csJ.ans to take over 
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staff functions .1 2  
'rhe Urgency Program ( sometimes called the Sur.iitro Plan)  had im;Jortant 
:" 1 rovisions for the ;)remotion of small"-scale industries and industrial 
res€arch. Tlns study, however, isconcerned only liith its plans for large­
scale industries . These also lrere divisible into ti10 grou�s : short-term 
(expected to be completed by the end of 1952 ) and long-term. 
Table 38 : Short-term Large-scale Industrial Projects, Sumitro Pl an 
Type of project No. of units Proposed sites Est. cost* -
1 .  Printing plants 6 (later 7 )  Djakarta (2) Semarang, Rp. 13.J 
Surabaja, Palembang., I-1cdan.,
Makassar
2. Rubber remilling 9lants 7 Eandjorrr.asin, Serr.pit, Pontianak, 24
South Asahan., Sibolga., Djambi,
Palembang, 
J .  Portland cement plant 1 nos.  (later Gresik) 
4. Tire factory 1 
5. Spinning mill 1 
25.3II 
II (later Tjilatjap) 
6. Knitting mills 




II (later Surabaja)  11 .s  
• 
* in mill ions 
n.s .:  not i .mediately Gpecified 
Source : Indonesian Review, I, 187 . 
Table 39: L ong-term1 L arge-scale Industrial Pro;je cts--Sumitro Plan 
Type of project No o of units 
1 .  Caustic soda factory-----1-
2 .  Am. sulfate fertilizer plant 1 
3. Aluminum plant 1 
4. Scrap-iron smelting plant 1 
5 . Flytrood facto:t"'J 1
6. 1-Toodpulp and paper factory 1 
7 .  Gl ass factOlj' 1 
8 .  Spinning mills 3
9. Knit ting mills 6
1 
Prosposed sites • Est. cost➔� 
n .s .  (later tfaru) Rp. 80 
Tjepu 75
Ashan Valley 92 . 5  
Semarang 48.2  
n.s.  10
Takengon 67 .5  
Surabaja 12.5 
n .s .  105 
II 19 •5 
II 
8.3
10.  Tannie acid plant 
11 . Desiccated coconut plant 1 Sukur ( ; iinahassa ) 
3/'" = in mill ions 
n.s .  - not immediately specified 
Source: Indonesian Revielr, I, 188-189 
1-Jhereas the short-term projects, requiring investments of Rp.178,685,000 
12.  Ibid. , p.  186. 2xisting enter,rises (not so easily c ontrolled as
ne"..r ones ) rnight receive Government loans for expansion provided that the 
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were virtually all post-indeper1dence  projects , all save tl1e last three of the 
lor1g-terrn projects ( costing a total of Rp.522, 230,000) had been ir1cluded 
in the 19 41 Industr:y- P lan. 
13 
Sumitro ' s  Economic Urgency Program was taken over by the hinister of 
. .
Economic Affairs in the Sukiman Cabinet, but the capi"tal : needed - for--it 
. .  
turned out: to be mextremeiy short supply. Thus Prime 1'1inister \vilopo had to 
announce that the period for implementing the short-term projects would be 
1L
extended from one to three years". 
Among the short-term projects only the printing plants ( the cheapest 
i terns ) were cor:1pleted an d in operation b;y 19.54; no project had been cor-ipleted 
within the allotted two years . A seventh printing press ( a secor1d one for 
Djakarta) was added, and instead of one for Palerabang, one went to Bar1dung. 
ThGse pr.osses ·were sold on credit to private national cornpanies, a number 
of  ·which were set up jointly by local newsJ)aper companies. The c:.ernand for 
rubber ren1illing plants was not so sustained as that for printing presses , arid 
by 1954 only five Government plants had been built to join the b6 private 
plants ir1 existence. t1oreover, the plants !'Juilt did not go ir:u:,eciately ir1to 
operation for various reasor1s including the s l1arp co1,1petition from examingp.ant� 
·. :-ould �roo to include Indo11esians in tho staff or tr:J.in thern for such 
pocitions". 
:tj. bet: table 9 .  The only projects in ·the 19Ll plan which had been 
realized were some of the spinr1ing mills . The country ' s  great demand for y·arn, 
however, led to provisions for addi"tional spinning mills in both the short­
term and long-term projects of the Sun�tro P lan. 
The alumint?n plant's C'onstruction was continge·nt on the prior construction 
. an ele9tric power plant at the f all s on the Asahan ( at additional expense ) .  
14. Statement, 3 June, I . P .  1952, p .  571 . ..
lS . "The Government ' s  program on industries" ,  Ekonomi dan Keuangan 
I 11donesia, VII ( 19.54) , pp . 705-709. S ee below i'o:r particulars or1 large- and
medium- scale industries develo·ped during this period. 
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Thrl!e of the other projGcts ·wE-rt:: eventually Lakcn over b�, the Bank l nous tri 
:h.. gara, while the tire and knitting plants in the light of increasE'.d  dor1est:i. c 
production were r10 loneer so urgent . 11ost of the long-tcrn1 projects 1.-.;c-:re 
su�Js8quently absorbec� into the planning of the State Planmng BurGau. 
Industrialization and Foreign Investment 
On 21 March 1951, shortly hefore the r,J atsir Ca 1)inet went out of office, 
llinister ;:,umi tro installed an Inc:ustrialization Conum. ss1.on, with l)rs . KHOUvJ 
Rian Tie as Chairman. Seven weeks later, }t.nister 3oej ono HacL..no�o, t0rm.Lng 
foreign investment necessary if  the national econorr� was t0 be promo�ed, 
declared that he consid£red the .:-orei6n investr11en[. d1.rEcti ves in the 1conornic 
Urgency Program both attractive to .f oreign capi tal and sufficihent to protect 
national interests .h16 
Under these circumstanct:!S , the Commiss::i..on co11t1.11uod J. ts work, and or1 
31 J�ugust i t  issued an intc-r:i m report which asserted that: ( 1) I r1donesia ' s 
economic future demand£d that the Government give leadership to economic 
d€VE:.:lo_p m.ent but without rejecting private ini tiat,i ve; ( 2)  the goal of 
industrj alization had to bt: thE attainment of a �alancEd econonrl.c s tructure , 
the utilization of the population increase, and r,he raising of the national 
income; and ( 3)  the hasic form of indur;try had to consist  of srnall uni ts--a t 
1nost mediuri-sized--and that large:: enterprises would have to support proc:: uct1011 
connected �,i th rural development •
1
l The Commission then elaborated on the 
foreign ir1vestment provisions in the urgency program and cl2ssificd industries 
into four groups . Group I were incustries which had to Jelong to thE; btate and 
16. Indonesian Review, I ( 1951), p .  169. 
1 7 .  w.n Oorschot, op,ci t . ,  p .  68. 
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fron1 ·which foreign capi"tal participation was to bB virtually cxcluc1(,u, •�J . t._;". ,  
u8fcnsc in0ustri E!S and public u tili -c,ies .  Group II  were i nuus cri; ,s  wtuch 
were; r0scrved for lr1concs�ans,  i ncluding small-scale i11dustrits and those 
trad.;. t,1.onally opera teci b;: Indor1esians . G roup III were " ½asic or ke;r" 
ir1dustri es ,  in i1hich forei '. :>ners could invest but in  which I ndont;sian capital 
was to have or to acqui.:re '·)y optior1 a controlling positior1 (at least 51 percent)"> 
in  th(; abser1ce of private Indonesian capital, the Bank lndustri Negara. would 
be · the Ir1donesiar1 participant. Group IV we re rni scellaneous inc,ustrie�, i11 
which foreign and Inctor1csiar1 capi Gal could participate without restrictions on 
their capital holdinL;s, but in which trainir1g of lr1oonesians for the highest 
positions would be require<J.18 
Despite the value of such grouping> as a rule of  thwnb, many cases fell or1 
the ,)ordf;rline.  t'lorcov, r ,  although the Co1nrrii.ssion once gave n o cice that 
i t  would prE::sent c:: d (  tailed plan for a balanced development of Groups I ,  1.I , 
s11d IlI , it  failed to yield further concrete results . 19Knowledgc of its stallf.'d 
opt?ratior1s did not ir.u.1ediately co111e to light, but when no further report from 
tht: Commission was issued, Engel and l�srarudin in P.aFlia:oient in· mid-1952 in­
quired about this matter, and Engel 2sked the Government to explain i ts 
position on the ratio !)etween alien and national capital in  the industriali-
. + 20zat1.on S8C .,or. Thl; Wilopo Government replied that this latter subject had 
been turned over to the Industrialization Commission, but i t  was unable to give 
18 . Ibid . ,  .pp . 69-72; of. "The Government ' s  program on industrit.,s" ,
Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia, Vll ( 19SL ) ,  p .  728. 
19. van Ooorschot, op .cit . ,  pp . 12-73.  
20. Speeches, 20 tlay and 6 Jun�, I .P .  1952, pp . 169 , 634. 
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any !-'rogress report on tht:: work of tho Commission i tsL.lf. 21 
Concerru.ng industrialization, the \vilopo Cabin&t cxplain0d that it w,: s 
to bt di.rE:cted primarily toward incrcr,.sing the r,1anufacturo of conunodi ties for 
dumes tic consump tion and replacing iI1iports. This goal was to be approach0d 
through such ways as building ai1d expanding "basic" industries using 
domestic materials, promoting industries that manufac"tured commodi tics which 
could be used by the existing production apparatus, er�cting ent0rprises by 
the Goverrunen t.  and/or the funk Industri Negara, so long as pri vnte national 
initiati vc ·was lackirig, and issuing regulations to pro tc.ct  new enterprises 
. 22durin.g th ." . · t· 1eir im ia ST,age. 
I ncreased in tere,st in the possible role of foreign capital in i11dustrial­
iza tion folloi1ed a cri ticism in  July 19.52 of th8 h:i..ghly-pu.blicizeo Eco11omic 
Urgency Program, wlu.ch had been the forfjrunncr oJ the investment class'.l.f::i..ca­
tions of the I ndustrialization Commission. vJ'hile J&,.va Bank PresidE:n.t 
Sjc.fruddin expressed his resp£;ct for the intE.:ntion of the Urgency Plan·, hf­
took issue with the naturt of i ts categorizations". Thus, he deplored its 
use of such terms as "national capi tal" and "national economy" without 
defi:nition . Sometimes "national" appeared to r e:,fer to " ci tizen" ,  and at 
other times as "indigenous citizen " ,  while the "economically weak" for whom 
various small indus tries W(ire reserved werE. Indonesian national-s . Sjafruddin 
also felt that too much emphasis was placed on ownership ,  so that the 
Gov(�rnmt;nt ignored the fact  that i t  might exercise authori ty ov6r an industry 
without n8cessarily having a majori ty control of i ts stock . The plan , 
moreover, gave the impression that i' orcign capital and personnel had to be 
21. Statement, 3 June, I .P .  19.52, p.  566. 
22 .  S tat�ment, 9 May, I .P .  1952 p.  249 .  , 
Fortign investment came to be treated not merely as a subsidiary item in an 
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th<3:nkf'ul for the opportuni t.y of working ir1 lndon�sia, wht•reas · .:.he c:0r1u1 ....L cr<l."1:}' 
w€ak would bene:fi t most from an expansion of foreign capi tal (arid thus of 
.J:..1r0Juc tion)  in Indonesia. 
23 
Sjafruddin recommended that all personnel and en t�rpri��s working in 
J:.r1donesia be considered as national capital, regardl8ss of tt1e nationc:1.li ty 
of t,he 1 nl\i v.Lciuals conct:orned, and that the only dif .:.' crence 1nado bL tw0en 
"national" and "forcic;n" would be that no transfers abroad would be allovJCd 
the one, whereas the possibili ty would be open to the other. \1,jhilc sugges ting 
tr.At foreign capital 1r1ould best work in the export sec tor anq that 11 dorr1estic 
capi tal" from the net proc 1:,e·ds -0.f: exports b<'.: used in  cstablishir1g comestic 
industries , and citing Turkey and India as examples of non-discrimination 
toward foreign capi tal, he urged that if iorbign capi Lal did manifest an 
ir1tcrest in some ac tivi ty where insuflicicnt inter€st was displayed ir1 
I ndoncsia!l qua1 te:rs, the foreign., busincss�n should be allo1-1ed to de, vote his·
er1�·r6ies to that  field. However, where no private capi tal evinced intcrcs t:, in. 
particular projec ts considered by the Government to be "of major importance· 
fo r strengthening the economic structure. of Indonesia" , Sjafruddi n declarec:l · 
that i t  would be up to the Government to ( s tablish State industries in  order 
to fill the gap. 24 
The sharp decli ne in  s tate revenues which was occurring at Ghe time the 
.1ilopo Cabin0t was .forme:d gr-ad�ally \)rought increased awareness of the subject 
of n€w foreign investment and oi' iT,s p(?tential importance t<? the �conomy.. 
23 .LSjafruddi n Prawiran0gara, ed.J'Java Bank Report, _1951/1952, (Dja��rta :  
Kolff, 1952) ,  pp . 39-1..io . . Tho ;E;nglish and Dutch versions of the Urgency 
Program and the Commission ' s  classifications translated "national" as .,
"Indonesian . "  
24. Ibid . ,  pp. 39�Ll. 
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inuustrializution plan ·)ut as a subjec t uorth: Oi i-c,b ot, :n sc. parctt . llc!i, and 
cabinets there.after 6avc this :.. cpc.att:;d consid(;ration . 
25 
1 .. ccordin.;-=l,y, 
�jafru1..-din'  s rer;1arks 1-Jer8 1110::t tir.1cly--evC;n l. �  the� did run c .. un i.:.(r to the 
f<:: clings of man;y Inc. onGsi.&ns at c.hat r..ir.1e. 
Bank I ncustr1. tlcgara 
for Financing Reconstruct:i..on conti11uc d to channel bo .:L r·nrr1<-.i1t.. lunas to 
industr::..c1l and l)lanta t:i..on projects, and b;>' mid-Scpter:1 �er 1950 it hcd ht-en 
decided to <:stablish another state orf;anizot,�_on to fine.nee reconstruct,:i..on 
instead of the. B.N. I . ,  ·which ·was startJ.nL to spcc: _alize in ser1r_,_ nL .:orcign 
trade . Originally thE:· corpora t:...on f or1n which h2d be cr1 cor1sidercc.t .for th0 
"9.N .1 . ,. :2s chosen, �.nd i t  1Jrs planned ·l,hat rnost of the Rp. 200 nri.llion i1li tial 
capital viould be o b -L-ained on the frGe cap.:.. tal market. 26 1�ccordingly , on 4 
lipril 1951, thC;; charter of the l'J .V. Ban k  lndus"i:,ri i�< : ara (B.1 .1,J .--State 
Industrial Bank) ·was drawn up, and "i:,he new "ir1c;us"tr..c.al i"inance corporation" 
s carteu op\. rations, taking over the ou tstai1c":inw business of the Bureau for 
Reconstruction Financing."27 I ts presiding oificcrs v-JcrE: _µrinci}Jally n1en who 
held sirn:ilar positions in the Bank i.Jc6ara lr1ctoncsia. 
The requisite lct.;aliza tion of ,.,he corporation ' s  charter ·was not forth-
25. For a rc,vier1 of Inr.lonesia11 poll ti cal a tti tudcs toi-Jaro forEign
investment in 6 cneral, see Chapters XJ�V and .1J1..Vl". 
26. R.P.  1950. pp. 339-340; see "B.:N .I." in Chapter XXIII . Tadjuddin 
Noor recommended that the GovE:.rrunEnt increase the capitalization ,  suhscribe 
to 51 percent of it itself, and mak€ the rest c1vaila!)l£: to the public 
( including alien capital) . R.P". 1950, p. 1L2o. 
27 . B . I .N .  Report, pp. 10-12. The new officers were President Margono and 
·Vice President Sukasno ( both holdin[;' equivalent positions i-ri th the Bartle 1>Ic gara) 
and r:sgo Taco Kl IPER ( Deputy Director of the Foreign f;xchange I nstitute) . 
Outs tancJing loans issued by t,he ')ur-eau had increased frorri f .13 ,500 ,000 at the
start of 1950 to Rp.52 million whE,n the B.I".iJ. took ovr-::r . 
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coming in view of certain objections raised by the Ministry of Justice. There 
was also some feeling that the usual corporate fonn was inappropriate for"_"a 
government institution. Moreover, a corporation according to European civil 
and commercial law was not authorized to accept mortgages on land with an 
Indonesian customary title. According ly, the bank was given a new legal 
status by an Emergency Law promu lgated on 28 February 1952 . This defined the 
purpose ·or the B � I .It�· : "to promote the reconstruction of the country and the 
development of the Indonesian peop le in the sphere of agricultural estates, 
industry and mining."0 Provi sions of both European and Indonesian customary · law 
became applicable to it.  Its authorized capital was to be Rp.500 million. 
And its officers were appointed by the President of the Republic from binding 




Imp lementing regulations issued by the IYiinister of Finance (Surnitro) on 
12 August 1952 emphasized that the B . I .N . "1 s activities would primari ly be 
concerned with granting loans in the industrial sphere. I t  also provided that 
should granting a loan be unjustifiable from a banking point of view or because 
it did not fall within its competency, the 1·,1inister of Finance cou ld order the 
B .I .N .  to undertake such financing under his guarantee of the risks and 
liquidity position.29  
From the foregoing instructions, the Bank Industri Negara came to serve 
two sets of c lients, private industries and the Government. Not only d id the 
B .I .N .  grant loans to enterprises belonging to these two sets of c lients, but 
28. ilundang2 Darurat No.5/1952 11 and 11 Pendjelasant' .  So long as the old 
charter was not legalized, the B . I . N .  officers were liable as private persons
for all transactions . Thus the Government issued an emergency law rather than 
undergo the time-consuming process of waiting for Parliament to pass a statute .  
29. 11 Keputusan Menteri Keuangan }Jr 192508/U.  U .  11 , 12 Aug . 1952 
7G4 
it a�so participtited in the :i't:,oc, ar1d so bt car�t; a holcing cor1pa1\y ior ( ntt r­
pri ses founded b. · . ,ri vate busi11t:ss and the Govl rnrn, . nt . ln t his position it 
was one of Indonesia I s major e11treprcneurs and also the princ::i..pal membt;;r 
( often on )bhalf of  the government) of "joint e;ntE.rpris€s 11 , ir1 which oiththr 
citizens or aliens were its partn1 rs.  An idt;a o:( the groi-1th of tho Bank 
Industri ' s  activities may be gleant-:·d from th8 following table:  
Financi11g b.cti vi ties of Barie .Li ndustri Negar 195.l--1S$(in millions 
Date Pai -up capita Outstan ng ere · ts Stock participa.tions 
4 Apr.1951 Rp. 90 Rp .52 Rp . 0 
31 DE:c. 1951 lLO 130 n.a .  
31 Dec .1952 140 250 n.a.  
31 Dec.1953 2uo 351 au
31 Dec .195 !1 21tO l!26 90 
31 Dec . 1955 2!,o 531 120 
Sources : Java Bank Report, 1952-1953, p .  79; Bank lnoon�sia Heport
8 
195u-195S ,  
p .  77 ; Bank I ndustri Negara Report 1951-1956, pp . lL-16, o .  
Of the thirt:r-one credits t aken over from the Burt;au for Reconstruction 
Financing, the majority vJerl; l or rehabilitati11g sugar nrills .  Subscquer1tly , 
major portions we1°e convE- rtcv into stock and, thc..rcb�, the B .l .N . acquirGd 
control of fiv<::; sugar and three tea cstate;s . By the end of 1955 , the Bank 
Ir1custr::;., also had a stock co11trol of twenty-four other corporations, roughly 
half of which were s tarted undEr its owri ir11 tiati vc and the balance;  under 
ir1struction and where necr.ssarJr i-vi th funds frorn the Govr. rnmE:;nt. Sevf. ral of the:; 
latter group were from the Economic Urgency rrogram. In addition to the 
capital partic�pations of the B .I .N . ,  it  also granted credits to its sub-
si di2ri1:: S ,  amountinc to Rp . 224 mi 11:...on by the c:nd of 1955. At that tirnc , over 
Rp . 154 million in crcdi ts was guc1rantc0d th6 Govt,rnmcnt ( financl;d largely !);y· 
b;y Governmehnt payr1rnts)h. The balance of Rp.152h'million in credits outstEnding 
wr.s dis ·:�ributed among 145 private cor.1panies , prin.cipally 1ndustria1.h30 
JO. B.r .1,r . Hnport, pp . 10-16. J:iajor categori es of private borrowrrs i-rcre: 
textile 1;d.lls , printing prcss8s, upland c s ,.,ates ( principally tohacco) , shipping 
companie:' s, r.tr tal 1,,1orkinu, a..-- sGr:1bl�,· plants , rubber p� ·ocessing plan Ls, �:;ur,ar 1.,i 11s, 
and mini.I\, companif:s .  Cf. note 12,  s:1pra. 
.J�l though less thar1 half of the )e.nk ' s n�minal capi tal \-: a. s paict-i11 during 
the period under rLvic w, the B.I .N . b€gan to acquire a n�w ancl important 
source of 1-rorking capital in 19.Su .  This source ·was of especial interest to 
foreigners, for i t  conct;rned th(; so-called RURNI, which 1-1ere blocked rupiah 
accounts of non-residents". Posses"sors of buch. accounts , who wLrc unable to 
transfer their funds out of Indonesia, v.rE;re pE rmi tted. to invest in  reconstruc­
tion proj.r..cts v::a the Bank Industri Negara, which . issued. 15-yt�ar thrc8 p( rcE11t 
bonds. The Government guarantE.::ed that interest as ·well as principal could 
then be transferred abroad. 31 The fi rst such bond issue of Rp.5O million was 
quickly su0sc�ibod, and by th0 end of 1955, Rp . 194 milli on w orth of such 
bonds had been sold by the B .I .N.  However, since the Govcrruncnt had carrnarked 
some of these funds for housing construction, the B.I .l\J . was not i rce to 
utili ze them in in0ustrial projects which i t  rr�ght have pr8ferred. 32 
ltl though the B .I .N . officers had bE..:en appointed for f'i vc-yt.-ar t0rr:1s, lt-ss 
-c,han three mor1ths after thG installati.on of the Ali Sastro�djojo cabinet ,  2no 
Dr. oi,JG Eng Dib 2s rfinister of Finar1ce, there was a major shakeup i n  the bank I s 
officE.,rs . The justification given ·was �hat sorne duplication between the 
offict rs of the B .I .l-!. and of the B .N .I . ought to be er1ded. Accordingly, . 
President lJiargono was honor2bly ciischargcd. Vi ce Presi dent Suka.s110 r elin­
quished his position ·wi th the B .N . I .  and was reappoint<:;d to the B . I .l'J .  ( but 
in the third i nsteaq of the secor:.d-ranking position) . The occas:i_on was used 
to di scharg0 honorably t,he last remaining alien holding a top posi ti on ·with a 
31. B .I .N . prospectus and U,APLN Circular B .  No.  54, 25 Feb. 195L . 
During each of the first ten yrars, 6% :of the priric:i_pal was to be repaid, and 
8% during bach of the last five years. 
32. B.I .N.  Report, pp. 13,. 83. 
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··state bank ( 1/ice  Prisicent Kw.per)". In r,he vacanci"es two leading offi cers of 
the ?.ll .I . , both of its moderate �d.n0 and •with economic as w ell as mini::; tcrial 
experi€nce, were appointed. So£wirjo resigned as president of the P .A .  B·ank 
Urm.un l�asional to take over the presidency of the B .I .N .  Forrner r-finii:;ter of 
Economic Affairs Surnanang becar:ie B.I .N .  executive vice-president."3
3 
· 
The Bank Industri Negara continu€d to expand under i ts new nianagement. 
Hoi..Jevt:;r, since i ts Supervisory Board consisted entirely of members of the 
P .N.I . ,  the bank lost some of its earli er non-partisan character.3L 
Major Nev1 I11dustries 
There was extremely little new foreign investment in Indonesian industries 
during the years following the transfer of sovereignty. Also, although many 
small plants continued to be set up, there v1as virtuaJ_ly no private domestic 
capital invested in major industries . Consequently, the Government provided 
the funds for those few major industries which i-1c re establi3hed in Indonesia 
during this p€riod. 
Possibl�r the fir3t nE-w inc: 1.ustry of i mportance ·was the asseri1bly plant of 
the N .V. Indonesian Service Company Ltd . of Djakarta ( Tandjong Priok) , the 
charte.r of which was drawn up on 2L l'-iarch 19.52.  The Ear1k Industri }I€gara hE:ld 
five-eighths of the initial stock issue of Rp. 8 million, and a Bank NegeEa 
Indonesia suhsiiliar.y- (N .V. Putcra) , the balance. John C .  Lee, tlatthew Fox ' s  
representativ-e·, had bten instrumental in orcanizing the I .S . C . ,  while lJJ:as 
33. "Keputusan Presidt:�n R.I . No.  lLl111 , 31 Oct. 1953. 
3i1. At the end of 1955, the three rriembers of "the Supervisory· Board were 
Messrs . Soemarno (chairman ) ,  Loekman Hakim, and Soegiarto, respectively 
Secretary General of the l-'finistry of Economi c .Affairs, First Deputy Governor 
of the Bank Indonesia, and Treasurer General. 
• 
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A.N.M. Hasjim NINO became its first President."35 Beginning operation in 
late 1952 of the country's second automotive assembly plant, the r.s .c .  
turned out Willy' s  Jeeps and Dodge trucks. 
The first major new industry founded under Government auspices in the 
outer islands was the Su.kur Desiccated Coconµt Factory ('*Sud.�s.co" ) at 
Sukur, Minahassa. Even before the -Sumi tro Plan was announced, a Philippine 
company had contracted to construct the plant and place it in operation. The 
plant was financed by the Jajasan Kopra (the Goverruoont 1 s copra export 
monopoly) ,  which intended that its ownership would eventually be turned over 
to regional cooperatives and private individuals. Originally it was planned 
to move a complete factory from the Philippines, where a factory was facing 
production difficulties , but when the Philippine Sen_ate rejected this idea, 
new factory equipment was ordered fronr the United States. The factory, which 
cost approximately Rp. 15,0001000, and which had a round-the-clQck daily 
, ' 
capacity of twenty-seven tons, came under Jajasan Kopra operation on 27 April 
1953. 36 Despite the excellence of the plant, however, it continually lost 
money, for it was virtually unable to market its product abroad because of 
Philippine competition. Consequently, to supplement the foreign trade it 
·embarked on a domestic sales campaign in an effort to introduce its product 
35. B . I. N. Report, P •  23J see also Charter 1209/1952. Charters (and 
their amendments) of corporations in Indonesia are publisned in the 11Perseroan
Terbatas"". series . as  supplerrents to the Berita-.Negara R .I. Hasjim Ning, who
had been �a  co-founder of the "Sativa" trading co.mpany five years earlier, 
subseque't'itly was a.'ctive· in setting up distributors and agencies for the I.S.C.  
Thus he was president of the Djakarta Motor Company. 
. ' 
·36. "Desiccated Coconut", Indonesian Affa-:i.rs., Mar. 1953, pp. 3.5-40, 44;·nt1 s Program on Industries" , Ekonomi dan "The Governrne . Kouangan Indonesia, 
V (19.54),  PP• 708-709• Sudesco ' s  first Indonesian manager was A·.P. Lolong, 
a Menadonese, formerly with the Department of Shipping, and later a P.S. I .  
candidate. 
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into the Indonesian diet. 
The Bank Industri Negara became Indonesia ' s  leading entrepreneur in the 
growing spinning industry. It becama a stockholder and c reditor for the mixed 
enterprise set up by government and private capital at Semarang just before 
the war and renamed N.V. Pemintalan Djahtra. In addition, the abort•raiige 
sector of the Swnitro Plan had called for another spinning mill, and so after 
around a year of discussions over whether the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
or the Bank Industri would carry out the project ., the B .  I .N. acquired it, 
Thus the P.T. Pemintalan Kapas "Tjilatjap" was organized as a B . I.N. sub­
sidiary. In mmrl-1952, soon after the initial survey at Tjilatjap by a 
Japanese firm, the machinery from Japan began arriving at the site. Con­
struction of the plant only then began, but by late 1954 it was completed. 
Production with only a part of the 30,000 spindles began the next yearc 37 
High on the 1941 and 1951 industrial plans had been the construction 
of a paper mill in Takengon near the pine stands of the Pusat Perkebu.nan 
Negara in Atjeh. A Swedish firm drew up blueprints,  and the B . I.N. and P . P.N. 
jointly set up the P.T. Perusahaan Kertas Taken&on, each accounting £or half 
of the Rp. 1,000,000 initial paid-in capital. Soon thereafter, in September 
1953, however, the Atjehnese civil war broke out, causing the project to be 
shelved indefinitely."38 
Another Government enterprise, the Perusahaan Garam dan Soda Neger� 
undertook to establish the long-planned caustic soda factory in Waru near ·"
31. See Charter 62b/l954; Warta Ekonomlil untul<: Indonesia, V {1952 ) ,  p. 607;
overnmentts  Prog�m on Industries" , op.cit. , B . I.N. Report, pp. 23.t 43; "The q .
· pp,. 106-101. · The project involved payments of $1 .,640,000, while the corpora­
tion1 s nominal capital was set at Rp. 50 million. 
38. See Charter 688/1953; B . I.N. Report, p. 16. 
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Surabaja. Con struction 1,1as ne rforme d  by th e Indoi;i.e si ar1 fi rn1 N .  V. Birokaroi. 
Hoi.re ver ,  progress v1as sbw, and not unt il 1955 - was it possible to be gin 
rJroduction .39 
The N.V. Pabrik· Karung "Rosella", e st2blished in cooperatior1 wit h  the 
- ,[ . . 
Dutc.h firm Tiedeman & van Kerchem, began production in March 195_5 at . 
1,r�agel , Surabaja • .  It became the country's princi pal produce r of sacks made 
of rosella ; :the cultivation of v1hich  vrc.1.s foste red by N .  V. Tani .(iul.ia, a B.I .�\1 
agricultural subsid iary estab1. ished in 1954.40 
Indone sia 's largest new industry, the P.T. Pabrik Semen G�sik ( Gre sik 
Cement Fac_t,ory) at Gresik., East Java, was the principal manufacturing project 
financed unde r the Export-Import Bank line of credit .  The supplementary 
agreement for a eredit of � >14 mill ion for this specific project was signed on 
14 August 1954 and ratified l ater in the ye ar.W- Afte r e�tensive planning, 
. ..,, . 
in 1953 the Bank"·Industri Negara had set up the new corporat ion as  a wholly-
01med subsidi ary, and Ir . IBRA III1 bin Pange ran I"Iohammad Djahie r, a". senior 
offici al of the Ministry of Economic affai rs , ivas appoint�d President . By 
mid-1954, a local survey had been completed and the nece ssary lan d  purchased . 
In 1955, Morrison-Knudsen Inte rnational began construction of the factory, 
the annual capacity of whi ch ( 250,000 tons ) would exceed that of the country ' [  
39. "The Government 's Program on Industries",  op.cit ., pp. 707�708.
A':)proximately Rp . 65 million was spent in erectin g  this", -factory. The
lYiaduresse had ple aded to have the sod a factory on the ir i sland but w�re 
turned do�m because of the shortage o f  fresh water there . 
40. B.I .i\J. Report pp. 24; Harsone Reksoatmodjo·, ttPe rkembangan Industri
kd i  Indonesia", t!arta E onomi untuk Indonesia; · ·x (19.57 ) ,  P•  9 . 
. . 
Ll.  See Undang2 No . 35 of 1954, promulgated 6 December . 
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only other cel,Tlent plant. 42 
A brar1d-ne11 industry for Indonesia was the soy"_ bean milk factory at 
Jogjakarta sponsored by the �·1Iinistry of Heal th - ·ith coooeration from U.l'JICEF. 
A corporation, the l-J.V. Perusahaan Pembikinan den Pen ·:ai-.retan Bahan :•1akanan 
"Saridele", 1-1as established and j ointly financed by the B.I.N. and the govern­
ment, 1.rith the Bank Industri taking over the management. Although production 
• wa-s scheduled to begip in 1 ate 1955, delays in deli verin!?; machinery--a gift 
from Ui,i1�·F--necessitated its postponement."43 
Several other state manufacturing enterprise s inaugurated during the period 
under review ,iere handled by the Bank Industri i\Jegara". The I•r.v. Pabrik Hard­
board "Seranite" of Banju1-1angi �va s founded in 1954 to '?roduce hardboard under 
a German process from coconut fiber in the neighb0rhood of that F-ast Java port. 
In 1955, the l1J.V. Pabrik: Tinta Tjetak "Tjernani" was established, to produce 
•printing ink at a plant at Pasar I1inggu (near Djakarta ) under a S,;iiss proccess. 
Plans for the construction of the country ' s  l argest bottle factory led to the 
e stablishme·nt of N.V. Pabrik Botol in Surabaja in 1 955. liachinery was purchased 
under a cred·it arrangement ivith the French Government, ivhile construction 1-1as 
undertaken j ointly by a French and a Swiss company.44 
�2. �.I.Ff. Report, pp. 22-23 ; "The Government' s  Program on Industries" .,
op.cit., p. 706; see Charter 451/195). The corooration was initially 
capitalized at Rp .2 million, but total costs were e stimated at  approximately 
Rp.200 milliQn. , . . .  · 
The ne"t-1 cernent fa_'ctor;y 1-:a s officially 09ened on 1 5  �Iay 19.57 . i-1orrison­
Knudsen undertook to provide technical trainin[s and . .advice during the first 
eighteen months of operation, after which an all-Indonesian staff ( some 
members of whom received t raining in the United States under I .C .A .  grants ) 
1-1as to take over. Report on Indonesia1 VIII, No�31 ,p. 9,  and 1,ro. 4 p .  16. 
43. B.I. i,T. Report, P• 29 
44. B.I.N. Report, pp. 25-26,29. Production of hardboard and printing 
ink was scheduled to begin in 1956. The bottle facto1;;, , which i:,row..d al so produce 
other glass ;'.)roducts, was scheduled to begin production in 19.57 . Its primary 
purpose was to help conserve foreign exchange through domestic production of 
beer bottles. Consequently, in its planning it secured the cooperation of the 
Heineken'"s beer c�any. 
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New priva;�e Indonesian industries 
The nu mbe r oi new private Indonesian industrie s oi' meaning ful size ;_ iu ring 
..
the period unde r  review 1•1as quite small. As might be expe cted, Djaka rta, with 
its many large industrie s constru cted by foreign capital and many me dium-sized 
industries set up  by Chinese capital ( much of ·whi ch be came "nationalnl) ,  1-vas 
also the principal site of ne,i II Indonesian national" industrial undertakings., 
,. . 
most of ·which were eithe r  set u p  or expanded with gove rnment assistan ce". f'Iany 
of the m  develope d out of trading con ce rns--fre quently themselves e stablishe d 
only shortly be fore . One of the first set up du ring the Unitary Republic was 
the N .V.  Pabriek Tjat dan Tinta 1 1Indonesia 11 ( "Indonesia.11 Paint and Ink Factory) 
which later adde d 11varnish" to  its name and produ ction . Its fourrle r and 
president ,  Sidi Tando ha d set up a trading limited partne rship under  his name 
in late 1949, which had be come incorporated in 1950. The first 11 Indonesian"1 1  
entry into the enamelware industry, thitherto complete ly Chinese"-controlle d, 
was N .V .  Pa brik Pantji Email "D_jawa 11•• The compa ny, originally set up in 
Bandung in 1951 by two P .N . I .  businessmen and two alien Chinese (one from Hong 
Kong ) ,  subsequently chose Djakarta as its site . The company was later re­
organized  so that all its stock appeared to be held by Indonesians, and R .  
Notohamipr"odjo be came board chairman . Also in the capital city Hadji Sarmili 
set up a large tanne ry under  his name.45 
By 1953 a se"cond e chelon of Indonesian industrial companies 1,,ras arising 
in Djaka rta, in which political partie s, espe cia lly _t he P.N .I .  were to have 
45. Republik Indonesia:  Kotapradja D.jakarta-Ra.ja , pp. 344-345 . I·fany of
the ea rly in dustries we re family corporations. Thus Sidi Tanio and his wife 
were"·:so+e stockholders of his trading company, which in turn 1,1as sole owner 
a lon g ·  wt·t.h S:i:c;i$.. Tando personally' bf .. the ··paint· corporaj;ion"_,, Hadji Sarmili and 
·his four . �ons :w.ere sole st ockholders in their company. 
Notohamip°r�od.jo subsequent).y became nominal hoide r  of 97% of the stock of 
the co.mpany (also call�d Jav.a �namel Fa ctory N . V� ) .  · rts cha rter provide d  that 





-interests .  R.. Ku smuljono and Dr •" .l .  Ku ssardjono had establi shed N.V .  Perusahaar1 
Dagang dan Indu"stri 11Indonesi an Planni ng  Office" (Indoplano ), with which l1r. 
11iTi lopo became associ ated. Indcplano e st abli shed the country' s first penci l 
-.
factory at Kalibata near Pasar 1-1:inggu . Two p arty leaders, Doel Jlrnowo and 
:i:-iohama.d TAERAi,JI , resi gned from the gove rnment service to devote themselves 
almo st entirely to bu si oo ss, with the assi stance of Chine se p eranakan capital. 
Doel Arnowo , former mayor of Surabaja, taki n g  advant age of t he "· :name 11Indos" 
(from "Indone si sche Studieclub11 ) in that city, founded along 1-Jith Wirontono 
a company with that name in Su rabaja.  Shortly afterwards in cooperation with 
N.V. "Sindo" { a  P.N.I .--Chineee peranaken bu si ness: concern),  he entered the 
. .
rapidly growing knitting i ndu stry with N.V . Indos Knitting Factory Ltd. in 
Djakarta .46 
Tabrani , with a record of a quarter-cer1tury of political and newspaper 
activity behind hi m, re si gned as Chief of Peranakan and Alien Affai rs in ·the 
Mini stry of Interior .  1rJhen the "Golim Concern11 , a trading company owned by 
Ir . and Mrs". GOUW Hoan Giok incorporated, Tabrani joined as  vice p resident . 
Gouw in turn ·was  co-president with former i\fi.ni ster Todoeng gelar Soetan Goenoeng 
�1oelia,  of NV United Indone si an Trading :::. Indu st ri al Corporation ( Uni tra), 
which had been founded in 1948 . The Gouws, Tabrani , and Profe ssor Moelia then 
on 6 11arch 1953 became t he p rincipal stockholders and officers  of what was to 
become one of Indonesi a ' s  most famou s i ndu stri al enterpri ses, Indonesi an 
Bottlers Limited N .V .  The comp any, licensed to bottle 11Coca Cola11 , soon ,..,as 
competing for tqe positi Q.n of number one soft-drink producer.. in .the country 
· 46 . See Chart.ers 122/1951, 229/1952, and 281/1954. Sie Tek SoeP, an
_Indone�i an citi z,en, '!as ·. Pre sident of -N"V• Si r.d.o ·(�J. V-. 1 Sino Indoncsi.:l I:.·.;port-
·Export-Transport- Indus-try Coripany Limited).  P. }.,J.I . Chairman Sidik 
Djojosoc.l:arto ,-:.:::J on the bo:.rd of dir0ctors cf both JV Sinclo and the Inc!os 
knitti� company. Doel. Arn.oti:o, 11ho had other bu sine.ss intere sts too, 
resigned from the i�lini stry of Interior with the rank of Re siden on 30 April 
1953. 
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where the Muslim reli gi on and a warm climate made soft drinks very p opular • 
. .. .
Tabrani (as co-president with Gouw) drew barbs from the P .S .I .  pre ss, which . ·
( i gnoring  i1oe li a of Parkindo ) attacked the company as a P. N.  I • indu stry and 
for a short whi le laun ched a campai gn against " Coco Cola" sli ghtly remini scent 
of that which the wine produ cers of E'rar1ce had engaged in  after the second 
World vJar. 47 
Djakarta v1as a lso the center of Indonesia I s small but growing  entertain­
ment industry. Unti l 1951 Indonesi an recorded music was only avai lable to the 
public . on records ma.de in  l-1alaya. Then on 17 riay 1951, The Indone si an Music - . ' . . .  ' 
: .. 
Colf!Pany "Irama11 Ltd. was founded by several Indone si ans inclu ding  SUJOSO 
K arson o, who became genera l manager. Records from hi s tapes pressed fi rst in  
India and later by Phi lips in  the Netherlands were di stributed by the company 
in  Indonesia under the ''Irama11 ( Music )  label •". Then on 15 Apri l 19.53, the 
company opened it s own record pre ssing plant ( and studi o )  in Djak�rta.  It s 
recordings found a ready market amon g the Indonesian p�pulati on .48 
.. 
The Indonesi an moti on pi cture indu stry began deve lopi n g  rapidly lJ\J ith it s 
center i n  Djakarta after the tran sfer of soverei gnty. Perusaha an Fi lm Negara 
' ' ' .. 
(P.F.N.--State Film Enterpri se ) ,  under the i�i ni stry of Informati on dominated 
the field of newsreels and documentary and educati onal fi lms ,. u sing  the old 
Multi film Studi o in Poloni a.  However, reside s the reappearan ce and e stabli shmen-. 
rter 293/19.54. -
Chine se Conference at Jogja ( 17-18 Sept . 1546) , �ad :many other business i nteBes 
Shortly there�fter he was t o  help laun ch PT Pertjetakan dan Penerbitan 11 S���
Indonesi a" and publi sh that P.N.I p arty organ in Djakarta. r1oeli a divided hi s 
ti me between business intere sts {he was a vice chairman": of ' DEIP)  and educati on 
(he became chairman of Universitas Kri sten Indonesi a ) .  
L7.see Cha . . Tabrani , who had been ohair1r�n of the Ind onesi an­
48 . "Gram ophone Records 'Made in". Indone si a ' u ,  Indone si an. Affai rs, Jan/Feb. 
·1954, pp . 26-35. S_ujoso, an · avi at or," al.so sang on severfila· -6{ the :records . , 
IC. H. Maschet,rshi, a German-born citize-n of Indone sia".t was plant manager.  
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of Chinese-0'"1ned companies, such as Tan & l.r,'ong Brothers and Bintar1g Su.r·::_,."_,aja, 
private Indonesian concerns ,..,ere also built up . On 30 11arch 1950 the Perusahaan 
.:i1lm l{asional Indonesia ( Perfini) i:-1as established vJi th u�:nnar lsmail as managing 
director, and soon afterwards it incorporated. Its principal competitor among 
Indonesian producers was Perseroan Artis Indonesia ( Persari ) ,  who�e president 
Djamaludin Malik, became the principal businessman associated with- the Nahdlatul 
Ulama."49 
The Ali ·3astroamidjojo Government provided a variety of protection to 
the Indonesian motion picture industry. Concerns producing "feature" motion 
pictures were protected by an import r egulation ef.fectiv:e". l January 1954, 
which provided that single Malay and Philippine films could be brought into 
Indonesia {where they 1-tere very popular) only if the iinporter exported three 
Indonesian films in return. The several smaller companies specializing in 
adapting foreign films were protected by the r1otion Picture Film Importing 
Regulatton effective 5 June 1?5h, which prohibited the import of foreign movies 
dubbed with Indone"sian dialogue, stipulating that such dubbing had to be done 
in Indonesia itself. Domestic motion picture producers in general were ex­
tended a degree of protection by a general prol1ibition against impo_rti:qg films 
over three years old . At the sari1e time the importing of foreign films vJith 
Indonesian sub-titles ,..,as also proscribed in order that domestic sub-titling 
i-.rould be encouraged. Since dome st�c comoanies could not then meet the demand 
for sub-titling, however, this latter provision was subsequently suspended, 
but importers 1�ere ·warned that as  rr.uch sub-'ti t ling as possible had to be 1one 
·h9 . cf. R.J " : Kbtapradja . :Djcekr�-�ja, pp,. 465�467_;. Ens��OP:z,9-¾e I-ndonesia1 
p;.;677 ;,·· charte·r 66o/l952 . Ifjamaludin M:;.:.ik rs m ny bul!iness interestE', c_ n er 
around his Djamaludin Malik Concern, including publishing the Djakarta ctaily
Duta r1asjarakat (an N.U. organ). 
within Indonesia."50 
Djakarta also continued as thE3 country' s publishing center. Since or1ly 
two Indonesian printing companies existed in the city at the outse·t ol' ·1950 and 
several Indonesians complained that the alien press worked solely in -its own 
interests, Ir"o Sakirman (P .K.I .) urged in Parliament that they be nationalizedf 
However, by 1951 the number of Indonesian print inf[ companies in the capita.· 
had risen to ti-.1enty-three, compared to twenty-four "alien" ( virtually all Dutc.h:: . 
and eighty-six Chinese. Thereafter, the number of private Indonesian and 
Chinese printing concerns continued to gro�� However, two of the largest new 
presses were government-controlled and privately managed and set up to supple­
ment the production of the fertjel��  Negara (State Printing Press). The 
larger, Pert.ietakan Keba,joran NV, a j oint enterprise bet·ween the Republic of 
; 
Indonesi a  and the Enschede printing concern of the Nether�ands, was established 
at Kebaj"oran to produce currency for the .:republic. The NV Pertjetakan Dagang 
l\Jasional ( Perdana--Nati"onal Commercial Press) ivas capitalized by the Bank 
Industr.i Negara and managed by the Central Trading Company, the B .N.I . sub-
SO. Central Office of Imports (K. ·P.U.I.) descrees No. Dir. 2938, 12 Dec. 
1953, "B .P. no. 81t 5 June 1954, and "B.P. no. 9", 1.5 July 19.54. 
51. Field trip report, I.P. 1950, p .  308 . Sakirman complained that severa"j
older Dutch companies were setting up new enterprises with rruxed capital. 
520 !!·I• : JCota:e_wacija Jj�-;Raja, . p .  345·. By 19.52 the- nwnbe;r of'. Djakart, .
printing presses had. risen to l?�, of' ·which 36 were owned · by Indonesians and 
92 by Chinese . 'The publication of maey new newspapers gave a major impetus to 
the growth of the printing industry, and the number of nominally independent 





I ., ,. 
sidiary. 53 
The nu mbe r of important nei-1 private Indone sian indu strie s out side the 
capit al are a  during the first .fe1-1 years of the Unit ary Republic remained 
extremely small. In i:vied"an the Larat I'rading Cornpan,y under Pre"sident Victor 
HtJi'A;: ,A t.AT be gan production at it s Barat Cigarette s Factory at the be ginning 01· 
1953 .  This 1-Jas the fir st 11 Indone sian national" comp any to manufacture cigar­
ette s with Virgini a tobacco by inachine .54 In Surabaja the Udatin co�any (Usaha  
Dagan g Tehnik Indone sia N .V . ) , cocperated with the Borgward automobile company 
of Ge rmaey on a 50:50 canital basis to organize in June 1954 the N .V .  Pabrik 
Mobil 11Borguin 11 , which set up Indone sia ' s  third auto assembly plant . Fri ts 
Hendrik lJ-;IAf\l ( a 1"1enadonese ) became the nei-J company' s  p resident , 1,-1hile its 
technical affairs were initially h andled by German s.55 
Const ruction indu stry 
Of the two principal · Indone sian ente rprises in the con struction field 1111hich 
arose in the e ar ly years of the Unitary Republic , one 1vas G·ove rnment-owne d and 
one private . The N.V.  Pembangunan Perumahan (Housing Deve lop ment Corporation) , 
a wh olly-owned Bank Indu stri Negara subsidiary e stablished in 1953, was as its 
name su ggests an organization to promote the building of hou se s (p rimarily 
53. See Charter 427/1953 . Both companie s h ad a nominal capita l  of Rp. 10 
mi llion . A mixed "nation al" printing enterprise , l� . ·v. Grapica-Iridonesia, ·was
owned 50:50 by the B . I .lJ. and N .V .  Handel },Ji,j . " Intraport " ,  which latter 
company managed the new conce rn . Arrangement s for the Kebajoran p ress as a 
joint ente rprise were initiated under Finance l'Jinister lifibi son o.  Antara, 
4 Sept". 1952 .  
54.  Tobing, Su ma.ter a  Utara ,  pp . 183-188; R . I . :  Propinsi Sumatera ut·ara, p .. 
64h. 
S5. Antara,  20 July 1954.  At the ground-breaking ceremony in Ju ly 1954,
Dr . Ambio (of the P.N .I". Party Council) ,  a member of Borguin ' s  board of
directors, explained that one need not fear that the existence of the new 
indu stry or its alien p articipation contained the seed s  of c apit alism, for 
Borguin was to be made into a mode l company ·with a labor council. 
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for t overn.1nent personnc 1)e. A ma,j or portion of ·the procetc!s .1·r0n1 the -��orced 
loan to the B .  I .i� .  ( the 3;;� bond�} to 11 .. ?.urni" holders) ·were available to tt1e 
comi)any, which ·v1a.s also emr)owered to saperv�se the cor1structjor1 o.f buildings 
and Government orojects and to promote the bui ldinr mat3rials indu�try�6 
The construction industr;r :.·1a s also the .focus of acel:,ivitie s of the t'. 1ird of 
Indonesia ' s  Big ·rhree entrepreneurs ( all in Djakarta ). VJherea s DaJaad of Dasaad 
i·1u s:in Concern had begun his l-1usiness career during the lar.=t part of the Dutch 
period, and Ir. Sosrohadikoesoemo of N .  if. Intraport ha.d left government �o go 
into business during the H.evolution, Ir. Herlinl Laoh ( a l'-1e11adonese )  ·waited. 
until the Unitary ltepublic--having held a Public 'ljforks portfolio almost continu­
ously from January 1946 to September 1950. l,Jith his background in goverrunent 
and politics ( he was a moderate P.  tJ . I .  minister),  it did not take long to push 
to the fore front among Indonesian busine nsmen. He immediately 1,�ent into 
construction wi tl1 his own firm Perintis, which 1°ras incorporated as N.  V .  Perintis 
A. .T�J and developed it into the international trading a.rm of his vroup of 
comoanies. With other Indonesians, he organized the Kartel Pemborong Indonesia 
( Karpi--Indonesian Con�ractors Cartel ) .  Its memb3rs in 1951 set up a company 
i.Jith Laoh a.s president, to serve as  their agent ,  and the following year this 
concern was converted into a. construction c ompany itself with the na1ne I'J . V .  
56 . See Charter 749/1953 ; B.I�N.  Re�ort PP� 13,  24-25. David CHENG was .::1ppointed President of N. V. Pembnngunan 7erumahnn.; Margono becnme Chnirman of th1 
bocrd of directors and i·1r .. R.  Achmnd (a  B . I .N. official ) and the 7reasurer 
Generale Soctikno Sl. amete board memberse. ., ., 
57 . Laoh spent much time on choosing the names of his companies. Since 
the key name 11Perintis11 ( pioneer)  l1ad been already acquired by a Palemuang 
trading corporation, he incorporated ·as. N.V. }1askapai Dap;ang dan Bang.unan 
"Perintis Asia 'l'enggara11 (lit .  11 SoutheasteAsian Pioneer" Trading and Construction 
Company); the term "Asia Tenggara11 he borrowed from his early partnership,
"Bromo Concern--Asia Tenggara11 • As was popular v1i th a nuraber of Indonesian 
companies ,  the key name " Perintis" wase· made to form -an abbreviation, .of "Perusa­
haan Industri Tan1bang Insin.jur Sipil" ( Industrial, l"ll.nirig, and Civil i;ngineering -
Comnanv , • Charter t:b87l 9Sce,. 
- - - - -
- -
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!3irokarpi,58 �--,l1ich quick ly became ti1e leading n.Jtiona l Indonesiar1 �on,:·1,r1:1Gtiun 
conlpan1r with ·�overnment contracts on a number of 1 ..:;adinf proj-".:!cts. 
The third principal arm or' the Laoh group, ·with 1'1hich a number of o-c,her:
enter1:,ri::;es \·.tere connected, was i-J .V. PA.KA,5 9  which was the first mixed er1ter-
prise direct"l�>' beti-ieen the Indonesian Go·vernment and a private Ind onesian 
company. ·rhe state, through the ivfi.nistry of Publi� ,dorks and ?ower, he ld 
RP.3,000, 000 of its initia l capita l and 1'J.V. Perintis A.T. , :lp. 500, 000, with 
the option of acquiring more shares (but not a majority) .i.'rora tl1e state . Laoh 
was president of the nev1 corporation, ,1hi le .:our of its seven board members 
were ministry officia ls, headed l>y Secretary General Putuhena as board chairman. 
PAKA :r.anu.factured prefabricated 1-1ooden bui lding sections and other building 
�nateria ls. 
'\ilfith oth,3r >Ienadonese businessmen Laoh founded in Djakarta and became 
president of ? . T .  Perusahaan Keramik BromR _Maesa originally to produce ceramic 
iv are. HovJever, its p lant at Bandu� soon became a :ms.j or producer oi' hollow 
·bricks fro1n trass el In 1953 1'l.V. Perintis A.T. secured a permit to extract 
trass from the Anak Krakatau c!'ater in the Sunda ,·.:traits to be manufactured 
into hollo-t·T brick:s by its sister cornpany. 
·To1Jards the end of 1950, severa l months after he had left governraent 
service, Laoh visited North Sumatra with Vice President Hatta ."60 He especially 
58. "Birokarpi" was originally the abbreviatiorl of "Biro Karte l Pemborong 
Indonesia" . When the c orporation charter 1-Jc>.s amended to make the company a 
principa l operator rather than an azent, the apbreviation was retained, but an 
unwieldly new forma l nar.1e ·was constructed :"liN . V. Biro Insinjui-· ( Oktuplus»rsi tek 
dan Pemb,orong Indonesia". Charter 12"94/1952.  
59. 11 ?AKA1 1  is the abbreviation of "Pabrik Kaju" (vJood factory or Lumber mil.) ; 
its comp lete name was P II s .  f1askapai Da�·:ang dan Industri I(aju "PAKA" (PAKA Lumber 
Industria l and Trading Corpor&tion). Charter 1293/19>2. 
60. Ichtisar Indone"sia Sepekan, 18 Dec. 1950. 
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lnade an effort to ·visit t.he .Siharimau (�:Jilhelmina) Falls on the Asahan River •" .. 
'i'horeaftGr, he becc1me the prime mover behind reviving the Asahan industrializa-
tion plan . vJith movi.es of ·the T.V .A. in the United States,  he became the 
leading proinoter of similar valley development projacts in Indonesia. 61 
•, 
Indonesianiza.tion of Existing Factories 
In the pos_t'.9transfer of sovereignty ·period, besides :..he partial and at 
tiroos unlegalized operation of a number of enterprises in interior regions 
abandoned- by their proprietors, a handful oi c omparatively important factories 
were legitimately Indonesianized. In the Jogjakarta region were two examples 
of factories which played an important role in the region and which were sold 
out by their Dutch owners". In 1948, the owners of the ·well-known 1,1 . V .  l'Jegresco 
cigar factory, then uncler operation by the Badan Industri Negara, offered t o  
. . . .. . . 
convert it into a mixed enterprise and to sell half of its stock to Indonesians-­
to its own workers, to . farm3rs, villages, and the Special District . The 
transfer of so,,ereignty passed �1ithout any decision, .for the 11eputlican Govern­
ment at Jogjakarta had indicated that large industries had to be r ebuilt under 
· t, 1 62th· .ip of th t . d·mixe de howners te s  ·a te or an au onomous region or by cap1· a ,  an 
the Special District demanded a 51 percent sh�re of the ot·mership. 63 l\Iot until 
two yea1·s later ·was the company bought by the Special District Government". Its 
· 61. Another engineer, Pangeran �-1oh. 1Toor (1,ras�iumi ) ,  during the detiates on 
the lJatsir cabinet ' s  program strongly recommended that T. V .A . •  r s  be built in the 
three principal v alleys of "!�alimantan" . R.P. 1950, pp; 1.20_2-1214. 
·62. . 'Explanation of tl1e Halim Cabinet Program, 8 and 16 Feb� 1950, Kabinet
Republik Indones�, pp A 69, 127-128. 
63.  Harmani speech, 29 -Sept. ,  R.P.  1950 pp. 786-787 . Harmani was· pre­
mature in reporting in December 1949 that an"·agreement for- a 51:49 Indonesian:
Dutch partici pation had already been reached. Cf. Antaxa; ·14 Dec .  1949"0 
0ncUu 
nam3 �-Jas chanfe , to i�.V . Taru ?1artani . }retaining its pro-·war rnanager ( va.n Habraken.) 
ar1d ·with .>rofessor J.<:ertanegara as supervising director arypointed by the regional 
-�overnment, the fac tory resumed production of its quality cigars. At the same 
time tha t it acquired the N·sgresc o plant, the Government of the Special District 
of Jogjakarta bought out ('with the assistance of a Bank Industri Negara loan) the 
J.V. Con0tructie-wink:el de v·orstenlanden and renamed it the P.T . Perusahaan Besi 
Jaerah Instimewa Jog,ial<:arta ( Perbedij ) .  Its produc tion of agricultural implements 
and other metal goods, hoivever, remained at a low level lar�ely because of in­
experienced management and surplus la.bar. 64 
In Djakarta itself Indonesians entered the metal -i.ressels construction 
business when the Carya Ship Euilding Company on 2 January 1952 bought out the 
Jutch-mmed N .V .  Scheep1verf Ant,iol. Und.er the name Cai-ya Shipbuilding Coy Ant.jol 
H.V. , managed by R o r1ardanus,  and '"Jith a government subsidy, the new company 
gradually expanded output oi · small and medium-sized vessels, and thus became one 
of the largest private Indonesian enterprises with alien origins.65 
In 1954, by which tirre f oreign exchange for imports ( including imports of 
industrial materials) had become q'.•.ite scarce and pressure by oiiicials controll-
ing the licensing of such imports--aimed a t  inducin6 alien c ompanies to appoint 
Ind.onesian distributors--,,Jas at a peak, t.l1e N. V. Philips Fabricage en IIandel 
i·laatschappi.i i:vas c ompelled to c lose down its Surabaja plant and to c oncentrate -
61.i. Antara, 3 Sept . ;  2 Oct .  1952'; interview by Selosoemardjan, Ithaca,  
17 �-1ay 1958. Tfie regional povernment initially invested Rp. 3 . 6  million in the 
combined enterprises .  The metal goods plant at Jogjakarta had been better known 
l ocally as "Paberik ::latson" � · 
65. See Chart,Jrs 318 and 474/19.54. N . •i .  Scheepsi-Jerf Antjol \va.s a subsidiary
of the Ingenieurs- en Handelsbureau 11Kerner'' o·f .Landung. Cnly indigenous 
citizen and Indonesian organizations were a.7.lowed to hold stock in the new cor­
poration a
In Djuana, the "Taat" shipyards lTere nationalized. �ek, ']]he Government 
and Econ0mic Development in Indonesia, 1950-1954, p. 204. 
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production in its  Bandung plant vvhich had bee n opened the ye ar be fore . Un(ie r 
such ci rcumnt a.nce s many another foreign-owned company .recon sidered the ad.van�. 
and di sadvant age s of continuing ope rations in Indone sia .  Only one major 
company, however, liquid ated it s Indone si an manufact uring propertie s and sold 
out to  an Ind one sian party. When the General Yfotors Corporation decided".to 
di spose of it s assembly plant in Tand jong Priok, the Bank Ind ustri Ne gara 
bought t1:1e prope rty and �arly in 1955 organized �.To Ga,i a  t1otor to  put it back 
i nto operation . Since the r.s.c. was alre ad y  it s subsidi ary, the B .I.N. thus  
came to  control Indonesi a ' s  two olde st and large st automotive assembly plant s�6 
In the oute r i sland s re lative ly few alien factories were tran sferred to 
Indone sians.  One enterpri se which was both a new Ind one si an unde rtaking and 
a forme r alie n one h ad an unu sual itine r ary in East Sumatra. The ramie spin­
·ning mill built at Femat ang Siantar by t he Japanese late in their occupation 
had continued in ope ration until  mid -1947 g Du ring the NoS.T . period , it was 
di smantled and moved to  anothe r e st ate , 'TtJhe re it came unde r the control of 
the .In stitution for the Re storation of Prope rty. I n  1951 the machine ry was 
bought by the Sungai Agu l  company, an Indone si an conce rn, which set it up in 
Med an . A numbe r of gove rnment agencie s on the reg ional and central level,  
including the B.I . N . ,  contributed to e ffort s to  promote ramie cultivation in 
�ast Su mat ra, and the companv wa.s provided with a loan in order to suppleme nt 
it s machines with new equipment from Japan ."67 
c6. Bank Indone si a Report , 1954-1955, p. 148; Nan Amstut z ,  Deve lopment of 
Indi ge nous Importe r s  in Indone si a. 1950-1955". (i n proce ss ) ,  c h. I ;  l 'ieek, op cit. ,  .
PP• 204-205.
Although the Ea.ndung municipality had once approved Philips '  plan s for ex­
panding it s Band ung plant Oi1to surrounding lot s,  political demon str ations com­
pe lled it to aband on it s deci sion . Ant ara, 30 June 1952 e . G.1,1.c. r s  asking price
wns re porte dly one million dollars .  Antara, 17  Dec .  1954. 
670 R � I . :  Propi n si Sumate ra  Utara, pp. 644-6h5; B�I . N. Re port , pp. 24, 49. 
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In .parts of l�alimantan, Indonesianizati on started with sa1,1mi 11s, 1vl1en 
several belonging to Java I!out in -c,he Kapuas and Pontianak regions passed to  
Indonesians."68 Subsequently, the country ' s  largest sawmill, Bruynzeel-Dajak, 
was renamed ?.T.  Sa1npit-Da,jak . During 1954, the Government, in an effort to 
Indonesianize an area where the indigenous business force was quite weak, 
reportedly used inducements to cause a number of Chinese factory operators 
in West Kalimantan to  turn over their businesses--including a number of 
coconut oil mills--to Indonesians. 
�tlmic Distribution of Some Industries 
Despite such occurrences as the above, there was still comparatively little 
Inconesianization of the ownership of manufacturing--unlike events in the 
importing sector. That Indonesians continued to play a minor role ( albeit a 
growing one ) in the manufacturing of a nu1nber of regions may be inferred from 
the fragmentary statistics that ha.ve been published. 
Limited data providing an ethnic breakdoi-Jn oi ownership of Indonesian 
industrie s (regardless of size) are av·ailable tor certain provinces for the 
year 1952 . Among a total of nine registered industrial categories in �ast 
Java, 140 1Jere listed as Indone"sian-01-Jned, and 434 as alien-ov-1ned. By 
kabupaten the numbers ranged from 6 :1  in Ponorogo, 15 : 3  in Lamong·an, and .5 : 1  
in Pamekasan in favor of Indonesian enterprises, through 20:42 in rialang and 
40: 161 in Surabaja, to  4 :26 in Djember, 1:9 in Djombang and Tulungagung, and 
2:23 in Probolinggo in fabor of alien factories. Throughout the province 
aliens had an edge of 138 to 16 for rice mills, 116 to  34 for printing presses 
24 to O for ice plants, and 6 to O for machine-made Cifarette factories, but 
68. qepublik Indonesia : Propinsi Kalimantan, p .  181. 
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only 95 to 85 for ·weaving mills. 69 
In :North Sumatra, Indone si an industri al operators outnumbered alie-ns only 
in Tapanuli , whe"re they accounted for 65 pe rcent of the enterpri ses to '34 .. 5 
p Grcent Chinese, · and o.5 percent II other aliens" . In At jeh ,  the Chine"se led wit 
64.5 percent to  35 percent ( and o .. 5 r::e rcent for other aliens ) ,  while in East" , 
Sumatra, t he Chinese accounted for 72 p encent, to cnly 25 p ercent fgr Indone s­
i ans, and 3 percent for other aliens. In the i mportant rice mi lling sector, 
the Chinese led in East Sumatra 231 to 107,  but in Tapanuli and At jeh ,  the 
Indone si an s  led 111 to 11 and 49 to 13, respectively. In the printing sector, 
the province had 36 -Indone si an printing presse5 compared to fou r Dutch ( all 
in t1ed an ) and ten Chinese". Howeve r, the output capacity of the Dutch surp asse d  
that of each of the other two group s. 70 
The province of South Sumatra had yet another kind of ethnic bre akd"own. 
Of 1108 enumerated indust ries  ( sma1·1-scale included ) ,  635 were o·wned by Chine se . 
423 by Indone sian s, 18 by Arabs:, 15 by Europe.ans, and 19 by othe:rs. Of 153 
ricemi lls throughout the province, 116 we re owned by Ind one si an s  and 32 by 
Chine"se and 1 by an Arab; of 80 sa�i mi lls, 60 were Indone si an ,  15 Chine se , 4 
Arab, and l European .  But in mo st other fields, including food -proce ssing , 
th,e Chine se led . Among the Kareside.nan :, in Lampung , 53 percent of the indu st rie: 
1,Jere Ind onesi an and 44 percent Cl1ine se ; in Bengku lu, 51 and 40 p 3rcent ,  re spect­
ively; in Palembang 43 and 51 percent , re spectively; in Bangka and :Gelitung 
only 9.5 and 88.5 p ercent Indone si an and Chinese re spectively.71 
b9. .i:l.1. : Propinsi S1..uaatern Utara,. )p. 64J-6L� ; 1l . I .  � Propi11si Djc.11_n _ _  Tirnt 
)lJ • 233-244�. . -
· Of · the province I s 47 1-1nre,house compcanie.s, all but two vrore al ; en ownec 
r-'lost of tho al ion fnctorie s in t·he province were Chinese , there were also many 
Dutch and Arabe. . .
70.. R��r<> .: :P�opj.n.ci Sur.intcro Utara, pp . 643-644. , 
71. R.I. :  Propin si Sumatera -Selatan,-2, pp . 418-422 . 
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Du 1·ing the fortie s numerou s sma ll, someti me s  :.ri1niti"1re in ,.;u 3tri es hvd - ·  
arisen in Tndonesia to manu fac ture cornmodities fonn2rly imported. Fro.n 1950 
on , however, they had t.o ·compete with che ap imports() 
Indone si a ' s  most numerous indu stry which competed d irectly with its 
counterpart in other coutrie s was the weaving indu stry. At the time of the 
estab lishment of RIS, its weaving1"mills possessed 67, 161 hand-looms and 10,590 
machine looms. This �as a signi ficant increase from the twenty thousand and 
six thousand looms, respective ly, at the end o.f World 1�1ar II , and the 49, 316 axi 
7600, respective ly reg istered in 1867 mills at the time of �he Japane"se inva sion. 
By the beginning of 1951, the number had risen to 72,025 hand"-looms and 11,267 
machine looms ( of which 8307 were double -width) in 2537 1'1eaving mi 11s of a ll 
sized . Yet data avai lable at that time showed that whereas the share o1 the 
�uropean s and Arabs in this production had fallen , that of Chinese operators 
rather than Ind onesian had ri sen the mosto 72 
1 .Natit1nality Weaving mills · d,!echanized looms han _ _  ooms 
European 1,% 30 % 1%
Arab 10 173. 19
Chine se 
Table L1 :  The vreavinQ: in induatq 
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For the next severa l ye ars, h0v1e ver ,  the weaving bu siness of Indonesians 
experienced a recession ,  since thei r hig h-cost product made princ ipally with 
hand -looms cou ld not compete ·wi th the texti les being freely i mported by 
11benteng"11 importars. At the sane time the number of machine looms gradually 
rose , a nd  companies with such looms ( principall�f, Chire se, Ang lo-Dutch, and Arat )  
benefitted from Government orders for textiles. · B;? the end of 1955, ho1ie"var, 
72 .  Speech by A.A .. Achsien", 5 June, I . :::. . 
1951/1952 , p .  189; cf.  Table 6 
1952, IJ• 609; JJ.va B,e.nk Report. 
. . 
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the number of hand-looms had risen to 78, 357 and of 1nachine loon1s to 12, 697. 73 
Indonesianization of Rice .. 1!illing 
Data such as  0he above confirms �he importance of the Chinese group--
1rJhetl1er or not". subsequently citizens of Indonesia--in the country ' s  indus1,rial 
sector. Some of the Chinese factories had been operated by Dutch or other 
aliens before the war. Similarly, most Indonesianization described above and 
p·ertaining to factories acquired from aliens had been at the expense of the 
Dutch. 
In 1954, hoi,rever, a new kind of indus"Grial Indonesianization wa.s inaugura 
at the expense of the Chinese. Moreover, unlike the piecemeal kind of process 
described above, where the alien seller and the Indonesian buyer ha.d not been 
subject to direct pressure from the Government, the Government itself announce, 
a new Wholesale Indone"sianization of a specific industrial sectore Already on 
5 i1ay ·1952 the Emergency Law concerning the Obligation to i•1ill Paddy had been 
put into : operation authorizing the Government ( J,Iirrl.ster of .�conomic Affairs) .
to control the production of rice mills which came under the 1940 Rice t1::i.ll 
ReguiationJ4 most of which were owned by Chinese. In Parliament Achsien 
criticized both this regulation (drafted when vlilopo had held the Economics 
,.. .
Affairs portfolio) and a related regulation against hoarding rice as unworkabf; 
The regulation remained, nevertheless. Tiio years later, ho1:'7ever, came th1 
even more drastic "Paddy-milling and Rice;_polishing Restriction degulation" 
73 -. Cf ., annual reports of the Java Bank and Bank Indonesia;  "1rJilopo 
Cabinet" -in Chapter XXV. Sak1i.t'man (.P .K .I }  anq. Sarino - {P.N.I') i $.sued. a report
blaming the depressed condition of the Indonesian " national" weaving industry < 
11a1ien monop2J.y__ 9.apitalt! .at flOme �nd abro�d. I�Po  l-�5.�� P:o 6.73� F.or developm.en1 
in the batik and kretek industries, see nBatik arid retek0 , in Chapter XXIV. 
·74. 11Und.ang2 Darurat :· No. 7/1952"". 
75 . Speech, 5 June, I .P. 1952, PP• 610-611. 
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(G ovarnment -tegu lation i�o . 42 of 1954 ) ,  �-1hich, su� rsed ing the 1940 regu la.t ion 
in i ts ent ireti aimed at brea king the dominant positi on of the Chinese in tha t  
i ndustry. Already for some t,ime before thi s regu lation no new rice -mi lling 
licennes had been issued to Chinese or Indonesian 0it i zens of Chinese descent . 
In add it ion to aey pu re ly economic mot ives for the re gulation ,  the 11nati onal 
economic policy" was cited ·which "re qu i red that enterpri ses operating in the 
foodr-;tu ffs sector not be controlled by persons 'who a re citi zens other than 
citi zen s of Indonesi a '  1 1  /;;i c/ and which demanded that a "ba lanced midd le class11 
:Je deve loped . The text of the regu lati on itse lf speci fied that an application 
for a rice-mi lli ng license cou ld be re jected as not in accord with the economi c 
int �re sts of the State i f  its g ranting wou ld be neither in the interests of the 
supply of foodstu ffs nor in harmon�, 1�ith t he "economic or soci al circumstances" 
of the State or �he respective regi on nor contrary to the development of the 
balanced midd le class. Four nat ionality provisions  were then listed : 
(a )the entrepreneu r i s  not allowed to be" e citi"zen other 
than a cit i zen of Indonesia ; 
(b) i f  the enterprise is  a lega l entity, it must be lega li zed 
according to Indonesi an law and its members are not a llowed to be
cit i zens other than citizens of Indonesia; 
(c) the capit&l of the enterpri se must be the property of
cit i zens of Indone sia and may not be controlled by persons who a re 
cit i zens othe! th�n cit i zens of Indonesi a; 
(d) no rig hts involv ing the ente rprise (whethe r complete or
partia l, d i rect or ind i rect ) may be he ld by persons who a re 
cit i zens other than citizens of Indonesia.,6 
Thus iJiinister of Economic Affairs Iskaq was empowe red by Government 
qegu lati on No. 42, in i mple1nentati on of the 1934 Industrial Control Ord inance 
( authori zing the government to license industries),  in effect to Ind onesian i ze 
the rice"-milling industry. The new regu lation went into effect in general on 
76 . "Peraturan Pemerintah No . 42/19.52 11 and 1 1Pend je lasan" .  ·rhe under­.
scored porti ons, inse rted by thi s  ·writer , a re lite ral translations. 
Jo? 
11 June 1<?5L, ,  
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·but not until nine rnonths later !or mills then op;:!ratin� u11der . 
old licenses; tl1e uti.nister 1vas a lso authorized t o  grant provi sional li,�enses 
.t'or a. period o.f adjustim8nt . The nBtionality provisions (cited alJove ) ::!rafted 
by ··1Iinister Iskaq ·were apparently both discriminatory and _ambiguous . 1 hey 
appeared to ue airred against not only aliens, but dual nationals, i .e  •. persons 
who rel_d both Indonesian and Chinese citizenship. Lhus not only ( 1 )  re3idents 
o.f Indonesia wl10 nevar had a claim t o  Indon.;sian citizenship, and ( 2 )  residents 
·who had renounced their claims to  Indonesian 'citizenship" by 27 December 1951, 
but also ( 3 )  t·esidents ( virtually all of Chinese origin) i-Jho had passively 
accepted Indonesian citizenship, ivhile not renouncing a�y Chinese citizenship, 
1,Jere excluded. 
The protests of rice mi 11 opArators, ·wl10 1rJere thus 11 enc"ouraged11 to take 
indigenous Indonesians into their companies, especially those who claimed 
Indonesian"'�itizenship},'�ere loud and strong. Whereas the injured party in the 
su�jsequent new 1rJharf and warehousing regulation T•Jas largely foreign c ornpanies 
c ontrolled by persons or c orporations domiciled abroad, in the case of rice-
mi 11 operators it 1.ras la.rgely a group of Indonesian ci tizens e And so  the issue 
of discrimination bet·ween g1--oups of Indonesian citizens was again raised. To 
overcome this diffic11lty, the final clauses of the nationality provisions of th, 
regulation 11ere amended eflecti ve 2 December 1954 to: "must be citizen( s )  of 
Indonesia11 in sect ions (a )  and ( b ) ,  and "1-1ho are not cit'izens of Indonesia" in 
sections ( c )  and (d) . 78 
According t o  Government legulation Noo 42 of 1954, Indonesianization of 
77.  The effective date of the regulation 1r1as also ambiguous � It (perhaps 
in a drafting oversight) r_eferred t o  the date of signing by the ?reside11t; ·\-fha're­
as legislation c ustomarily became effective on the date prornu.lgated by the 
Minister of Justice ( in this case 2 July 1954 ) .  
78 0 "Peraturan ")emarintah l\fo .  60/1954"". 
• • 
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the eiif sting ricemi 1 1s sh- ,uld have been completed by 11 i1arch 1955. Ho1Jev�-,r
by that time, Indonesians had acquired outright only a fraction of the Chine"se 
mills . In addition, some Indonesians had leased mills, and several mixed ente1·­
pris2s had be€n set up"o In view of the financial incapa�ity of Indonesians to 
take over all the rice mills, the Ministry of �conomic Affairs thereupon issued 
one-�r0;ar temporary licenses to the Chinese mill operators. 79 
Industrial Promoti"on Sch.emes 
Outside of the government ministries and later the State Planning Bureau, 
severa l private and semi-official organizations of Indonesians did their bit 
to encourage the establishment or sound operation of Indonesian industrial enter­
prises . The first to operate after the t ransi'er of sovereignty, of course, was 
DEIP, which under fl.. Roedjito and Suchjar l'edjasu!<mana w orked to promote all 
kinds of Indonesian business activity o Although because ol' the nature of the 
Indonesian societv D .i:I? was most active in trade, its Industrial Section under 
Ir. ·:)i;)okusumo ( former head of the ?.K.T.  and Badan Industri Negara ).,a DEIP 
vice chairman, continued its activities to promote Ir1donesian indust,rial 
production. 
In Cctober 1952, a semi-governmental body was set up, Jajacan Badan Adrnini­
strasi Perusahaan (Baper--Business Ad1ninistration [i'oundation ) .  Its purpose 
in general was to serve as a clearing center for administrative services for aew 
Indonesian enterprises.  This included inspecting those enterprises which 
app lied for loans from the Jajasan Kredit (and thus also the Bank Industri 
Negara) in order to ascertain their status as economic risks . 
?9. A.tr:-� l�euman, " On the r'romotior1 of Indigenous Indonesian Industries 
with Special �ef�����e to �redit Facilities ior Private Businesses and f or Local 
Government J:nterprises, ' ���_o_!frl. _ d�_n ��:i:i_a:P.t:a!'! Ipdonesia, IX ( 1956 ) ,  p .655 .  By -1'1arch 1956 many of the temporar-f liGt.-or.t.:,es �d '""Ut3eti ...,_.A. ""'rl.e.d another year, b�t '9itr 




Severe.l of Baper 's  propos0d tasks concerned foreign capital, including: 
a.  to set up corporations with nll tional ca.pita.l in order to oper:::ite 
businesses or, if they 1r1ere still in foreign hands, to purchase 
and continue operating them; 
b .  to set Ui:> corporations with mixed cc2pital (51:Li9) for purposes
specified in a . ;  
c. to buy shares of forei;�n compenies on the stock market • • •  c'.nd sell 
them to bonafide citiz,ens . J\ n effort 1,rill be made to pre,rGnt such .
stock from falling into the hands of fro.nts for aliens; 
d .  with the a!.)Droval of the party concerned, • • •  to endea,,or to 
collect nationale- capital for alien companies needing additional 
capitel for expansion; 
e .  1,rith tl1e ap_provcl .·yf the party concerned, • • • to endea,ror to 
collect national cr.pital under f)rovisions such as abo"'re for alien 
companies needing addietional raoney for rehabilitation • • • 80 
:aotos oedirdjo was appointed manager of Baper, and thG follo�ring became 
members of its Administrative Board: 
. .
R.  Soewirjo (former Deputy Prime }>iinister) , Chairrnan 
Ir. Darmav1an I-langoenkoesoemo (Director Genera.L , Ministry of 
Econoraic Affairs ) ,  Vice Chairraan 
Mr. Soebagjo Djoj�1idagdo (Chief of Secretariat, I-:Iinistry of f'griculture) 
Ir. Sak:sono Pra1-1iroharcl.j o (Director, Pusa t Perk:ebunan 1,regara ) 
.Aehmad Sunartadirdja (Chief, Department of Industry, }1inistI"Jr of 
Econo1nic P .. ffairs ) 
Sulaemen Suriaatmadja (Cha irman, Jajasan Kredit) 
Rahendra Koesnan (I1lember of Parliament representing P. 1'J. I .  and Labor) 
l1Ir. J\ chmad (representative of Banl{ Inc1ustri }Jegara)
l.gus Ra.medhan (Director of the Budget, l·iinis tr�r of Finance) Bl 
In April 1954, under the auspices of DEIP, the Inoonesian Industrial 
Development Corporation Ltd • . 1-.r�s founded. Its purpose 1�ase. to assi:;;t. in the 
inr1ustrializa tion of Indonesia b;,r offering three lcinds of services : 
1.  as an engineering consultati·ve bureau,. it will .p��par.e plans. . .
concerning opera tio. 1s , organiza tioi1, and blueprints , and pro-
vide cost data for new entrepreneurs in setting up new factories , 
end 1.vill provide plans for improirements in operations and 
organization for old businesesmen; 
• 80. PBnggabean, I'ienuclja Rank I\fasional, '9• 12 • 
81. Warta ;]:konomi untuk: Inc�. o.nes ia, V ( 1952 ). ; p .  Notosoedirdj o was 
,., • • .t:' nf th P. �T t . 1\P. l T0- . . 11nJ..nP' Proour.tR S;:ilP.F: ()ffi�P.e-, , :1J.P. f · J.ona. 
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2 .  as a contact bureau and interroodia.rv, it will attempt to: ( 1 )
attract credits and capital for domestic and foreign entrepreneurs 
from domestic and foreign credit bodies and financier�; ( 2 )  facil­
itate relations between busine�smen ar.rl government agencies in 
matters of licenses, accommodations, lator affairs, and legis­
lation ; and ( 3 )  seek or develop markets for Indonesian manufactures; 
3 .  as a founder of indus·c.rial enterprises, it will establish 
factories where no  initiative is shown by others. 
·Since its twenty-nine promoters fe lt that the I.I .D .C. c ould best operate 
as a self-sup:)orting body, it was organized as a corporation. Ir ., Albert 
i•iarnix 10.SJiiLAN TC13If-JG was appointed General i1,fanager under an Executive Council 
c on sisting of Suchjar Tedjasukmana, ( P resident) Ir. Dipokusumo, and l1r. Kosasih 
Poer1,1anegara ( all DEIP officials ) ,  whi le f ormer mini"sters Djuanda (Director of 
the State Planning Bureau) ,  H. Laoh, and Iskandar Tedjasukmana joined a Bank 
Industri Negara representative on its b oard of directors.82 
In February 1955, yet another organization was established to promote 
Indonesian indust�J, the Madjelis Industri Indonesia ( !1� I . I o--Indonesian Chamber 
of r· ndustry) in Djakartao In general, its purpose as its name implies, 1�1as to 
·w ork on behalf of its members--Indonesian industries, providing advice, infor­
mation, am protection and thereby "to improve the industrialist and business­
rr.an . 11 Ir. Omar Tusin was chairman of its executive board. 
83 
There was a need for such bodies as Baper, the I "I .D .C "  and :-1. I � I . ,  but 
by the t ime of the e lections the first two had been unable to function properly 
reportedly because of a lack of a trained staff (despite the lumin osity of their 
promoters ) ,  and it vJas still too early for the I-1.I . I o to have left its mark on 
the Indonesian industrial sector. 
82 . Sea I . I .D .C .  prospectus . Ir. Omar Tusin was subsequent�y appointed 
genera l manager. 
83. Industrial Directozy of Indonesia, 19.57-1958, (!)jakarta: Labora 'l'rad3rs 
Company, 1957), pp. ii-iii, 43..L7. . 
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In addition to these purely Indonesian industrial promo�ion agencies, a 
bi-nati onal organization wa·s c onsidered followinf! trade negotiati ons in  Djakarta 
in the second half of 1952, when Japanese businessmen made oi'fers to invest or 
to establish j oint c ompanies 1:1ith Indonesianso 84 A year later, f ollowing, approva .i 
by the i'1onetary B oard and (in July) the 11\Jilopo Cabinet, p lans 1-1ere drawn up i' or 
a developmen t  corporation with mixed Indonesian and foreign capita l. A Bank 
Pembanf'linan Indonesia ( Indonesian Heconr-truc tion Bank) at Djakarta was envisaged 
with 51 percent of its flp s50,000,000 capital  provided f rom Indonesian sources, 
represented by r'ir. Jusuf 1-J'ibisono, and 49 percent c onverted from dollars supplied 
by the Ishiwara Sangyo Company of Tokyo. It was intended that the development 
bank participate in estab lishing new industries and in  expanding existing ones. 
The bank p lans, however, enc ountered politica l  dilficulties . Since repara­
tion talks with Japan had n ot b8en making headway, the Indonesian foreign Mini­
stry later in the year advised the .!·1inistry of 1i'inance to suspend acti on on the 
bank. Then, on 21  January 1954, fol lowing a visit to Djakarta by Ishiwara, dr . 
Sudarsono ( P .S.I . ) ,  who as Direc tor for Asian and Pacific Affairs in the .tt,oreign 
•'
Ministry c onducted the reparation talks, sen t  another letter to the Ministry of 
�inance stating that the preparations for the bank c ou ld resume. There were 
accordingly expectations that the bank might be established by the end of 
January."85 
However, -Sudarsono had n ot obtained c learance from .foreign J.viinister Sunario 
( P.N.I . )  for his letter. Consequently, since the Ali Government did n ot agree 
that Japanese-I"ndonesian re"lations had progressed to the point where Japanese 
businessmen could r esume investing in Indonesia, Sudarsono '  s letter of approval 
84. Antara, 27 Au ." • , 16 -Sept. , 17 Oct. 1952. 
85. Pedoman, 26 Jan . ,  4 /eb. 19.54. 
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,;vas rescinded, 86 ending for the time being further action on the bank. Shortly 
thereafter Sudarsono was removed from his p osition. 
During the first year of the .Ali Sastroamidj oj o administration, :11ini"ster 
of Ec onomic Affairs Iskaq had given most of his attention to 1,rays of Indonesian­
izing the import tradeo Later in 1954, he c onsidered the possibilities of 
promoting industrialization by a ne1-1 devicee Inflati on, which had mounted 
signi ficantly by the end of that first year in office, 1-1as often ascribed by the 
G overnr,ent t o  so-called "hot mone:;,11 --excess liquidity in the hands of merchants 
(implying principally the Chinese) ,  on nruch of v1hich it ·was assumed taxes had 
been avoided. Acc ordingly, in an effort t o  have this capital absorbed for con­
structive purposes, a decree ·was issued in Oct ober by 1-'linister of Finance Ong, 
by which it  was declared that hot money belonging to citizens ought to be 
released lor investment in c orporations set up to work in industrial fields 
speci fied by the Department of Industry. As inducements, it was announced that 
the origins of such private capital would not be examined and that there woµld 
be no claims for back inc ome or personal property taxeso 87 . . 
Sa.nd,viched in 1-1ith thi s decree (which in effect ·would legitimize past 
evasi on of tax�s)  was a policy statement reflecting the seri ous drop in Indo­
nesia ' s  f oreign exchange reserves. It was declared that in order to  aid "citizen 
businessmen:r foreign exchange c redits from abroad would be allol'IYed only to those 
industrial c orporati ons specified by the Department of Industry, and that as 
far as possible the capital of such c orporations had to be mobilized from within 
the c ommunity and s o  be in the form of "domestic capital"--which could not 
86. Ibid. Approval for establishing thi s joint bank was finally granted 
in 1956. Report on Indonesia, i"Iay 1956, pp. 3-4 e 
87.  Decree of i'finister of Finance lloe 614/ivI,,K, 9 Oct .  1954 . Iskaq had 
broached this new policy in an earlier sp�aking tour in parts of Java"o 
813 
result in transfer of profits abroad. 
An emergency law issued in January. .1955 formalized the foregoing provisions 
with a few modifications. Thus the recipient industrial companies were not 
required to be corporations, and the B .  I.N, - (which managed the payments of  the 
rupiah countervalues of the foreign credits ) was also designated as the agency 
to absoro hot money by accepting long-term deposits that could then be lent out 
to the specified industries. It was announced that the opportunity to make such 
deposits was open only through the end of 1955."88 
The l ack of any sign of suocess either of this device89 or of any of its 
predecessors reflected the fact that much energy expended in planni�g was being 
lost so long as the climate for new industrial investments in Indonesia remained 
relatively unattractive. Consequently, during this period implementation of 
the State Plan.ning Bureau' s u.5 Year Plan° 90 was continualzy postponed. Ironical­
ly the investment climate showed little improvement despite the fact that the 
head of the Government, Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo1 had during his incum­
bency in the Indonesian Embassy in the United States bee .n a most vocal proponent 
of foreign investments in Indonesia. A major deterrent to further industrial 
investments, which was commonly alleged in business circles, was the efforts of 
the minister most directly concerned--Minister Iskaq--to acquir� for his personal 
or party use a portion of the capital or profits of a number of prospective 
alien industries as well as some already in existence, in return for the grant 
of necessary licenses or permits. Although his termination from office removed 
a major source of harassment for the factories of aliens, dual nationals, as 
�ell as many Indonesians, by the time of the general elections neither 
Indonesians nor aliens in manufacturing evidenced any significant recovery. 
BS. "Undang-undang Darurat No. 1/1955°, promulgated 22 January 195.5. 
89. Cf. de Neuman, op. cit. ,  P• 701. 
90. See Ekonomi don Keuangan Indonesia, IX (1956) ,  PP• 661-682..
CHAPrER XX: MINERAL PRODUCTION 
lfuereas most estates and factories established by f oreign capital and 
not yet returned to their alien proprietors before the transfer of sovereignty 
subsequently were returned, few mining and mineral properties not already 
restored to their proprietors by the end of 1949 were returned to them later. 
Among the reasons for this state of affairs were the feeling in many Indonesian 
circles that minerals production should be reserved to the government and 
the demand by some that a new mining law should be composed before further 
restoration of alien properties as well as extension of expired concessions 
or the granting of new ones take place. In individual cases the mlirnes lay 
in inse"cure areas, labor organizations opposed the return of their proprietors, 
or the cost of rehabilitating mines long abandoned was prohibitive. 
The state of mining affairs periodically was aired in Parliament. Already 
in April 1950 the RJE Senate 's  Prosperity and Finance Committee asked for 
clarification of the government'"s oil policy. It also wondered about such 
subjects as whether the Government intended to set up new mixed mining enter­
prises, to help small Indonesian workings and gold mining modernize, or to 
develop an iron industry in South Sulawesi.l 
Since more pressing political and other economic problems demanded atten­
tion after the Unitary Republic was first set up, Parliament gave little consid­
eration to mineral matters during the Natsir Government, although a member of 
the Interior Affairs Committee visiting East Kalimantan noted that the local 
population did not appear to be happy over the difference between their 
standard of living and that of the personnel of the Bataafsche Petroleum Maat-
1. Ichtisar P3rlemen 1950, p. 1840 
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sch�.ppij. Ono purson in Bn.likpapan h.:1.d 0v0n thr...)�t-.::nl.:ld t'-- :)urn duwn t�1u -.., il 
comp:iny ' s installDti;_,ns if hTGst New Guinea w0rc net turnud 0vor tl, Ind0r1..Jaia. 
by tho .;nd cf 1950. 
2 
During thJ dub9tes cvdr tho progrnm of tho SukiD'k'ln 
C,!J.Lin0t in 1951, hc11\l...JV__,r, minornl �n:.>.ttGrs rocoi ved 6r0<1tlv incroasvd att0nti1..,n. 
Thus Socdijonc Dj ojoprajitnc, spunking i.'or tho snw.11 Nati::nal-Curnmunist Partai 
Murba, oven ur:�d th�t thG Govornment follow tha load cf tho IrQniQn Gcvornrneni 
and nDti0n1.lizG a.11 c.•il ·wells. 3 
P.T . j·•I.R .  I .  
During thesu d0bates 1t.Terdojo ( SOBSI ) and Hu0tomc -Scep::?.rdan (P .K .I . ) 
broached one of the m0st cvntrovz:) rsial econcmic questi,:ins · cturing tho pe:riod 
under r.:iviow--tho stntus of tl1e oil fiulds in North Surnatra (along tho 02storn 
coo. st north cf I·1odan, principnlly in li.tjoh) and around Tjopu ( on the border cf 
Central �.nd East Java) ,  \iThich before tl1e 11ar had been oporD.ted by the B.P •.: 1. 
In Juno 1949, thG North Sumatrn oil proportios-�-e broug;ht und0r a uni t-3d locu · 
mnn�gem0nt, :J.nd in ,i.ugust - 1949 buth those and these near Tjepu came teclmicull· 
under tho supervisi on of the "P.T.)!I.I\J . lnJorking Committ.ocn ·within the jurisdict 
ion ,_:f the I11inistry of· �Prosperity. 4 ��lthough tl10reaft0r it appe.:irGd t.11::it tlae 
pr0p0rties '1-1ould bo roturnod to B •.i? .r-i . ,  some le:.,.ders of the :">OESI 0il workers 
affiliate, the S.B. i1·1 . ,  urged that tho fields be imrnedintoly nnti0nalized, 
:illoging tl1nt none of the originnl Dutch equipment above ground hnd survived 
2. i"Iohamo.d -'3addak report, 13 June 1951, Ris0.lDh Porunding:in 1951, pp.5006-
5007". 9addak n0ted th�.t the F . r  . .  , l. owned th0 local utilities. 
3. Speech, 31 M['.y, R.P. 1951, l)• 4226. 
4. ilnnex tc Hootomo ScepDrd:n sp0cch, 12 June, R .P .  1951, pp. 4901-4905; 
}:_P. 1952, PP• 454-455; Ib_I . :  Pro,Jinsi Su1natc"_·G Utc1.ra,  PP• 530-531. 
�) .J.0 
Q., ,, 
• ) r'., irs.l "'1J<. . , , ... nd 
loc3.l scvrch-Jd-o�rth 1n0.:1sur-Gs :1ftc2."' the Dutch mi li t:iry '' c:ti1 .ns. ....lth<.;ugh must 
v.f the B.P.l-i. cnpita l  goods in 1Jorth Sumatra had disappoc1.r0d, tl13 pr0pon..Jnts 
,_f !1nti.__ n�liz.:1ticn suggGoted tho.t producticn would ent:til f0w n0w copital 
axpenditurGs s1.nce 175 w0 lls \-Jere ·se lf-fluwing .:.1.nd foreign buyers of ci l could 
pump it a.boo.rd th�ir own t!'nkers 3t Pangka lan Susu, ·:)roviding new L,i l equipment 
in returrJ.. Net L•nly wcu ld the 0mp lc,y::,d and se1ni-emp le,yod loca l pur�unno l bo 
provide0. •with ·work, but thrc-.1 thous:-ind inactive l-!Orkcrs frc,m Tjepu cvuld .11s0 
bo n lact:d th.Jre , it w:1.s sc1id. 5 
f1canivhi lo , during 1950 under I'-li.nister of Tr:idc ·:1nd Industry :ranu L f tl1;:; 
rtCl')U�)lic 1.t J ogjo.k['rt� ." .:-i.nd Ir • .  \n-.. ndc, :1 plan \J'Jns drafted to rouni ta t110 North 
Suma.trn �.nd Tjepu oil enterpris0s undur a cuntro l petro leum ::idministrotiun. 
The purp0se of this p ln.n wc.s reportedly t0 rustcre production, tc.. providcl WL-rk·
icr the �,1 crl{ors, and t,e; 0nd 1..113 neo.r-chaotic ccnditions in t.hc mnn.1.g01ne11t 
r,.;; sultin[ from obscure -�uthe:rity, osp0cial l1r in North Sum.:-.tra, thcr0by irrprvv­
ing th..: centr�l g0v0rnm0nt"' s ccntrol.  The petrL, leum adrninistr2.tion was te; 
f.�c:i"lit:Jte tho r0storatic-n tu the Dutch ;Jrcprictcrs if tho conditions for the 
return i-,ere met . HOl'llovor, it reportadly ·w0uld be rec.dy t0 cc.ntinu0 opor,-:itions 
itsalf if B . P.lf. was nvt in a po.Jition to return. .iJ..mong oi l work0r groups 
n.nticipating this lntt0r ci.. ntingency, it ·was oven planned to de lay rest"oration 
propor.'J.tions ·whi le end�Pvoring tc imprcve oper�!tions, in order to prove to tho 
Gc.vGrnment e..nd t!1e public thct the oi l ontarprises c ould �.)e we l l  rt1n by 
Indonesi:1n personne l arid th0roby pro•vide an induc1o1roont .for ncJtic.,n�. liz2tiun. 
5. W�rdojo SJ)eoch, 1 June , R.?. 1951, pp. Li.343�4344. s. l'{e.rtc l�.ter
reported tht.it d�m�_g;) tc the oi l insto ll1ti.cns in ;�tjGh h[.l.d b0en li[lhter than 
th.�.t in Langk2t". I.P.  195L, t1 •  1175 
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Hot,1ev ;r, be �l,r0 this"· "Jogj:! Plnn" could be implam3nted; the Unit::-ry Re,ub lic 
had beon s.Jt up, :··nd l,ho p ln 11 ·was not acceptab le to tho nc.-
rw gov0rhment �11d 
tho i"linistry of Tro.dc and Industry undor Dr. Sumitro. Since thu Gov�rnmont 
c onsidered th0 oi l fie lds legally tl1tJ pr0perty of I. P .;: i. under thJ terms of 
the Round Table Conference agroemonts ,  the ministry rejected de;m8.nds of those 
lnbcr groups ca l ling for government interv.ention, disc laiming -:1uth0rity in the 
1natter. 
l�fter sever'.l l more i,K,nths of discussion without results·, in JaFiu,'.lry 1951 
i'1r. l\firwonojudo ( mannr;er of tho P.T .ii.N. opernti1..,ns at Tjepu) , witl1 5.B.,:,f. 
bocking, ·went aho:.'.d undor the c1d p le..n to 3stabli sh-..tilla llegedly under the 
jurisdict'ic.n of the Jviinistry of Trade and Iridustry--an a.chninistr[lti<.1n with the 
n.1.me Perusahnan Tnmbt1.ng �•Iinjak ReI)Ub lik Indonesia (P .T.M.F? . •  I . --Repub lic of 
Indonesia Petro leum Enterprise) Qnd inf onned the ilf!inisters of TrAde and Industr 
and of Lc1.bor of this step. Nirwoncjudo proceeded tc tJortl1 Sumatrt1 during the 
int8rim bef ure tho insta l lntion of the nevJ governer and attempted also to 
incorporate the nruch more e:...'tansive oi l ·works in that province i nto thG 
P.T• .,i.R.I .  The Ministry of Trade and Industry, however, disavowed this som0-
wh2,t syndicalist n1ove in a c a.ble to  GovJrnor Hc1kin1 of North Sumatra on 9 
February r?.nd, · having learned of p lans for shipping petrc,. leum from North Sumatrr 
to  Singapore, in$tructed the Gov0rnor to stoi) suchr exports . itcc ording ly, tl1e 
! ' . 
office set up in I'1edan by l'Jirwonojudo and the 8.E • .J. ,;-.,a,s raidod on charges of 
6. Sarikat Buruh I1injak letter ( annex to v-Jerdojo speech, 12 June ) ,  R . P .  
1951, PP• 4846-4848. 
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smugrling, "nd the f' . 'l'  • . . •  ti . I .  Diroct ..:.-r fl01,, bnak t .. J�v.:t. 
7 
Fi nally on 1 1•-furch 1951, the !tin i st0rs of T r�du .::i.nd Inch.�.stry ·1 nd :...,f 
. .  gricultu ro ( Sumitro �nd Hnnu , re spective ly) i ssued 1 joint decr00 liquidnt.i t1�: . . 
t..h0 11 Contral Committee" :nd "Worki ng Ccmmittcos11 (wl1ich si nce ':'-,eptemuer 1949 
h;:td L.Jon suporvisin8 1-1ork of the 11N" Board s ) :1nd sti pu lating t 11!'t op-3:r .:-itiGn s  ur 
maintennnco of the i ndi vidu.:i.l ente rp ri se s  a.ffected remained unde :- the mnnagt:­
,nen t of tl1e re spectiv.J " r�" B oo.rd ( st ;ite-trust ) .8 Thi s i n  oi'.t.'ect r0acti v"ted 
the old P .T .  I.N.--but in i t s  net-, form as  tho P. 'J: . ,\.n.I . --with jurisdi cti cn uv0r 
t11� 0i l enterpri se at Tjepu . In N orth Sumatra, howe \rur ,  followi nt: instruction s  . . 
frc.,m �,Jini"st.:.ir Sumitro,  G0ve"rnor Haki m confi rmed ti1c appointment of Dj ohnn as 
gt3n�ra l 1n:1n l•.gur <.,f the oi l inst ;, 11-:-ti c,n i n  Kabupaten La.n gk.:1.t ( iast Su m::it ra) nnd 
of Tungku .iimir HUSI1� .hl }fudjahid c1L reneral m.:inagcr of tho[;G in East iltjeh. The 
-n mge rs \-Jere in st i-ucted t0 facj_lit c.te th.a return of tl1e oi1 install:iti ,.,ns tc  
the owner .9 
7 o I bid o ,  PP• 4848-4850; S. Nart c speech, 26 l,Tov . 1954, I .P.  1954, P• 1175 . 
Cn 23 Jnnu ary Nirwon ojud o attemoted t o  place Djohan , mo.n :-igGr of tl1e Lan gkat 
in stDll�ticn s, on inactive st��u s.  
The raid was coll1:1ectod with a report of a. Communi st attempt tc- S!llUgt le . 
.. ,i l tc  Communi st China. ive rdojc n.sncrted , )l.:iwever ,  that t he export h.:J.d been 
licun sod by _the regi on�l government . 
8.  Cf. Labor Min i ste r Tedjasukmana statem,:;nt , 12 Feb. , R .::? .  1952 , PP• 
456-458 �  The joi nt d ecree was made ret roactive tc  l De c. 1950. 
· 9 .  Tcuku Ifu.d a ' Dalam report , 19 N ov . ,  I .?. 1954, P• 1109; Economic C0m­
mittee report, 30 Nov . ,. f.:P.  1954, p. 1183. The S.B•.1 ·!. ,  vi a \ferd ojo, pre ssed 
for a clari ficati on of tho status of the Ncrth Su matra oi l ent3rpri so . Cf.
R.?. 1951, pp. 4840-4841, 4849-4851. 
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In reply tc  cho.rges by Werd oj o t l1nt the Governmant"' s interventi on ogain �1t 
exports of l\Jort h .Su i.natra oil h2.d resulted in the loss of hund red s of millions 
of rupiahs, t he Government merely observed t ho.t the qu0stion of ·profit or loss 
should those oil field s be nnti on�li zed wns sti ll under study.lo 
C onditi ons o.t t he relatively small P.  T • . ;I.R. I .  installation s  in c.nd wost 
of Tjcpu , whe re t he SOBSI uni on Perbum was d ominant , alt h0u gh still legally 
unsett led soon appeared to  be c omparatively normal. Rec on struct i on and 
axpansi on programs lj-Jore unde rt aken , and by 1953 an operating profit was even 
reported . 11 .tllthoug h t ho E.  P .i''I. l1ad resu med operating ?--ts oil prop0rt ies n orth 
and east of Tjepu in early 1949, it exhibited litt le interest nftorwards in 
reacqt1iring thosa under tl1e P.  T.11. '.l. I .  The more import ant oil properties in 
l\Jort h  Sumatrn, however, where t he oil u ni ons we r9 divided between those :� 
favoring nati onc.1lizo.tion o.nd t hose fee ling t hat t he ·welfare of the 'lrJorkers lay 
in rost orntion t o  the B.P. ii. , were before long to bec ome t he scene of a major 
c ontroversy. 
Tcuku Hasan i\1oti on 
For scvcrnl months l'tr. Teuku l'1ohamad H/,.Sfl \J, Chairman of the Trade and 
Indust ry Committee of Parliament , had boon gathering d ata  on mining and petro­
leu m  problems. I\.s former Gov0rnor of Sumat ra, residing in Med an ,  and an an 
/1.t jehnesc, he :. was especially c oncerned with t he ccntinued ambi gu ous status of 
the N orth Sumatran oil field s .  Finally, he and sev3rnl other members drafted 
a. moti on on mining affairs for su bmissi on t o  Parli a.ment . 
10. Government st atement , 15 June , R.P. 1951, p .  5097 . 
11. _:}.I . :  Propinsi Dja.i'ITa Tengah, PP• 234-235; !1.badi , 4 l\.u g .  1953 . The
P:r .I1. :1. I .  opera.ted 252 wells r,nd produced �;asoline , kerosene , 3.nd solD.r oil,) 
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He was c onvinced that the pre.fits of foreign ce,mpanies, es!)3ciall.y- · ui l c0rnpr.nics, 
were too l:;.rge, and determined that drastic measures ot1ght to be to.ken to 
reduce them, without dri vi� the compa.nies off . Short ly after the -taxt cf the 
motion ·was pub lished, Teuku Hasan discussed the Ilk�.tter ·with some oi l compc1.ny 
offi cia ls, 1-1ho suggested thc!.t outstanding prob lems 1J,3 sett l.Jd as soon ns 
possi bla nnd offered to split profits on a 50:50 basis as  in the l1iddle East. 
Hasan replied that he would r G afraid that ir1 that ca.se 11 operrti on coststt 
would rise so that the proffi3rred ratio would lose a.ny meaning. He suggested 
instead that the proceeds from producti on be split 50:50, which reported ly 
left the others nonp lussed. 12 
The dra.ft mc-tion on �orming a State Commission on I�Iining .c\ffa.irs, stipu­
lnt0d that the Parliament: 
I.  Urges the Government to form within one month a Sta.te Commission un 
on Mining ;i.ffl'.irs with the task of: 
a. investigating as soon as possible problGms of ci l extr.:1cti0n, and 
of tin, coo. l, gold, oilve r, rind oth3r 1nining in Indonesia ; 
b. drafting an Indonesian mining law i n  harmony Tlith present 
c onditi ons; 
-c .  providing the Gov·ernment with its c onnidered opir.d.on on the 
attitude to be taken by the Government c oncerning the status of
oi l extraction in North Sumatra and T jepu in pr.rticular, a.nd other 
oi l production in genera l; 
d .  providing the Government with its c onsidered opini on on the status 
of tin mining in Indonesia;  
e.  providing the Government with its considered opini on on taxes on 
petroleum prcducts and the fixing of oi l prices;  
f o making other proposals concerning minine mntters to the enrich­
ment of the State ; 
1,. Teuku Hasan speech, 2 Aug? -� ?i951, pp . 5784-5785 . Among tha co-signors
of the motion 1,1ere Siau1-1 Giok Tjhan and i1r. !1..Ja i(usuma Sumnntri. 
Hasan i nherited hi s chair, h:iv.ing headeq. the ProspGri ty arid ·�inarice Com-
mit tee of the RIS Senate. 
021 
g .  cumplating itc report 1-1ithi11 thr8e ,n0r1ths,  · nct subrrii·:.. ting 
it to the Government ."nd Parli:.'in�nt. 
II. Urges the Gov0rn1nent to postpon-:: nl'J_ ��:rBnting (,,f cuncessic,n �.nd
exploitation permits or extending expired ;-:>err11its, pen11r1g the rasultr 
of the work oi.' the State pommission on r1ining �1.ffairs.  
t"i1hcn thcl draft motion came up for discussion before tl1e plenary session 
on 2 11.ugust 1951., Hnsan gave n lengthy explanati,;n of it•" .".J.{e Cl'lcul.:�"Led that 
if rnin8rals were extracted under optimum conditions, the c ountry 1•1ould be 
richer each year by an amount of Rp. 5 billion--roughly half the entire State 
budget. In such a case ., he visu�.lized the tax burden b.aing dropped frum the 
shoulders of the poorer people, large-sen.le construc tion projects being 
embarked upon, and plentiful funds beco1ning e.ccessible for rehabilitatir1g 
nulitary vetornns. ·rhe increa.sed revenue c ould ba used in general f or the 
peorJle '  s prosperity ,7- s ·was intended by J\.rt. 38, Sec .  3, of the Constitution. 
i1ost of Hasan ' s spcoch was concerned with the present operations of 
foreign petroleum c ompanies in Indonesia. He dec lared that oil compD.niGs ·t-.1ere 
. .
allegedly paying forty parcent of their profits to the Govern.rnent in oddition 
tc paying nn cie;ht percent duty on exr>orts, excise duties on domestic sales of 
gascline ::ind kerosene, as well ns a 25-sen fixed duty per hectare of c oncos­
sicr1 lo.nd plus a cuss of .{our porcent of gross prodv.ctic,n (provided in ;�rt. 35 
of the 1899 Indios flining Law) . Rejecting the claims of some others that the 
oil companies ac tually - paid up to suty-five percent of the..ir profits to the 
Government, he of ferad a rreat number cf figureG to prove that. they paid only 
ten percent tc the Government. The cl1ief discrepancy he � ttri buted tu the 
companies I stating the price of petroleum exports .:lt Rp"& 100 l)Or tun inste�,.d . 
of ' :150, th0 rnte JapanesG buy,1rs reportedly of · ·ored for North Sumatran petro­
leum p.; .. oduc ts. Thus, he ca. lcul· .. t ed tl1at the oil companies gross0d vn exports 
13. Ibid . ,  p .  5772 . 
speech, op .cit . ,  pp. 5773-5780. 
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Hnsan 1.,hen propc,sod. that- tl1e p.rovisi · nt �f ... r1.1.c l� 35 �I "n'"' L,�l.1' '1 .i:1. . u.fli. . 
- ,
vlh.i.ch brought in re"lr1tiv0 ly :litt l.J revenue (a.pproxi.Tlc3.ta"l:-<r Jp. 20 . .d llion in 
1950) ,  be ch�nr.od . Considering t,10 fixed duty tc  ·:-;;a inappr0priat,.: i'or 
Indon�sil! ,  he not3d that Indvnesians l-!era more fa!ni liur ·with 1 1dee lbou\J11 and 
"maro11 --f0udn. l terms under i:-1l1ich thd tenant sht.1red l1is prodt1ct,s w:Lth the l;:1.nd-
. ... 
lord on a 50:50 basis--and proposed that th0 law provide for 1 50:50 distribut­
ivn betweJn the 0il COtiipany --:!.nd the ste"Ld of the proceeds realiz0d frc:n the 
sale e;f p0troleum products. Hasan then went on to calcu"late tnat the 
Government ohou ld alsu recoi "lE:3 proceeds froro th0 excise tax, the Gxport duty-­
-which 1·Juuld bu co llected 0nly on tht"t half 01· the �etroleum axnorts c!'la.rgcd tc 
the c,i l companies r sic1•-plus the < forty percent> company tax. Under Hasan , s 
..... 
fornu.i.la the rea l  profits of the companies would bs reduc0d to one-quc.rtGr 0f 
their £'orme". · size . Neverthe le�s, i1e figured th:,t they still :night m:1.ke an 80 
to :·o percc.nt orofit on thoir invested capita1."14By his fir;ures, l1ow0ver, the 
Governroont"' s share of the 11profi ts" would be 78:  22 . Should the c01ni)any returns 
h�ve been a.ccurnte, on the other hand, the Governroont' s "share" of the profits 
1-1ou ld be 94:6--a ratio, perhaps, ff!•r exceeding feuda l Jn,ra or Sumtra a.t its 
worse". Under his 11 maro11 system--contrary to his assuniptions--Teuku Ha.san could 
iL. Information in the preceding paragraphs is taken from 'I'euku Hasan ' s  
Hasan calculated the 80 to 90% profit for oi l 
companies on an estimated ca1)ita l cf Rp. 1 billion .  Were the capital t,-Jic0 thD.t 
figure, he sti l l  fe lt they would .(\;{, a superb profit of 45%. Based on his 
ca lculations--a lthough he did not put it into so many words--thc companies 
were then [etting a 320% return on their capital armuc,. lly ( or 160% if his more 
conserva.tive estimate were used) .  The present writer believes Rp. J.5 bil"lion 
wou ld be a more realistic valuation on the capita l of oi l companies in 
Indonesia in 1951. 
---1
-.5-. I-b-i. d-.-, PP• 5780-5784. 
not h,J sure th.:1t the 0il CL,nlpnnies \vould uut urun nv1ny11 • 
'i'euku Hasan !.ilso express8d diso.pprovn 1 cf the " l0t-r-i. l0ne agream0n·ts11 , 
be liuving that Lhey ror1u ltad in a ; ra�-:it loss of .i'oreign oxchc.nge .for the 
treQsury . Notint; tl1D.t a company ( C.i ltex) 1.-1r s  prepnring to bui ld .1. refinery 
ne0.r Mani"ln, he 11r ed inste,�d that -c,ho export3,tior1 o.f crude oil Je prohibited 
and that it be refined in Indonesia so' that Indonesians would obtain lvork and 
increased ski lls and th:J stnte treasury mor0 revenue . He then turned his 
attention to the problems cf lJorth Sumatran a.nd Tjepu oi l. Noting that 
conditions in Tjepu were re lnti·ve ly satisfactory, 110 dep lored the 11 mess" he 
ascribed t0 the ambiguous status uf the oi l property in North Sumatra. He 
sue;gested tho.t ·with little expense it cou ld be producing a mi llion tons of 
petroleum annual ly,  and thnt perhaps the refinery '.J.nd some of the labor J.t 
Tjepu, where there ·was not much oi l, could be 1noved tu l�orth Sumatra to assur(; 
production there. He a lso referred to the assure.nces of some union uf ficers 
th�.t if the North Su1natran oi l property were nationa"lized, it vJould E�ross 
half a bi llion rupiahs annua l ly.  .Admitting that he ·was no expert on such 
inatters, he urged that a State Commission on �tining ii.ffairs be formed to 
. 
study the matter. 
15 
Hasan was a lso unhappy with tho tin situation. He suggested that 
Indonoaian receipts might increase by Rp. l bi l lio� if tin ·were proce_sscd on 
Bangka instead of Ho l land ond urged that funds be a llocated for repairing 
the domestic sme lter .  }Joting · that the Bangka tin mine s 1,-1ere being mane.ged by 
the G . i-•I.B., he cu lled .for this state of affairs to be ended sovn to avoid a 
� 1-1aste 0f .l.'or�ign axch.:-i.11i-� �1nd l0sses tu i..h8 stat� treasury. 
Director Gener� l Darrnawc.n of the i"linistry of Economic iifi.:.1.irs, sni.3;1.kir1e 
\ in behalf of the now minister 'rJilopo, annow1ced th.::i.t the Governm0nt could 
'1CCGDt the proposed motion and noted that the Cabin-3t i11 Juno had decided t0 
. l?up sue comnuss1.0n . ns men 1oned . 1.un . set h ::i. t. 1n the t1110 . 
,Jluhamma.d Yamin, ·who ri.groed that c olonial mining laws should b0 ended 2nd 
in gcncra.l TrJas attrPcted to tho moti on, cautioned o.gainst 1ttempts tc build 
an ecunomv by confiscating and nationali zing in the manner of 1-Iossadegh in . . 
Iran. In. general he i:-.1as attracted to the motion . }1oreo1.r0r, noting that the 
commissi on was supposed to complete its \-,J ork in three months, he observed thot 
tho tasks given it, inclcding drnfting a comprehensive law, might take up to 
twv ve,!lrs, by which time the Constituent llssembly would probably be working 
wvar the ntlning-principles itself. Since he felt the problem of a new mining 
lai-1 t__. be tied to thc.t of a ne1-1 agrarian law, he suggested th:it before mining 
rights could be determined, a solution to agrarian problems had to be 
approached.18siauw, one of the motion ' s  draft0rs, asserted that Yamin need 
not bcl so pessimistic,. for it was expect0d that the commission ·would not be 
given too much work ( sic ) .  It was necessary, he said, that the Goyernment 
take steps to step the II swindling" of Indonesia ' s  mtural riches" by. 
16. Ibid. ,  pp. 5782-5784. Hasan noted too that the goose eggs in gold 
�nQ silver production did net help the treasury. 
1� week later Finance Minister 1rJibisono told Parliament thnt · Hasan • s
figures on tin affairs �-,ere f:1r from accurate . R.P .  1�51, p .  5�67 . 
. 17 . Darnawan statement, 2 �ug. R.P. 1951, p .  5785. 
18. Speech, 2 Aug. I.P. 195!, PP• 5786-5790. 
Hu (.. . ..., '") r� 
t o  i mport good s  l're€J from foreign exch�nt.:·e reglJ.l�ti ons,  :.i.nd supe rvising 1nore 
cl0se l)r the oi l price cf exports. He urged that Has:tn"1 s 11m.1.ro11 .forrnula be" . 
used , so that rec or1st ructi on proje ct s c ould be paid .J.·or by the country ' s  own 
me ans i nstead of mo.king loan s with strings att �1ched th0t encumb3r.Jd. tl1l) c 0mm0n 
pe ople". 19 
Ir . Darma.,-1an had expressed the Government ' s  approv[.1.1 for e st�blishing  
the c ommi ssi on referred to  in tl1e first article of the Teuku Hasan tnc,ti on . He 
fai l0d t o  menti on the sec ond provisi on which 1-1ould postpone  action on minornls 
permits.  l\Joting tl-1is, and st ating that there 1-Jas alarm th :1.t the c once ssi on of 
th0 G. !.1 .B .  due t u  expir-e in 1953 might lJe extended , Sjamsuddin Sutan I1akmur · 
asked whether the Government a.lso  a.g reed t o  the sec ond artic le of the moti on . 
Darma:wan , brushing aside ?1akmur"' s que sti on of what were the Government ' s  own 
views on extending c uncessi ons, �aid merely that the Government fe lt that the 
questicn of granting new c oncessions or extending old ones  should be submitted 
to  Parli ament . With th at ,  Chairman Sartono  d eclared the moti on ac cepted 
.unanimous y. l 
20 
· Praiseworthy as Part I of the Teuku Hasan Moti"cn may have been in view of 
the wide variety of inining matters demanding definitive deci"sions, it 1r-1as · 
virtually impossi ble for the ,State Commi ssi on which .-was formed to  c arry out 
it s 1nand ate ;within n. re asonably sl1ort period. Conse quently, Part II of the 
moti on--·which was hardly menti oned in the de bates--had n c rippling effect on 
some mining d eve lopment ,  for it was applied indi scriminately a gainst alien 
,. 
19. Spee ch , 2 Aug., I .P. 1951, PP• 5791-5792. ___.......,_ 
20• .  Remarks, 2 .ttug . ,  I.P. 1951, ·pp. 5791;5794. 
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it �Jns nprroveci primarily with th0 s.Lnl lv c0nc0 8Gil-n Gf the G ., :.b . in rnind. 
:,tate Commiosiun on i1ining ;i.f fairs 
By Pr�sidential Decree on 9 October 1951 the State Co1wmssi0ri. un 1;1ir1inf 
.r' .·:iirs ·was established, nlthoue;h it had nlready begun working early in 
September. It ·was made responsible for drafting an Indon0sian raining la1-1 in 
harmuny with current conditions and grounded on e national 0cunomy. It was 
·) lsc to make proposals on the subject of tin mining in Indonesia :.1nd to  
consider disputer; over cil production. It was instructed to finish its work 
in six months, then rop0rt its findings to the G overnment. To the nine-man 
commission, four memb8rs cf Pnrliament w0re appointed. iir. Mohammad Roem 
( i'Iasjumi) was appointed chairman and Teuku Hasan, vice-chairman. 21 
The six months specifi0d--twice that recommended in the motion--c.:.11ne .ind 
\vent without the commission completing its 1-Jork. The President 1.ccordingly 
extonded its mandate another four months--ur1til the end of June 1952 . 
Subsequently, 1tJhen Roem was nppoint0d ,..,linister of Interior in the new \iJilopc 
Cabinet, Loekman Hakim ( P.N .I. ) was moved into tha chair."22Even �.fter the clnd 
uf the extended period, however, the commission was far from finished with its 
assigned work. 
Large Petroleum Producers 
,� major subject studied by the 8tat0 Commissiun 0n IvJ:i.ning Affairs l:Jns 
the " let-alone agreemer1ts11 n1a.de bet·ween the maj or oil companies and the 
21. "Keputusan Pr3siden No. 81/195111 • Other mcmbars 1rJere Members of Parl­
iament Gusti D,iohan, Koesnan, and Sundjoto; �-1r. Tandiono Manu, 1,1r. Loek1nan 
Hakim, Tr. Darma:wan, and I1r. Kartodjumena (Director Gen3ral of Sta.te Revenue ) .  
22 . 11Keputusan Presiden No. 96/1952" and "KE;?putusan Presiden No. 119/1952"". 
:-.1r. Jusuf 1�Tibisono was ar)pointed as o member when toekman Hakim t-ras l)romoted. 
• • 
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criti cal of thos'3 agreen1'3nts for Svine tirn0. Thus in rn:id -1951 i-Loet omo S00fJ;.1.rdnL 
c � lculated thut the Government lost Rp. 1.5 bil li on in 1950 Qlone because the 
oi l c ump�ni os cou ld make export s free from the Indonesi an forei gn exchange 
rJg:.ilati uns.  
24
The Gov· ke the err:unent renli ed th�t even th ou gh it did not lj_
'lgreomGnts, because .of thei r  existence it had saved Rp . 293 mi lli on instead 
of suf l'ering a l·oss . 
25 
The let-e.lone agreement With N:c V.  Stand ard Vacuum Petroleum i'1aatschappij 
(Stanva,2_) expired at t l1e dnd of 1951, and so in 1952 t he Government caJTB to 
control that co1np any' s use of foreign exchange". In practice, the Government 
acquired control over the n0t foreign exchange proceeds,  whi le nupervising 
Stanvac"1 s foreign trading transact ions.
26 
For two more year s, the Gov )rnment and Stanvuc negotiated over a . mod us 
vivendi". Fina lly, in }1arch .1954, a ne·w four-year n.greement was"· re-:'cl1ed under 
wl1icl1 tl10 company received a ceneral foreign exchange p arini t t o  spend forei gn 
currency for i n:iports and invi si b le p a1rinents nec essary to maint ain and d eve lop 
its oper ations in Ind onesia .  It w1.s also allowed provi sionally _to_ r et ain 
• 
23. Government re1)ly t o  .Saroso Harson o inquiry, 3 June", I.P.  1952 , p.  5-72 .  -
�4. Spee ch , 2 June , R.P. 1951, pp . 4624-4625". 
. - . 
25. Gove"rnment reply, 7 June , R.P. 1951, pp . 4673-4674, 4716.  Parliament 
1-1as informed that a gov2rnment c ommittee was studying the agreements. 1ts a
·result of a ruling by the Supervi sory Counci l of the For eign Exchange Institutt, 
the Government reported ly recei ved over Rp. 32 mi lli on from the two l2rgest 
oil compa.nies for foreign exchange certificates covering i mport s  whi ch were
not ca�ital goods.  
26. Reply by !'1inister oi' iconomi c ii.ffairs .8u 1nanang to inquiry .by tho Zcor1-
·01nic llf.'fai rs and Finance Committees, 8 Apr . ,  I.P. 1953, PP• 418-419. New 
forei gn exchange was the differenca between �roceed s from p etroleum exports anu 
the sum of payri1ents for p etroleum i mports (e .g., lu bricants )  and oper�•ting 
costs. 
In rep ly to a questi"on signed by Si auw (in iiarch 1953 ) ,  which urged that 
th e other let-alone agreements b0 cancelled , the Government de murred". I .P .  
1953, pp.  402, 404, 419. 
f oreign cxch.:inge 0.:irnings. lr1 return, -�tanv:_ ·! c  :1gr00d tu 5 n"lrest, 70 L,J )30 
2 ,· 
over -1. thr3e-year period in dXpansion .::i.nd mooerrri � ation· projectD.  
1 
\rJhi le plans i'or caoitn l investments ·Her� ;.;ei1 .. c deve"loped, r;tanvac l1ad 
bde11 pushing its 11 I-program0 • By 1955 a lmost 1000 of its 41,000 emp loyees 
were active in some training program. Between 1949 o.nd mid-1956 the pro1)c.,rtiur; 
,:;f Indon0sians in a l l technica l, administrative, and supervisory positions · 
had increased by t·wenty-eight :_.>ercent, :.1nd a large number of j ob c lassificat-
ions had beccine Indonesianizcd. 
28 
Yet in spite of the investment progra!n, St:�nV,'.:.C sufi'ered � decli"ne in out-
.,ut, .i:'or its reserves vrere srnn"ller than those: of tha otl10r t1-Jo rriaj or oi l 
C(:'Tif):inies.  It badly needed to undert.'.lke further v:L l explorntions, yet wns 
unnblG tc obt::i.in new exp loration permits thanks to Part II of the Teuku Husan 
.-1otion. 
�J.V. Ca ltex Pacific Petroleum .-Jaatschappi.i (Qa ltex) finally began cummer­
c; n l  production of crude petro leum at its "i1inasn oi l fiG ld near Pakr,n Baru in 
..·1.pri l 1952, with Minister Sumanang present for t,he cerernonies. A.s n result, 
27. U.S. Department of Commerce , Investment in Indonesia, (Washington: 
u . s. Government Printing Office, 1956) ,  pp. 41-42. The agreement also covered 
a profit-sp"lit. 
Stanvac was granted a 10-year exemption from import duties on capita l 
goods in dri lling for and refining petroleum, effective 1 January 1954. 
11 Keputusan Menteri Keuangan" , 14 Dec. 1953, Berita-Negara R.I.  1953, No. 104. 
28. The Indonesia Project, Center for Internationa l Studias, 1'1assachusetts 
Institute of Technology, Stanvac in Indonesia, ( National P lanning ilssociati,)n, 
1957 ) ,  PP• 36, 71, 76-77.  
Two members of Parliament ( Tjoeng D-nd £1aruto) ,  who visited the Stanvac 
refinery in 11.fa.y 19.54, reported that the \iiorkers ·were ·we ll-paid but that 
discrimination was shown by compo.ny officers toward 11.sian ( inc"luding Indonesian) 
personne l .  I .P.  1954, p .  720. 
the cour1try set . -1  crude production a..nd. export record ir1 1952.  
29i.,.rhen the Caltox 
let-alone ar:reoment expired at the Gnd of 1953, it l1c.d mo·ved intc third iJlac0 
( ::1.hen.d . of Nii� i·1) among the country I s leading· producers of' crude. 
Caltex, being a new large-scale anterprise in a relatively spa.rsely­
porJulated -'.3.rea, attracted workers ( many from W�st Suma1,rc) 1t1i th good lJotking 
condj_tions and high wages. t"Iany ·workers left the Government-:-owned umbilir1 
cual mine to 1-rorl{ with th0 petroleum conipany. $ince B . P.j"1. and Stanvnc had 
. . 
:ilready been able to serve fully tho domestic market, Caltex exr>orted a ll of 
its production. Occasionally, suggestions were made tl1at it ought to refine 
its crude in Indonesia instead of shipping to refineri3s in other countries."30 
The Government used this a s  a barg-aining point in its discussions ·with 
Caltex, but realized in the carl,l year3 that the large capital 8Xpenditures 
for beginning the production and transport of crude oil precluded building a. 
refinery at Pa.kan Baru at that time."31 
At the end of 1953, the let-alone agreement •with Caltex expired.  In 195Lt 
... . . .
Caltex signed a. ne�, five-year agreemen.t with the Gov·�rnment similar tu tliat 
,;-Jhich Stanvac had reached.  Hotvever, Caltex agreed to turn over (,60 i'nillion 
worth of "acceptable" foreign currency to the Foreign Exchange Fund over the 
-
29. Indonesian production and export of �etroleum set new records in 1953: 
1954, and 1955, thanks largely to ir1creased· Caltex production". Cf. Bank 
Indonesia Report 1955-1956, p . 147 . 
30. Cf . Saroso Harsono speech, 15 r1ay�l952, pp: 368-369. 
31. Government reply, 3 June, I.P. 1952, p.  572. 
. 
,)( , _3 ,· ') 
During the period undo.t· r.aviei-J, the �. V.  Bataaiasche Petruleum .-ii,j. 
(B.�.:,. ;'1. ) remained the c ountry ' s  l:ir'.--ast producer of crude oil and pdtroleum 
µr0ducts, despite the fact tha.t it did not have access to its North Sumatran 
concession and much ol' tho.t around Tjepu. Its let-alone Qgreement expired at  
the �nd of 1955.
33 
·rhe fourth major producer, NDd·1, continued unde r the management of B .P.l1l. 
Hc1-1ev.Jr, at the c!nd of 1953, ·when Ir. Darna'\,·-1an left to j oin the mf!nagement of 
Bank IndonBsia, Mini ster Iskaq took the opportunity tc Indonesianize further 
l\Jii1Jl 1 S Executive Board. He appointed f·1r. :'fuchjidin ftfandi as Da.rmawan"' s  
successor as board chairman and re1Jl3.ced a Dutch vice cha.irman and one member 
•t-1ith Indone"sians. Then in 1954 Sediono (former Secretary General of the 
l1linistry of Economic i1.ffairs) was appointad as Nili.'1 Genern l Representative 
in Indonesia.34 
32 . Investment in Indonesia,  pp. 41-42; Bank Indonesia Report, 19�-4-1955, 
P •  141.
Caltex was granted a 5-year exemption from import duties on capital goods, 
starting with 1954. " Keputusan !1enteri Keuangan" ; 24 June 1954, Berita�ega� 
R.I. 1954, No. 57. 
33. Both the B . P .M. and Niill-1 were given 10-year exemptions from import 
cluties en capital  goods, effective 1 Jan. 1954. 11 Keputusan I11enteri Keuangon11 ,
10 Feb. 1954,Berita-Negarn Fl.I. 1954, No. 17. 
34. 1 1Keputusan Menteri Perekonominn ·No. 16. 387/M" , 17 Nov. 1953, and 
"No. 16 . 524/M1' , 20 Nov. 1953. See Government statements, I.P. 1954, pp. 335-
336, 1272. 
��-' 
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1�orth :,umatr:in Oi l: to 1�3.tiunclizu 0r not to i�ativna lizJ?  
.tift,or 1.n on--�he-spot in--10 stie-ati on in JanuD r-:tr 19�2 oi' thu rur!:1er B. • - • 
oil installutie;ns in l�orth -Sumatr.�, the State Commi�sion on l.ti.ni ne: Affo.irs 
sub tnit,ted its advice to  the Govcrnroont. I101r1eve:r, aft0r the cabinet ch:.1n .- _:c, 
. ;Ir. Loekman Hakim (?.N.I. )  rep laced Roera as the Commissiun"' s ch1:. ir!nEin, and 
.·Tr. � libisono j cined the Commi ssion. In a press interviei:-1 on 2 July, : Tibi sono 
declared tha.t he favored the return of the we lls t o  B . P. 11i. because. operotion . ' 
by tr1e oil company ,-�ould be more prol'itable to the Governrncnt than operation 
by the Gov•.)rnmont its01£ since it la -�ked necessary equipment. 'tJioreov0r, 
the return w ould b0 in l{Geping w:i:tl1 e.x:isting c ontracts and ccncessions.  '11-10-
+.Jiil'dt, of the Commission I s membars (Koosnan had 1,i  thdrawn) wore LhJn r0nortedl 
in favor of return ,  a.lthough some of thes8 ·prefGrred that cor1ditions oe 
attc-1 chad. One of t".-le thrae inEHnbors stronFl�, o•; J: .L: o;)osed to return �!as Teuku . ,'> ·
Hnsan, 1.vhc dec"lared th:}t  the oil vj 0lls were pi-educing 10:1s· than expectGd be­
cause of th0 G0·va1."'nJ10nt I s h-3sit.!lnt 1.ttitude !Jbout 1)I'CYviding equipment. Since 
t11e Dutch tl1e:mselv0 s hQ6 dG stroyod th8 refinGrios, 110 fe.lt t�1at the"· conc,3ssion 
did not nose nny problem. To eet the ci l enterprise into efficient operati on , 
l1e reco1.-rrr,1ended again that t he installation at Tjepu be sent to  tTorth Sul'll-:.1.tra 
and that the cfi'er of sc1mG Japnnese oil C01npaniGs to supply eqt1ipmer1t should 
. -
be '.:lccepted. Coincidenta.lly ?t  that tin1e th:3re 1-ia.s a Japanese trr:i.de : · 
dolegatic..n in Djak::1 rta to  discuss sottlemdnt of I ndonesia I s .trade d�fit:it 
1-vi t :1 J.;ipan , and the de leg:.1ti on re�;orted l·'f 1vas ready to settle its c laims in 
• • . . - 35re 11rn t fl ur permiss1.0n or Jap�.nuse J.nves t:: t .in oi . l 1 tlf nen . anc 0 1or. lTll.ning • 
• 
35. I.P. 1952 , P •  572; i1.ntara, 2 July 1952.  11":JO months later Ino.gaki, 
heo.d of th•3 Japanese mi ssion visiting Indonesia c0nl'irmed that Japan was ready 
to. Sdll. oil 1nncl1in_ery, 0.11d send t::chni cir:ns. A.nta 0• 16 Jul�•· 1oc;2 
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Half :i month 12te r it , .,a,:-,,, 
t0 tl1a Gov3rnment th�t the oil ·viells :�-e return0d to B • . ) . : ·I. ·on condit�.on that 
t:10 c0mpanv pay coinpens"-:-.tion and. i'a.ir w��-:s to the 1 •1orkers. Tl1e Gov"::1rnm0nt, 
according to the sa;n0 rer)ort, vJD s prcpoxod to acceot tho reco;:iunendation. 36 
In less than a week, ho1:-rever, .hntD.ra Ne1Js :.gency reported that "trading circlos11 
in North Sumntrn felt that r3turning tl1e oil f'i Jlds 1r;ould b3 to th,Jir 
detriment. and t,hat i.1.' the Governinent retained ·i.,he oil fields, Indonesio.n 
importers ·would bo able to provide goods to their workers. 37 
1vfhen some mem·bers of ?3rliament"' s ,e;conomic Cormni ttee opposed to tl1e return 
cf the oil wells heard of the reports of the Govern.rnant"' s intention, they 
called i·tini ster Su:nanang t0 give an 8:X:)lana tion. In a commi ttec meeting on 
7 1·.ugust which lasted for ..:·cur hours, 3u1nanang stood his ground, insisting 
l,11rt the oil 1-•re11s 0hc:1ld :;e retur-ned to B. P .1·I. 0ince thi r. would be more 
)rofitable to the Government. 38Four davs later Prime .linister 1,Jilopo announced 
thc:.t the Firm.ncinl �nd .2conomic Council, 1�hich ha headed, had recommended to 
the Cabinet the.t th.J oil wells be returned to B . P. 11. and that the Cabinet ' s  
position would be in keeping T·!ith this recommGnda.tion. He expressed his 
conviction that an agreement irith the Economic Com:,ri.ttee would be possible ."39 
36. Pedorn...'1n, 20 July 1952 . PedorM.n ·was the daily of the P.S.I . ,  which 
f.::ivored restoring the oil propertias to the B.P  . i,'l. 
31 • .i�ntara, 25 July 1952. rationale given vJas that Indonesian tr:1de �1. 
·was little carried on D.round the o.reas of £oreign capital, such as estates , 
Antara I s Genero.l .i.'1anJger (i1.dam leia.lik of Partai i"Iurba )  and i,fedan branch 
heed {;'1ohamad Said of t!10 P.N.I. ) i'avored natiC:nnlization of th8 oil 
inst:Jll.e.tions. 
38. Anta.ra, 7 .:i.ut;. 1952. 
39. i.1.ntara, 12 Aug . 1952 . The Fina ncial a nd Economic Col)ncil had inade it.s 
reconnnendation on the ha.sis of the Comnission ' s  report. I.P.  1953, l) •  736 . 
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.ti.ft..;)r l1a:.> rin: l,•ilo�o, ·-;uu1a 11c.1 ng, ':i.nd Loekman Hnkim (o.11 inerr1l:•ers of the 
·.}.! • .!�. )  the i:c on(·,inic Com'Tiittae of ?v.rlirunent got ::i c.c .J;rri.tcnont th?.t bc;"·o  .. :e t1.1e 
Cr(YV•·)rr1 ·1ent would make 1 docis; on on the status c ::' t.110 oil 1.:·Jells, it 1-Jould .Lirst 
diocuss tho 1no.t ter ,with Pnrli['I mont or nt least tho Sconomic Connni t teo .  'I'l10n 
or1 e,11e thirteenth, fcur momb0.rs of "i.,he c onrrnittae 18ft to  i.11,·;poct for tl10111s0lv(;;ls 
tl1e 0il f'.:lcilities in i'Jorth Sumatrr1 , �>Jhile t·f.lo others lf:Jnt t.0 ;rje1:>u.40 
. me1nLer of the \,Tilopo Cabinet ·liJas opposed to che Ho1:10v .)r, r.t l..Jast one 
G.:"'.bii1ct"' r, .st-1.nd. Tl1is ·was .!.1inis"l,0r of ?ersoru1el f;.ffairs Soeroso, 1i1ho 
Qnnounced his opposition on 18 ;1.ugust, a �•1eek ai'tGr ;:, speech at the Parindra 
Gont·re·- s .r. ' in 'Hhich he took is.sue •with those ·who allagadly felt t.11:i.t if 
Indonesians h�d political ·qo1·Jer j_t did not matter who controlled tl1e economy. 
tle declared that unlcr.G  restrictions i1era placed 011 f orai6n caoital--nlthough 
Q country lacking capital had to seek o.ssistance--Indonesia wo·uld suffer a s  it 
'·J ,., s then doing, for occupying a stro.t,Jgic economic positic11, .foreign capital•, ... •, 
5tii'ling thG growth of nationel capitai."
41 
40. Antara, 19 l1.ug. 1952; r.P.  1952, pp. 728-729. Tha Committe0"1 s inspec­
tion tenm to If orth Sumntra consisted of ifuruto l'Ji timihardj o ( Partai 111Iurb�) ,  
TjikvJan ( 1vJasjumi) ,  Soem�.rtojo (?.S. I . ) ,  and i·Ir. 'I'JOEl'JG Tin Jan (Partai 
Katholik) ; i"lr. Burhanuddin (non-party) and 1'jugito (P. i(. I . )  visited Tjer)u. 
41. i�ntara, 12, 18 1'1.ug . 1952 . 1.t the Pa.rindr.::i. c ongress, <1oeroso declared 
that the party still worked f'or a socialist society �.nd op�1os0d o. l.l i'orms of 
capitalism a.nd imperialism. He steted that elthoueh it mir:ht 1Je possible to 
combine individual enterprises and v. planned 3Conomy, he fa�rad that a 11.libaral 
ac"onomy11• . based on "individual enterprises" ( read: "private enterprises" ) 
would lead to a capitalist aconorqy. 
In  his remarks on the oil 1,rells, he c.:illed th01n 0ssential for tl1e country 1
1'17clfare and asse rted tha.t an,r temporary gain to the Governmont fr01i1 a pa.:vment 
ty the oi 1 corrq:,an,y, if they 1r-1ore roturned, ivov.ld be insirnifico.nt compared to .
/utur>e r�� ti_r- if tt.i:�1 ·.were e-xp&c·tted b::· IndonetianB;., . l:$ocnet>t� �ould be
-v�eruttod r:rom ah.road, he s1.1�fastocl ,  and ca--)f ta1 r2is0� by the sta.to or 
ol:)tainod throuf.'h a forcipn loan. 
-;ev0ral -',.-�yf; lDl,0r .•ir .  Nirwonujudo, dir0ctor 0.f t.h8 .t'.'l • .  f. :t.I. in ·.' n an 
0pun l1Jtter to r;averal J.."loliticnl parties bl2.med th� bc1d c ondition o.i.' �ht:, i.ljorth 
Sumatr?n oil walls on their uncertain status and �Jictured a �Jot0ntiQ.l output of 
'.) million tons of crude annunlly a�'ter only minor ra1)airs. 
42 
Tha campaign for nationnlization cnme into full s1-1ing wl1;Jn t,he F.1�.I. 
1�ortl1 Sumatra branch demanded thc1.t the Government :tnd Porliament put the oil 
t-J3lls under government control within �ix months, 3.nd appenlGd to  the P.N .I .  
p0.rt1, council and tha ?arlinrnant faction to promote its demand. Response ·was 
immediate from the P.K.I.  �0ntral Com..mittee, howev0r, which on �he twenty­
third announced its ba.ckinG of nationalizati on ol 'ooth tl1e North c;umatran �. nd 
the Tjepu insta llations.
43 
Then during· the Lirst t·Jeek of September at 3 ineetine; of the P.N.I. 
Executive Board, attended by mcr11� 8rs fro;-i1 tha I,iorth Sumatra Branch .::1nd the 
farliamantary faction, it 1-Jas decided i-hat thG restoration of the ·wells to the 
B.P• .,i. should beoppeood. Citi ng."11.rticle 38 oi the Constitution, th0 Part;y 
Council .cecommended that the Governinent should otm the ivells Dnd set up a 
commi!"ision to implemJnt nationalization as soon as possible .  When asked in a 
pr�ss intervievr 1:.Jhat ef lect this dGcision lrJ ould have on the sta.tein0nt of 
Iinister Sumanang, P.1,J .I .  General Ch8.irman Sidik Djcsoekarto declared that 
since tl10 ;ninistcr' s statement had been ma.de before the lilicecutive Board had 
made its decision, he 1vas sure thot Sumanang would adapt his vie·ws to those of 
the Executive Hoard.
44 
42 . Antara, 21 �-ug . 1952.  
43. 11.ntara, 23 f1.ug . 1952. The party branch chief, .iohamB.d .Snid, ( ,1 lso 
publisher of"\Jaspada, ) , o -.iern1,ad a bengkel (repa..ir shop) ·which reportedly 
trnded in scrap iron frcrn the oil fields. 
4L. Antara, 10 Sept. 1952. 
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On 10 September the findings of the two parliamentary inves"tigating 
teams were discussed in committee. The team which went to North Swna.tra 
' .'.,· 
concluded that it would be possible for the Gove�nment to operate the wells, 
temporarily emphasizing the production of crude tor export while improvements 
were being made. It urged that tl1e enterprises there be brought under a 
single Management Board co.nsisting of three or four experts . The report from 
. . . 
the two-man team to Tjepu was more specifi_c, declaring that the oil wells in _ .. 
that region had to be owned by the Government in accord with Article 38 of 
the Constitution.45 
Despite the increased political opposition, Minister Sumanang told a 
press conference on 19 September that from an economic as wall as a political 
.. 
angle, returning the North Swnatran wells to B.P.M. would be more advantageous 
for the country tha� nationalization. Declaring that he would not follow the."
example of Mossadegh, he urged that the question not be made one of p rineiple, 
in view of the different attitude held by the P.N .I. party officers, or else 
he would feel compelled to resign.46 
Sumanang held to his views through the P.N. I. Sixth Congress, which met 
45. I.P. 1952, P• 735; I.P. 1924, P• 1186; , Antara, 7-8 Oct. 1952". The
Tjepu team called for capital assistance from the Government in order to 
expand output. 
46. Antara, 19 Sept. 1952. He observed ·that the Government would have 
difficulty obtaining oil equipment (whereas B.P.M. had such at its disposal) 
and that returning the oil fields would mean new investment and more state · 
revenue. If the oil company later was reluctant to fulfill reaso.nable labor ·"
and technical training provisions, he ·warned, he would then be forced to take 
a decision which he did not desire. If restored, he added, the enterprise 
would have to use foreign exchange under state control. 
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during the second week of December in Surabaja. There Mohamad Said and Saleh 
Umar from East Swnatra called for implementation of the demands of the North 
Sumatra Branch for nationalization of the oil wells in that region, which 
demands the party council had taken over. Since the P.N. I. Party Executive 
Board assigned liaison officers to each party minister in the Cabinet, the 
chief liaison officer for Minister Surnanang, Sarine Mangoenpranoto (who was 
a member of the Parliamentary Economic Committee, and whose various business 
interests included the Indonesian General Mining Corporation Ltd.) ,  presented 
the views of the Executive Board on this matter. He declared that since the 
crude oil in North Sumatra could flow right into the tanks without pumping, 
it would be wrong not to nationalize it, and that this step could be taken 
simply by passing a statute expropriating the enterprises in North S�tra.47 
Despite Sumanang ' s  arguments, the party congress approved the position of 
the North Sumatra branch and the party Executive Board. Sidik concluded that 
the matter had been reduced to one of reaching an understanding between 
Minister Sumanang and the party.48 As  a result of the failure of the P.N.I .  
and its top officers to back their ministers in this matter, the matter was 
put in the deep freeze. 
47. Partai Nasional Indonesia, Kenang-kenangan Kongre s P.N. I. ke-VI, 
(Djakarta, 1954) ,  PP• 126-140. Sumanang, who said that taking over the oil 
wells around Tjepu could be justified, called the nationalization or· those in 
North Sumatra a matter of timing, Because the state lacked funds, since its 
revenue was then falling, and also because it was necessary to attract foreign 
capital, he asserted that it was better to return the wells at that time.
Later it might be more propitious to nationalize. 
48. Antara, 11 Dec. 1952. 
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rJ'ortI-1 Sun1ut!·a Petroleu.n �oordir1�.tor 
The following y:.;:o..r, the nei:J 1.\. li Sa stro-'.:1n1;_d,j c,,i o cabinet tro· ' c ;.1-:-1:i the 
subj.act of the North Suma t:.rn oil �=- nstallations in .l'10 explcnatory st, ..J.to[nent -
e,n its program. It indicated th.:i.t in ·vie1iv oi' tl1e conflictinr · needD of .i.·0raign 
inveDt:nont and ;Jlan:.1ing for natit)nalizat,ion, o fin2l sct·�lernont of tho 
i1roblem 1-Jas being ·oostponed. Regardless of its Zuture status, the 
Govorn:ment felt responsicle for the existing fate of the installations. 
Accordingly, it announced t,h�t it ·would immediately inc1.ke o n  i11vost,igation 
3nd aim to improve the �.11:i.n,;_gerilent, organization, ,.1r1d ,roduction, and to _"
inventory personnel, wells 1nd eqi1ipment . It noted thet it mi½:l1t utilize ther
G}cp0I�iGnce of th0 oil fields around Tjepu, 1-1hich der;pi t.::; not bcj_ng returned 
tc �1--,.0 concession h • ,lder 1.Jore opera.ting l::1.irly nor2n2 lly.49 
itt this ti1ne, l11usjumi becan1e tl1e first party to announce publicly 1ihat 
it fs.vored restoring; the oil propertios to B .P. j. In t�1e fnce of Conrr,1unist · 
ch2.r�·os  tl1c1t it ·was the defender. of i'oreign monopoly cnpital, it took: its 
stand, oxple.in0d i'1r. Jusuf 1·,!ibi sono in Parliament, on the basis of Art. 1 of 
tha Constitution, which declared that -c,he Republic of· Indonesia. 1,.ras a state 
gov�n:·nod by law. l:i.ccordinf,ly, ;.fu.sjumi believed that the property of everyone-• 
citizen or alicn--which hD.d been l0gally acquired sl1ould be re;J1)ected. If 
Indonesie ·hi shed to violate l1er ini.,0rru1tiona.l co1n£,rit1nents, like that at the 
49. Government stnte�,1ent, 25 1�ug.., ��-�95}J IJ • 727 • . In its reply tc- tl1e firs·-round of debates on its prorrrain, the Gove:cn.mGnt expl::i.ined tho.ti the postuone­
�nent of a decision over the restoration of the l'l"orth Sun1atrn oil properties 
meant [-1. i)OStl)onement o.i.:· a decision about nationnlization. It observed ·that
altl1ough the"· ro·:)ort of the investigDtions 1J�.r the Sta to Co'.,11Tiissio11 and by the 
economic . committee 11era of value, they l,Jere on ly ·passing i:·n.prossionp; thus 
it 1,,rould · ,1t:ike a new nnd ;nore thorough investication. Reply, 2 Sept., I .P. 195� 
D e  794. 
Round l'able Conference, he cone ludGd, only .c:,ao !l(:Uld sul1\:�r, l'or t :1-.; 0utside . 
1.,j orld ·would no lon�ier hnve faith 
·�., 
in m:- kin�: 3...... . �reo,.,1en �s ,,1ith her.
50 
·-
Il • ·I.., -- .ng this doclnration, tha l1li Snstroami.djojo Government cori-cinued 
to pr•:3p�re to und8rta.kJ stdps of its ui·m. However, barel�r 2. i·,Jonth C;.ftar it 
h�}d tak�n ofl'ice , Jnd before it could take action, tho situation around the 
oil installations in East j.tjeh suddenzy beca111e extrenl3ly confused, l'or 
General :·1nnager Husin i1.l i:1udjahid absconded to join the rebellious forces of 
Tengku Daud Beureueh. 
51
;1.bdulrachman, Husin' s deputy, r-vas then on 12 Octol:.er 
appointed n.s l,he ne1-J General l'1a.nager by the Governor of N orth Suma.trn. The 
task he faced was not an aasy on3, for during the Atjeh Re·i.::ellion therG ·were 
s-3ver�.1 acts of snbotage and interference in the ndministra.tion !'-nd fina11ce s 0f 
the o; 1 entei,;>risc, a¢ it lost 'nost of its : ,KJ.rl<:ets in :1.tjeh boca.uce of break-
downs in communications. In addition, .1�bdulrachm2n a c-::used Perbum 
(Persatuan Buruh l-fi.n.iak, the ()OISI oil union ) ,  wi dcl1 i:�as active b oth in �ar·ts 
of i"i. tjeh ond Langkat, of strikes and thefts. In c0nr;equence of the distressed 
fir1c-incial straits into 11hich the uil enterprise in -�tjeh had �·allen, .as a 
re milt of which many of its i\1orkers were due several mont,hs bn.ck pay, the 
Govern'l'lent granted it a subsidy early in 1954. On the ether nide of t.he l0ctg0r, 
it 'tvas reported that i�bdulrachma.n' s financial re;Jutation 1:Jas far from good 
�nd that even �fter he had access to the new. funds, they 1:,ere not properly 
50. Speech, 29 i1.ug. ,  I Q P. 1953, p.  754. 1.-Jibisono com, .. 1ented that .the 
iasjumi 1Jrogra!71 of political strug�le specified certain brvnches of productior1 
for iultionnlization, but ffi3[1.sures had to b3 taken according to D plan and
according to lal·l • 






It 1.1as reportod that .£.b� in general O!)poscd 1-e .st0r9_tj _ ,·.n ol tl10 
oil installatic.;;ns to B.P. ;:. , ·:11ile Djohan ( General Janager at Langkat) ,  whose 
Q.dministra.tion h.".d reportedly been running smoothly on a solf-supDortin[; basis, 
was amena1)1G t o r  3storation .  Similarly -the tour 1)rincirJ�l unions to ·which 
oil �.-1orkers in  North Sumatra belonged, ·were also divided on tho question . 
?erbum was campaigning for nationalizGti on; Serbumi (Serikat Buruh r·Iinjak) 
favored it• nnd the S .E  .. I .  I .  opposod it long -�here no prior so a.:-
t' 0n 9 December prepara ions. 
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the· S.K.B ./I. (So.rika.t Kaum Buruh 
. . . . 
a.ffilinted 1r.1i th the moderate socialist federation , the K.B . -': . I . ) announced that 
it 11ed given the ne1,1 Govornmtjnt thre,J :·:ionths to carry out its promisan but 
the Government had done notl1i ng. Therel' ore, citing ·v:1e B . P. "i-'l. ' s  expressed 
readiness to supply ca:�)ital [lnd technicians b 1"es1-orinr:: oil ,.:iroduction in  
North Sumatra, the union uri;ed that the conceosion be rest o:ced to  the B .P  . tii. 
so that it c ould rel1abilitate tl.1e oil fields and guarantee the ·wor-kers a 
liVGlihood. 
54 
·5� . Teuku :·iuda Dalt!m r0port, 19 1\Jov.,  I .P. 1954, p .  1110; Nirwonojudo 
letter to  IvJi.n. Iskaq, 31 r1ay, !..P.  1954, PP• 1122-1123 ;  J£conomic Commit tee 
report, 29 Nov . ,  I . P. 1954, pp. 1180-1181. 1\bdulrachman r eportedly hc.d oven 
mortgaged off the oil enterpri se to a Chinese businessman. 
. . 53.  Economic Committee reryort, 29 Nov. , I.P. 19.54, PP• 1183-1185;
Nirwonojudo letter, op,cit. ,  PP• 1123, 1125. Serbumi was close to the P. 1�· . r . ,
and the S.B. I . I .  was c onnected with �-1.Insjumi . 
· 54. i1.ntara, 9 Dec .  1953. The S.I( .B . 1-1. sucge$ted th�.t ·"he conccssivn 
could be restored on terms beneficial to the stDta, lD.l>or, and the 1)e ople and 
prop osed tl1at B.P.��I. tr�in Indonesians in  technical ·work so tl1nt 'L hey could -
take over if l�t<::r the oil i' ields ·were nationalized. It lelt it necessary 





Ignoring su ch recommendati ons for re storati on , 55Minister of Econ omic 
1i.fi'ai rs  I skaq on 15 January 1954 finally app ointed a foU.I"-mD.n Commisoi ,in lor 
N orth Suma.tra Oi l ltffair s  to undertak:e the investigati on 1..rhicl1 th e .Ali Govern­
ment ha.d anriounced in llugu st and to report l>a(}k and make prop"osals for put ting 
into effect the i mpr ovements the G'.ff'i!l!Dllttm't ha.d set as  its  g oal at that ti me.56 
�fter the Commi ssi on hAd reported back t o  him, Minister Iskaq on 12 April 
decreed that the oi l enterpri ses in North Sumatra thereafter came under the 
supervi sion and direct admini stra.ti on ofhu mini �try. l1t the snme ti me, he 
appointed Mr .  1'Jirwonojudo (from the Commissi on ) c'.s North Sumatra Petroleu m  
Coordinator, �ith the ta sk of coordinati ng the work of the oi l in stallati ons 
in Atjeh and in Lan6kat and combini ng them into one ad ministration,  of a ssuring 
that they were operated in accord �,ith the mini ster ' s  instructi ons, and (in 
line with the 11.ugust announce ment ) of taking nn inventory and i mproving tl1e 
org anizati on and prcxJ.u cti on . He 1-1an further inst ructed to carry out c1 
rehabi lita.ti on plan so thc1.t tho oi l �nt erp ri ses c culd become "self-Duffici ent 
operati ons capable of' r eturning a Drofit . 11 5711.lthough it  t"1as not immedi ate ly 
pu blii ci zed , Nir1-1onojud o ·was also entru sted 'fl\Ji tl1 th.J task of re org ani zing them 
· . . . 58 .. as a gov�rnment insti tute (jaja.san ) .  
' 
55. ii.bout this time, 1 :ihen P.N .I .  leaders were blockin �: the establishment 
of a Jape.nese -Ind onesian developm�nt company, tl1ora were . rumors that ·the P.N.I". 
would form a joint company with �ome Japanese to exploit petroleum in Ind"onesia . 
Pedoman ,  5 Feb .  195h. Sorre Japan3sa had expre ssed intere st in Ind"one si an 
p etroleum d uri ng  the latte r half of 1952 . .i·1.ntara, 2 July, 16 Sept . 1952. 
56. I.P. 1954, PP• 315-316, 334 . The Commi ssi on was h eaded by an offi ­
ci al of tha Department. of i'fining (sumantri Purwokusumo ) ,  and"· its  members i n­
cluded a m0mber of Parli �.Ill3nt ( Rasjid Sutan Rad ja Emns--P.N.I . ) ,  a Department 
of ·tabor Supervi si on official, and Mr. i�irt•1onojudo.  
57 . I .P • 195'-i, PP • 334-335. 
58. Ni rwonoj�do  lett er , op.cit . ,  p .  1129. 
Tl1is n�rr! move bv Ll10 C0ntral Go"·arn ment \•Ja::; follo1t1ed up �,ri th a suLsidy 
of H.p . 10· •mi llion for rel1abi litati on pu1"noses, c."\ s a result of T-.1hich i t  1,Jr-�s 
ti:rndually possibl0 t o  bri r1g  a.b out solne improvements in p roduction . In the 
field of lab or-manage ment relati ons, hor•.iever , conditi ons quickly det eri orDted . .
On 13 .:i.pri l Nirwon ojud o proceeded to  N orth Sumatra ;-nd mat 1-J"i th the"· t1-10 
general manager:s "tCJ discuss means of carrying out �·fi.ni star Iskaq' s in st ructi on 
9.nd of unit i� the two entariJri. sas into n sin gle North Sumatra Petroleum En ter • 
··p,rise under his central offi ce at i1·1edan . Since the fiscal admini strativn of 
the .�t jeh an terp rise remained in a relative ly d eplorable state despite the 
cash infusions from the Government, Nirwon ojud o d ecided after some qualms to 
r eplace .ilbdulrachman ( a  member of the 11 anti -rest"c,rati"0n 11 front ) with the 
Perbtim 1:-Jranch" chief for atjeh (Bachti ar .i(sli ) ,  ret itling the p ositi on " Chief · 
of ¥lllgsa· ;{rlt jeh ) Operati on s. 11 He then end eav orGd t o  match thi s 1nove by 
converting the othe r 0nterprisa into 11Pa.ngkalan Brandan (Langkat ) Operati onsn . 
He re ·he ·was faced 1.ii·�h a quandary, for the Lan gknt en ·1.,erprise c0ntinued t o  be 
1f1ell op erated , and its genaral ma.nager , Dj oh an ,  "trla.s J::>O�)ul.'.Jr 1--Jith rnost of hi s ·
sec ,ti on chiefs and the vrorkers. Ho1Jever ,  one dny some p erson s  vi"sitad 
Nirwonojudo and gave hi m a blackli st of "traitors t o  the State I s struggle " ,  
ivh o :were alleged t o  be �.greea"ble t o  tl1e re st orati on of the enterpri se t o  the 
. B.•P.i�I • . 1.nd supported by the u Opp osi ton" (i .e . ,  the parties n ot s11pp ortin g  the 
i�li Government ) .  Ni rwon ojud o 1rvas ask:ed t o  get rid of -c,he men on the list wi tl 
. .in s1.X mon th· s.59 
• 
59. Nirwon ojud o letter, op.cit � ,  pp. 1122-1125, 1129; E�on omic Corimri.ttee 
rep ort, op.ci �. ,  pp . 1180-1183. Gne of Nirwon ojud o's  re"asons for hesitating 
to  suspend Abdulrachman was that the latter had t l1e b acking of a prominent 
member of the provinci al g overnment who was a inemb'3r of a Government p urt:v·. 
He anticip ated ( corr8ctl·y) that Abdulrachman might react t o  his r;uspension by
join in g  force s ·with the 11:pro-re st ora.ti"on" g roup . 
Sumadhi, he ad of the de legati"on ·wi t l1 tl1e blac.t<:list (-wl10 stvled thernsalveE 
the 'l'eluk Haru Pe ople ' s  Committee and i:1ere allied �Jith Pe rbum) , ·was a"::)Dointed 
deputy he ad of th e Langkat op erati on s 1)y Nin-Jon"ojud.o. 
� 
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The opportunity to QCt came sooner than l\Jirwonojudo had allegedly 
expected, for on 18 i1.iay, the day after ha hod also decread the liquidation of 
the Langkat oil enterprise as  a separate entity ('while permitting Dj ohan to 
stay on temporarily a� Eeneral manager ) ,  most of the Langkat section chiefs 
sent him a ; letter declaring that they c ould not acceot his interference • 
.tlbdulrachmn JlllleBniwhile announced that he himself h:1d set up a unified North 
Sumatra Petroleum Enterprise vJ ith Djohan as his deputy. Nirwonojudo then took 
action, and on 21 IvJay suspended Djohan and a number of ·l,he section chiefs. 
Since many of the workers refuned to acce:::,t these 1neasures, there was a peric'Ci 
when two sGparate oil admini"strations w�ra operating in Langkat before 
Nirwonojudo"' s men obtained c umplete c ontrol. VJhen old workers objected to  the 
60
Coordinator' s  acti01s, now ones ·were hired under tho nuspices of Perbumo 
The unions opposed to Perbum' s  aggrandizemGnt at th�ir expense ( including 
Serbum:i. (the pro-P .I� . I .  union favoring nationalization) set up a Kesatuan ilksi 
Buruh r1in,iak ( Oi l  :-lorkers I�ction Unit) a.nd demanded l�irwonojudo'  s recall. In 
view of the unre st that hod arisen, the Economic and Labor Committees of Parl­
iRment sent inspection teams togeth0r to r'Iedan on 9 July to examine the ma.tter • 
. a majority of the five me:nbers on these teams did not strongly favor naticnal­
ization. Then on 20 July, the Finance Committee (headed by l·Io0tomo Soepnrdan-­
?.IC . I . )  sent two members, Tjugito (P.K.I . )  and Teuku Jusuf .tiuda Dalam (P.r-J . I.,  
ex-P.K. I . ) ,  to  make thair own investigation o The inspection team reports were 
60. I'J'i.r1-1onojudo letter, op.cgt·" '  pp. 1126-1129;  l
1Iuda Dalam report, .9.E.acit • .,
PP •  1113-1114; s. Narto speech, 2 l�ov . ,  I�. P. 19.54, pp. 117.5-1177;  Economic
qommittee report, op .cit . ,  pp. 1183-1186; Ln:bor Committee report, 29 Nov� ,  
I .P. 1954. ,  PP• 1187-1188. The two former General I-·ianagers ( and their backers) 
c omplained that the Coordinator lacked the autl1ori ty to  terminate the mandates 
.issued thei11 by the Governor of North Sumatra. Sub oequently, however, Gov0.L·nor 
.L�min c onfirmGd that the old :'.Tio..ndates ·were no lonr::er i:i.1 effect. 
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presented to Parliament in November.. Since the full Fina.nee Committee refused 
to accept the report of Tjugito a .nd Muda Dalam as a Committee report, it was 
presented as a report of two individuals. Their report concluded that a re­
habilitated oil e .nterprise in North"- Sumatra would be very beneficial to the 
State and people, and they approved the Governrnent t s "·"rehabilitation plans and 
the efforts of the Coordinator. The Economic Committee ' s  report ( in which 
Mr. Tjoeng--member of the 1952 investigation team--participated) presented 
conclusions (similar to those of the 1952 team) , asserting _ that the best 
future of the oil enterprise in North Smnatra lay in expanding production 
of crude for export (rather than in copying the small extraction and refining 
for the domestic market done at Tjepu) a .nd in setting up a joint management 
board rather than a single administrator. On the other hand, it charged that 
Nirwonojudofs actions were hasty and 11 inflexible" ,  showed poor judgment, and 
impaired the prospects of implementing the plan for maintaining production, 
The Labor Committee, noting that the labor conditions in general were tolerable 
although not comparable to those at B . P.M. or Stanvac, observed that the 
psychological atmosphere was poor and that in many case-s workers who did not 
approve of the Coordinator were not well treated. All three investigating 
groups urged the Central Government to settle the" status of the oil installa­
tions as soon as possible. 61 
· 61. Abadi, 13, 20 · July 1954; I.P. l95y, PP• 1107-1108, 1114, ll79-118o, 
ll85-11·aa. Mr. Tj oeng (Katholik) and N'garadjai Meliala (Demokrat) made up the 
Economic Comm:Lttee team, and" s .  Narto (Masjumi), Nj . Lastari Sutrasno (P.N. I . ) ,  
and O.K. Ra.mli (Demokrat), the Labor Committee team. The Economic Committee 
report noted that the Governbr and police of North Sumatra felt that Nirwono­
judo should first have discussed the problems with them instead of waiting 
until after trouble had begun.
As "additional orientat,ion rnaterial0 , Hoetomo Soepardan arranged with the 
Soviet Embassy for a film showing of oil develop1nent at Baku. 
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On 28 October 1954, between the presentation of the inspection trip re­
ports, Surip NARTO Mulj ohadipramudj o (Masjumi and an officer of t he S .B. I. I . )  
and several others drew up a proposal for an interpellation of the efforts of 
the North Sumatra Petrolewn Coordinator, especially in regard to the welfare 
of the labor a .nd the state of the finances under his administration. Among 
the points touched upon by Narto in explaining his proposal (which largely 
concerned labor matters)  were questions concerning the appointment of 
Nirwonojudo himself' a:id of some of his appointees. s .  Narto referred to 
Nirwonojudo"' s attempt to replace Djohan in 1951, and suggested that there 
might have been some improper dealings in scrap iron from both the Tjepu a .nd 
North Sumatra oil fielda ."62 
-After Parliament on 28 January 1955 approved holding the interpellation, 
Nj. Lastari Sutrasno (P.N.I. ) defended the appointment of Nirwonojudo as the 
logical man because of his experience with the P.T".M.N. and P.T .M.R .r.• 63 and., 
Minister of Economic Affairs Roosseno denied that there had been any wrongdoing 
connect� with the scrap iron sales from the oil installation. In reply to a 
statement by Mr. Andi Zainal ABIDIN (P.s . I. )  that the welfare of labor in enter­
prises run by the Government should not be less than that in alien-operated 
enterprises,64 M:tn1ate� Roosseno declared that an·" examination of labort s  own 
62. Speech, 26 Nov. , I.P. 1954, pp. ll74�ll77.  Co-signers of the pro­
posal were Amelz (non-party member from Atjeh
1 
shortly to join Masjwni),  Tjoeng 
and M�liala ( o.f the Economic Conmi�tee ' s  team) ., and Mr •• A.Z. Abidin. .
· While still with the P.·T .M.R.I. ,  Nirwonojudo had beeri director of the 
Jajasa,n Logan Tua (Scrap Metal Institute) ,  which the Government had set up to 
manage the export of scrap iron which had accumulated during the war and revo­
lution. The institute experienced financial difficulties and was liquidated. 
er. Pedoman, 2 Feb. 1953. 
63. Spee.ch., 16 Feb., I.P. 1955, P• 77. 
64. Speech, 26 Nov., I.P. 1954, P• ll75. 
reasons for fightlng for nationnlizDti on 1.Jould sho1r,1 nc 0.npha sis ·r)ut on Jocial 
gua.rantees. For laborers, h3 s�id, ·working- ; n 3.n at1nosphere f·:-·e � fror; J c.:liGn 
in.fluence ,-1.nd operating an ent,erpri s0 according tc thair ov1n. abi li tic s  was 
worth more tl1an ho.ving even perfect social guarantees provided by an alien 
employer. 11.cknowledging that tl1e G overnincnt ha.d once planned to convert the 
North �umatra oil enterprise into a jaja san ( g overnment institute ) ,  Roosseno 
decla t·ed that since 5ome of the community had misgivings about such a form 
•· 
for Government undertaking::, it ·was being reconsidered. 
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In vi0w of tl1e still indefinite sta.tus of the oi l installations and the 
fa.ct that the Coordinator ' s  appointment ·t-1as only temporary, Nj. Lastari urged 
that the Governme nt make a decision on their status. Tjugito declared that 
11 labor and the people" ",1anted tl1em to be converted i nto a state ei;iterprise . 
-9oedijono ( Pa.rtai �...,Iurba ) ,  on the other hand, inquired whethe� r'1asjumi had give: 
'..lp tl1e principle of returning the ; • to B .  P. �.,I. , a.nd askod ·whether the Government 
ir1tended to carJ:·y out their nati"onalization. 
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Indicative of the .fact that :'lasjumi may ·;av0 been movinr,; to1-.1ards a 
compromise solution, Narto cited the forri111lc1 for nationa.lizing vital enter­
prises in  his 1)arty' s progra.m, 1-Jhich called for ca.rrying out nationalization, 
t3.kirig i nto · considerati on circumstances and the state I s .finnnces. If the 
G overnr11ent i'elt the ti::ne 1,,1as ripe f or nationali zation, that admini"strative �.nd 
technical leadership and funds were available, h0 declared; Masjumi would say, 
- 65. Statemont, l Feb.,  I.P. 1955, pp. 29-30. 
66. Speeches, 16 Feb . ,  I.P.  1955, PP• 76-78. 
r 1 ,( !.6 
- ·
"G0 right ahead," 
67That th0 GovernmJnt ,..,as not r�ady ·?et tc 1.·orc.:0 t :1tJ i ,;suo 
seemed Gvident 'tJhen _.fi.nister lloosseno--des:,ite Chairrtkln of Po.rlitunent c;nrton0"1 s 
assertion tha.t Scedij ono I s question to the Government about its intentions 
concerning na.tionalizcltion lav outside the scope of the intarpella.ti on--did 
.. 
ackn<J\-rledge thet it ·was diffi�ult to achieve a consensus of opinion between 
· ·those who favored nationalization 9nd t· 1ose ·w·ho { avored reotoration to  the 
B.P.  'i•
68
under the circurnstances tha status quo l'7as still Drovisionally main-
t-:iined until after tl{c elections .  69 
Indone"si:inization of Tin Production 
The question of the contract under T,jhich the Govern.ment I s Bangka Tin 
1fincs 113d been ,nanagec�. since 1948 by the 1� . V. Gemeenschappo lijke Mijnbou1.-,maa t: 
scha·ppi,j "Billiton" was also in the mand2.te of the -State CorrUtri.ssion on �ii.ning 
i1.fiairs. Already in 1950, A.I1. Jusuf :msjidi (P.N .I . ,  ·who had been a labor 
l3ader on Bangka) ,  noting di$conterit on B�ngka over 1:,ho groat difference be­
t,vuen the pn.y scales of t,h-3 t,"10 cntarprises, reported that Dutch personnel 
on thci pay r oll of t:.1e state enterprise ,:,;rere being ter-ninated or nensiuned 
67. Speech, 30 Mar.,  I.P.  1955, p .  203. 
68. Statement, 15 i1.pr. ,  I.P.  1955, pp. 292-293 . Roosseno also deni�d 
c;. i�arto' s charge t}18t Perbum i,Jas t.; eing favo:ced in l1lorth -Sumatra over the 
3.B.I.I.  
69 . Bank Indonesia Re
�
ort · 1955-1956, pp. 1L6-147 . .� superintendent, was 
a 1nointed a:t. the 0nd of 19:5, and following nev1 dis-putes over management, the 
Coordinator was dis1ni�sed in February 1956. l-1.fter its appointment in April 
1956, the State .. �dvisory 9ornmission on Implementing tl1e 11.brogation of the . 
·R.T.C. ""i.greements ( headed b;y 1,b.nistcr of Finance vJibisono) studied · the North 
�urnatra c-il question. Follwing _ its proposals, tho second lili Sastroamid.j o.j o  
·Cnbinet announced on 24 October 1956 that the oi1 1Jroperty 1,J ould not be re­
tur1Jad to B .P .ii. In line with tl1e Government' s decision to continue its con­
trol, it reorganiz:.3d -�he entarpris3 as a corporation called P.T. Ek:sploitasi 
Tamb:ing i•unjak Su..'Tiatera Utara (North Suil18.tran Petroleu1n Operations, Inc.). 
Cf. Alma�k Urnum �rasiono.l 19�7 , pp. 37h-379. 
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off and replcrc0d by Dutch personnel from the G.t:1.B . He interpretGd such 
actions o.s an atterniJt of the 0 .11.,1.B . to present the Goverrunent wj_tl1 a fait 
ac(!ompli : by referring to its employees  in key position as indispensable , it 
would compel the Goverrunent to extend its ma.nageme11t contract. 70To prevent sue! 
an e:xtension, in 1951 the Teuku Hasan l"lotion had been passed. 
When r1ohamad Saddak ( PI ,i) asked the nevJ 1iiTilopo Government what action it 
proposed to take in connection with the expiration of the contract due on 28 
Feburary 1953, the Government replied that it i;j-ould make a decision following 
·advice from the Commiession. A 1nonth later, in July 1952 , half of the members 
of the Commission visited the ti n islands.7½ihen i:n September, the P.N.I. 
Party Council resolved that all the tin mines should be 011\Jned and operated by 
the Governmente. 
The vJilopo Government eventually decided to terminate the mana.gement 
contract of the G.:,:1.B .  for Bangka, 11Jhile approving n five-year extension of 
the c ompany ' s  conces sion on Belitung . Ir. UI(J�H. Bratakusumah (P.N.I., and 
l11inister of Public 1rJorks in the Sukiman Cabinet)  was appointed Genoral 
> Iano.ter of the Bangka. Tin :."Tines, and whereas a number of key foreign etnployees 
,vere retained, the top Dutch personnel were re1)laced. Althougl1 tl1ere were 
misgivings in certain quarters about the efficiency of the new Indonesian 
ma.nngement o.f what was perhnps the -world ' s  largest t, in production enteri:>rise, 
70. Questions dated 8 Dec . ,  I.P.  1950, p .  606 . 
71. Saddak speech, 16 May, and Govarnment reply, 3 June , I .P. 1952,pp. 
398, 572 ; Antara, 19, 26 July 1952. 
72. Anta�, 10 Sept . 1952 . 
(\1 ()
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1953 becaroo th.;;; second b0�t post-war y8.�.r for 1)roducti on on Bo.ngktt . 73 
Lat3r in tho y0er 1·1Iini ster I s!<:aq beg·an :ne a.su :: ·0 s  n5 :nud �J t . i . .'ur• c.. :.10r Ir1d u-
ntjsi <ln izing tl1e tin mi ning industr·y in  Indonosi a. l.t the ti me ho o.r,.uu.int,3d f.;ir. 
:•!Iuch,iidin .. 1.fo.ndi as Ir .  Darmawan"' s succ"essor .3.s Chnir!nan of tha �ecuti ve 
Bu8rd ol ?�L�I•1, h:e made an id entical appointment c oncerning t,11e G. !�1.B . and 
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plncod tvJo Indonesi an mem·uGrs on the boo.rd in plac,3 of · -former Dutch off·i ci a.ls. 
The chanf:es were intended tc• be more than nominal, for ..:1ini ster I skaq h ad 
d ecided that the Government 1,Jould end its role as vi rtual si lent n2rtner t o
'.· 
the N.V . Bi llit on Ylij. in  their mixed -ente rpri se, the G • .  i.B. 
The l� .v . Bi lliton �aj . ( as minority st ockholder) h ad be en h and ling tho 
d ai ly oporation s of the G.£·i.B. on the busi s of a man age1nont c ontract , ·  whi ch 
had been automatically renGwed 8ach year, most �0cent ly on 28 Feburary 1953. 
In I ska<:J. 's  secret instruction to the Government ' s  repr3Sdntative s on the 
0• .1.B. 8:xe cutive Board , d nted 27 February 1954, howev0r, it ,,1as made c lear 
that the Govarrunor1t int .3nd ed to exe rci se the d ominant authority which i:sJas i ts 
due lJutl1 as ina,j orit:? st ockholder as well as the grant or of th -.:: c c,inpany '  s 
concer.:sion . The me 1nbers were obliged i n  gene ral: ( a )  t o  gi·ve attenti on t o  and 
sn.fe gu ard tl1e int0r0sts cf tho Republic whicl1 accrued to it .1.n vi ew of its  
laga.l relationship wi th the compri.ny; and (b )  11 to harm.0,1. -.ze in t-he short,3st 
�3�7---
:--
-.--=J-oh-n�O. Sutter, 11 :eliner�.ls and Petro·leum i n  Ind onesi a, 195311. , Forei gn 
The G • .1.B. had onlyService De spotch //584, Djakart a, 15 1'·1nr". 1954, pp. 2-3.
its fi fth best post -war production ye ar for Belitung during 1953.  .I n  19.54, Indone si a  D.chi e-;.rnd a post-war re'cord rroduction of 35, 862 tuns
of tin in concentrates. Bank Indonasi a  Report 1955-19.56, p .  148 . 
' . 
74. 11 Keputusan ?Jenteri Perekon(-,ian No. 16. 387 /"'iA" , 17 i�ov. ·1953, and 
"l�o. 16 • .524/M"5, 20 Nov. 1953. See I.I) . 195L.., �J). 334-3JS. 
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possible time the status of G.M.B. with "..the _ political" and • eco.nomic natio.nal· 
desires of the Republic"1 .s Gove_rnment., in accord with the principles in 
Art. 38., Sec. 3 of the Constitution." 
Special tasks enumerated i.n this instruction were aimed a.t increasing 
the Government 's  control over the mixed e.nterprise at the expense of the 
N.V. Billiton Mij. and at facilitating the Indone"sianization of its personnel, 
all of whom had theretofore been connected with the N.V. Billiton Mij. (which 
had completely controlled personnel matters .in the G.M.B. ) ,  It was declared 
that the condition the.n existing weakened " the bargaining position of the 
Government should the nationalization of that mixed enterprise be desired." 
The instruction accordingly provided that G.M.B. work contracts should be drawn 
· · up at once and that thereafter employees be hired thereunder;" free of per­
sonnel ties with the N.V. Billiton Mij. The Executive Board was to have a 
direct role i.n personnel matters, and in appointments of new employees "con­
sideration had to be given to the Government 1 s desire to control completely 
mining enterprises as soon as possible. "  Consequently, Indonesian citizens 
were to be trained for positions in the G.M.B. 
Other facets of the management which N.V. Billiton Mij. had
.
operated 
without restriction were also to be limited by the Executive Board. The posi­
tion of G.M.B. General Represe". which formerly had been ntative in Indonesia"., 
held by N. V .  Billiton Mij,'e representative in Indonesia, was given to Ir. 
A .}L Semawi from the Ministry of Public Works. Indonesian citizens were to be 
placed in the management or on the board of directors of the G.M.B . ' s  six 
subsidiaries. 
An endeavor was even to be made regarding the management of the O.M.B .  
itself--which role the N.V. Billiton Mij. had filled by itself--to replace 
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the Dutch company or at least to get it to accept an Indonesian as  a second 
Manager. Should the N.V. Billiton Mij. be adamant on this latter measure , its 
management contract was to be terminated as soon a s  legally possible , e .g. 
28 February 19550 75 
The instructions outlined above were issued, in Iskaq 's  words, with the 
expectation that 11 in th� shortest possible time the G .M.B. will become 
completely co.ntrolled by . our Government so that the production of every tin 
mine in I.ndonesia can be regulated by us ourselves and used in accord with 
the interests of the state."1176 However, they were only partially carried 
out during the period under review. 
Salt Monopoly 
At the time of the tra.nsfer of sovereignty several government age.ncies 
played a role in the salt industry and trade". The old opium factory was con­
verted into a factory for toothpaste and tubes, and the salt production center 
in Madura (an I.B.W. enterprise) again operated under the name Perusahaan 
Garam Negeri (National Salt Enterprise) .  On the distribution side the 
Zoutregie of the pre-federal period and the Djawatan Garam of the Republic at 
Jogjakarta were merged by joint instruction of the two Ministers of Finance on 
75. The preceding four paragraphs were from 11 Keputusan Menteri Per­
ekonomian No. 63/M. Rahasia" , 27 Feb. 1954 and 11 Pendjelasann ; see I .P. 1954,
pp. 316, 336-339, 1272.
Although the G .M.B. did not have stock control, its· Executive Board was 
also instructed to endeavor to place Indonesian citizens , or at least "its 
own men" , in the management or board of directors of seven subsidiaries of 
the N.V. Billiton Mij . (some of them inactive) which either operated in 
Indonesia or were connected with the tin trade. 
76. Iskaq speech in regard to Tjikwan motion, 20 Apr. , I.P. 19.54, p. 316, · 
A two-man Parliamentary inspection team (Tjoeng and Maruto) visiting the 
tin islands in Mc\Y 1954 recommended that tho Bangka Tin Mines be operated in a 
form more"- efficient than that of an I.B .W. enterprise. They also recommended 
that Indonesianization of the personnel in the tin mines Qn Belitung be speeded 
up and that the G.M.B. Executive Board be moved from The Hague to Djakarta. 
I.P. 19.54, pp. 675, 717-722. 
1Jr1ich t ook· ove r the cld salt monopoly privi lege s of t .he Zoutregie . l:he Sa lt 
;:1onopoly Qrdinance of 1941, ·which remained in effect, did not cover 11.tjeh, 
tl1e island s  off Suma.tra, or East Indonesia (except for l�orth Su lawe si ) .  
However, sin�e the salterns of the population in the Rernbang-Tu ban region along 
the northe rn coa st of ea st-central Java, which had pdrformed . yeoman service 
aftor the first Dutch rni li tary :i.ction, cou ld not be liquid ated 11ithcut 
further ado ,  the territory of tho 11Ne gara Repu blik Ind one sia (d aerah Re nvi llfj )" 
· ·,-Jas temporari ly exempted fr om the monopoly regulations. 
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Su bsequently it was decided that the Sa.lt Monopoly Service cou ld operate 
b0tter as a commercial (albeit still government") enterpri s2 than as a 
government d epr!.rtment, which bu siness for,-, would make it })o ssiblc also to  
be gin production of cau stic sod a.  11.ccordingly, on l Jnnuary 19.52 the two 
existing governme nt salt agencie s 1-Jere provi si onall,y merged into an e nla.rged 
I.B.t·J. ·with the name Peru sahaan Garam d an Soda Negeri ( National Salt and Soda 
. .
Enterpri se ) ,  after ·which a bill formalizing the change i:..Jas sent to Parliament . 
During the de bat8s whicl1 opened on 25 Ju ly 19.52 attention rJas focused on the 
. .
Govarnment • s  salt monopoly, and .Abu lh ajat ( Progre sif', born i n  l1Jadura, the 
primary zalt production site ) announced that he 1•Jould introduce a motion 
.. \ 
concerning it . Mr. Yamin proposed that the monopoly be broad ly reviewed,  whil6 
. . , •  ..
Su badio ·sa strosa.tomo ( P.s.r. ) approved it so long �- it ilt14 a social rather 
than fi scal nature. Mini st er of Finance Sumitro replied that the imoortance 
of t he monopoly lay in it s guarantdeing the intere st s of the pu blic and safe -
guarding the people ' s hea lth . 
78 
77. "Pe nd je lasan Unda ng2 No . 14/1952'.' ,  and "Inatruksi Bersama mengenai 
Djawatan Regi Garam" , 2 Fe b. 1950, in Tambaha11 Lembaga l,Tegara .i:t,.,l,, Jc,-. 389.I r u· 
78.I.P.1�{2, IJ�;.. 7�2-723. }1embars l'ron1 1'1adur� ·were expeci ally i n terest�d .in the su6jec" , for in 1936 the Netherland s  Ind ies Government hnd axpr-opnated 
_._ ,_ _ . __ ... ..t,. _ __ _ . __ ,,t:l ..... ,_ _  � -- -1 � - - -� .., _ _ _  .. -·-- - � "" . . - .. _ , _ - - -· 
Strong oµµosi tion to tnc bill. cnmt, frora H .  t. .  Trur10dJOjo (��e�, 
fro1n lViadura ), who 01. ,posed th�� Goverruncnt rnonopoly aud �-,_l,L '1 ·  Oil the• 
Govurnmt.;nt to justify wnnting to maintnin it.and to unify 1;roduction and snlus · 
under � cen trnl organization". In reply, Minister of Finance Su1ni tro said 
that there was an advantage in having responsibility centralized in one 
�gency . If private bodies were allowed to operate, he visualized them 
se(_ ki ng mmcimum profits and ignoring sales in th€ mountainous and other 
remote parts of the country. en the other hand, whilu admitting that tb.ere 
wns [;. shortage of s alt under government distribution",. he stressed that the 
government did not neglect sales to the population in the interior and that 
it iodized its snlt. Moroovor, he declared, i.f the Govornment lost its 
monopoly it would moan n inass lay-off . i(ccordingly, tho Parliam8nt passed 
tn:: bill". 
79 
Too condition under 1·14icb some parts of Java weru under the monopol;:,' of 
the government salt onterprisc 3nd other parts weru o.llowt:;d to produci; and 
. . 
sell their own salt led to smuggling and on.forcement problems". Accordingly, 
• 
sccurin�:· the approval of the Wilopo Cabinet, l"Iinister Sumi tro decreed that 
private salt-work operators in th� former Republican (Renville ) territory 
would no longer he al.lowed to produce after l April 1953, rescinding that 
portion ot the joint instruction of three y0ars earlier oxQinpting that 
terri to1·y from the salt monopoly . :rn justifying this decree; ,  Sumi tro, 
bc.:sides repeating tho points he had touched upon before Parliament the prev­
ious September, cited Article 38 of the Constitution and also mentioned 
79 . Debat·:.·s, 5 Sept_ lf'l952 , :_-:•_) . 736-7 38; "Undang2 '; c. 14/1952 ,i. 
roports .!. rom the Minist�r of· HGalth t11at thu private salt !i-rorks on tl'i,_ north 
coast of Java wore sources of malaria. The prl va to operators wore alloi:<Jod 
until tho tJnd of tho year to sell the Sc!lt they lw.d previousl:y produced and 
were given three months to register tl1e area of -their land on ·w·hlcl1 wore their 
salt works in order thot they might bo compensat\.;d b;y· tl10 snlt entcrpri se .BO 
Abulhnjat i�otion 
The unpopularity of the government • s  monopoly in snlt among many 
Indonesians did not go unnoticed in .i?arliarnent". Already on 8 September 
· 1952 Abulhajat and others l1ad submitted a draft motion on tho" subject, 
although an explanation did not follow until 23 Jnnuary 1953 . Finally , on 
18 Iviay, barely six woeks after I-1:inister Sumi tro had i ssued his decree, the 
long-pending draft motion came up for debat �. According to the motion, 
..
Parliament should "call on the Government to abolish the salt monopoly 
as a ve stige of colonial expoloitation, which no longor is  in harmony with 
thu principles of independence ond democracy ." Tho explanatory note 
declared that the salt 1nonopoly gave rise to discrimination betwe. n inhabi­
t�nts of one part of the country (under t ho monopoly) ahc1 t i'1oso of anotl1er 
part ( ouside the r:1onopol_y- ) ,  since persons in the latter areas c ould produce 
and a3ll salt to their hen.rt• s content while those m the former ��:J •·re sub .:i; <• 
to prosecution i'or f3iUe:� ·1�e'tlV:i.td:�-� It was thus proposed to end the 
discriminattion and allow people in the "monopoly" area to regain their rights 
to make and sell salt lil<:e their cornpatriots in other nreas. It was noted 
that there was a current shortage of salt in tho country . This situation could 
be overcome, it was suggested, if the inhabitants far from the government salt-
_______,.:.,__ 
80. 11'Koputusan Mentori Keuangan R .  r. No. 66646/K. au , .  31 :r.i1ar .  1953 . 
Ocmpensation was set at Rp .1000 per hectare, 50% to be . paid right after ,
registration and the balance· after there was e vidence that the"· lands had been
changed into sawah or fi shponds . 
f"l.r:' l .  
U,..>4 
produe;i ng regions wure allowed to produce their o , .rn salt and sv.pply nenrb;r 
areas . rt was observed , too , that whereas poverty was on t hu  rise i n  
areas whi ch climate wisu wer e best suited to s alt production, the inhabitants 
affe_cted could i ncrease t heir subsisten ce , and poverty would be r educed"., 
i f  t he monopoly were ended". Final�y, it was ompl1asi zed t hat abolislling t he 
government ts monopoly would not result in abolishing the state salt 
enterprise". It was even visttali z6d that with the government and small­
scale enterpri ses of the common peo9le w:>rking sid e  by side , the country 
t..,uld not only end domesti c salt shortages,  but prodt-.ce surplus-as for 
•' 81
export and for i ndustri al purposes . 
The Abulhajat motion against a government monopoly re sulted in a 
peculiar li neup in Parli ament , and perhaps because most parti es did not 
want to commit themselves on an i ssue where the interests of the "common 
people " appeared opposed to those of t he 11statc 11 , few spoke out i n  the debat&s . 
The motion, s proponent� represented an �lli ance between loft-wing �oci al_· sts 
and persons. with a r ather li bE:ral poli ti cal outlook. The only sponsor t o  
speak at length was 11r". I wa"., who dwelt on the history· of the gove"rnment I s 
salt monopoly., describing its 5radual nnnexation of territory from salt 
producers a mong the local population. its an argument i n  favor of abolislring . . ' 
the Governme nt •  s monopoly, Iwa cited a previous Government remark to the 
effect that i f  the monopoly were removed its more effici ently administered 
anu better e quipped salt works would not experience increased competi tion 
from Fmallholder salterns . He also asserted that aboliti on would act i vat8 
81. i i  U cul-mosi Abulhajat c .s . ttg . pen ghapusan 1nonopoli garam" ,  
·I.P.  1953, )·PIO 516-:'17 . Other signers of tht prop oser! moti on were 
Tr�nodjotlo .<lttd R.  Bagi oatii i. ANTJANEG. (both Iviasjumi , from •l .- ariurn.) . .AJ-Ui _
anr1 I . H .  Iobo r r.pres�ntin?, Sunda Kctjil) anri :tv.ir .  Iwa J(usuma Sumantri .·(both Progressit).  
the �:-,:ist:ilr �1l"'r;o�oly Qrt · (� : .. : · . o�.ld the G0l1c r;.1l'i10nt .:'rec t.o d ititr.�butc hi.:;11 .)r-
and transport amon g t he  people and to in cre 2sed tax recei pts as a conse­
quen ce". He categori cally denied t hat the abol.· t ion would be contrary to the 
intent of .Arti cle 38 of t l1e Constitution ; and l-1r . Yamin se cond ed hi m on t his 
point,  declarin g  t r1at Art icle 38 spoke on ly of 11controlling11 , not of �.,,.'.·T:i .nc-' ', 
and so it could not be interpret8d to re ject private salt production .82 
Ma:ruto Nitimihard jo announ ced that the I\1urba fa ction could approve t he  
motion since the monopoly systen1 was basi cly �� (t'ic). iVIoreover, b ecause of the -
quality of i ts pro .tuct , t he Government had no need to fear competi ticn by the 
smallholders . The P .I( .I". did not i m 1ed i ately take a publi c stand . However, 
Soen ard i Ardiwirjono , (a n ative of Pati on the edge of t he Rembang salt 
prod ucing  are a ), in a reference to the recent action by the Min i ster of 
F inance ,  indi cated that the sonopoly should not be restcred over the 
Rembang ar�a, to prevent sufferi n g "
.
among the population of that are a .83 
On the other hand , various politi cal g roups opposed the motion". 
Whereas two I�adurese Masjumi members had co-sponsored the 1notion , Mas Mohamad 
Zainal Ali m  (also a Mad urese Iviasjumi rnember)  opposed it ,  princi pally because 
of the adverse effe ct which would result on"· the smallholders existing out-
side 
. ' . 
vJhere standards werequality salt t hroughout the ent ire country .  set, on+y 
a fe w r i ch entre preneurs would prosper in the salt business, he warned". 
Nevertheless, he d id urge that the 1941 salt monopoly ord inance be broug ht 
more in line with Article 38 of the Constitution". R. T. Soerjoning prod jo 1 
a conservative Madurese who had served most of h i s  life in  the prunong"• _pradja, 
• 
62 . I .P.  1953, pp. 517-518, 523 • 
83 . Ibid". ,  P• 523.  
., 
opposed t� ri1otion >  notinf! that thv Government 11t:-id i .,ept the pricE; of its . , 
sclt low, that the government salt-workers"• union c·..:.,;);>er�rJits monopoly·, 
�nd that thro·ugh the monopoly the Gove rnment contri"buted funds for con"struc­
tive purposes in Madura . He also expressed a fear that overproduc"L:i .  � mi ght 
rest:lt from 1nany persons rushing to produce s alt . Although abolishing the 
mono,µoly wou ld benefit a few residents of Madura , i1e advised , the interests 
of tha si ate and of the entire population had to be considered . Besides, 
the motion would lead to a "liberal economy", 't-1hereas i\rticlf's 37 and 
38 of tl1e Constitution were opposed to liberalism, ht:"; folt. He consequentl.,.-
. , . 
urged that the motion be �eworded so that the Government would be requested 
to set up a state commission to replace the Salt f!Onopoly Ordinance of 1941 . 
84 
Had ji Alwi. Isa (from Gresik, fonnerly an important salt center ) ,  
speaking on behalf of the 1-,asjumi faction ,  opposed the moti on ,  noting that 
Government salt was of a higher quality and more healthful than smallholder 
salt, and that the Government sold cheaply in remote areas". He also warned 
that if the coastal population in Java and Sumatra were allowed to make salt, 
the Government might suffer from the competiti on and be forced to close down 
some of its operati c� resulting in increased unemployment.  I .B . P . r1anuaba 
(P .N.I . )  appeared tb believe that the state enterprise would c&ase production 
should t.hc monopoly. be ended , and that the state bud �et would suffer . He 
also felt that smallholder production would not be able to meet domestic 
d emand . Accordingly,  .he oppqsed the motion". Sund joto announced that his 
· 84 . :bn.d· . ,  pp . 520-523 . Whereas Zainal Alim feared that the small- · 
holders outside the monopoly are a would not be able to compete with quali t;y
overn-ment S<llt were the monopoly aboltshec., Soe ,;-jonin&prod jo warnE;id that
speculators wou1d arise and that persons would copy· government .salt ·so that 
it would be easy to ste al the latter , and that ulack-u-dlrketeering would".
increass( ! )Soerjoningprod jo started as a member of the 11a�junrl. faction in 
tre Parliaroont of the Unitary Republic, but later became an, Indepen dbnt 
and by 19.5li was a member of the Nahdla tul ulama • 
faction, parindra, rejected the 111oti0n". In support of this stand, he 
noted that an inspection t rip of the Parliaraent • s Finru1ce Comr!li tte througil 
East and Central Java had s hown that profits 1roir1 the smallholder salt 
enterµrises did not g o  to the Rembang prodt�cers but to  Solo ri10ney·lenders . 
Moreover, sj.nce the producers lach.ed the means of transpo ·ting their salt,_
the trade 1.Jeca1ne controlled by a "certain crou.p 1 1  ffeunese Iiterchant�. 8
5 
Debate on the 1notion wes su.spended, .howui.rer, for shortly afterwards the 
Wilopo Cabinet fell". 
i
About this time , demonstrations ago.inst the decree of the Fi nister of 
Finance reached their peak . Delegations reportedly representing the 13,000 
persons affected in the Rembang-Tuban salt producint area were sent t o  the 
local and central governments". Since the v'Jilopo Cabinet suddenl i had:
become demissi onary, precludj_n\ the possibility of imrnediate new measures by 
the ge'J\lemment , man>r of the salt producers ignorecl the decree and 
continued production . In )\Tovember, the new Minister of .ti'inance Ong hng Jie 
first postponed the cutoff date f or selling private salt on the north c oast 
from 1 January 1954 to 1 January 1955 . Shortly afterwards , another decree 
permitted salt producers , who on 1 October 1953 had made preparations for 
producing salt, to c ontinue production for another year (i .e . until 1 
· 86
October 1954 ) • 
About this time tho I'ri nistry of Finance sent to a Parliamentary 
committee ( Justice and Internal Socuri t;y- ) a thirtecn-poin't justifi cation 
85 . Ibid., PP • 518-519 , 523 . 
86 • .ifKeputusan r1Ien"teri I(euan3an i1i
0
• 258969/�(, "  6 i\Jov . 1953, .and tl1'Jo". 278198/1<0 , lo 1'J0v .  1953, Tambahan Lerabaran-i\Jegara"· R . r . i'Jos . 473 and 474 . 
Finance ) ,  I .P.  1954, p rs. 
I j � (',
·.. )v 
for retain ing the Goverrunentt s salt monopoly, WJri.ch included !nost of the 
s�pporting argume"�ts u�ed in the earlier debate s .  Article 38 of the 
Constitttion in particul3r was ci ted as a\'U�h:>rity for state control of 
such important 1JroL-uctinn". Additional ar5uments presented included th A 
fact· that other inde pendent cour..tries ha'i goverru11ent salt monopolies and 
the assertion that �ih creas under the Dutch the monopoly had primarily a 
fiscal nature , since the excise portion of the sale s price h ad fallen from 
about ooventJr percent to barely fourteen percer1t and a supply of cheap salt 
wa s guaranteed , t he monopol;y hed -acquired princi pally a social nature . 
These points were repeated by t he  Government before 1:-arlia111en t when d ebate 
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on the Abulha"jat Motion resumed on 21 July 19�4 . 
Abulhajat re plied to  the Governn1en t r s  statement an.ct the 
charges rnade a ye ar earlier by opponen ts of his motion . He strongly 
attacked t he  monopoly built up by the Dutch , whereby the Government exprop-
riated the enterprises 0! t he people and rescinded the riGht of e ach re"sident 
of Indonesia to make salt f.r-om se a water . If the p roblen1 had been one of a 
handful o f  very large private salt work�, he said they might well be  
nationalized , but at stake was the livelihood of the very pvor coastal 
populations". Abulhajat cited AJ:t,icles 26 , 37 (2 ) ,  and 38 (2 ) of the 
. . 
Constitution and declared that the co-sponsors ot· his motion favore d  the 
principles _ _ in th:l se last t ·wo a rticles ,  which implied a mixed economy, 
albeit in the special�·.Indonesidn form with kek8luargaan a He agreed that the 
state must control salt prodvction , but citing the official Clarification of 
Art. 3L , he observed that the m8aning 11own.11 was not to be ascribed to "ccntrol " . 
't .  Saubari (SecretP.r;y General of t he  Ministry of
The Government also pointed out tl1at 
existing regulations guaranteed the right of members of the population to manu­
� ;c:·,,· ··� l�.., , -� ·?o� .. t'.1 ·
87 . Statement b:y �lf• . l·
·655-656 . 
1ccc· ·"· •'"' �..., . • e-i · •  _.,....... l, � - 1..,; u ... :..L v  o··r.,•Ll-..i. •_ 
As part of its efforts to cont rol salt , l1e reco1T1t.1ended that the Governrnent 
provide leadership and guidance j�•or· improvin g  and i ncreasi ng tl10 !Jr vclt�c tion 
and market in g of salt by · smallJ1olders . Sinee the Government had alreadvV 
provided ample a id  to other econohti.c se ctors, he ter1Y1ed i t  only proper -that 
smallholder salt production also be a i ded . Noting the r11ajor discrepancy 
between t he opponents of the motion who feared that underpr0ducti on 
would result from abolishing the salt mor1opoly and t hose �"7110 nntici �)at ed 
over-production , he conunented t 11at salt supplies .1ad been only four percent 
of the stocks aut hori zed by· la1r1 and that if the pri ce were rigl1t , Japan
88
would buy a million tons". 
·Announcing that he was following Soerjon ing1.1rodjo  Is suggest i on" about 
c allin . .. for a state cormni ssion , Abulha jat prese11ted a revi sed rnoti on a 
,;-1e 0k later . .dy t l1is t ilne the two Iiasjvmi c o-spon sors had <iropped out and .  
had oeen replaced by two Conununists (Soenardi of the P .I{ _- I .  ru1d DJ.,J)I 1\riro-
subroto cf t he B ., T ,.I . ) ,  and since co-sponsor Iwa had .. .1ovecl into t " 1e cabinet , 
hG 1._ras replace( . ; Sidil<: rerta pati (also a Progrossi ve )". 'I'he justification 
part of the nel\· . .:.raft of ti1e· mot i on declared that it was necessary in the 
shortest possi ble time to end t he difficulties arr·ising from 
'
within t he  salt n1on opoly region and that the Salt 1-,1onopoly Ordin ance of 
1941, ivhich  was no lon eer in  keeping  with t l-1e ti 1nes, had to ce replaced by 
the existence of smalll1older saltern areas (along t he Remban g-'Iu ban coast ) 
88 . I .P.  1954, pp . 656-660, 671-672 . For those who spoke of t ll3 social 
fe . ·ure of t he Government •s s alt monopoly, Abulhajat declared t hat in ef�1�·ect , 
wh: . :..& it su iJsidi zed ren1ote interior re �;ions, i t  had impoverished the i sland 
of 1{adura . He also cited a note of Gove rnor Sarinlin -of Sunda I(et jil., dated
5 Feh.  1953, whi ch fa�crcd turning the producti on and trade of materials over 
to the corrunun ity .  To guarantee qu.ality and quant ity as tvell oo a cheap pri ce ,  
Sarimin reasoned, it  was not necessary for the Government t o l:e  both producer 
and di stribt1tor, since the purpose could be achieved by makin 6 regulations . 
a "nationa.1 11 statut0. Ac cordin ·:.:,l�, , the .motion cnll8:.: :: ,n the Goverri..:ent. � · 
(1) Lo form a state commi ssion to prepare n n ational st atute in .iJlace of t l:"k. 
!nono ,uly ordinance; and ( 2 )  to permit t 11e smallholder sa l terns ai' 1:ec. ted 
to c ont inue proLli;.c·i n� sa lt t1ntil the results of the state COilli1 1i ssion had 
be come law. In pre sen tini:,  the motion , Abulhaja t said it wns left to t l1e 
state com.n1i ssi on to decide t he fate of the salt r;1on opol�; , although it was 
exrJected that a unifonn la w for t he entire country 1..;ould be producad and 
t hat i t  would t ake i nto con sideration sugcestions brougi1t forlvard J.urint t he  
debates . SAcretary General Sau bari announced t hat t he Goverm1 e11t nrld i10 
objections to t l1e draft motion and so ?arii amen t approved i t  by ac"clamation". 
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The immediate result of t he moti on was t o  end too Gove?TuTi0nt"1 s encroachment 
on the smallholder salt :-:>rodt:-.ction in t�,e Rembang-Tuban area . 
• 
During the years follo·win .: t he t ransfer of sovereignty, there were no . . 
m�jor chan ges in t he e thnic composi tion of ownershi p  or new investment in 
Indonesi a •  s t l1ird and fourtl1 1;1ajor mineral sectors--coal and bauxite  minint -­
where virtually all the minin €:, companies had re sumed production after tl1e 
Second world War . Few minin 5 compani8S in o t her sectors had re sun1cd 
operation , hot-1ever .  There were sundry rea sons :  m :1.ny cf t oo  mines lay in 
re::note,  insecure are as (e s)eci ally on Java and Sulnwe si ) ;  sor11e mines nad been 
almost depleted by the time the Second v�orld l,Jar had broLen out ; most of t b.e 
mine s had gre atly det eriora ted over t he ye2rs ( partly as a result of t he 
. .
Dutch scorched-earth t actics early_ in 19425) , ·  and rehabi li tation: costs  were 
89 . Statement s ,  28 July, I .P .  1954, PP• 797 -7985. ·· 
Not until three years later, after an extremely wet year had a 
disastrou s  effect on salt produ ction, was t he Governmen t •  s inonopoly 
abolis lied by emergency· la1-1. In vie,;,r of t he Governmen t • s  Salt  Enterpri se r s  
fai lure to meet  dome stic demand for salt and in order to end t he need for 
import s ,  private salt produc tion was again encouraged . Report on Indon�si a ,  
IX  (19575) ,  No . 6,  p .  h. 
-� . . 
8 ,,.,()j_ 
almost prom.bi ti ve . Ir. t he case of gold minin g, rnore over ,  as President 
Hou1dnl<: of the Java Bank·· l1ad pointed out,'. in 195:0, al though small working's 
by the local popu"lation ··in South Kaliman tan a.nd :N0rth Sulawesi were 
allowed to sell their gold on the open 1nark:et ( usu ally to Chinese traders ) ,  
'"1ATestern " -operated gold ndnes 1rvere required to t urn over their production 
to the Forei gn Exchange Fund at the official pric.e of . . gold--far belo1-r t.i1e 
open market rate-.;..as a consequ.e"nce of which a profj_table operation was 





Nevertheless , by the end of · ·1955, four of the leadint pre-war producers 
of other n1inerals were still in production (only one of them mining gold) : 
AIME, mining n1anganese ore at raran"f:;nun"ggal, 1ivest Java ; l\JICI�I , extra�ting 
kaolin and quartz sand on Bangka ; Watoedakon , prodt�_cinb iodine n ear r-1od­
jokerto ; and Bengka lis, resumin g output of gold after reh aoilitating its 
11Logas" concession in eastern Central Su matra in 1953.
91 
In two instp.nces the Jndonesian Governn1�nt or a subsidi ary t ook over 
forr;1er alien operatio11s". The contract with t he  Government l1eld by the 
country ,  s only prodtJ.cer of n atural asphalt , the }T . V.  Mi jn bou w  Mij. Boeton 
( which operated on the island of Bt1tun g off Sula wesi ), e xpired in ."Oc°t,QQ�r. 
1954 . Durin g the la st ;years of t he  contract, '"t }19 COinpa ny' s field C�Jerations 
had been handled by' an Indonesian trading · company, N .  V .  Handel r,1i j. Intraport . . ~ ·•
After the con.tract"•s expiration , asphalt was e xtracted by the I I Butas" section 
------· · -
90. Java Bank Report 1949-1950, p .  1171. 
91 . Cf. Chapter I I ; Sutter, op .cit ., pp. 7-8, 11. The Government allowe� 
thle Beng kalis company to  dispose of some of its production on the free 
marlcet in order t o facilitate rehabi litation. 
93 
Since jutwirth and a number of �' �ding Gompa�; ( I11clonesia ) •
92 . Su�ter, op .ci t • ,  PP • 4.5 ; Report on Indonesia, VIII ·(1957 ) , 
.· r 
4 J \.. It.,. 
of the Ministry of Public Works .92 
The Government also became active in the �old mining sectur. As was 
noted, most gold concessions had cl1anged l1ands aft8r tl1e temporary return 
of t 1-x:: Dutch to the arc11ipelago, wl1en t he princiµal concessionaire, 
Erc:L bought out b;t a company tl1at took the 11ann & Sielcken, was name 
- .. . ·---------------N .V .  Gutwirth 
companies in o·vner mining sectors continued to postpone resuming production, 
in 195L after const:ltQ,tion with Minister Iskaq, the uank Industri Negara 
founded the 1'Te. V .  Perusa haan :Oembangunan Pertambangan (r1ining Development 
Corporation ) ,  wi ti1 Isk2ndar TedjasukI.12i12 ( Partai .duruh, and ·vice Chairman 
of the hconomic Com7iittee in Parl1eament ) as PresiGent and Ir . Vjuanda 
{Director of the State Planni� g 2urezj as ....card Chn.irman. . By 
the end of 1955, when the B.I . erJ . had iJrovided the company 1vitl1 almost Rp . <J 
million i n  wcrkillg capital and loans, the company had a cquired the n1ier1es at 
Tjil<:otok , l,·Jest Java, of the Gutwirth subsidiary, 'N oV .  t:Ii.inbouw 1--1ij. 1 1  Zuid 
Banta�, bought back the minP • s buj ldin s and equipment w l1ich had. b,;en s old 
to a Clunese merchant, an9 �tarted _erehabilitatin ; t he minee. r1eani-11ule , other 
. . 
.· of the �Jo .  3, p .  13 . Bu tung production had been restricted largely because 
.lack -. of t.. ransport frome. t� -i�land . The Public vJorks service accordingly 
plannede· to multiply· output not only by increasing the amount of equipment on
the island but by purcha sing freignters to s hip t,1e product . 
93.  See Chapter XVI; I .  Tedjasui-�mana interview, Ithaca, 5 Aug . 1958 . 
Gutwirth, one of th:? largest alien family e nterprises in Indonesia- ,- ·had been 




potential mine-site s  in Java and Sumatra were in specte d •. . 
Meanw.dle , Inaonesi a t s  richest gold and si lver !nine s, t r1e 11Ji r:1al II mine s 
at Le bong Tandai near Bengkulu ( also a Gutwirth holding ) ,  remainect i n  n statE. 
of virtual neg lect ., i:Eing worJ�ed by some of tl1e old wor\�e"rs on a caretal:. : er 
oasi s .  Touch J..ng upon this state of �ffnirs and chargin g tl1at the la0or 
leaders acting as managers were reportedlJ1 pock0tin g the �.Jroceeds ,  l.ol1amad 
Saddak (PIR member of Par li ament from South Sumatra )  in mid -1952 ash:ed the 
Government what acti on i t  plann . : er.ning th e neg le cted ri nes. d to make conc_
Admitting that the :--ii gh cost of rehabi litation and the rule s requir:.n [.:: 
companies to turn t heir products over to the lrovernn1ent di scoiiraged then1 
from r e surning operation , t he Govern1nent repli ed that si nee there was a 
. .real need for resumin"5 produ:cttcm,. -it WfJti,1.a consider auspon ding 
thd golc\ ... W.!'.ala!er �s . 95 
Neverthele ss,  two ye ltrs later aft : :r two mer. tbers of 1-arl amen t r  s Economi c 
Co1Tu,�i ttee inspected the Simau gold 1'.1ine , they reported t h at the min in g  company· 
had sti ll not arri ved at a. f orrnula T,J'i th t l1e \.i'overnment for gold pt.rcl1ase s  





the Indies Government at tb,e out break of tbe war". In response to t ·�1eir · 
urging t hat the neg lect of the mine workers and equi pment be brougnt to an 
94 . See Ch arter 421/1954; Bank Industri l�0gara Report ., t?P • 16 , :20 ; Tedj a­
'sulanpna .in terview. When Presi �ent lecljastil<mana recovered . 1i s  . labor portfolio 
1n ·ne iillrhan uddin Harahap cabinet , he was B:ucceeded by M:r. TJoeng (the
mining authority in the Economi c Committee ) ,  
In mid-1958, President Soekarno offici ally t7eopened t t1e gold r:1ine at · 
Tjikotok". 







end, the Economic Comlnittee called on the Goverriroo nt to take imrne.Aiate stops 
to have the conce ssionaire reopen the nline s or else have it operated by 
96
another company or b/ the Government itself". By the time of tl1e. ele,�tions, 
however, there l1ad been no change in its status". 
Since t he Indonesian e arth i s  potentially rici1 in  a w:Lde variety of 
minerals, there have continually been a large n1..u11,)er of projected private 
Indonesian enterprise s for tapping the se riches., b esides innumerable small 
local d igging s .  Few such companies,  however, have lasted beyond the t alking 
stage . A P .N .I .  mining company, N .  V .  Perusahaan Explorasi dan Pe.r'trunbang,an 
'Ijokr� 1 wit h  Isk aq as President and NotGt.t.mii:rodjo as  board chairman t,ras 
ortginally founded in May 1952 .  It �ubsequently obtained a concession for 
:··iron"ore in Lampung •97 One firm; Garnelan ·Corporation, an Indonesian and 
Chine se concern headed by Soetan Ractjo Ameh SJJG.iSIB, started out as a"· film 
importer"., but by 1s·53 it was v1orkin6 rnanganese deposits near Jogjai_arta
· 
and Sukabumi". 
96 •. Report, .. 23 July, I .P .  1954, PP• 675, 722-£(25". The inspection 1r1as 
made by I1r . Tjoeng Tin Jan and Fiaruto Nitimihardjo .  
97 . Charter ·  io8/1953; Industrial Director�, of Indonesia, 19.57 -1958,
p.  536 . Iskaqr s  company (of which Sidik Dj"ojosoekarto� P .N. .I .• , Chairrnan., was 
a board member) was or:i-ginally called "Indonesia" mining; before the charter 
could be legalized, the name w as changed to t he first part of Iskaq, ·S 
surname ( 11Tjol(ro" ) • 
98 . Sutter, op .cit • •  p .  9 .  Gamel� Corporation subsequently acquired a 
minint"'; concession ne�r s.airolan.gun , ·Cenc.ral Sµmatra •" . _ The comr:anyr s charter 
was Mee di sapproved b;r 1:thEf gbvernment until '" iron't>OUnd provisions were
added s·tipul.a ting tl1at the stoc�,. i1olders of 70 percent· of t.•1e stock and the 
pre sident and vice presidents had to be citizens 0£ Indonesia". Charter 
l�l/19545. 
During the period under review only a very f ew cori1:s,anies co1nposed 
entirely of indigenous Indonesians co1Tu11enced mining operations on any 
significant scale". l.\Tear Alahan randjang, lrJ'est Sumatra, the N. V. P·e rusahaan 
iJ l)(") ,,.5 
Dagang den Tambang Batu Tulis Ou1nanti began quarrying slate in 1952 . The 
same year., the l\T. V.  Perseroan Dagang & Fertarnbangan "Welirang" of J1alang, 
promoted. by Sutomo {Bung Torno of the Partai Rakjat :rndones;l.a ).. began buying 
up sulfur extracted by small local workings in the crater of Gunung 
lrvelirang in East Java, which at roughly 10, 000 feet made it the countr-J' s 
highest commercial ent, ...:rprise". After Minister Iskaq inspP.cted its operations 
in October 1953, he announced that for the time being no more pennits for 
importing sulfur would be granted. ()1 Sumatra, near Tarutung,. the N .V .  
11 1',Jamora i Langit11· began extracting sulfur in 1953, a year after U.N. 
technician·"inspectors had approved the site.
99 
The Teuku Hasan motion of 1951 had contributed to the stagnation in the 
sectors of Indonesian minerals production outside t l1e enterprises then in 
·production because of its provisional virtual prohibition against the 
Government , s taking action on r11ost concession matters . Even existing 
producers , like St&a���, were compelled to curtail output when they could 
no longer acquire exploration permits". :r--1ost Government action awaited the 
completion of a new omnibus mining act, which although largely· drafted 
durin6 the period under review, had not �/et been submitted to Parliament". 
9-.9 . Sutter, op .cit., p .  12;�i1;ftopinsi SUlllatera utara,p .  647 . The
ban on sulfur imports, which was a form of protection for the domestic
mj_ning production, was allegedly because t-ti.,e$� was a sufficient supply
of sulfur in the country. However, domestic production was far beloi,r 
the current industrial demand both in -qu,a11ti >-Y and quality.
ABBAS gelar Datuk Radjo Nan Sati was president of the GUIJ).anti Company. 
(' ." ,· 
;..11.)v 
NcvGrtht2lcss, a numb•, r 'Jf 0111, unusdri concussions were: WE:8ded out 
fol l owing a r� quir,.;JT£.:nt thHt pr(;-War concession holrJcrs rc...-regiater wi.th 
the Jkparttrt nt of J,,j_ning b0tween June: anri SGpt(;mbi_:,r 19.55. Failure to 
re-rcp;ister or to corrITTlEoncc l:xploration or mining· operationso. ·within one year 
causf.;r3 aff�octe:rl concessoions automatoical�,oto lapse. 100 
--- ------
100. Bank Inriont.sia RE::port, 1955-1956, p .  146. Th(;; Gov(:,rnm( nt announceq 
in 0ctobf2r 19.SO that mining concessions could only be givt'n to Inrion0-::sian 
citizens or corr·pani(: s Lstablished unrier Indoncs ian lal,T iJith headquarters
in the country. Foreign C •Jnccssion holders thus hart to reestablish in 
Inrioncsia. Re7Jort on Indonesia, vr:,�I ( l9.Sc ) ,  No. 2 ,  pp. !,-�.-
OHAPrER XXI: PUBLIC UTILITIES 
Outside of Java and Sumatra, the gas and. electricity COJnpanies which"­
had been built by private enterprise were virtually al] returned t_o their 
owners by the end of 1946. However, on the two major islands gas and 
electricity enterprises, like the railway enterprises after October 1945-
were operated by government departments, the Department of Electricity and 
. .. .. . 
Gas being a part of the Ministry of Public Works-" Although according tp 
the foreign pol.icy manifesto of i November, 1945, such foreign propert;,y . - -
was to be restored to its owners-except that which the St;ate itself_ 
needed to operate, for which it would.  pay fair compensation--most gas� and 
electricity workers and their union lea�ers, including. Kobsars_ji� of _ 
Partai Murba believed that these companies. had been nationalize�. 
After the Dutch administration had regained control over most of the" , 
coastal and urban areas of Java and Sumat�a., the private railways con­
tinued to be jointly operated under a state enterprise. Accordingly, it 
was a simple matter for the D.K�A"o to resume joint opeiations in" _l950. 
The situation was.. different with the other public utilities.,_" _however, for 
from 1946 on they had been gradually returned to their separate owners,": 
and after the transfer of sovereignty, the several companies continued 
operating �hemo The �overnment did play" . a role � electrical power" _ 
. .. . .
generation, of course"
. .. 
especially in West Java wh�re- • it operated ., 
Perusahaan Negeri untuk Pembangkit Tenaga Listrik (Penupetel...;;.National -----------------------· ( 
Enterprise for Generating Electricity)" and it still owned fifty percent.. ., 
. . 
of the shares of NIWEM, the mixed enterprise which generated electricity_ 
. .
in East Java. Fur�hennore"., it partic_ipated in GEBEO whic� distributed 
.� 
., 
electricity in the interior r'erions of West Java • However, at least. 
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seventy percent of Indonesia 's  eleqtrical power wa� stjJJ distributed by 
two private companies, Aniem (with headquarters in Surabaja)  and the 
N.v. Overzeese Gas- en Electriciteits Mi.1e. · (OGEM, with main office in 
Djakarta), whose concessions were to expire in 1956 and 1953, respectively.1 
Moreover, OOEM was also the country's  principal producer and distributor 
of commercial gas. 
Article l (4 ) of the R.T.c. Financial and Economic Agreement had 
mentioned the possibility that electricity and gas companies would be 
nationalized, and the RIS Government in June 1950 observed that it sup­
ported the eventual nationalization of such companies, yet for the momente· 
too many political devell>pnents were occupying its attention and that ofe·. 
the people •e. Consequently., although the April congress of the Serilcat 
Buruh Listrik dan Gas (Electric and Gas Workers Union) presided over by 
Kobarsjih had passed a resolution calling for nationalization, there was 
little other organized sentiment for further nationalization of public 
utilities during the RIS period.2 
-However, during August the fuse on a political-economic powder keg 
was touched off. From 1946 to 19L8· while the electricity companies were 
beinge· rehabilitated the Dutch administration had subsidized them. Then ·. 
i. Statements by Minister of Power., Public Works, �d Construction 
Johannes, 14 and 15 Dec. ,  Bisalah Perundi�an 1950 pp. 2627-2723. The 
pre-war Lanri.waterkrachtbedr f '"""' become Penupe�.J the pre-war N.I.G.M. 
was rename ; he pre-war ANIEM (an abbreviation) had been renamed 
N.V. Electriciteits Mij. Anie� and Aniem retained the oth�r So percent.of the stock of .. Nl.wzj-i. er. ·.C pter III. . . . . 
2 .  Cf. Hatta statement, 19 June, Ichtisar Parlemeri 1950;�· ·P• 259•; : ·· . 
Kobarsjih speech, R.P. 19.50, pp. 2809 ff. Hatta 's remarks were in r eply 
to urging ·by Mr. Iwa Kusuma Sumantri, whose political .eorientation was not 
far from that of Kobarsjih and Partai Murba. 
·•In April, the PrOf'-peI"ity and Finance COlTJnittee of the RIS Senate · · :­
had recommended that Aniem, GEBEO C.sic 7, etc . ,  become "associated" with 
·the Government., I.P. 1950,·ep. ]8.4. · · 
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in that latter year a commission calculate_d higher "commercial" . ratest1 so 
that the subsidy could be dropped. Following the monetary reform of Iviarch 
1950 there was a general price rise". Accordingly, on 1 August, Penupetel 
(the state enterprise, which sold to GEBEO and OG�) raised its rates 64 
percent, and �TD,JEM (which supplied Aniem) ,  rais�d its by 50 percent. On 
the tenth, the Economic and Financial Council approved a rate rise for 
Aniem. Consequently, Aniem raised its rates 58 percent .. 3 
The rate rise 111as greeted by the consuming public with a noticeable 
lack of enthusiasm. Djaswadi Soeprapto ( P. l'T. I .  from Eas.t Java ) reported 
that the people in East Java were aroused over the action by Aniem. He 
suggested that instead of permitting the rate rise, the Government should 
have taken some emphatic action to protect the people ' s  interests, for 
example by nationalizing the company. His remarks came during the debate 
on the Government 's statement on the program of the Natsir Cabinet . 
other speakers also sug@'ested that electricity companies be nationalized, 
idthout referring specifically to Aniem 's actions, Mr. Harinani (PIR) 
suggested that the water and electric systems be nationalized since". they 
were important for the people I s welfare and they would not cost ve-ry. · 
much in compensation C,sic •. 7• Soeparno (P�N,I. union leader), urging 
that Art. 38, Sec .  2 of the Constitution not be forgotten, asked why 
the Government 's  program did not include nationalization of important 
enterprises like electricity. And then Kobarsjih ( simultaneously with 
. .•
the Labor faction and a member of Parta; Murba)-, condemning the Government ' s  
J. Government statement, 14 Dec . ,  R.P. 1950, pp. 2630-2634;- Govern­
ment statement, 11 Oct. ,  R.P. 1950, P• 1845. OOEI� was permitted to 
raise its rates 48%, and GEBEO 20�. Smaller companies such as the E .MeS. 
of western Sumatra also raised their rates. 
program and the Dutch, called for nationalizing electric companies.4 
in its reply on 11 October 1950., the Government announced that Point 
3 in the pl:an of the Ministry of Public Works was to expand generation of 
electricity and begin nationalizing electric companies. Nationalization 
of the electric companies, which were included among public utilities"., was 
declared to be· the duty"· of the Gove11unent., in keeping with Article 38 of 
the Constitution. However., although it was to be undertaken as soon as 
possible"· since confiscation was out of the question, it would require ., 
time, (considering the country 's financial strength and personnel ) . �  The 
Government believed that the country 's  capital should be used instead for 
acquiring enterprises whose nationalization was more urgent or for set­
ting up"·new enterprises, which would benefit development in the country 
more than nationalizing existing electric companies. The Government 
further declared that it had also to consider whether it would be better 
to nationalize at once or wait until the concessions of the electric com­
panies expired0 5 
Nevertheless, the matter was far from closed, for in the major 
cities of the country there arose Committees Opposing the· Electricity 
. .
Rate Rises. • Their attacks against the Government for a11•owing the rises 
caused some officials; including Secretary-General Roes1an Abdoelgani of: 
the Ministry . .of Information, to charge that they were politically moti- · 
4. Speeches by Harmani, Djaswadi, Soeparno, and Kobarsjih, on 29 and 
30 Sept., 2 and 3 Oct • ., resp • ., R�P"·"1950, pp."· 782, 1031, ·12o6., 1287 ff. 
5 .  R.P. 1950, pp. 1846-18L7. Hannani was reminded that pract�cally
all water companies ·were c'9n��ol��d .by· the Government a 
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vated �iming at the collapse of the Government.6 Aniem 's  quick cutting off 
of the current .of customers who· did not immediately pay the new rates., 
ho�ever., only added fuel to the fire". 
Kobarsjih motion, �tc .  
Not. satisfied with the· Government"1 -s reply., on 25 October., the very 
day that the Natsir Government received its vote of confidence, Kobarsj'ih 
and six colleagues submitted a motion, which called on the Parliament t·o: 
urge the Government to ttcarry out the nationalization of all electric"·· an:d 
gas companies in Indonesia within a short t:iJne so that the income and ex� 
penditures of these national enterprises could be included in the State 
Budget for 1951.'' Various reasons put fort-1ard for the motion included :  
( a )  that electrification was necessary for industrialization; (b) that 
the production of most electricity and all gas in Indonesia, being done 
by private and semi-private companies which were only guided by the profit 
motive, was . · since it was not regu·lated ac­inefficient and anarchistic"., 
co:rding to the needs of the state or of the masses; (c )  that state con­
trol of all electric power and gas was an absolute condition for" ·eleetri­
fication throughout the sta-te _; (d)  that . · the continual rate rises over a 
short period had caused unrest among the population; (e )  that Part A .,. Arti­
cle 1 (4 ) of the Economic and Financial Agreement at The Hague allowed for 
such nat.ionalization after the public utilities were returned to t:1eir 
owers which condition had already been met; (f) that such nationalization., 
would largely benefit the people 's  health and prosperity C,sic ·7 and the 
state.'s finances and defense, and thus would become a condition for the 
6. : .Cf. Ichtisar Indonesia Seo/ekan" 13 · l\Tov .• 1950., p. 26; I-1:usirin 
speech, 15 Dec • ., R., P. 1950.., p.• . 2 26. 
., 
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continued independence and popular sovereignty of the State L,sic 7.7 
Jhe Kobarsjih motion was scheduled to be debated in Parliament on 14 
December, but by that time two other rel ated motions had been submitted . 
One drafted in November but not registered in Parliament _ _  until 12 December 
was submitted by Sidik Djojosoekarto (P.N.I . chairman ) .  Citing the critical 
atmosphere that had ariaen because the"- rate ri se s had been approved without 
first hearing the views of the people , most of whom had been hard hit dur- : 
ing the Revolution , this urged the Government to "review at once the 
decision on the Aniem rate rise .""8 
A motion apparently sponsored by Werdojo (Labor faction and SOBSI ) and 
citing "Art. 33 of the original Republic· of Indone sia Constitution which 
has been inserted into Art"e 38 of the R. T. c. Constitution of the 
Republic of Indonesia11•, called for"nationalization of all electric and gas"· 
companies and merging them into a Department of Electricity and Gas ."  It 
al so-.provided that the approval g ranted to the current rate ri se be re­
scinded ., that a "progre ssive"11 rate be set for electricity (heavier at the 
top and lighter - for the common people )"., and that the new department be 
"democratized "  (i .e"111 that labor have a voice in production policy) .9 
7.  I .P. 1950, p. 541.  A subsequent version of the text stipulated 
"nationalized" rather than "national " enterprises in connection with the 
1951 budget. Co-sponsors of the motion were Iwa, Koesnan (Labor faction 
and P.N.I . ) , IvJr. Djody Gondokusnmo (P.RaN. ) 1 D. s. Diapari"· ( S . K .I . ) , and 
I .  Tedjasulanana (Partai Buruh) 
8.  I .P. 1950, p. 6o4. Co-sponsors included P.N.I . members Djaswadi, 
s .  Bahrei sj ; and Dr . Dradjat; Ki Hadjar Dewantoro (non-party)"., K .  Werdojo, 
and Ersat Trtinodj ojo (Masjumi ) .  
. . . . .
9 .  I . P .  1950, p .  602 . One justification for the motion was that 
alien capital had control over all production in Indonesia th!o�gh_ o�ing __ . ..
electric power production . · C.o-sponsQrs were Tjugito and Tviusirin .. (both 
P. K .  I .  ) , Siauw, and A .  Erningpradja ( also Labor· faction and· .SOBS I ) . Al­
though this motion was drafted a fortnight after S'idik rs, -·it was
registered in the Parliament a day earlier . 
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The debates on the motions concerning electric power lasted from 14 
to 18 December. Minister Johannes opened the debate by sketching the 
·:-..,:;-. . i: . ..... . ., 
histocy of the electric power industry in the archipelago, noting that 
since 1925 the Government had intervened in the industry to guarantee that 
power be continually provided to the public and to limit profits of the 
private companies to a fair return on their capital considering the work 
and limited risks. He then made the po�nt that such enterprises had lost 
their free profit-seeking nature, that in" effect a managed economy applied .
to them, and that such status was little different from a state enterprise, 
where production and rates would be approximately the same."10 
.. . . 
Most of those who took part in the debate favored nationalization of 
the electric power companies.  Djaswadi Soeprapto, speaking on behalf of 
the P.N.I.  and thus Sidik_. declared that there was 11 no real Indonesian" who 
did not want nationalization. Thus since the Government agreed in princi­
ple to nationalization, what had to be settled then was th� question of 
reducing rates.11 Nevertheless, the other two principals,  Kobarsjih 
and" Musirin (speaking for the 11Werdojo" motion which would have been 
more appropriatedly called the "ivlusirin motion" ) ,  drummed home the neces­
sity for nationalization •" . Kobarsjih, declaring that approval by the 
"imperialist" Netherlands Indies Government of the ttcapitalist" Aniem 
policies in the past was understandable, expressed surprise that a 
national government would also grant such"·" approval. He felt that drastic 
measures were in order and found a parallel between the current situation 
and a case of constipation, where the necessary remedy was not in merely 
.•. 
10. R.P. f950, pp. 2625-2639. 
11. Speech, 14 Dec . ,  R.P. 1950, P• 2654 .  
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who attacked Roeslan Abdoelgani ' s  suggestion that the com-
mittees opposing the rate rises were politically motivated, observed that 
electric power enterprises in modern countries like Europe, America, and 
Australia were operated by the municipality or the state. Thus he regretted 
to see that in Indonesia they were still under private foreign capital. 
Noting that the Government had agreed to the rate rise because of Article 8 
of the Financial and Economic Agreement at The Hague, he asserted that under 
Article 33 of the original Constitution, the interests of the people still 
.·came first. Musirin also disagreed with the Government 's  views that"
electricity companies were considered to be commercial enterprises, for to 
'him, since they were public utilities, neither profit nor loss could be 
·considered. Thus, since no private company liked to suffer a. · 1oss:, it was 
not possible that one should operate an electric enterprise. The Govern� 
ment could not use the condition of the state 's  finances and the shortage 
of technicians as excuses for postponing action, he declaretl, for finances 
. .
could be gotten from the population, especially the consumers of' ele'ctricity, 
and technicians could be gotten from abroad, even from the Netherlands.13 
. . .
Whereas the P.K . I a ,  speaking through Musirin, did not feel that pri� 
vate enterprise should operate public utilities, allegedly since they 
·might suffer lossea C.sic 7, Koba.rsjih and �ir. Dali{jono rejected large 
. . .
profits for the private· companies and looked r·orward with anticipation to 
. .  
' ... 
12 . Speeches, 14 and 15 Dec . R.P. 1950,.. pp. _2641-2644, 2702 ff. 
13. Speech, 15 Dec .,  R.P. 1950, PP• 2725-2731 . 
� 
�-- . :.�· 
875 
·. · .:. . - ·.' 
the Government I s acquiring such profits as a source _of State revenue •14 
Ir. Enoch (Parki) ,  who represe�ted the city of Bandung on the GEBEO Board 
of Directors, however, took still a different view. Noting that the 
Government-owned electricity company at Madiun ha� been sll:1'fering losses, 
he declared that it was necessary that such enterprises pay their ow way"o 
Enoch also described the Aniem management 's  action, in apparently only 
looking fo-,:- money and in arbitrarily cutting off current in-stead of accom­
modating itself to the changed times as  typical of a Jer.,,11 not an., 
Indonesian. He urged that a joint government-parliamentary commission be 
. -
set up to study a timetable for nationalization.15 
Sundjoto from East Java, urging that Aniem"1 s _histo�y be investigated., 
recalled that Aniem was originally a foreign (nol'.).-Dutch)  company which had 
been_ nationalized by the Dutch. He condemned Aniem ' s  practice of demanding 
advance deposits for its service and of charging rent on its installation, 
the dep�eg-iation of which., he alleged., had lopg .. $.ince been written off... . 
�e, too; conQluded that the company was hardly. a . "public utility bu-t 
. , ... . 
rather a profit-seeking venture working contra:ry:,,.�t.P _the wel_fare of the 
. . . . ' . . .  ' . . 
people. --H;e .vannounced that Parindra agreed in prµiciple to ��ti9�alizat�on".,
.. ..• .. . 
but not immediately o To avoid having to pay too"_ heavily, 1e, . suggested J . ' . 
that it would be, In the mean--- · 
while he suggested that efforts be made to reduce the rates.16 
:b.etter to wait,. until the conce�sion ended •. : :. .. .. . . 
D. Dalijono speech., 15 Dec . ,  R.P. 1950, pp. 2709-2711� Dalijono in 
some ways was considered a Masjumi maverick. 
15. Speeches, 1L and 15 Dec . ,  R.P. 1950, pp. 2645-2647,  2733-2734. 
During the debates ove�" .the Exim Bank loari, Enoch"_"in reference to its . 
. opponents commented th��: a certain group in Indonesia wanted the people to - .stay ·poor so that their .. ideology could flourish. Ro Pa 1950, p .  2515. 
." ·: ... . · . ,
16. Speech,," 15 Dec . ,  R.P. 1950, pp. 2667�267_0. 
�her faction representatives expressed the views of their parties. 
Wondoamiseno merely indicated that the P.S.I .I .  felt obliged 'to attack 
capitalism. Al though Mr. Dalijono recommended that the Government go ahead 
and nationalize the two largest private companies, Aniem and OGEM, Mahmud 
L. Latjuba announced that the Masjumi preferred the course suggested 'in the 
.' 
Sidik motion, although it felt that the text could be improved. Two members 
spoke on behalf of the new Partai Ra.kjat Nasional (P.RoN.--Nationa,l People 's  
. .
Party),  most of whose members had seceded from the P.N.I. since the middlP. 
of the year. Mr. DJ0DY Gondokoesoemo, the party 's  head, recommended that 
nationalization of aJl electric and gas - companies be started and com­
pleted in two years ; that the govermnent •s  decision approving the rate 
rises be rescinded and a state commission be formed to investigate and 
. ,
settle the rate question; and that old concessions which were not being 
operated be abrogated. Djody's  party colleague·, Saroso Harsono, proposed 
. .' .•.. ·also that nationalization be started at once. But in order that it not be' 
.. .
too great a burden on the stateJs finances, he suggested that· �ha.tiorial.iz-a-
' : -
tion start with the enterprises half-owned by the state and" that· the 
··government acquire ten to fifteen percent of the private enterprise ·each· · 
year o�er a succession of years.17 
..
Professor Johannes touched on some of the above points and others 
which had been" ·raised in his replye Hadji Siradjuddin Abbas (Perti) had 
de. "yes concerning whether the Governm�t;- would .manded a or no �Sll18r11 
r • . · 
, • • . . ' , ... .• .. t '  , .•. �.. . ... .. . ...,- -
cancel the electric rate rise and whether it could nationalize the elec-
. 17. Speeches, 15 Dec. ,  R.P� 19$0, pp. 2701-2708, 2712-2716. Saroso
Harsono •s  formula was somewhat ambiguous for it did not state clearly whe­
ther each year the rovernment would acquire a fraction (10 to 15%) of 
the stock of all private companies concemed or whether each year it 
..would acquire in toto such percentage or - all · the companie�; · 
Djody was a broiher-in-law of Kobarsjih. 
0('177; 
tricity companies in 1951". To both., Johannes gave a categorical "non . 
Commenting on Musirin"1 s opposition to operating commercial enterprises in 
the electricity field., the Minister announced that no subsidy had been 
given in order that the users would be the ones who paid for the electricity 
consumed., not the entire" . Indonesian people. He termed subsidies unjust to 
the Indonesian people ·who did not use electricity •" .Concerniilg" the ap­·"
proval of the rate rise made during the RIS period, Johannes noted that it 
had first been accepted by the six-minister Economic and Financial Council . 
In reply to a matter broached by Enoch., Johannes said that the Government 
was attempting. to acquire a majority on the GEBE0 Board of Directors in 
order to have a voice in operations, but although the R.T.C"o agreements 
had recommended that Indonesians be placed in the management of companies 
operating in Indonesia" he anticipated little to be gained by sending one ., 
of the country's  few engineers to the Aniem home office in Holland to sit 
on its management board.18 
The debates over the subject of the electric power industry did not 
resolve the question of what action should be taken concerning the three 
proposed motions. Since the three motions dealt with two subjects., 
nationalization ( the more far-reaching) and electricity rates ( the more 
immediate ) "., the three sponsors agreed that there should be two motionso 
Kobarsjih., on Saturday., 16 December, with the approval of his co-sponsors,". 
18. Government reply., 15 Dec • ., R.P. 1950,' pp. 2740-2744. Johannes .
announced that he 1-1ould postpone a reply on Enoch 's suggestion .for a joint 
commission until after the debates were overG In reply to Dalijono 's 
inquiry about whether the administration of the companies· might be simpli­·
fied., he commented that although the salaries of personnel in private
companies were higher than those of civil servants, their work was more"· 
efficient" for in private companies they were required to devote all their 
energy to
., 
their work". He also observed that had the electricity company 
in Madiun raised its rates, it would not have suffered a losso 
, · , I .V ( · '-' 
merely dropped the final clause from his motion, ,so that the Parliament 
would urge- the Government to ."carr-y out nationaJ ization of all gas and ·
electricity companies in Indonesia within as sho� a ,period as possible." 
Musirin agreed to withdraw his (and Werdojo 1 s )  motion:,• with the understanding 
that while rate rises were being reviewed they ought not to be implemented·• 
Implying that nationalization just for the sake of nationalization was not 
enough, he asserted that it -had to be accompanied �by n democratizationi• in 
.order to end labor unrest through giving. labor the "right to intervene�" 
Then Sidik and his P.N.I. colleagues, whose original motion might have 
been acceptable to the Govermnent, collaborated with the P.K.I. ( which was 
also in the -Oppps�t�on) to make his motion quite unacceptable to the Govern­
ment by refo�ating it so as- to have the Parliament urge the Government 
to: 11 (1·) review .at-: ()nee its decision on the rise in. electricity and gas 
rates; and ( 2.) postpone implementation of the rat,e rise pending a decision· 
on a new rate resulting from a more 'progressive"' reviewo n l9 
. . At this - turn of"._events,- . }Tinister Johannes took a bold stando Con-
cerning th�" que$tion of the ra�e rise, he declared that the Government ·".... . .  .... . .. 
accepted_ complete responsibility although the matter was inherited from 
the past cabinet. Declaring that the Parliament, and .especially Sidik:, 
lmew." wao the minister in the former cabinet was who permitted the rise·" · 
[.Laoh�P.N.I.J, Johannes remarked that the question arose as to whether 
he had not first discussed the subject of the rate rise with his party and 
'• • · ... . . ·- . .. .·•
. , 
190 Statements, 16 Dec. , R.P. 1950, PPo 27h9-2759, 2766. Musirin
later . amplified his remarks on "democratization" by declaring that unions
had to be given freedom to organize the personnel in the Department of 
Electricity. 
. . � , ' . . . . 
• ... • I • 
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with Sidik himself before approving the matter. Since Parliament had given 
. .
a vote of confidence to the Government 's  program, which included the rate 
.... :"
rise the Government· did not �gree with the Sidik motion. Concerning the ., 
·point of nationalizition, he declared that there was no difference of 
opinion between the Government and Parliament, although it did wonder 
whether the unrest among the p eople would be quieted if Parliament accepted 
the Kobarsjih motion.
20 
In the ensuing exchanges., the atmosphere in Parliament became qU1te 
charged. Kobarsjih, declaring that he wanted to reassure the Government 
•'
that the matter of nationalization was not merely to calm the population 
but was solely to strengthen the national economy. He noted that · many 
organizations outside Parliament, including the Gerakan Pemuda ·Islam 
Indonesia · (a.P.I �I . "--Indonesian Islamic Youth Movement) supported 
, ' . .
nationalization of the gas and electricity companies e Since there were 
. .
different opinions in Parliament, however, his motion had sought a middle 
way. Since most bf .. the "run-down equipment" had already been written off, 
he felt that possibly there was no need to pay for it . His more volatile 
.
colleague, Soedijono t,jojoprajitno, asserted that the economic order had to 
' .  .. ·be brought in lirie: ,-idth Article 33 of the old Constitution, starting · at once 
with the nationaliz�tion of all vital enterprises."21 
, • •1 .. •• , 
Sidik, in reply to Minister Johannes"1 s alleg�tion, retorted that there 
had'"not been any time to bring up the matter during the RIS and that then 
-
200 Statement 16 Dec Q , Ro PQ 1950, pp . 2759-2761.., 
21. R.PG 1950, pp. 2762-2764, 2781. Kobarsjih also condemned the 
Government for . apparently emphasizing imports and exports and truces ..thereon
instead of dealing with the fundamental"· p:coblems . of the national economy, 
which in order to be strengthened required. that the national state possess 
the sources of livelihood. 
. \. ....... 
the people were not in a state of unrest. His colleague, Djaswadi"."So�prapto, 
also chided Johannes for attempting to place the blame on others • . He 
asserted that if. the Govenuuent felt that its financial condition required 
that nationalization be delayed, the matter coul� be turned over to th� 
people with a national loan, or the approximately Rp. 5 mi]Jion in customer 
deposits held by Aniem could become the people 's contribution in helping 
the Government to carry out nationalization. The P .K.I. position on com­
pensation; as explained by Paris Pardede, was that the real, depre�iated 
value should be used in calculations, not the market value."22 
Siradjuddin Abbas charged that a Govex'tllnent rejection of the. Kobarsj ih 
motion would be a violation of the Constitution. Another Islamic politi-
cian not especiaJJy noted for his moderation, Arudji Kartawinata,. declared 
P.S.IlI. support for the Kobarsjih motion. He used the"_opp�rtunity to 
criticize the attitude of Minister Johannes concerning the rate rises, 
l·1hich he felt to be more like that of a. representative of the Aniem rrtcµlage­
ment than that of the Government. Enoch and Djody announced approval of 
both motions. The latter, observing that the". plan evolved by the Republic 's 
"brain trust" during the Revolution h�d included the nationalization of 
.
.
. .  
.
gas and electric companies, declared that the P.R . N. in general. defended . 
everything once possessed -by the Republic as a product of the people 's  
, . 
23revolution•·
Other speakers expressed some reservations". Ki Hadj�r Pewantoro, a 
signer of the original Sidik motion, while agreeing in principle with 
.. ,, "'• . .. . . ,,.. . . . ,,. 
. . ,
nationalization, was disturbed by the P .K.I.--SOBSI insertion of the term 
' 
22 o R.i P. 1950, PP• 2766-2774, 2799-2800. 
23. RePo 1950, PP• 2776, 2784-2785, 2792-2794, 2803. . ' 
uGl 
"progressive""· in the revised Sidik motion, which made it ambiguous, and . 
asked for data to support the proposal that the government review its 
decision on the rate rise. Mr. Harmani (PIR),  Mr. R.A.A. Soehardi 
(Katholik) ,  and Soendjoto (Parindra) expressed agreement with nationaliza­
tion and approval of the Kobarsjih motion, although that of the latter 
was qualified. Harmani, believing that nationalization had to be ·" done in 
a gradual manner, doubted whether it would come off smoothly as in England 
and declared that it did not mean that the people would see electricity rates 
fall." · Being an officer of Minister Johannes" 1 s own party, he did not express 
approval of the Sidik motion. Soehardi, asking parenthetically that if 
private business could already be regulated, what was tl1e need for the 
Gove1"nment to control it absolutely, approved both motions,. with the ur1der­
standing that nationalization be carried out with discretion and according 
to a rational plan. In this connection referring to · point (e )  in the 
justification portion of the Kobarsjih motion, he reminded its sponsors 
that Article 3 of the Financial and Economic Agreement provided that 
nationalization could only take place by a statute and with compensation. 
He also observed that the state 's  finances were still too insufficient· to 
pay compensation for nationalization at that time. Soendjoto, repeating 
that Parindra approved in principle the nationalization of electricity 
companies, said that his faction would approve the Kobarsjih motion if in 
view of the existing high valuations the words nas short a period as 
pos·siblen be construed as "in as efficient a manner as possible consider ... 
ing the means and circwnstances. 1124 
The Masjwni, however, announced that it" ·" cauld not support the Kobarsjih 
24. RaPo 1950, PP• 2764-2765, 2786-279151 2805. Harmani agreed with 
Kobarsjih about not buying delapidated equipment� 
... 0 , .. .;; ( )\.• 
motion, al.though it was sympath�tic to it, since it provided for implementa­
tion ' of Article 38 of the Constitution and protected the interests of the 
coJ1111on people. Mr. Jusuf Wibiaono explained that the Masjumi disagreed 
with the motion's sponsors over the timing and manner of carrying out 
nationalization. Since onJy a limited amount of funds was available"., '. 
nationalization had to be done in an orderly fashion according to a plan, 
not in an anarchistic way, and the Masjumi felt that priority should be 
given · to other vital enterprises like the Java Bank. Noting that the ques­
tion of nationalization of gas and electric companies had appeared aJJ". of 
a sudden in connection with the Aniem rate rises., Wibisono asked whether., 
whenever certain c ompanies raised their rates"., there would also be demands 
that they too be nationalized. His colleague., Latjuba., announcing the 
party' s  stand on the revised Sidik motion, declared that it would be 
acceptable if · it was not considered as one of non-confidence in the 
Gover,nnent •s · po-1icy. 25 
The day's actions closed with the statement by Minister Johannes : that 
the: Govenooent· ·was agreeable to the first part of · ·the Sidik motion., biJ.t.- he 
specifi"ed that the proposed review would cover only the renting of · elec'""" 
trical installations., without mentioning the rate · rise. The second par:t 
of the motion was declared to be unacceptable.26 
, ·• • • ,..._
' . 




P........ --R pp. 2777-2781, 2794. 
· Masjumi: was" · an
who said he wanted to 
· ·avoid" -the charge that the 11accomplice of foreign c apital 
or an agent of Wall Street", termed the fact that his party and the G.P.I.I. 
had different"· ideas on the subject of"· ·nationalization evidence that the 
youth organization was not a subsidiary of the party . 
Kobarsjih, citing the decision ot� his labor congress". of the previous
April, denied that his motion was proposed only as a result of the disturb­
ances or would contribute to anarchy. Ibid.,  p. ·. 2809. 
26. R.P. 19$). P• 2808. 
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Saddak Motion 
The Govenwente' s  opposition to at least half of the Sidik motion 
meant that passage of the motion could be interpreted as a non-ceonfidence 
vote againste- the Natsir Cabinet •e . However, the showdown vote on that motion 
did not come until the next meeting of Parliament, on Monday the eighteentho 
27During the intervening Sunday, the Masjumi held a caucas on the question,
and it was decided that Trunodjojo would withdraw as one of the co-sponsors::­
of Sidik Is motion. The same day a new motion was drawn up by R. Mohamad 
Saddak {of PIR, the party of lli.nister Johannes )  and six otherse., inclu�g 
Latjuba of Masjumi. Repeating B!- -extenso the_ text of the justification 
portion of the Sidik motion, the proposed new motion woulde.have the . . 
Parliament urge the Government to : . tt (l)  form a State Commission toe. 
review the electric rate rises; and (2 )  suspend, pending re�ults of the 
investigation, the rise in the rentals of installations.28 
The next dayi 18 December, when the Saddak motion was enhered in 
Parliament, Minister Johannes stated that the Government could ag�ee to  
the Kobarsjih motion. Regretting Soedijono •s  comparison of it with the 
Aniem management, he expl�ined that in defending the peoplee's  interests, 
the Govermnent had rejected various de�a�ds of Aniem and had scaled down 
the company's request for a rise of ll5e.epercent to .58 percent. Asserting 
that "such foreign companies of course _always like to seek the largest 
possible profits" , he declared that whereas a rise ov�r 58 percent would. . 
injure the people, one of less than 58 p��ente.would injure th� people and 
' 
27. Ichtisar Indonesia Sepekan, 
' 
15 Jan. 1951, p.  31. 
. , 
28. I,P. 19501 p, 644. Other sponsors of the Saddak motion were 
Nj . Soewarni 
1
Pringgodigdo (P.S.I. ), Soendjoto, O.K. Ramli (Demokrat), 
Mr. Tadjuddin Noor (PIR), and Dr. R.V. Soedjito ( Katholik) o  
,: ''- 1 
vu 
the state, for Aniem would suspend operations and its technicians would" . 
quit. Meanwhile, the Government's endeavors to obtain technicians from 
abroad for various purposes had had scant results. Nevertheless, he 
threatened sterner measures against Aniem, which he revealed had raised 
the rentals on its installations without Government approval. Then passing 
to the Sidik motion, the Minister remarked that the Government could 
accept the first part of the motion since it felt sure that a review of 
the rate rise wo1ll.d bring no different result. The second part c.f the 
motion had to be rejected., however, for it becama a mot1-.)r1 of no��confi-· 
dencc since it ir.1plied that the Government I s con�id.erati:;:r1s h�d. been :
insufficie;itly progressive or even reactionary arid ct.e..:-gecl tJ.�at the 
Government had erred before an investigation had been made.29 
In the ensuing exchange Kobarsjih announced support for the Sidik 
motion, and Mas SOETARDJO Kartohadikoesoemo (PIR) criticized t:1e Gove-rrunent 
for interpreting it as one of no confidence, which he thought it was not 
intended to Ersat Trunodjojo stated that although ha and Latjubabe e  
personal J y agreed with Sidik that his motion was not one :·or non-oonfidence , 
the Government still considered it to be so. Thus to :avoid conflict, he 
announced his withdrawal as a co-sponsor. Latjuba then·"·declared· :. that 
for the same reasons he withdrew his approval of the Sidik motion, ·" and 
he requested that the new motion of Saddak (and himself) be cons•iaeredo 
Concerning the Kobarsjih motion, he referred t o  Wibisono 1 s statement 
that a Masjwni vote against it meant that his party only disagTeed with 
the time and manner.  Soendjoto announced that Parindra could not accept 
the Sidik motion1 while Saddak declared that U PIR did not give its vote 
29. �Op$ 1950, PP• 2831-28345. 
• , �· • ! 
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to the motion it did not mean that its members disagreed with the purpose 
of the motion but only that. they felt that approval_ by the Parliament might_ 
lead to 11undesired consequences .  �•30 
Since the Kobarsjih motion was already accepted by the Government, 
there was some question whether a vote was necessary. It was then passed 
by 120 to 190 Then on the next balloting the Sidi� m9tion was defeated, 
64 to 89. As the proponents of the Sidik motion left the room, the Saddak 
31motion was approved by Parliament, 93 to o.
Nationalization of Electricity Companies 
Although the Kobarsjih Motion had been passed and ac_pcpted by the 
Government, implementation was a rather slow process • .  The l\Ja.tsir Cabinet.' . 
f�ll before it could .act on the matter. Then when the Sukiman Cabinet 
. . . 
took office, it became apparent that it did not consider nationalization 
urgent, for. ite.eannounced that all electric power generation and distribu­
tion would be brought under state control without neg�ecting the needs for 
construction of new electric power facilities.e32 This indicated that 
priority would be given first to building new electricity facilities, 
then to national_izing old ones, and lastly to nationalizing the . g�s 
enterprises of CXJEM. 
Finally, on 4 December 1951., almost a year after the passage of t1:l9 
Kobarsjih Motion, the Government set up the Electric and Ga:� ..... Gompanies 
• 
Nationalization Commission with. Secretary General Putuhena of tl:\e_ .eMinistry 
3loilbid • ., PP• 2851-2860:) Afterwards Minister Johannese.9 remarkjng
that members had forgotten toe'eask where the Government stood on the Saddake_ ' ·motion., declarede. that it approved iteo 
32 . Government statement, 7 June, R.P. 1951, PP• 4657-46580 
• • 
of Public Works and Power as chairman. Two of the members were Kobarsjih 
and Iwa from Parliament. During its term which lasted about a year, the 
cormnission examined the legal, technical"., and financial problems involved · 
in the matter of ·"nationalization and sent its recommendations to the 
Government.33 · 
On 23 December 1952., shortly after the commission had submitted its 
final report, the Wilopo Cabinet decided that all electricity companies 
throughout Indonesia were to be nationalized, thus making the priority 
over the nationalization of gas companies effioial. In view- of the condition 
of the state finances., which precluded total nationalization within a very 
short period., it •s decided to commence by a�quiring those companies owned 
100 percent by private capital through expropriating them in accord with 
the provisions in their respective concession licenses.34 
Since it was necessary to embark on thoroughgoing negotiations with 
the private companies affected, a new commission., the Electric and Gas 
Companies Nationalization Negotiation Commission., was established in April 
1953. · Meanwhile"., the · · "oovernment 1-.-as undertaking a kind of positive 
Indonesianization. Not only did the ¥dnistry of Public Works promote new 
, ·, . 
·or expanded electricity facilities in many towns and cities" ·to" be owned 
and :operated by government agencies (often• municipal services) ,  but in the 
regions of Central and East Java, western Sumatra, Kalirnantan, and Sunda 
Ketjil served by ANIEM" ·"and its subsidiaries the Government instructed 
ANmM to expand its generating plants mder Govermnent _financing, as - •a 
330 Government reply tc Maruto Nitirnihardjo (Partai Murba) query 3 
Jurie, .,
---�
I Po 1952., p ,,  58b.,- .... Aritara•., 11 Dec. 1952, • Iz-o SOEDORO Mangoenl<cesoerno, 
., 
·.- --- --::r.
who was to head t!1e gove1-nrnent r s  electricity distribution enterprises, was
secretary of the cornmission"o 
340 Cfo "Keputusan Presiden RoI• Noo 163" ,  3 Oct. 1953., Berita-Nee:ara
R.I. 1953, No. 85. 
no7_,, uu 
result of which:ethe new facilities becamee: the· property of the Government.e35 
The December 1952 decision was publicly announced by the Ali 
Sastroamidjojo Cabinet on 2 September 1953 and given legal status by presi­
dential decree a month later, when·h· the nationalization of all electricity 
companies was ndecread", retroactive to the date of the cabinet decision.e36 
Although there was little reactione·eto the announcement by other mem­
bers of Parliament, Kobarsjih was far from satisfied with the decision. 
He termed it out of line with not only the spirit and intent of his motion 
(whieh both the Parliament and the Government had approved)e. but also with· 
the motion made at the previous con�ress of his union, the Sarekat Buruh 
Listrik da.n Gas Indonesia, which had threatened to takee·ea strong stand­
with all its consequences--should the nationalization of electricity and 
gas companies not be carriede-out by the beginning of 1954e. Disappointed 
thate- the Government was only nationalizing companies entirely owned by 
private capital, he asked whether it was because the Government felt that.­
it could already control the mixed enterprises.37 
The Government replied that it would also expropriate Jnixed enter­.e
prises, but only when financial conditions permitted. In the meantime it 
already partially controlled them and coulde·ethus steer them in thee·edirec­
tion of national enterprises_. Kobarsj ih had asked whether the · Government · 
was ready to urge the "patriotic workers" or the gas and electricity 
companies to carry out nationalization •. The Government in r�ply empha­
sized that nationalization would be done according to tho provisions in 
35. Address by Pres�dent Soekarnoe., 16 Aug. 1953. · 
J,6. l}c:vernment statement, I.P. 19.53, P• 781, "Kepu":ius.'ln Presiden· 
R. I. No. J..63/1953" .  ·
37. Speech., 7 Sept . ,  I.P. 1953e1 PP• 814-815. 
�E:'.Pt_�,. --� P,��;:?1' p39. Govertunent statements",. 2 - r, 751 _., !..� -! __;J :21h., 
t)le concession licenses . : · ·Thus for -carrying out the expropriation, three­
man committees would be"·"set"·"up., consisting of a member from·"tne Government, 
one from the · company, and the third jointly chosen by the first tl'10. · The 
committees were to determine which assets·"were to· be taken over and· to 
d�termine the cost. In this situation, the Govermnent"1 s-: member would rely 
for .assistance upon those members of the company labor who were technically 
and."economically skilled. 
38 
By. . September 1953, the Department of Power of the Ministry of : Public 
Works and Power had begun taking over the first power c·ompany to be 
nationalize��:"the Electriciteits Mij. Ambon, which for a year ha d been the 
target of a local campaign £or ..nationalization. This wa_s . roilowed _with- the 
El.ectriciteits Mij . Balikpapan. Although comparatively small companies., they 
still were the principal public utilities in Maluku and·"East Kalimantan. 
Then., by 195L, nationalization of the large companies had begun when the 
electricity facilities of OOEM" .in the vicinity of Dja karta and".Tjirebon 
were taken over. 39 These fecili ties ·were renamed Perusahaan ··Negara unt'(lk 
Dist�ibusi Tenaga · Listrik ( Penudi tel).--and headed by Ir. Soedoro. 
- Next on the list for nationalization was Aniem, the company which had 
touched off the - clamor for"-nationalization" and which had· .-already been · ., 
informe_d in March J.952 that its concession., due to .expire on l January 
1956., would not be renewed. The Government decided £irst to nationalize 
Aniem•s £acilities in Central and East - Java-the '·heart of'· 't�Je ccmpe.riy's  
operations--on 1 August 1954, with the intenti011 of n3.ti·J1·:,/1l:tziiig the rest 
38. Gove1•1nnent statem-ent, 10 Sept •. ,: Io--P• 1.�a, P• 833 0 
·p. 143. Local demands for the iiationa]izatior. c.•i E��1.�1.. 3o ? :,��-�� :,r0:1• <-1. power
cut during an Independence Day speech by Presidan t Sockan�uc fo.:.dt�:� , 
1 Sept • 1952 • . ·.. . . · · ,
· ..... ""•.-· •·. _.........•. ..  ·.
of the parent company and its many subsidiaries when the concession expired.e
40 
On learning of these plans from Minister ot Public Works Mohamad Has.an 
( F.S.I.I. )., the Oommunications, ·Public Works, and Power Committee ot 
Parliament on 24 June 1954e., following largely the recommendations of 
Kobarsjih., issued a protest and urged the Government to natio�alize the 
wholee·Aniem network by August 1954 and to endeavor to complete the nation­
alization of aJl gas and electricity companies by the end ot August 1955.41 
The Govertun�nt, however, proceeded on 1 November 1954 42 to· take over only 
the Central and East Java facilities of Aniem. 
Thus three years after the passage of the Kobarsjih motion., vir-
tually all the electricity enterprises on Java were in Oovenunent handse., 
either through outright ownership or through mixed enterprisese. These 
outlays were a heavy burden on the budget, especially since they occurred 
as the budget deficit for other reasons had been growing larger. Accord­
ingly they were not followed by similar measures for other private companies ., 
outside Java (including OOEM and Aniem plants) during the remainder of 
the period before the general elections� 
Inheriting a critical financial situation, the Boerhanoedin Harahap 
Cabinet made no mention of further nationalization in its program, 
although it announced that it did plan to convert the nationalized elec­
tricity facilities into I.BoW• enterprises in order to rationalize their 
. .1 
4o. lbaa3., 2.3 Apr. 1954. In February 1952, Ir. J .H. Ondang had become 
the Governmenie1 s representative in the management of Aniem's head officee · 
in The Hague• 
41. I.P. 19$�, PP• 20-22 . 
42. Djawaban Pemerintah atas femandan�an Umum Babak Ke-II Dewan 
Perwakilan mengenai Ke�_ran�an Pemerintah tentang Program Kabinet diutjap.­
kan oleh Perdana Menteri Mr.-Boerhanoedin Hara.hap dalam ra at leno ierbuka 
D.P.Re tan · · l mber 19 mimeo • ., Djakarta, 19 o 
• • 
-" .:.· . .  -r 
operations.- · , Nevertheless., Kobarsjih, speaking again in the . .name . of his 
union; .--demanded that all electric power companies remaining in private hands 
be nationalized all together before the end of 1955., suggesting t1:U1t . 
nationalization could lead to lowering the defi�it in the State Bu.dgeta . 
He also threatened that if the state eledtricity enterprises were operated 
on the basis of the I.B.w. , all the personnel of the Department of Power 
' .would resign.43 .  
Prime Minister Harahap reminded Kobarsjih, concerning the threat over 
the I.B.w. issue, that the leaders of the State were acting in the 
interests of the State and thus that there were no grounds for opposing 
its policy ,  especially since other vital Government enterprises were ope�� 
ated under the IaiB.w. In regard to the demands for nationalization, he 
reported that those enterprises already nationalized instead of contribu­
ting a sizeable profit to the state, showed losses running at the rate of 
over Rp. 20 million annually. Moreover., if companies were expropriat�d 
before their concessions had expired, the Govertmient not only had to pay 
for the company ' s  capital assets but also compensation for income lost 
over the unexpired period of the concession. In view of these facts,  the 
Prime Minister ,took di�t issue with Kobars.jih ' s  claims that nationali­
zation was a way. to reduce t�e deficit in the State Budget. It was . also 
announced t�t the Government-' s  stand in nationalizing electricity com-"'. 
panies depended upon whether its maintaining electric power generation 
. . . . . - - . . . . ..  
t
and distributi�, :wa:s good for tlle pr9gress of the State or not. If after 
I t 
due consideration it were found that nationalization hindered the pro­
gress of the State, the Government would be acting wrong ·if it compelled 
· ·"· 43. Ibid. ,  pp. 64-66� The Indische Bedrijfbr,a authorized certain"- · 
government enterprises ,to have personnel (and pay) regulations djf:t'erent 
from those of the civil service. · er. "P. P .  �T. No. :ici";i itl'· Chapter .XVIII. 
nationalization, free from the question of whether the State ' s  finances 
would allow it.44 
The debates over the Kobarsjih motion and subsequent developments 
brought out the fact that Indonesian political sentiment had not been openly 
divided on whether or not electricity and gas companies should be national­
ized, an action proposed as early as the period of the Jogjakarta Republic, 
with which few took issue, possibly because they did not care to  acquire 
the stigma of not being--in Djaswadi 's  words--a "real Indonesian." More­
over, virtually all major political parties agreed to the pr;i.nciple of a 
fair compensation, although some of the" . ultra�Marxist groups advocated 
placing the valuation on the property so low that the owners might consider 
nationalization equivalent to confiscation. The difference of opinion that 
was apparent during the debates and continued afterwards Vas over the timing 
of nationalization of these public utilities in particular, and in actu­
ality over the timing of any nationalization in general. One group-­
principally the moderate religious, nationalist, and socialist parties and 
most policy makers in the Government--felt that nationalization should be 
given priority only_ after the country 's  limited capital resources had been 
put into new productive undertakings; the other group--primarily the radical 
'. 
nationalists and ultra-Marxists, personified by Kobarsjih--were ce�ain that 
nationalization was in the country�s  best interests and so should be under­
taken at once without regard to the question of where to get funds for new 
.• 
development projects. 
The period under review indicated a compromise between the �wo divergent 
views; but largely because of the increased depletion of the reserves in the 
state treasury, it closed with an emphatic rejection of demands for (in 
Musirin ts  words) "nationalizing just for the sake of nationalizing. "  
44. Ibid. 
OHAP11bH. ;..xrr : TAAi'ISPORTATIO�T 
Garuda Indonesian Airways 
As the time for the arrival of a scvercifn Indonesia approached, the 
Republican government began making plans for the important field of civil 
air transport. Under the Financial and Economic Agreemtnt being reached 
at The Hague , pre-war concessions would be recognized. In 1940, the 
K .L.M. -subsidiary, K .P .I .L.M., had been granted a 40-year monopoly concession 
on air transport., and by 1949 the interinsular air service of the K.L.IvI. was 
operating this concession with some planes owned by the pre-federal govern­
ment. Rather than continue an alien virtual monopoly, the Indonesians 
through negotiations at the end of 19L9 with the K.L.M. management decided 
.
upon . founding a n�nf JDJ.X�d enterprise to carry on the old concession. RIS 
.. . � .  . . . .  if � :.. . . . . •· • > • • ' .
. ' ••
President· Soekarno chose the name 11Garuda Indonesian Airwa.ys11 for the 
• . :·· .- j
' . • • ':'" �
· ..company and was· a passerig-er on the company"' s first 
. .flight -• from Jogjakarta 
to Djakarta - on 28 December 1949. 
• I 
. ' .  .. ..
On 21 December 1949, a provisional� agreement was reached between the 
RIS Gove11nnent, represented by �Iinister of ColllJTIWlica tions, Power, and Public 
,. ' 
Works Herlin� LAOH (who had initiated efforts for tho new company shortly 
. .
after the Hatta R.I. Cabinet had been· reshuffled, and K.L.M.,"which specified 
that the two parties at the outset would share equally in the stock of the 
new company and that the RIS Government 's  contribution would be the planes 
it had inherited from the pre-federal govermnent. The RIS Government would 
have an option to obtain a majority of the priority shares • after ten years, 
while private persons would also be allowed to buy stock. 




JO-year c oncr:ssion with !ilon opoly ::"'ight£' was to h.E. grantee t,c GIA. ./or 
til1G first ten :vears , K .1 .111 .  would und er take to manage th� new c orpo"Y'ation". 
4.ccordingly, she agreed to make avai lable her own personnel at once so 
that t,her e  would be con tinu ity in ai r transpor t in the islands .  At the 
same time she agr eed to begin inten sive training of Ind onesians in ord e1· 
ttiat they might "so far as necessary" gradual ly take over the servi ce.  
Eepr esentatives of the two share-hold"ers wou ld �it in the Board of Di reetors , 
. . 
.the chai rman of which would be n onunated by the RIS Governmen t .  
1 
Garud a Ind onesi an Airways N .V . ,  whic h was offici ally inc"orporated 
in Djakarta on 31 Mar ch 1950, thus spr ang full-blown into the air with .-:­
.fleet of 27 ai rplanes, trained personnel , airports, and sched11led flight� , 
wi th the usu al pi on eering hard ships of any ai rline having been borne b·y 
the predecessor s .  Wi thin a few months it acqui red its first C onva.ir 1i :r-
1.i.ners , 2 .1.nd soon i t  was operating one of the best air servic es of any 
ne1v nati on .  Bu t the Du tch hegemony in the company's  management rankled 
rr;my n ati onalists and Marxists _, and i t  repeated ly was 1. su·bject for d.ie­
cussion by· some members of Parli ament .  
1 .  Informati on in the above two"· par agraphs was collated frorn: 
Mimbar Ind onesia, 24 Sept .  1949 ; Antara, 21 and 23 Dec . 19L.9; Reply by 
Minister Laoh in Parli amen t to Muhammad Yamin qu ery, 24 Mar". 1950, RIS
Dewan"_ Perwakilan R akjat, Pertan ·aan An gota d an D,j awaban Pemerintah., I ;,
106-107 ;  Charter 136/19 O; Statement by .the Governmen t in ·,reply ·to commen ts 
by Mr. Iwa Kusuma Suman tri ) ,  25 Oct . , �isalah Perund ingan 1950, p .  2229 ; 
Ensiklo edi a  Ind onesi a, pp·. 525-529 . The clau se allowing p ri vate p ersons 
·'Du tch as well as Ind onesi ans) to buy common stock was a d ead letter , fo r 
the co-founders took all the stock at the outset . 
2 .  The Ind onesi an Government bought the Convairs with money fro� 
the Export-Impor t  Bank loan". 
J9l� 
One of the first to inquire publicly .1.bout GI.l\. ·was {luharnmad Y3.rnin 
( non-party) of thG rtIS Parliament, 1-Jho asked l:'1hat percentage of the shares 
the R.IS had obtained solely for grantinp; the aviation c oncession and i:,rh:.it 
opportunities there ,-rere for other companies seeking aviation c oncessions.  
He inquired also about the ratio of Indonesian personnel in various posi­
tions, and indicated. a 1-.rish that private Indonesians should ha,,e an oppor­
tuni t�r to purchase shares .  ;-1inister Laob, in reply, said that in effec t 
the Government did not grant rt concession but shared in holding one, and 
that in vielJ of the R .  T .C . Agreement recognizing pre-1e1ar concessions and 
the nature of GIA as a vital means of c ommunication for Indonesia, no con­
sideration could yet be given for concessions to other companies .  Noting 
that there i-rere no Indonesians in the fli,�ht section and very fei:-.r in the 
ground and technical sections,  Laoh declared that training for these needs 
1-1ould be�in at once and that nlacement of Indonesians on the f-lana�ement 
3oard ,;ras bein:; considered. Up to .five million rupiahs worth of stock 
'l-!as to be made available to private persons, he declared . 
3 
During the debates over the Natsir Cabinet program after the Unitary 
;-tepublic had been established, i'-tc". l'l-1a Kusuma Sumantri ( then in the "Blok 
Islam" faction) complained of the Dutch c ontral of the GIA management and 
expressed a fear that unless the c ontrol of alien experts over technical 
matters 1-1as stopped. , Indonesians still t-.1ould not be suffic"iently trained 
to take over t·rhen the contract expired. He also su�gested that the con­
tract bet1°Ieen K .1 .1,1 . and the RIS Government 1-1as not yet valid since Parlia­
ment had not ratified it. He recommended that the contrac t be changed 
so that the managing officers -- all of t·rhom he proposed ·would be stationed 
3 .  Pertanjaan AnR"gota dan D.iai,1aban Pemerintah , I ,  106-107. 
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in Indone sia -- 11ould be selected by the Gove rnment as 1-1011 as K.L. i'.1i �  and 
so that the Governrnent tvou.ld have th� right t o  terminate any of the;r1 i n  · 
the public i ntere st .  He proposed that the c ontract be limited to  fi,re· 
years, the capital rati o  be changed t o  80 : 20 in favor of the Government , 
and that the number of alien employees be reduced ." · He furthe r opposed any 
·to  i ntervene i n  any a i r  transport"
matters i n  Ind one sia ."4 
mon opoly clause , 1�hich permitted GIA .
The Government replied that its  goal of nat i onali zing the aviation 
tndustry had not been dropped , si nce it wa s possible to  attai n it in ten 
years i·rhile I nd one siani zat i on of the GIA personnel 1-1as - t al<i ng  plac e. It  
declared that GI A had been formed i n  order to  avoid a vacuum i n  ai r trans­
port after the tran sfer of sovere i gnty. r1Iore o,rer, al thou�h K .L. I·T. handled 
the management ,  the Government c ontrolled its  d i recti on acc ord ing  to the 
c once ssi on .
5 
It·ra ·1,Jas most d i ssati sfied 1,1ith the reply. If the Government 
i,1a nted t. o n at i onali ze after ten years, he pointed out , it would have to pay 
1a penalty of 3-r:
·
· percent of the gross"·- annual income of GI A t ime s  the number 
of years rema i n i n g  i n  the c once ssion ( 20) , in add ition t o  buyi ng  the"· share"s 
held by J(.L.!'-i .  He called on the Government to  nat i onali ze immed iately on 
the ground s of a n  illegal c ontract ( ,-rhich had not been  ratified by 
Parli ament and  which i n jured the state } and not to pay anythi n g  -- as had 
4. Spe ec h, 3,··oct.  rt . P .  1950, pp. 1263-1267 . It-ra ' s  a rgument that the GIA 
c ontract .had to  be ratified by Parli ament t\ras based on Constitut i on Articles 
88 (that basi c regulati on s  on tran sport had to  be d etermi ned by statute ) and 
J8 . 
.5 . Government Statement ,  11 Oct . ,  R .P .  1950, po; 18l�2-181J.3 . 
been done lTith the Fox Contract� There i-ras no shortage of equi·or1ent, he 
declared , and several dozen Anerican, Filipino, Indian, and other pilots and 
technicians could be hired to fill the shortage of technicians.  That there 
'!-rould othe�·.ri se be enough trained Indonesian technicians �-rithin ten years he 
called an empty hope, for after almost a year of oneration GIA had not trained 
an Indonesian pilot or other technician . I,ra also dispu.ted the validity o.f 
the excuse of "fillinf!, the �,acuum" , since K . L.i·1. pilots and other personnel 
had. continued to seri.re the Government d.uring the period before the contract 
1.ra� si�ned on "April :Fool ' s  Day . "  He insisted, furtherr1ore , that the current 
concession t!as far 11orse than the old one ,  alleging that the Governrnent had 
virtually no voice in the management of GIA 1-1hich iias admini"stered by the 
K.L. i·:i. head office in the l'Jetherland.s -- since GIA had refused to accede to 
a Government rcauest that it chanee :i.ts rou.te to :t-1enado during the And.i 1.\ zi.z 
Affair unless the Government assumed all risks . There11i th, he 1�epca ted l1is 
dewand that the GIA contract be changed alon� the terms he had su0gested and 
e specially that its monopoly be ended. 
6 
In rebuttin� I11a' s char�es, the Go,rernment asserted that it did ·not 
need to exercise its ri�ht to nationalize after ten years, for it then uould 
be able to have a majority control of the ctock . i1Ior-·eover, by tl1e end of 
1959 it  planned to have the entire GI!\ personnel consist of Indonesians ( a. . 
point l-rhich it intended to discuss 1-dth :< . L . l·7 .). Contradictino: Iira , i t  f:tated 
that the old concession -- i-.,hich 1:!ould ha·ve bound the GovernJ'l'lent after the 
transfer of soverei�nty -- had no nrovi$ions fo� trainin� .  It  c1eclared that . , 
the anxiety over a possible 11 ,,acuum" had been real, that it 1-.ras only eaS)' in 
6. Speech, 18 Oct. , a .P .  1950 , pn. 1972-1976. Based on the current" · 
annual income, I1-,a calculated the penalt,y liould amount to �p . 56,000 ,000 . 
� �  
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theory to attract foreign experts, and that a co:nmercially-run air lines 
reauired more than a collection of pilots at a hi�h cost in foreign exchan�e". 
Furthermore, the immediate management tvas in the l1ands of persons stationed 
in Indonesia, who had full authority ."
7 
Since there 1:-1ere customarily only ttvo roun.d.s of debates on any ma.tter in 
Parliament, !1;Ja the f ollo,-1ing 1,reek reiterated his viei:-rs in a series of 
questions to 1'-'linister of Communications and Transport Djuanda. The minister 
replied that althou�h there i:-!ere certain matters about the contract l·Iith 
K .L.I\I. l-1hich the Govermaent did not .approve o.f, considerinr{ the circumstances 
under 't-Jhich it lras si,;r,ned, the Government accepted it,  for it co11ld not be 
said to be greatly detrimental to the State. t--1oreover, the Constitution did 
not re<iuire that such a contract be ratified . .1egardless of its role ir1 
GIA, the Indonesian Government had jurisdiction over such civil aviation 
matters as routes, frequency, and fares .  At that ti�e, 335 persons -- one­
quarter of 1-·.rhor.1 t•rere Indonesians -- t.-rere recei,ring administration _a11d 
mechanical traininp. in order to replace attached. I{ .L. :iJ.  perso11nel.  1-1ean-
l-Thile, the Government itself i-ras arranging separately for :9ilot training . 
Jidmitting that GI.\ had been given a monopoly, the . Government declared. that 
this had occurred because". there h·ad to be guarantees for the development of 
GIA as a transitional compan,y in 't-lhich the Go,,ernment had an interest. It 
also pointed out that domestic air transport t•ras based on monopolies in all 
7 .  Government Reply, 25 Oct.", rt.P.  1950, pp . 2229-2231. The Government 
remarked that since aviation affairs ,-1ere I'ar ·rrom satisfactory, it  t•rould 
endeavor to make improvements by going beyond the 80 percent control re­
commended by It·1a. It also declared that GI.P,. had flovm to f-'Iakassar during
the Andi Aziz Affair. 
--
countries with developed civil aviation, exce�t Brazil and the United Stntes .  
The Government continued making plans for expanding- air ser�,ice and 
nationalizinp: GIA by 1960,"
9 
but the proponents of an earlier nationalization 
obtained a ne1-1 spol-cesman in the l)erson of Asrarudin (Partai Buruh) , chairman 
of the Public i !orks, ?01.:1er,  and. Com.rnunications Committee of Parliament") 1.rhc 
in mid-1951 voiced alarm at the fact that most transport incll1ding air 
transport 1-1as still controlled by aliens.  
10 
A year later, durin� the <i.ebate 
on the pro;,.:ram of the r-1ilopo Cabinet, he declared tha.t the principal ob­
jection about GIA l·ras that its management 1-ras in the hands of K .L . i\1I. in The 
Ha�e. He analyzed this objection in five parts: 
(1) Political: The fact that domestic air service 1:ras a special 
national interest 1•1as especially true in nationally-conscious 
Indonesia ·which depended upon air transport; the problem t-Jas 
intensified because of the emotional relation bett-reen the tvJo
countries involved; 
( 2 )  Organizational: The actual and sole executive 1r1as in The Haye,
thus callinp; its agent in Djakarta "1;Ianaging Director" i-1as a
dee eption; rioreover, the board of direc tors , l-rhich 1-ras au thori z.ed 
to settle disputes among the managers (of 1..rhich there ·was only
one) had never met them; 
·- 8. I .P .  1950 , pp. 583, 585-586. The Government asserted that if it
nationalized GIA after ten years,  the compensation factor used v1ould be l,� 
rather than 3½% of the gross annual income. It observed that American feeder 
lines had no competition". 
9 .  Cf . statement of policy c oncerning air transport, I .P .  1952, n .  576 . 
Already in late 1950 the Government had formed a c ommission to revie,,J the
contract 111ith !C .L .1-1. Ichtisor Indonesia Sepekan , 29 Jan . 1951. 
10. Speech, 2 June 3. .P. 1951, °!1 •  L5h3 . 
(3) personnel: all top positionc �-.rere in Dutch hands, and over 55 
percent of the intermediat(;:! and senior �ersonnel 1:iere Dutch; 
the necessary des:tre to ivork together in the national interest 
l1as lacking, and the employees 1Jere represented by six unions 
i-.rhich promoted their otm separate interests; 
( 4) juridical: ac .;ording to the GI!t charter, the only member of the 
managing board 1i-1as K .L .M . ;  thus the corportation president 
(manaeing director) could be changed only by amending the GIA 
charter, and thet-chartert.could be amended only by unanimoust· 
consent at a meeting of stockholders ( including K.L.Pl . ) ; this 
violated Art. L4, Sect. 2 of the Commercial Code vrhich stated 
that a president may not be appointed. if it is im-oossible to 
replace hitn later; 
(5) military: GI1\ t-1as in the hands of K .L .I'·I. , but1fn time of ,..,.ar it had to be in  a position to be militarized. 
As sentirnent in favor of an early nationalization of Garu.da g:re1v, the 
Government revised the scope of its negotiations 1-rl.th K . L .i•;J. and by mid-
1953 had secured a�retement to its purchasin� tl1e GIA shares held by K.Lt.I-1. 
l-Ioi-,ever, the Dutch company did not at first t-Jish to relinquish the Mana�e­
ment of GIA and proposed-instead that-the office of the management be 
moved from The Ha�e to Djakarta. On 7 August, \srarudin announced that 
the Communications Committee \Janted the Government to buy out L{ .L. I- 1 '  s .  
shares during 195L and automatically to take over the management.  That 
same day the ne't-T i'-Iinister of Communiccltions, Abikusno, asserted that such 
12 
t·Jas indeed the Government'ts intention • 
..
· ii. Speech, · 6 Jun:, I .  P .  1952, pp -•t. 632-63.J . According to Asrarudin,t of 
.1600 intermediate and senior employees ,  900 were Dutch and peranakan (haif 
from Europe and half hired locally)t, 400 v-1ere Indonesians, and 300 i,,yere 
Chinese. He also objected tot. the sipe of the annual honorarium paid to · 
K . L .l-1t. as manager (averaging about f .  1 � 3- l!lillton)t. . . 
12. Jtntara, 7 Aug .  19531. s .  Hadikoesemo, on behalf of the P .N . I .  
faction, ·ratert· in the month called for complete Government 01rmershiP o.f 
·GI.A �'lfithin a short time .  Speech, 31 A.ug . ;  I . P �  1953, p.  772. 
In reply, Prime �anister Ali repeated that the Government hoped to 
buy up all the shares held by K .L  .IJ1. by early 195li. Statement, 2 Sept.1, 
. I .P .  1953,  . p. 782 . 
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The decision havi n g  been made , i n  Janua ry  1954 a del egati on was appointed 
to  negotiate a settlement with K.L �M. , and Professor Soepomo  was named its 
head ,, Finally, on 2L ivJ.arch , a n  agreement ·was Signed under i-1hi ch K.Ls.i•I. 
sol d  its shares i n  GIA t o  the lnd onesian Government while undertaki ng to  
p" rovide technical assistance until 1960. 
The p osit ion of President of the newest a nd most famous state corporatim 
was offered t o  t he econ omic elder statesman ,  Professor Su.naria Kalapaki ng, 
who turned it d own. Consequently, whe n  the new management t ook over on 
12 July 1954, it was headed by Acting President Soetoto,  Secretary General 
of the Minist ry of Communicati ons . A year later, i n  June 1955, Soet oto  re ­
signed from his p ositi on in the ndnistry m d  became full P resident of 
Garuda . 
At the t ime of the i nstallat ion of the new Indonesia n  manafem0n t ,  the 
Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabin�t Indonesiani zed GIA '_s Board of Directors, 
app oi nti ng twelve members -- two more than provided for in the charter -­
of whom ten were represe ntat ives from the ten fact ions in Parl iame nt 
supporti ng the Ali Govenune nt .  lYir. "i�Iilopo ( P .1'I. I .  ) l-Jas appointed Chai"rman 
of the Boara.13 
Pioneer Aviation Corporation 
The strength of the monopoly p ositi on of GIA, as successor to  the 
K .L.,M •. interinsular service , to which Iwa had objected so strongly in 1950, 
13. Pedoman ,  5 July 1954; Antara , 12 July 1954. Two ci vil servants 
were appointed t o  the board , Ir. R .  Soerjomihardjo (as Deputy Chai nna n )  and 
Ir• .Darmawa n .  Asrarudin ,  appointed to  the seat for Partai Buruh , turned 
do�m t he appoi ntment because the number of members exceeded that specified 
in the charter, a nd he re jected a:ny charter change solely in order t o  
award seats on the GIA board t o  Government factions .  
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was borne out in practice several years later. On 19 January 1953, the 
Pioneer Aviation Corporation �r. V. was legally established as an indenpen­
dent operation by several men who had been active in  the Indonesian 
Revolution. Its two managers were Abuildjani, a Djar,1bi businessman, and 
David F. Fo"t-1ler, an American pilot, and Dr. A·. K. Gani headed its boa.rd 
of directors. lrJhen the company ' s  charter ,ras first drawn up, it provided 
that 51 percent of the stock had to be ovmed by Indonesian nationals. 
However, seventeen months had elapsed before the Government legalizBd the 
charter, and it did so only after the minimum stipulated proportion of 
Indone sian 01-mership 1-ras increased to t1-10-thirds.14 
Since much of the Indonesian archipelago was not served by GIA, the new 
company felt that there was a place for it and its two small plane�. P.A.C. 
originally applied to handle its own routes in addition to charter service. 
However, the license finally granted by the riinistry of Communications.
specified that P.A.C. service had to be unscheduled and that its routes 
could not compete with Garuda, which had priority to all routes. It thus 
occurred that P.A .C. developed profitable service to such places as Tandjung 
Kar.ang and Sibolga, only to have GIA then preempt these routes .  
However, it  was in another field ·that the company won greatest acclaim. 
This took place · in August 1953, when a shipboard fire prevented the departure 
of the last scheduled pilgrim ship for Arabia. After a K.P.M. replacement 
. . 
took the majority of the passengers, it appeared that 280 still would be 
stranded and unable to reach .A.rabia in time for the pilgrimare. P.A. C. came 
to the rescue by chartering four 4-engine planes from C.A .T. and flying the 
·14. See Charter 280/1953. Three-quarters of the P.A.C. stock was held
by Indonesians, of whom Dasaad t-ras the leadinf stockholder. The amended 
charter was changed again to provide that the uni ssued preferred stock could 
only be sold to the founders and the Indonesian Government. 
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remaining pilgrims including several dignitarie s to Arabia on time.15 
1'Teverthele ss, the continue d lack of support of the l1Iinistry of 
Communication s led Dr. Gani to cha rge in public that its officials concerned 
with civil aviation and their Dutch advi sors were unde r the dictation of 
GIA, which favor€d 11Dutch colonial ente rpri se"o" �Jhen Sahetapy Engel 
(Demokrat facti on ) broached the subject in Parliament , Prime I-linister 
Al� Sa stroamidjojo denied that such dictation existed , asserting  that al­
though the Mini stry of Communications kept in close touch with GIA, the 
ministry itself d etermined all route s.  The Government ' s  attitude wa s that 
vital communication s  had to b€ controlled entirely by the Government . But 
despite the Gove rnment"' s  monop oly, in view of the needs ari sing in the 
community, the Government did not reject private initiative so long a s  it 
wa s a supplemental effort in meeting the se needs .  The p rimary condition for 
such an enterpri se was t i1at it be a n-:.tional one ,  i .e .  that at lea st two­
thirds of it s share s be h eld by Indonesians ,  Ali a �serted"ol16 
Pe1A.C , ,  deprived of its succe ssful routes, quickly lost moneyo 
Consequently, by the t ime Dr. Gani was appointed il,i nister of Communications . ' 
on 19 November 1954, the hop e  that the company might find relief could not 
be realized , for it -- the first· private .Indone sian air company -- was ··­· 
al.reac}y moribundo 
The Railways 
The tran sportati on sector which evoked th e fewe st demands for Indonesian• 
15. Outgoing :t-Iiniste r Djuanda was one of th£ passengers e1 Cf. Abadi , 
13 Aug. 19531. 
16. Engel Speech , 28 Augo,  and Government Reply, 2 Sept . ,  �. P. 1953,
PP• 733-734 ,' 782 o 
ization was the railways:, althou�h approximately half' of tht: trackagt; in 
Indonesia at the beginning of 1950 was still owned by private corporations. 
The principal cause of this lack of concern, of course , was that thL elev�n 
interurban railway companies on Java had continued to be operated by the 
. ' 
stat0 railway· system since the war period. Only the urban Bataviasche 
. .
Verkeers Mij. and Deli Spoorweg Mij. in East Sumatra, had been returned tc 
their owners after the first military action. 
After tho formation of RIS"1 the D .K .A .  continued to operat� the rail­
ways on Java, including the private systems in with the state-owned. The 
degree of p�rsonnel Indenesianization was far advanced since those who had 
been employees of the private corporations were made temporary clmployees of 
the D, K.A. and thus brought within the scope of civil service regulations 
while "on leave" from their original companies.17 The D.K.A� meanwhile 
continued to mak0 payments to the shareholders of the private corporations 
(principally in the Netherlands ) for the use of the property of their 
companies. 
There was little pressure for immediate expropriation of the bleven 
railways, althouffh the R,T.C, Financial and Economic Arreemont mentioned 
the possibility and the Governments from the RIS period onward had latent 
17. By dperatura.n Pemerintah No. 31n of 19.53, employees ·"from private 
railway companies became elirible to government pension rights effective 
the beginning .of 19.50. During t}:le debates on the Ali"- Sastroamidjojo 
Cabinet • s ·  program, no direct response·. was made to the request of Emon .
Bra�awidjaja ( Partai Buruh) that such personnel be made civil servants. 
.I.P�  :19,531 P• 7.56. 
18. Accordinf•' to As�p.rudin, the D.K.A ,  made .payments .of a half . .
million ro.piahs monthly for such purposes. R.PJ.951, p .  3859� 
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intentions eventually to t ake such m�asures.19 Pressure to expropri ate 
was lacking p artly because the existing  arrangement worked well in 
practi ce and it g ave the State complete control of the eleven private lines, 
and p artly because the Stat e 's finances would not tolerate he avy di s­
bursements to compensate the owners.  Moreover the D.K.A. consi stently 
operated at a loss and so did not have funds of its own to be used for 
expropri ation , Thus ,  following a n  i n spection trip in Java in lat e  1950 by a 
few members of the Communi"cations Committee, only one member called for the 
state to t ake over the private raiJways . 
20 
In 1952, the t·Jilopo Cabinet ' s  statement on communications poli cy 
declared that discussions were u nder way for the Government to obt ain 
po�session of the private railways. Accordingly1 by September the commi ssion 
studying problems connected with their nation ali zation,  headed". by D.K.A.  
Chief Effendi Saleh , submitted a report calling for the nationalization of 
the el,even railway comp anies  on Java.
21 
Probably because of fin anci al 
reasons ,  no priority was given to this goal. 
Th€re was relati vely little sentiment to nationali ze the D.S.I•i. , p artly 
because its system did not compete with the state lines as did the private 
railways in m any parts of Java. In 1951, twc somewh at p ar adoxi cal vievrs on 
19. Cf. Hatta remarks, 19 June I .P. 1950, P• 259. 
20. 'l'he lone proponent l-ra.s a Communi st ( Ir .  Sakirman ) ,  See hi s 
insp ection report read 25 Jau.1951, R �P .  1951, P• 38L2 � The only private
company he specified by name 1-1as the 11iJederlandsch Indi sche · �;Ii j. tt 
(referring probably to the 11 riederlandsch-Indischc Spoorwt·g !'1Ii j .. " ) .  
t1. 1952, p .  577 . An�ara, ' 30 Sept". 1952". 
-� 
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th e subject were expressed in Parliament . Gu sti"_Djoh an (Masjumi ) , returning 
from an in speGtion of the h arbor c ongestion at Be lawan and finding th e 
D . S .M. servic e for the port insufficient ,  rec ommended that th e Gove rnment 
take over the c ompany, or at least c ontrol it ."22 Djoko Soedjono  (P .K.I". 
ch airman of SOBSI ) noted that the D .S .M. , owned by foreign c apital,  fu lly 
implemented pr ovisions of the 1948 Work Law and still operated well . In 
c ontr ast , the government ' s  own D .K .A.  permitted lopge r hou r s  than provided 
by the law, while its workers did not demand all that they were legally 
entitled to  -- and still it c ou ld not run well . Was it wrong ,  he asked , if 
D . S .M. worker s  felt , "We no  lon ge r  demand the nationali zation of the D .S .M. 
becau se our fortune s would then grow wor se "? 
23 
P .p . D .  
A .  diffe r ent situ ation was enc ountered by the Batavi asch e  Verkeer s 
Mij .  N .  V . , which operated tram and bu s service in Djaka_rta .  It  appeared 
to  be plagued with a shortage of e quipment and overcrowd_:i.ng on the one hand 
and wide spread non-payment of fare s on th e other .  De spite the fact that its . . 
vehicles u su ally oper ated at or near c apacity, it -- like the State r ail­
ways -- operated at a loss, which rose to Rp . 150,000 per ."month". Some 
labor leaders ,  associated with SOBSI , demanded the c ompany"1 s n ationali zation , 
blaming the losse s on c or ruption by the man agement . A government":inspection , 
h owever , revealed th at some of the operating per sonnel were intimidated by 
.,. . ··' -.. 
hoodlums, th at many of its conductors failed t o  issue tick�t-receipts to  
passenger s on receiving the fares,  and th at there was large -sc ale  with"-
. 24h olding of rece ipts from the c ompany. 
22 . Report re ad 14 June ,  R . P .  1951 , p.  5064. 
23 . Speech , 2 June , R .P .  1951, p .  4596 . 
24 . Cf. Ju suf Wibi sono, " Nasion ali sasi " ,  Mimbar Indone sia,  31 July 1954, 
p. 5 .  Sin Po (Djakarta) , 3 Nov. 1952. 
-----
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On 12 July 19.51, the Djakarta court granted the B .  V .M. petition fo,� 
a temporary postponement of payment� on its debts and appointed administra-
tors representing the Government. 
25 
Not long afterwards Asrarudin submitted 
to Parliament a motion for the nationalization of the B .V .M . "26 In view of 
the continued losses and campaign of hosti lity, the B .V .M.  management in 
late 1952 announced that it was unable to continue the service. Accordin�ly ,  
the Wilopo C�binet agreed that the enterprise shou ld be nationalized. On 
1 November 1952, it was provisionally placed under the full supervision of 
the Ministry of Communications and the municipality . The Government paid 
subsidies to cover the losses which continued to exist and assigned plain-
c o  esmen rams . d1 th to t to t .main ain or er hw"ere necessary . 
27 
Late in 1953 the Government began to buy up outstanding B .V .M .  shares, 
offering 23 1/3 percent of par value in :C..tch currency ( or thrice that in 
rupiahs) -- an amount sixty percent above the maximum price quoted on the 
stock market during 1953 ."28 The B .V .M.  continued to operate with Dutch 
managers but under Government custody unti l mid-1954. Finally ,  on 
12 June of that year, an emergency law for the nationalization of the 
B .V .M .  was proc laimed . One of the grounds for the law, so read its eluci­
dation, was that "the legal consciousness of the public" demanded that 
pub lic transportation in the capital city of Indonesia be managed by Indo-
25. Berita-Megara R . I .  1951 , p.  450 . The administrators were officials 
from the Ministry of C ommunications and the Djakarta municipal government. 
26 . Cf . I . P .  1952, p .  2 .  
27 . Sin Po, 3 Nov. 1952; Keng Po, 23 Dec". 1952.  
28 . Government statement, 15 Feb . ,  I . P .  1954" , pp . 130-131 . The formul� 
of 60 percent over the market price was copied from that used in buying up
Java Bank stock. 
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nesians themselves. The law provided that"· shctrcs of B. V .  ,. stock not yet 
O'\'med by the Republic were to ba expropriated, 1tlth conipensation at tl1� 
rates it had been pay·inf earlier" 29 
The nationalized B.V .i't'. was renamed P.T. Perusahaan Pen&'angkutan 
Djakarta (P.P.D. -- Djakarta Transit Company, Inc. J,  and Indonesians took 
over the mancl{lEment. .-;iithin one month� one of its manapers announced that 
since nationalization t, ,.e company T:-ras operating at a profit c.nd ascribed this 
phenomenon to the increased diligence of the t1orkers a.nd incroased disci­
pline amonf the passenrers. In the lirht of continued losses in the rail­
ways and many other state enterprises, one canny observer suggested that it 
was still too early to accept the announcem0nt as proof that if only an 
enterprise were nationalized, its labor productivity 1-1ould increase and 
its profits would mount."30 
Bus. Transportation 
Indonesianization of bus transportation was to have important ramifi­
cations throughout the £ntire Indonesian community, for the bus -- not the 
plane, the train, or even tho boat -- was probably the most ubiquitous 
common carrier. Moreovez; although IndonG"sianization of air and r2il 
transport could proceed without a significant public stir, since the 
property of foreigners was affected , that process applied to·
4 
high:..·
way transport had further domestic repercussions, for it struck at the 
position of a resident minority -- the Chinese -- Indonesian citizens as 
well as aliens. The motivatinr power behind this process, making it a 
program, was the man who for the second time in his career held the port-
29. "Undang Da.rurnt i,To. 10, 1954". This nationalization law in
large part paralleled that for De Javasche Bank. 
30. 1rJibisono, op.cit. , P• 5. 
908 
folio of Communications through three straight cabinets, Ir. Djuanda ."
31 
When the program of the Natsir Cabinet was explained to Parliament, the 
Prime Minister announced that its transport policy would be based on Art. 38 , 
Sec". 2 of the Constitution and that it believed that oppDrtunity and 
assistance should be given to "national enterprises4 , especially in the 
field of motor transport ( and shipping) .  For the sake of uniformity and a 
fair and rational distribution of equipment, it was declared that the central 
government rather than the regional governments would initially control this 
32
sector. 
Two months later, members of the Parliament' s  Communications Committee 
made inspection trips to various parts of the country, and they reported 
their findings to Parliament on 25 January 1951". Regarding bus service in 
his home pro·vince of East Java, Dr. ATENG Kartanahardja reported a signi­
ficant difference between the status of "oldtimers",  who were about ninety 
percent "non-Indonesian" ,  and "newcomers" , who were almost all "indigenous" 
Indonesians". The former, mostly family operations with the most experienced 
personnel, had the most equipment and routes.  Whereas their vehic les had 
been acquired principally before the "money-cutting" ,  tho�e of the newcomers 
had been afterwards; thus they had to pay a triple price. Most of the 
31. Djuanda had served in every cabinet save the first ( Soekarno) one
in 1945 .  After being Vice Minister of Communications in the 1st and 2nd 
Sjahrif .Cabinets', he served as Minister in the 3d Sjahrir, the two Amir, 
and the 1st Hatta Cabinets". As Minister of State in the 2nd Hatta Cabinet, 
he headed the Economic Commission of the Indonesian Delegation to the Round 
Table C onference at the Hague , as a result of which he was awarded the
position of Minister of Prosperity in the Hatta RIS Cabinet. In this 
position, he spearheaded the first program favoring indigenous Indonesians,
in importing ( see Chapter XXIV)". 
32 .  Statement, 21 Sept. _!t.P .  1950, pp . 358-359 . 
909 
in i ti al investment of the oldtimers had been rec ove red , depreci ation f11nds .
had been set up , and their  financ i al position was stron g .  They c ou ld thus 
afford to provi de low fare s .  Newcomers, with costly ini ti al outlays and 
hi gher fare s,  found i t  difficult to c ompete . Ateng noted, too, that old­
timers wanted to exp an d  the i r  compan i es ,  whi le newcomers wanted fac i lities 
and protection from the Government . Analyzing the situ ati on ,  Ateng ob­
served that from the standp oint of t he economy, whi le the oldtimers were 
st i ll qui te necessary, the Governmen t  ought to give attention to "nati onal 
demands" of the indi genou s Indonesian newc omers,  whose weak financi al 
condi ti on nece ssi tated Governmen t p rotecti on .  However , fac i lities,  priority, 
and credit were not enou gh.  If ffi1ch n at ion al comp anies  were to  be operated 
ec onomic ally, he declared, leadership had to  be provided for the i r  operai.·: 
tions .33 
Asrarudin found motor transport in West Java in general good, althou gh 
ei ghty percent owned by 11non-Indonesi an s " .  The largest c ompany, "Tan 11.1.xe " ,  
with about forty bu sses ,  was Chinese-owned, as were most of the others . The 
few Indone sian newc omers had at most fou r  bu sse s .  Asraru din rec ommended 
that the granting of route s be restricted so that c omp anies with li ttle 
c api tal cou ld also get routes in popu lou s areas and that a law be made to 
protec t small cap i tal, espec i ally "national c ap i tal" ,  so that "nat i on al 
c ompanies" cou ld grow. 34 
33 . R.P. 1951, pp . 3853-3858. Elaborating on hi s last su ggestion , Ateng  
recommended that regional tran sp ort foundati ons be set up  into which "nation­
ai0 bus c ompan ies would be merged. Leadership and support would then be 
provided for the assoc i ated companie s .  
34 . }bid. , pp . 3861-38631. Asraru din also noted the lac k  of uniformity 
in granting franchi se s ( some were for a spec ific pe riod, others were in­
defini te;  some specified the number of busses for eac h  rou te ,  othe rs di d 
not) . 
"Tan Luxe" also operate d  in East Ja,ra. 
910 
Abdullah Jusuf reported that ninety-five percent of the transport 
companies in East Sumatra ( operating 3316 busses, trucks, trailers, and 
taxis, etc . )  were owned by aliens (Chinese) . However, four of the eight 
companies on the important Medan-Bukit Tinggi run were owned by Indone�ians } S  
In Central Java, according to Ir.  Sakirman, transportation in the 
regions which had passed to the Dutch after the first military action was 
virtually entirely in the hands of "oldtimers" (Chinese)". Furthermore , the 
few new companies operated by Indonesians out of Jogjakarta and Solo appeared 
far from strong. 
36 
Data subsequently published for Central Java showed that 
the routes served daily by common carriers increased from 18 , 478 kilometers 
at the beginning of 1950 to 53, 020 km at the end of the year". In the 
beginning of the year, alien companies ( read "Chinese") accounted for 97 
percent of this service, and "mixed enterprises" ( of Indonesian and Chinese) 
for the balance. At the end of the year, the alien companies,  while doubling 
their mileage, took only 64 percent, the mixed companies accounted for 26 
percent, and "national" ( read "indigenous Indonesian")  companies, almost 
ten percent. 
37 
The Communication Committee' s  Report contained in its conclusion a 
recommendation that routes be reviewed and redistributed "to ond unhealthy 
competition and provide expanded and fair opportunities to national business . "  
It was suggested that government enterprises,  "mixed enterprises" ,  and 
"private enterprises ,  exclusively emphasizing and supporting national enter-
35. Ibid. , pp . 3865-3869 . By 1952 there were only 5, 8 ,  and 2 bus
companies owned by Indonesians in East Sumatra, Tapanuli, and Atjeh, 
respectively . R . I . ": Propinsi Sumatera Utara, pp. 638-639. 
36. R . P .  1951, pp. 3848-38531. 
37 .  R . I .  Propinsi Djat•T� Tengah, pp . 363 , 364. 
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prises" could operate in the field of motor transport . 
38 
But the week before the c ommittee report was read , recoITL'Tle n ding support 
for flaation al "  enterprises, Minister Dju and a h ad t aken the first step in the 
direction of the goal in th e c abinet policy statement by issu ing a c ircular 
commun ic ation to all governors on 16 January 1951 u rging that consideration 
be give n to  the c itizens wh o were still "economically weak" when  grantin g bus 
franchises". 
39 
The c ommunic ation offered a "guide" to be followed in granting franchise s 
(1) when approving bus routes, franchise s  for h alf of the busse s need ed 
should be given to I nd onesian c itizens who h ad operated such routes connnend a­
bly before the war; h alf of· the balance of franchi se s should be given to  
other Indonesian citizens,  wh o accord ing to  information from loc al offic ials 
might be expected to operate their companies  in the public intere st . Bu s 
companies ,  as servers of the dome stic interest s,  should properly be managed 
by I nd one sian c itize n s .  I n  interpreting "c itizens",  it should be remembered 
th at the Governme nt is obliged to assist and protect the group of c itize n s  
who are economic ally we ak; 
(2) for a company to be"· c onsidered "In.done sian " ,  its preside nt or 
managers must prove their I nd onesian c itize n sh ip and seventy-five perc ent of 
its c apital stock must be held by c itizens .  The c ompany's  charter and books 
38. R .P .  1951, pp . 3836-3841. "Mixed enterprises'' here wc.s not defined". 
It might h ave meant either c ompanie s  in wh ich both government and private 
c apital partic ipated or c ompanies in which d ifferent ethnic groups partici­
pated (see preced ing paragraph ) ". 
39. Statement by Secretary-General Soetoto of the Ministry of Commu ni ­
c ations before Parliament, 19 Ju ne , R .P .  19.51, pp . 5155-5158 . 
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should be scrutinized; 
( J) utilization of rights to pre-trar franc"hises will no longer be 
approved; 
ho 
( 4) route applicants i-rill be informed that the grant of a franchise 
depends upon their readiness to sign a contract for a joint enternrisc 
( perusahaan bersama) , a model of 1·rhich t·Till be supplied later; 
( 5)  applicants for franchises or rene,-1al of frnnchises will be obli�ed 
to hire former DfG-i:tI employees or demobilized men . 
Technically the I,iinister of Communications could only propose a guide, 
for under existing lat•r provincial governors �-,ere authorized to grant the 
franchises.  Since ,  in fnct, a variety of officials had issued franchises 
in the immediately preceding years mid the terms of the franchises had been 
quite varied, and since it i-.ras alleged that some of the governors did not have 
adeouate staffs for administerinP, a proper franchise policy, r"linister Djuanda 
-- in line ".Ii th the Government' s  policy statement of SepteMber 1950 -- so\1ght 
in effec t to reverse temporarily the allegedly prevailing trend of decentra.­
lization in government and to obtain for his position the authority to grant 
franchises.  Accordingly, the GovernIYlent submitted a bill to Parliament for 
amending the n.uthori ty--besto1,vi.n� sec"tions of the pre-1r1ar Highi-ray Traffic Lat"· 
as well as certain other sections in order that necessary implementing regu­
lations could be issued to facilitate the attainment of the primary goal i n  
transport: "the development of a national transport apparatus formed of trans-
ho . Soetoto commented that thus the l1Iinistry of Communications re­
cognized neither "historical rights" nor the existence  of "ne1-1comers" 
( nppellations made by the Dutch in the late forties) . 
. � , . 
• • 
. ' . . . . 
f • ' • •  
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41.
port companies most of i-.rhich are national. m . . . 
Dis.cussion of the bill by the plenary s�.�sion of Parliament did not take 
. . . .  
place until 19 June, the day after th� ne� S�n Cabinet had received its. . 
vote of confid�nce. Ir. Soetoto .., Se<;r�ta!Y General of the Ministry of Commu-
• •• • ,I 
nications, presenting the bill 9n behalf of :the Government declared that
• • • ' .. ' 
centralized granting of bus franchi��� was temporarily needed: (1 )  to guarantee 
., . . .,. . ' ' 
unif
• 
.orm execution of franchise regulations; ( � )  to provide the best possible 
• • ' 








coordinat�on of routes among the bus c9�pa�ies t�emselves and between them 
• < . ,  
and the state railways; and (3 )  to carry out the Government 's ideals 9f aq.-
. .. . . . ' 
vanci�g genuine national transport companies. To those who wanted a review 
of tne franchises granted by the Dutch because they felt that the old traffic 
. -
law had been an obstacle to the growth of new national enterprises, he gave 





. , , . J •.B.A.F.  Mayor Polak ( rep re sen ting European p.Branakan and P .  S.I .  ) 
questioned whether franchise-granting �uthority needed to be centrolizcd for 
( referring to poi�t 3 )  he felt that regional governmen�s had the same ideal 
goals. Soetoto responded by s�ressing the first two reasops (uniformity and 
' . .., . . . 
coordination). SARINO Mangoenpranoto (P.N. I . ), observing that a state whose 
gov�:rnment is 11na1;,ional" sh.ould give guarantees to national businesses so that 
they will in turn" guarantee the people 's prosperity, declared that the state ."
would not :meet it� �bligation �imply by granting future franchises to new­
c.o.me.rs, for the routes not yet served w�re in the sparsely-settled areas. 
. . 
LI. Cf. Tambahan Lembaran-�Iegara ·R ., I.  'No. 114. · The Highway Transport 
( o-� Traffi�) Law was originally the We{!verkeers-ordonnantie of 19331
rende·red in
. 
Indonesian as Undang2 Lalu-lintas D.ialan. 
As a result of the hi storical ri fhts of the Dutch period, the populous 
routes had already been secured by aliens (he did not know whether they were 
citizens,  "candidate citizens," or what ) .  Consequently, he recommended , the 
Gover1uuent should be ready to revi e1-r the distribution of franchi ses and n1ake 
regulations based on justice so that newcomers would receive equ al treat­
ment with existing strong operators over the heavily popul ated routes. In 
reply Soetoto , expressing  a hope that the term "newcomers" would not be used 
any more , declared that thitherto "new enterprises" ( sic ) were also given 
11fat 11 (populated ) routes .  Admitting that only sparsely-popul ated routes re­
mained to be granted, he  suggested that the problem could be fairly solved by 
centrali zation of the franchise-granting authority and a review of franchi ses 
that were expiring.  Soetoto also acknowledged that there was evidence that 
many national companies were only used as fronts for alien capital ,  and that 
althou gh company charters were inspected , it was still po ssible for secret 
43
agreements to exist"o 
The fact that "hi stori cal rights11 priorities appeared to be gu aranteed 
by certain sections of the existing traffi c l aw disturbed vari ous members. 
A special committee headed by Ir .· Pangeran ?1. NOOR (Vice Chairman of the 
Communications Committee ) had proposed that historical rifhts be restricted 
only to Indonesi an ci t'izen s, but the Government had demurred . Mayor Pol ak 
suggested that aliens -- and not "ali enated" citi zens  -- mi ght be excepted 
from such ri ghts, whi ch ivere otherwi se necessary for the sake of continuity 
of service. Achmad Soemadi (P .K. I . )  proposed that the section under ,dis� 
cussion be replaced by one r·iving- priority first to state-owned enterprises, ·
' .. 
second , to "national enterprises" ,  and third , to compani"es applying for renewal 
43. Ibid. ,  pp . 5140, 5146-51L9, 5152-5155, 51625-51635. 
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of their franchises •" . Iwa remarked that it would be peculiar if the Government 
inserted no claus.e requiring support for national ente-rprise:s in the statute". 
In· reply, Soetoto declared that there should be no anxiety over the retention 
of historical rights, for the Minister of Communication 's circular of 
16 January no longer recognized them. He also declared that there 1-1ere no 
11alien citizens",  only 11citizens11 •44 tTevertheless, K. Werdojo felt that 
the Achmad Soemadi proposals had merit, and he introduced a draft amendlnent 
to change the traffic law in that respect.45 
When debate resumed on 20 June, Ir. Soetoto repeated that in practice 
the unpopular section 1vas no longer implemented and that it was improper t o  
place detailed implementing regulations in a statute. Regarding the proposed 
amendment itself, he found it to concern only the granting of new franchises ,  
while the existing clause concerned only the renewal of expired franchises. 
In an obvious reference to the problem of legitim"izing discrimination. · ., 
he also inquired whether the tenn "national enterprise" ( perusahaan nasional) 
in ·"the text of the amendment referred to a company of an 11Indonesian citizen" , 
or an "indigenous Indonesian citizen", or a ncitizen i:vho was economically 
weak" .46 
After Achmad Soemadi reiterated that the amendment was necessary to 
protect national businessman, and Ir. Sakirman declared that t he proposed 
system of priorities had been acceptable to Vdnister _ Djuanda at a meeting 
GL. Ioid. , pp. 5140-5141, 5150, 5155-51585., 5163. The principal clause 
recognizin� historical rights was Section 5 of lu-ticle 32 of· the traffic law. 
45. Ibid, PP• 5167-51685, Other �ponsors of the amendment were Achmad 
Soemadi., Sakirman, 1'Tona Soe1-1arti, and flJj • Ivioe dikdio ( all- of PG 1( � I .  ) • 
·46• .Ibid., PP• 5187-5188. 
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with the Communicat ions Committee , the meet ing was recessed while t he pro­
ponents and Ir . Soetoto worked out a compromise amendment". This mere ly added 
a new artic le to the traffic law, which declared that any provisions of the 
law providing priority on the basis of historical rights were rescinded". 
47Wit h  this add ition , the bi ll was accepted".
With his authority to control the franchising of land transport companies 
recognized by law, Minister Djuanda effective 1 July began issuing new fran ­
chises giving prior ity to Indonesian companies , in accord with his circular 
instruction of 16 January 1951, which had in effect been confirmed by 
Parliament. The year was significant , for on 27 December , t he two-year period 
during which residents. of Chinese descent with c laim to Indonesian citizen ­
ship could re ject such citizenship came to an end". This event could have had 
.important repercussions in the field of bus and truck transport". Dat a on 
ethnic or national stat us of ownership of bus companies· at t he end of 1951 
for Central Java, may reflect the sit uat ion in many other areas too". At 
that time bus service had risen to 78,066 km. daily provided by 57 companies .  
IJJileage of routes served daily by "aliens "  dropped from 64 percent at the 
beg inning of the year to 5 . 7  percent ,  reflecting the fact that re lati ve ly 
few e lig ible ethnic Chinese bus operators had rejected Indonesian"- c it izen ­
ship. At the same t ime the new category of "c.itizens" (read "of foreign 
descent " )  operated compan ies serving 51.5 percent of the route mi leage . 
Mi leage for the category of "nationals "  (read "ind igenous cit izens" )  trebled , 
. . . . .
and its proportion rose to 21.8 percent ,". and while mileage rose slig ht ly 
47.• Ibid . ,  pp ."· 5190-5194 . Se� .  "Undang"·. 2 ,  No . 7" of 1951. 
,1, • •  ; . .......... 
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for 11mixed c itizen n ation als" ,  its relative sha·re d ropped to 21 percen t .  
48 
When the Wilopo c abinet was formed the n ext ye ar, Dj uand a retain ed the 
portfolio of Communic ation s .  Consequently, th e new cab inet continued th e 
transport policy of the old , i .e .  it favored the transfer of means of trans­
portation which were not c onside red absolutely vital ,  to private n ational 
businesses und er th e supervision of the Gove rnmen t .  Th e particulars presen ted 
49in 1951 were re iterated"." In the ensuing d ebates ove r  th e cabinet 's prog ram ,  
as usual, one of the speakers was Siauw Giok Tjhan (non -party represen"tative 
of the Ch inese minority, who c cnsisten tly attacked n on -Ch in ese foreign capital 
while supporting enthusiastic ally th e capital of resid en ts of Ch in ese ances­
try, whe ther or not citizens", of Ind on esia) .  He expressed a hope that the 
Governmen t  would recognize that there were n o  g rounds for discriminating 
between "ind igen ous" and "n on -indigen ous " residen ts after 27  December 1951.  
He a:lso ·hoped that efforts to protec t those ec 9n omica lly weak would be 
d irec ted at those wh o we re really in tha t  c ond ition , reg ardless of n ation al 
orig :in-, and that th e misconc eption that a millionaire named "Kromo" (a 
Javanese ) should be en"titled to "facilities "  while a pauper named "Tan"" 
sh ould not, be ended". And so h e  called for the Governmen t to revise existing 
regulations for acquiring bus and tru ck lines". (and becoming a "ben teng"" im­
porter )  so that fellow citizens of the same econ omic status
.. ..
,;...· · . �L,  ' ; •'tt., 
. wou lq_ haye an 
. 
" ' t � I
.•
. • 1•' . 
48. R.  I.1: P ropinsi Dj awa Ten gah , pp . 364-365 . For c omparative data 
for the end of 1949 and 1950, see above . Fig ures for th e Special District 
of Jog jakarta sh owed all licensed busses to be in th e categ ory of Indon esian 
(n on a · in 11alien " ,  the only oth er categ ory listeq).  R .  r . ·: 'Da orah Istimewa · · .
·Jog,1akarta, pp. 427-430 .  
49. Cf. written .replies of the"- Governmen t, 3 June , I .  P .  1952, pp . 
577-578 .  
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equa . t f rom racia · · 51 oppor uni y t to progress ree f · 1 d1scrJ.IT11na ion . · · t o 
On the other hand Slamet Tirtosoebroto (P . N. I. ) ,  picking up where his 
colleague Sarine had left off a year before, observed that the profitable 
routes had fallen to ttnon-nationa l" businessmen because of historica l  rights, 
while private "national" busines"smen -- who were economically weak because 
of colonia l policy and less experienced -- were unable to compete with them. 
Rather than just "supervision" according to the Government statement, he 
ca l led on the Government to end historical rights, and to protect, promote, 
and where necessary give facilities to private businessmen in transportation ?"
1 
In rep ly, the Government reminded him that priorities based on historica l 
rights had long since ended. Moreover, whereas ninety percent of the fran­
chised busses before the war had been in alien hands, by June 1952 ha lf of 
the bus companies and two-thirds of the tota l busses throughout Indonesia 
had come into the hands of "economica lly weak Indonesian citizens . n The 
Government then gave notice that it would shortly issue new guides aimed at 
increasing the number of national companies by granting franchises only to 
Indonesian citizens and rescinding franchises held by businessmen who either 
had not become Indonesian citizens or. had rejected that status.52 
The new guides thus hera"lded came three months later in the decree of 
SO. Speech, 14 Har . ,  I .P. 1952, p .  299. Siauw 's  speeches on discrimina­
tion invariably used the figure of speech of a rich "indigenous" Indonesian 
and a poor Indonesian of Chinese descent". 
51. Speech, 20 May, I . P .  1952, p. 476 . S lamet was active in trucking and 
warehousing . 
52 .. Written replies of the Government, 3 June, I .P .  1952 , p. 580. 
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the !1Iinister of Communications of 21 August which .cancelled all previous 
circulars concerning franchising busses (except those issued by mayors for 
local service ) .  The rationale specified for the decree was merely that: 
it· is felt necessary to have a new guide for granting bus franchises in 
harmony with a transport policy based on a rational distribution of trans­
port, both between railways and busses, and between various busses, so that
such transport can meet the needs of the people. 
Part of the guide for granting bus franchises specifically concerned 
the national status of the bus company oi:srators: 
Art. 4. Franchises for operating bus enterprises can only be given to
citizens"· .of Indonesia, but when interpreting the meaning of -'citizen". it 
must be remembered that the Government is obliged to assist and protect the 
group of ·citizens who are economically weak. 
Art. 5.  Each operator or applicant who before 27 December 1949 was 
not a citizen of Indonesia as defined by the Round Table Conference agree­
ment, must prove that he is no·w· a citizen of Indonesia. by submititsl,ng a court 
certificate stating that he either elected or did not reject such citizen­
ship · (as appropriate ).  
· Art. 6.  Where companies are concerned they may only be considered 
11Indonesian national businesses" if their presidents or managers are all 
citizens of Indonesia, their stock is issued by name, and seventy-five per­
cent of their paid-in capital is in the hands of citizens of Indonesiac..
"Citizen of •Indonesia" in this section means a citizen in the economically­
weak group. 
The _guide also limited the number of busses to be licensed per company to a 
� of twenty (with a max:imwn of 700 passenger sea��) }3 
Indonesian bus operators and such notables as Mr. Sastromuljono (Chief of 
the Policy Section of the Ministry of Communications) and Prawoto SoemodjJogo 
' .  . ' 
(chairman of the Transportation Section of DEIP and himself a bus operator) 
publicly praised the new guide o The former asked what was the use of their 
fighting for independence if newcomers were not given an opportunity to work • 
. ' .  
53. Tambah.an Lembaran J\Tegara R �I .  J\Too 2 72. The guide als.o re stricted..
bus routes paralleling railways (since the -D.K.A. had been suffering great 
losses and as a measure to rationalize the utilization of transport equip­
ment) o 
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The latter had imp lied that Siami and col leagues wanted to maintain the 
colonia l econOIJ\Y by protecting the holders of historical rights rather than 
the economical ly weak population . On the other hand, Chinese and Chinese­
Indonesian bus operators were understandab ly upset . In addition to the more 
overtly ethnic qua lifications , the c lause limiting the number of busses 
affected only the larger companies,  which were principally owned by their 
members". Siauw, agreeing that there should be a transition from the colonia l 
economy to a nationa l economy, retorted that this should be achieved not 
sole ly by providing work for newcomers, but by mobilizing a l l  "nationa l capita l " ,  
which meant "capita l of citizens of Indonesia " .  He fe lt it paradoxica l that 
the Government on the one hand was attempting to attract "foreign giant monopo­
ly capital" to invest in Indones·ia while neglecting that of its citizens". The 
guide itself he considered unconstitutiona l, for s uch far-reaching measures 
could only be made by statute or government regulation . Furthe,rmore , its 
restrictions , which divided into strong and weak groups, tended towards ... 
race-discrimination, caused the "strawman"11 system to f lourish, and otherwise 
would divert money from legitimate to i l lega l use, he charged."54 
On 17 December 1952, the Communications , Pub lic Works and Power Committee 
of Par liament he ld a meeting with officials of the Ministry of Communications 
over the "New Guide",  which was opposed by the o lder bus operators . On 
29 January 1953, the committee formulated some suggestions which it sent to 
the minister . It asked for an explanation by the Government of the meaning 
of an "economica l ly weak11 citizen and of "nationa l capita l " .  It asked that 
such legis lative measures as the stipulations in Point 6 concerning status 
54 . Antara, 7,  25, 27 Oct. 1952 ; Sin Po (Djakarta) , "- 3 -Nov. 1952 . 
. ' 
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of capital, be rescinded since these could only be determined by the entire" · 
government by means of- a; statute �55 
·Minister Djuanda gave ground - slightly at the following meeting with the 
parliamentary committee on 12 February;· at which he made", the following defini­
tions : 
a .  the "economically weak 11 are those who in the import : sector, for 
example, are usually called "newcomers"". This includes those who have just 
started their enterprise and in general do not yet. have experience .  Thus
it is not the intention of the Government to say that this group is poor". 
b .  the "economically strong" are those who have long operated their 
companies and also have suff,iciently large .capital and much" · experience . 
In these two matters there is absolutely no differentiation between ·
indigenous citizens and non-indigenous citizens. The New Guide has absolutely 
no race-discrirnination.56 
A month later Minister ·Djuanda followed up with some revisions in the New 
Guide for granting bus franchises, such as the following : 
Art . 4 .  Franc.hises for operating bus enterprises can only be given to 
citizens of Indonesia. 
Art . 5 . Where companies are concerned,  their presidents or managers 
must.. all be citizens of Indonesia. 
Art. 6 .  ( in  extenso old Art . 5) 
A new· section read : 
_Art . 30. In carrying out this guide it should be remembered that the
Government · is obliged to assist and protect citizens of Indonesia who are 
·55. See, I .P .  1953, pp. 671-672 .  · The committee also had reservations 
about other features of the guide, which it considered provisional. It




but n. acqu;i.re more". 




A di rect effect of the Government 's poli cy of supporting the "economi­
cally weak:11 citi zens led citi zens of indi genous and Chinese origin to form 
"mixed enterprises" ,  overtly as lvell as covertly. A survey of new corpora­
tions during the twelve-month period following the i ssuance of the New Guide 
showed that of 18 new bus companies, only four were enti rely owned by indi­
genous Indonesi"ans". Four others were at least 75 percent so owned . The 
balance wouJ.d not h ave quali fied as 11economi cally weak" for two were owned 
equally by Chinese and ind igenees, two h ad a Chinese majority, and six were 
totally Chinese--indicative of the fact that some felt that there was still 
room to operate in an industry whi ch their group had recently dominated .58 
Indonesiani zation of bus transportation is  clearly apparent in the 
following table : 
Table 42 : Disposition of Bus Franchise Applications 
r.rovember 1952 - December 1953 by Ethnic Group 
Granted Rejected 
Province Indi genous Chinese DAivlRI Other Indigenous Chinese 001RI Other 
North Sumatra 5 l - - 3 l - -
Central Sumatra 15 3 - - - 17 -
South Sumatra 217 24 - - - 15 -
�-fest Java 30 8 l - 58 11 1 1* 
1-3.YH<-Central Java 15 6 l 1* ll 1 l
East Java 2 l - - 2 - -
(Java : 
interprovinci al )  - .3 - - 6 - l
Kalimantan l - - - - 4 -
Sula:t-1esi 89 - - - 18 130 - -
TOTAL 374 46 2 l 98 179 3 2 
$'I. Decree of 23 r:Jar. 1953, Tambahan lembaran-I,Tegara �.I". No • .383. The 
maximwn number of busses for a company was raised to thi rty for Sumatra. Busses
in excess of the maximums would be obli ged to serve on routes other than those 
applied for .  
58. Analysis by the writer of corporation ch arters published in 1953, 
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Three 11 other 11 groups : 
* - Arab 
-�A- - B.R .N .  
iP�� - Dut9h peranakan 
Source : Berita Negara, R .I. 1952-1954 . 
Although discrimination in favor of ''indigenous" Indonesians by the 
�nistry .of Communications may be inferred from the above table, for most 
areas it was far from total, and in the field of interprovincial service· on 
J.ava, the Chinese group appeared to be favored. · Juridical differences among 
bus operators tended to follow geographic rather than ethnic lines .  Thus, 
whereas on Java over one-third of the new (or renewed) franchises were granted 
to corporations and the maj ority to non-incorporated companies , in South 
-Sumatra virtually all went to single -ent rapreneurships". A report during this 
transitional period from South Sumatra showed that there were 254 franchised 
"indigenous" citizen operators with 521 busses and 173 "Chinese" citizens with ' ' . 
227 busses .59 
Another step in the Indonesianization of bus lines was taken by Minister 
of Communications Roosseno on 15 November 19545. Until that date there had 
been no restrictions against· aliens sitting oh"·" the board of direct�rs of bus 
corporations". But since in a number of instances alien bu�inessmen had turned 
,. . ' ·. . .. . . .. ... 
over the position of manager or president of their bus companies to Indonesian 
citizens while t�emselves moving to the board, a new decree on that date 
·amended· the text of Article S of the 23 l-1arch 19.53 decree to require that all 
board"members as well as all managers and presiding officers be citizens of . ., 
59. R. I. : Propinsi Sumatera Selatan, pp . ·  334-339
7 
� · In 1952 · there.- ·were 
65 bus enterprises in Central Java with 466 busses.  At the end of 19525, 
(bef'ore the big change) in West Java there were 77 "Indonesian national", 
39 "Indonesian citizen" (peranakan), and 10 "alien" bus companies . R. I . : 
Propinsi Djawa Barat, p .  321. 
921.t .I d n onesia. 60 
Truck Ccmpanies 
1
The story of the Indonesianization of the trucking industry, which the 
Chinese had dominated at the time of the transfe_r of sovereignty, followed a 
course similar to that of the bus transportation sector, without passing 
through as many stages. The centralization and New Guide for granting bus 
franchises having received the approbation of the Government and the majority 
of Parliament, Minister Djuanda issued a new guide for franchizing trucking 
enterprises on 22 April 1953, with ethnic stipulations essentially the same 
61
as those in the bus guide as revised a month earliero 
Although the handwriting on the wall must have been as apparent to truck 
operators as it had become to bus operators, five of twenty-nine new trucking 
corporations established during a twelve-month period roughly corresponding to 
the tenn of the 1iililopo Cabinet, were entirely Chinese owned. Perhaps more 
significant, twelve were entirely owed by indigenous Indonesians and six had 
a strong indigenous majority."
62 
60. Tambahan Lembaran-Negara R.I. No. 702. 
61. Tambahan Lembaran-Negara R.I. r-ro. 399. 
62 . Analysis of corporation charters published in 1953. Chinese
participated also in the remaining s:ix corporations on an equal basis
with indigenous Indoesnians in two, with an indigenous Indcilesian minority 
in three ,  and with a Dutch-peranakan minority in one. 
At the end of 1952 , ( before the big change), 1rlest Java had 819
Chinese public trucking concerns, 311 Indonesian, and 66 °alien"". R.I. 
Propinsi Djawa Barat, p .  321. 
: '\ -!� . 
: . : . . . . . : : . \ 
.The new trucking guide could not be _"implemented immediately, partly 
.because of the size of the screening of the many operators, most of ,;-1hom had 
only one or two vehicles, and the fact that the ministry in Djakarta had 
centralized the awarding of truck licenses. Despite the delay and more 
complaints from Siauw1 the Government would not revise the guide . It explained 
that this guide to licensing trucks was based on its policy that transport 
companies serving the public as vital enterprises could be turned over to 
private national companies and thus had to be managed by Indonesian citizens. 
Tl'®lks t:o the I Iopen-doort• policy in the past, many aJ.ien truck opera tors had 
become established. However, since truck companies were rather simple and 
did not require much expertise or organization so that one or two men could . . 
run such a company, the Government felt that there had come to be enough 
Indonesian citizens so that such work could be turned over to them. The 
Government pointed out that providing citizens with such licenses did not mean 
plundering the rights of existing alien capital, for the latter could still 
operate on routes other than those specified ( for Indonesians) by the 1'1Iinister 
of Communications. 
63 
The policy of developing private Indonesian bus and truck transportation 
·and favoring in effect indigenous Indonesians over peranakans (mostly �f 
" I I
Chinese origin) had developed under the stewardship of }1inister Djuanda during 
the relatively liberal administration�: �."tlle early years following the tr.ans-·--- .·• . . . 
··fer of sovereignty. This policy :r✓Ir. 
. 
T.AjJ Pq·._·:�oan ( P .s .I .  , and himself" a bus . 
or 11 Indonesiat;i I\1alanism", operator) termed 11Djuancla-ismfl · and it reminded him 
' ;
of the feudal arbitrariness of the period Multatuli wrote about.  To Siauw, 
·63. Government statement, 15 Feb. ,  I .P. 195L, p. 132.
The more stringent prohibition against aliens even serving on the board 
of directors of trucking companies (anticipating that for bus companies) was 
decreed by Minister Roosseno on 23 August 195L . TL!J R.I.  No. 922. 
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such policies continued to recall Hitler Fascism �
4 
However , if the Chinese 
peranakan citizens of Indonesia hoped for a more favorable treatment in the 
field of bus and truck transport under a relatively radical admini"stration , 
they were destined to be disappointed , for Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo 
embraced such measure s as part of his cabinet 's  policy for developing a 
"harmonious middleclass" .  65 
D/U\ffi.I 
If highway transport was the one transport sector in Indonesia in which 
private enterprise most easily flourish ed , it was also the sector where govern ­
ment enterprise -- born out of wart ime shortages and priorities -- showed 
little success". The Djawatan Angkutan Motor Republik Indonesia had been 
created in late 1946 by Mini st er of Communications Djuanda out of org anizations 
on Java with their antecedents in the Japanese period. After yeoman service 
during the revolution , DAMRI virtually ceased to operate following the second 
Dutch military action". In late 1949 DAMRI was r esuscitated when all motor 
vehicles in the Jogjakarta region were turned over to it". Subsequent ]¥ portions 
reappeared elsewhere on the island. After the transfer of sovereignty, DAMRI 
64. Tan speech , 29 Aug . ,  and Siauw speech , 31 Aug . , I .P .  1953 , pp. 651-752 , 
7655. Only a month before hi s speech , the charter of Tan 's  bus company
( 11Kemerdekaan " ) was legalized after a year ' s  delay. 
65 . Government reply 2 Sept., I .P .  ·1953, pp. 778, 783 .  
Another step in Indonesianizing highway transport was taken in March 19525, 
·with the establishment"· of Ja.;asan l"iotor (Motor Foundation ) ,  which assisted 
in training and equipping Indonesians for opening up automobile garag es, 
r epair shops, and service stations (fieid s  formerly domi"nated by the Dutch 
and Ch inese ) .  Its first director (until hi s appointment as Secretary General 
of the Ministry of Defense) was Colonel HIDAJ AT Martaatmad ja, who during the 
Japanese period h ad worked in the Zidoosya Sookyoku, and later was Chairman 
of the Ikatan Motor Indonesia ( Indonesian Motor Club)". Cf •". .  Kami Perkenalkan l ,  ' . . . , . p.  37 . 
• 
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in West Java took over the vehicles of the Pasundan Motor Service, including 
49 busses, 465 trucks, and a variety of- other vehicles. In East Java, where 
vehicles were inherited from the Motor · Transport Service, the name AMR.I was 
used briefly until by ministerial decree it again became DAMRI •" . During 1952 
DAMRI operated 26 routes in West Java · (with at most two busses per route ) 
and 39 in". Fast Java as well as seven out _of Jogjakarta."
66 
With equipment growing obsolete, heavi:cy overstaffed with unskilled 
personnel ( inc luding many cart drivers) who had worked with it at one time or 
another before and during the Revolution, and lacking its war-time monopoly, 
skilled personnel, and the imaginative leadership characteristic of many 
private bus companies," · DAMRI · (and its siblings with modified names) continued 
despite heavy government subsidies to be a losing -proposition. Minister of 
Public Works and Communications Sitompul of the constituent Republic of 
Indonesia in 1950 announced that the service would have to be ended because 
of its continual losses and surplus personnel. 67 However, its liquidation 
was obviated because of the vested interests of two groups represented in 
Parliament : the Communists (including Partai Murba) ,  for whom goverl'lJTlent ... 
enterprises were the ultimate ideal despite any practical shoftcomings, and 
transport workers leaders, who wanted to avoid a mass layoff . 
.. . . . .
Consequently, a few members of Parliament repeatedly touched on the issue 
of DAMRI, especially during the debates concerning the Indor>iesianization of 
highway transport. Several members of Parliament 's  Communications Committee 
inspected DAMRI operations at the end of 1950. Dr. Ateng, reporting that if 
it were not a monopoly it" .-could not be maintained under economic qriteria, 
-66. R. I. : Daerah Ist:i.mewa Jo . akarta, p. 425 ; R .  I. : Propinsi Djawa 
Barat"., pp. 3 -3 9; R .I. : Propinsi D.jawa Timur, p. 197 . "D .M .R . I. 11 was
another variant used. See Chapter XIII. 
67 , Asrarudin report, 25 Jan., R.P.  1951, pp. J86J-J864 . 
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suggested that if DAMRI were to be retained, it had best operate in areas 
(especially outside Java) insufficiently served by private companies . Other­
wise, he recommended that it be merged in the regional transport associations 
which he urged be set up to develop national transportation .68 Ir . Sakirman, 
admitting that DAJ.JRI was a big problem, hoped that it would be maintained, even 
expanded, and merged with the D .K .A .69 Asrarudin, suggesting that its personnel 
problem could be partly solved if its former cart-drivers could be helped to 
return to their old occupations , hoped that DAMRI would be maintained and re­
novated, and urged that it serve the sparsely settled routes which needed bus 
service". 70 
In 1951, when the Ministry of Interior was planning the decentralization 
of various government services , one of the objects it requested the Ministry 
of Communications to relinquish"- for operation on the provincial level was 
public motor transport (DAMRI, etc.).  Since the Ministry of. Communications 
considered such operations to be of a local nature -- like irrigation works 
of the Ministry of Public Works -- and since it allegedly intended that other 
highway transport, too, would eventually be regionally administered again, it 
acceded to the request.71 
68. Report, 25 Jan. 1951, R.P. 1951, pp . 3857-3858. 
69. Ibid. ,  pp. 3841, 3845-3846 . 
70 . Ibid . , pp . 3863-3864. 
71. Secretary General Soetoto, statement, 19 June, R .P .  1951, pp . 
5159-5160. 
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The decision evoked protests from several· branches" - of the. Serikat Buruh 
Kendaraan Bermotor (S.B .K .B .  -- Motor :Vehicle labor Union),  the union 
affiliate of SOBSI to which many DAMRI employees belonged. K. Werdojo, who 
introduced the amendment to insert a statement of priority for government 
transport organizations in the bill to amend the Highway Traffic I.aw, called 
the move an attempt at quiet liquidation."72 Minister Djuanda then reconsidered 
and by decree on 10 October 1951 placed DAMRI under the jurisdiction of the 
mini$try" 1 s Highway and River Traffic Section on a provisional basis pending a 
settlement of its status5.73 And there it remained .74 
Hotels 
By 1950- .the major hotels of Jndones ia, almost all ,of which had been ." . 
built by the Dutch, had lal"gely;. -been-._ .-r.e�tored to .their . owners . An important 
exoepti9n_ was - the Grand Hotel of Jogjakarta, which remained under Indonesian 
management first under the name Hotel Merdeka and then Hotel Garuda". Its 
manager . was Abdul Rachi.Yfl (i"a�her-in-law of Mohammad Hatta) .  Hotels in 
Indonesia regardless of ownership, because of the acute housing shorta_ges" -. in 
most cities, were under strict control of the government housing offices, and. 
so  their freedom of a .ction and availability of rooms to the general p$lio 
were quite limited. 
72. Werdojo remarks, 19 June, R.P.  1951, p.  5143 .  Cf . letters to
Parliam�nt., ..R.P. 1951., - .pp . 4200 ff . 
73 . er . . . R .  I. :. Propinsi Djawa Timur, p.  _ 197 . -.I b 
74 . Asrarudin in the debates over both the Wilopo and first Ali 
Sastroamidjojo cabinet _continued to press for a solution to the question of 
DAMRI. I .P. 1952, pp . (933-634; I .P .  1953, p .  739 .  
The first Ali Cabinet indicated, howe�er, that the subject was . .still in the "deep freeze " .  I .P .  1953, p.  782 • , 
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Du.ring the period under review only one new major hotel was completed 
in Indonesia, the 11 Dana" built in 1952 in Su.rakarta with funds from the Dana 
Mangkunegaran (Mangkunegoro Fund). Several years later the Bank Industri 
Negara established a new subsidiary, P.T. Perusahaan Hotel dan Touris Nasional 
(Natour), which was not only to rival the country"1 s la.rgest agency (the Dutch­
owned Nitour) ,  but which was set up also to build a large hotel in Djakarta 
and smaller ones in other cities. 
Although Indonesianization of the major hotel sector involved only one 
brand new hotel, in 1954 three hotels built by Dutch capital passed into 
Indonesian hands. By the beginning of the year, the Government had bought 
out the Hotel der Nederlanden -- the capital city"' s  second largest hotel -­
from the E scomptobank. In order to avoid replacing the initials on the linens 
75
and dining utensils, the hotel was renamed, "Hotel Dharma Nirmalau ."
Soon afterwards fate set in motion the Indonesianization of a medium­
sized hostelry in Surabaja, the Hotel Simpang� On 13 January, while in his 
former "home town" after a visit to ·the nearby Gresik cement factory site, 
.
Minister of Economic Affairs Iskaq decided to"spend the night in the Hotel 
Sirnpang. Wl1en the clerk did not give him a room, an incident took place. Tre 
Surabaja Municipality then had the hotel examined and charged with a number 
of infractions of its license, and on the twenty-third its license was . . 
revoked and the municipality took over administration of"·"the hotel. 
76 
.75. Pedoman, 27 Jan. 1954. · sizice the Government lacked money for this 
purpose, it acquired funds from the Commission for t he Restoration of Rightso 
76. Antara, 20, 24 Jan. 1954 • . The hot�� had been owned by the Nationale 
Handelsbank. The military command ."9f the city"·"�rrested the clerk involved · · · ·and begged the public to remain calm. 
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During the Tjikwa.n Motion debates, Hadji Farid Alwi Isa (Masjumi from 
the vicinity of - Surabaja) brought up the subject of the Hotel Simpang incident. 
He observed that visiting ministers customarily stayed at the mansion of the 
Governor (who then was a party colleague". of the minister) .  However., this time 
Iskaq did otherwise"t, Followi11g the incident., Alwi Isa . reported the city was 
S'tvept with rumors that the hote1·1 s turning do't-m the minister 'tras just what 
had been expected by "a .certain group" as grounds for later buying out the 
old owner in any easy manner, and in this case Minister Iskaq had been the 
pawn. There were bases for such rumors, Alwi Isa felt., since it was }Iinister 
Iskaq "..rho had been the cause of the incident., and he was known to be a "good-
. 77
hearted" person when it came to helping friends 1-1hom he approve do Iskaq 
responded that it was not necessary to answer the charge. 78 
The most modern of Indonesia 's  large hotels had been the Savoy�Homann 
of Bandung. Aft€r lengthy negotiations, it was finally bought out by an 
.
Indonesian group, and R • Mohamad Saddak" - became its President ."79 
77. Speech., 7 Apr, ., I ,P. 1954 P• 280. The charge of "pawn° was repeated.,
several weeks later. I , P. 1954, p, 401. Alwi" I�a o�served that the authori­.
ties had known that relatively few Indonesians were able to obtain accommoda­
tions at th� Simpang. 
78. ·statement, 20 Apr • ., I , P. 1954, p.  316, 
79. In October 19$4 ., when the third larg�st faction of Parliament (PIR) 
·split, only Saddak and one other member (Mas soetardjo ) stayed with Deputy 
Premier Wongsonegoro as the nineteen other members lined up in the Hazairin­
Tadjuddin Noor branch of the party in opposition to the Ali Sastroamidjojo
Cabinet. Earlier in the year the PIR branch in which Saddak was a leader 
was sometimes called 11 PIR Hotel Homann" . And in April, a committee of
Djakarta businessmen reportedly complained against special licenses issued 
for buying hotels as well as those granted for imports. Cf. Abadi, 20,
23 Apr. 1954 0 
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Shipping Pol icy 
Indonesia be ing an archipelago nation , the Central Government felt 
o bl iged to exerc�e a high degree of control over shipping.  Yet it was 
relatively far more djfficult for t he Gove rnment to carry out a policy in 
the shipping sector that in any other sector of transportat ion . Althou gh 
it could profit from maintaining  the status quo (as of th e transfer of sov­
ereignty in railways1 it could not afford to in shipping. Unlike its position 
in civil aviat ion , the Government d id not inherit most of the existin ? ships, 
t.Jhich would have put it in a strong bargaining  posit ion for fo rming a mixed 
enterprise . The Government could not leave matters almost ent irely to private 
local enterprise as in the case of highway transportat ion". Buying and operating 
a ship was �sually a far more complex undertaking than buying and operat in g  a 
bus or truck. The situat ion was complicated , of course, by the fact that a 
foreign company registered in the Netherlands (Amsterdam), the Koninklijke 
Paketvaart Mij o N oV . ,  was operatin g  a virt11al monopoly in shippingo 
Possibly no fore ign enterprise in Indonesia attracted a greater amount 
of enmity than the K.P.M. -- the c ompany ".with which proba bly more persons 
came into d irect contact than any othero On the whole , the K.P.M. performed 
its job of interinsular shipping well , but it could not serve all ports in 
Indonesia equally well , and so the smaller ones had far less frequent calls 
than they desired". With sh ip space at a premium upon the return of normal 
commercial cond itions after the transfer of sovereignty, it happened that 
.• 
regular customers often received preference over new ones . Moreover, with 
the unsettled harbor conditio ns that were especially bad in 1950, schedules 
were not always strictly mainta ined . Similar inconveniences to . the pu bl ic 
in air ,  railway, and h ighway transport were usually ta ken in stride , but when 
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assnciated with a large Dutch company they often appeared unbearable ."80 -
The "Groot Archipelago" contract with -the Government, under which the 
K .P.M. had operated before the war, had ·expired in 1945. Thus the RIS 
Government was not tied to an existing concession as had been the case in". 
air service. However, since the Government was confronted with the fact that 
it could not turn out the K.P.M. without further ado": and immediately furnish• 
its "i>wn shipping"., it tried to find a way to live with the K.  P .M. for the time· 
being .. The RIS Government proposed to the · K.P.·M.  to set up a mixed -inter­
prise, jointly owned 50:50, with the stipulation that after ten years (by , 
fifteen ,years at the latest) the Governm·ent might take over contro·l of the 
-entire enterprise·. This arrangement it was said, would"foll·ow the pattern 
set with K .L.M. in aviation."81 K. P.M. , however, did not readily accept, . for · :. 
whereas the Government at least possessed airplanes as its contribution to 
match the working capital, skilled personnel, and management which"-K .L.M. 
contributed . to the new air lines., K .P.M. -- which possessed the ships -­
could not visualize an equitable quid pro quo from the Indonesian Government.· 
The RIS Government,"· rath.er than put all ·i·ts e,ggs in one basket which 
K .P.M. was reluctant to buy, then announced that it was buying twenty ships 
abroad and that it intended to help solve the shipping shortage by encouragi�g 
.
80. Cfo !.P. 1950, p. 585; R.P. 1950, p • 846; R .P. 1951, pp. 5059-5064,
5328-5360. R .  Adhisoekmo termed the lack of K.P.M . service a basic cause for
the high".rate of smuggling. Pertanjaan Anggota· dan Djawaban Pemerintah II, 
138-139 .  
81. Letter of Minister of Communications, Power, and ·Public Works Lach,.":
19 Apr .. 1950,. in reply to Adhisoekmo ·query,. Pertanjaan Anggota dan Djawaban >· ·Pemerintah, II, 137. 
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the expansion of private "national" shipping and by chartering foreign ships.
82 
By the time the Natsir Cabinet of the new Unitary Republic had been created, 
the vision of Indonesian participation :ina shipping company jointly with 
K.P.M. was fast fading. Accordingly, the Government readjusted its plans and 
gradually formulated and announced the shipping policy which thereafter would 
be followed. Allegedly in line with Article 38 .(2) of the Constitution, it 
would strive to obtain a goverrunent enterprise for interinsular shipping, 
which qualified as an "important branch of production" • For other shipping, 
namely coastal and ocean shipping (sailing to foreign countries), private 
"national" enterprises would be provided opportunities and assistance."
83 
The dilemma of Indonesia 's lack of ships, trained personnel, and the 
foreign exchange for carrying out immediate nati.onalization evoked no pro­
posals by political leaders which could automatically be implemented. In 
April 1950, the Prosperity and Finance Committee of the RIS Senate had re­
quested that competition be allowed in shipping in place of the K.P.M. 
monopoly, and suggested that the Government and Indonesian companies operate 
three-fourths of the shipping (without explaining hoi-1 such shipping was to 
84
be acquired),  while foreign capital was allowed the balance".a After the 
82. IbiQ. ; reply by r1inister Laoh in Parliament to query by Adhisoekmo, 
28 July 1950, Pertanjaan Anggota dan Djawaban Pemerintah, II, 139-1400 
83. Government Explanation of the Program of the Natsir Cabinet, 21
Sept., R.P. 1950, PP• 358-359;
."Govermnent Reply to the First Round of Debates 
on the Explanation of the Natsir Cabinet Program, 11 Oct. ,  R .P. 1950, pp. 
1841-1842 ; Govermuent Reply to the Second Round of Debates on the Explanation 
of the Natsir Cabinet Program, 25 Oct. , R.P. 1950, pp. 2231-2232. The 
original explanation was someuhat ambiguous in not defining the three ship­
ping sectors involved. 
84.  I.P. 1950, p.  184. The 25 percent balance was to be allowed foreign 
capital as a gesture of 11 goodwilln . 
----
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formation of the Unitary State, Mr . Tadjuddin Noor (PIR) urged that if the 
�overnment intended to set up its own company in interinsular shipping,  it 
should form a mixed enterprise and allow foreign capital to take up to 49 
percent of. the stock. Such a step ,  he thought, might even induce K .P.M. to 
. . 
join in a mixed enterprise .�' - Iwa (who 1-1as greatly concerned with Dutch in-
. . ( 
fluence in GIA) warned that . the position of the State was endangered by K.P.M. , 
which in time of war could be requisitioned by the Dutch Government. He thus 
felt it necessary that Indonesia immediately control all interinsular trans­
port and related enterprise and that a permanent 11Mari time'�·"Board" be set up. 86 
Amri Yara (P,}T,I . )  suggested that pending the nationalization of I(.P,l'-1. -­
which did not appear imminent -- the Government" . should closely regulate its 
operations.87 
Since . the Government did not succeed in getting K.P.M. to agree to the 
.. . 
forming of a mixed enterprise , Minister Djuanda announced a modus vivendi. 
The K.P.M. - still being needed to forestall any vacuum in interinsular 
shipping - would continue to operate. Meanwhile, a State shipping company 
would be established and gradually enlarged. The ratio for shipping between 
the two enterprises would be slowly reduced, so that at some time in the 
88future the state shipping company would be in a dominant positiona 
85. Speeches, 4 and 19 Oct . ,  R.P. 1950, PP• 1420, 2109-2111 . His first
suggestion was that the state company initially operate in coastal .trade,
and later in international trade". 
86. Speeches,  3 and 18 Oct. ,  R.P, 1950, p. 1268 . The following June, Iwa 
asserted that natiqnal sqipping comP,anies were finding more obstacles than
assistance from the Ministry of Communications, and he urged that" 'they be pro­
moted using Cromwell 's  Navigation Act as a guide . R.P. 1951, pp. _ L450,4753-
4754. 
87. Query, 3 Nov. ,  · r.P.  1950, p. 585. 
88. Ichtisar Indonesia Sepekan, 29 Jan. 19�1. 
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Pepuska 
·"nuring the RIS period, the Stichting Gemeenschappelijk Schepenbezit centinu0c 
to function as the major stockholder and provider of ships to the two coastal 
shipping companies operating out of Sulawesi ports�- Since K.P.�I . was its partner 
in S.G.S . ,  and since it  was intent upon Indonesianizing shipping, the Government 
determined to replace the foundation with another one wholly its own. 
Accordingly on 17 August 1950 preparations for the new organization commen­
ced, and on 6 September, the day the Natsir Cabinet took office, the Jajasan 
Penguasaan Pu.sat Kapal2 (Pepuska -- Central Shipping Authority ) was set up 
with SOENAR Soerapoetra as President. The purpose of the new foundation was to 
assist private enterprises, both existing and to be set up, in the fields of 
(1 )  coastal shipping, and ( 2 )  ocean shipping. Aid was to be provided in the 
form of : ( a )  lending or ohartering ships to the private companies; ( b )  
granting c redits; and ( c )  providing direct subsidies . For such purposes, the 
Government provided an initial capital of Rp. 30,000, 000.89 Pepuska shortly 
thereafter superseded S.G.S.  as owner or agent of the ships chartered to the 
private companies and as stockholder in Nocemo and M.K.s.s. 90 
Unfortunate ly ,  Pepuska was doomed to a short and schizophrenic life. The 
foundation had been p lanned by the RIS Government and Minister Laoh when it  
was sti l l  believed possible to form a mixed shipping enterprise with K.P.M . ,  
• • ' 
. 
.. . ..
leaving the Government relatively free to promote private shipping in supple-
mentary sectors. A large number of public figures in Djakarta had been making 
·89:. Government Reply, 11 Oct. ,  R.P·. 1950, p. 1841. The Government' s :_ . 
initial capital provided was ten million "ro·reign exchange rupiahs" (equal to 
that many gulden ) • · · 
90. Minutes of Annual Stockho lder ' s  Meeting of Nocemo, 11 June 1953 , 
p. 5 ( mimeo ) .  Cf. Java Bank Report, 1951�1952, p. 193 . 
p . • 
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plans to buy stoc.k in a new private shipping company, P. T .  Perusahaan 
·Pelajara.n Indonesia (Indonesian Navigation Company"-� INACO), and the RIS 
Economic and Financial Council on 24 August 1950."had decided that the Goverru.-
. .
1nent would participate in it by buying half of its stock through the new 
shipping authority91 on a pattern similar to that followed in earlier years by 
the S.G.S. But within a few weeks after PcpuS{a 's  founding great changes had 
been made in shipping policy -- henceforth in the Unitary Republic under the 
·stewardship of Minister Djuanda, ror it had become increasingly apparent that 
.
K.P.M. would not accede to Government participation in"its operations. Since 
the Government wanted ultimately to replace the K .P.M. with a state enterprise, 
it would have to initiate steps soon for setting up a rival enterprise. This 
would require extensive outlays of foreign exchange (equivalent to an estimated 
Rp. 900, 000, 000) for new ships over a number of years.92 Since the Government 
had a shortage of foreign ·"exchange, plans for financial assistance to private 
national shipping companies would have to be sharply restricted. Accordingly, 
Minister Djuanda on 3 October reversed the RIS Government decision to partici­
pate in tho capital of private"·shipping companies such as INACO, and secured 
the decision of the Natsir Cabinet to initiate measures for establishing a state 
shipping company."93 
91. Speech by I .R .  Lobo, 9 June, I .P. 1952, p.  676. 
. ' 
92. Government __statement, R .P. 19 50, pp. 1841-184_�• 
. ; . 
93 . Lobo, op.cit. , p .  676. Although the Government wo:uld no longer 
participate in the share capital of new companies, it agreed to provide 
�redits and ships via Pepuska. 
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The Govermnent was in a ticklish situation. After plans for Pepuska had 
first been announced, great expectations had arisen among Indone"sian citizens 
with plans for developing private shipping companies, and no les s  than nine­
teen members of Parliament had subscribed to stock in INA.CO. Since the Natsir 
Cabinet had been formed without the P"o N.I.  and it t..ras not at all assured of a 
favorable vote of confidence, it had to tread lightly. And so the fact that 
an important policy change had been made was not expressly acknowledgect,"yet 
whereas the Government program explanation made on 21 September had stressed 
aid to "national enterprisestt in shipping without any mention of a state-owned 
enterprise, its reply of 11 October while mentioning Pepuska stressed instead 
the importance of a government enterprise in interinsular shipping (which was 
not open to private national enterprises), and its second reply on 25 October 
reemphasized that interinsular shipping would be taken over by a state shipping 
company., while remarks that the Government "of course will not forget its 
important obligation of promoting and developing private shipping11 were ex­
punged from the official record.94 
With limited funds and an ambiguous goal"., Pepuska did not always operate 
to the satisfaction of the new national shipping companies -- which were not 
aware that the Gove1·11ment preferred that they rely more on their own resources .  
Repercussions in Parliament were not slow in coming. Already on 29 September 
1950, BEBASA Daeng Lolo (P,N.I, - Merdeka., and a manager"· or the new Maskapai 
Pelajaran Nusantara) observed that the f. 10., 000,000 which the Government had 
assigned to Pepuska for aiding national shipping (which "usually had little 
capital) was a not very meaningful amount o 
95 
The Government replied that in 
948 R.P. 1950, PP• 2231-2232 ; cfo I.P�  1950., P• 536. 
95. H.�. �950J pp . 800-801. Bebasa had been active in shipp:i,ng between 
1942 and 1947e Kami Perkenalkanl ,  P• 76. 
- -
939 
addition _to that sum, it was spending nine times that much to equip its 
Department of Shipping and the Navy r: 796 However, Ir.  Pangeran Noor (Masjumi, 
and Vice Chainnan of the Conunu"nications CoITIInittee) called it the duty of the 
Government to build up national shipping as soon as possible, if necessary by 
taking funds from tl1e Department of Shipping and the Navy and even from the 
railway service.9
7 
At the end of 1951, Pepuska had a fleet of" . twenty-seven ships ( with a total 
tonnage of 10,450 B.R.T . ) ,"98 most of which were on charter to regional shipping 
companies. Four months later, however, quite unannou nced, the foundation was 
suddenly liquid�ted. 
The debates on the program of the Wilopo Cabinet, which commenced a fort­
night after Pepuska·ls demise, brought a flood of criticism of the shipping 
authority. Championing private national shipping in the face of the Government 's  
seemingly ambiguous policy was Asrarudin (Chairman of the Communications 
Committee),  who a year earlier h�d urged that it  be ." protected in its formative 
' . 
stage. He now charged that not only had the Government not given it  proper 
·guidance, but that Pepuska had been quite ineffective in helping it�99 Mochran 
96. Government reply, 11 Oct. , R.P. 12_50, PP• 1811-1812. The Department 
of Shipping of the Ministry of Connnunications had meanwhile been assigned
the task of preparing for the new state shipping company. 
97. Speech, 2 Oct. ,  R.P. 1950, P• 1210. 
98. Java Bank Report 1951-1952, p. 193.  
99 . _Speech, 6 June, I . P-> 1952, PP• 634-635; cf. speech, 2 June, R(IP.  1951,
p. 4454. Asrarudin charged also that interference by the" _l'finistry of Religion 
had led t·o the collapse of ·plans ·to transport Muslim pilgrims to Arabia in
1951•. 
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bi n Had ji Ali ( Pari ndra ,  and member of the board o f  N.V. Perusahaan Pelajaran 
.-.,..-_,..,. 
Kaliman tan ) ci ted complai nts from national shippi n g  companies that vessels 
chartered from Pepuska were i n  a state of disrepair or unsui ted to their needs, 
and that charter payments were double what such companies would have had to 
pay by leasi ng forei gn ships directly. Lobo mentioned reports that ships had 
been purchased by Pepuska a fter i nsufficient inspection and at exceedi n gly 
expensive prices, even  though they were lacki n g  i n  equipment. Consequently, 
they later had to undergo costly repairs. I t  was even  alleged that some old 
ships bought by Pepuska in Europe had never gotten beyond Lisbon or Port Said . 
Despite itself experiencing operati n g  losses, partly because of the failure of 
some national shippi n g  companies to make their charter payments regularly, 
Pepuska had meanwhile been buildi n g  flats for i ts personnel i n  Keba jora n ,  the 
residential suburb of  Djakarta ."lOO 
. 101N t . l hipp1.ng a 1.ona s 
100. Mochran and Lobo speeches, 16 May and 9 June , I .P. 1952, pp . 410,
673-676; cf. N.V. Kalirnantan whi te paper; Nocemo annua l report for 1952. 
A raason given for replaci n g  Pepuska with a government corporation  was 
to facilitate the purchase of new vessels which mi ght be more economically
chartered to nationa"l sh ipping companies than older and more expensi ve leased 
forei gn vessels .  Cf. I .P. 1954, Po 213. 
101. "National shippi n g" i s  the term usually applied to companies owned 
and/or operated by private · I ndonesi an citi zens  usi n g  motor (or steam ) ships. 
The subject of sai li ng-perahu shippi n g  by i ndi genous I ndonesi ans lies 
outside the scope of this stud y  of I ndonesiani zation .  However, it may be re­
called that the guarantee-deposit of  500% of the va"lue of  their cargo , im-
posed by the Dutch a dministration in o rder to di scoura ge smuggli n g  (especially 
to Republican areas) ,  had the direct effect of reduci n g  the proportion o f  inter­
i nsular trade carried by I ndonesi an vessels.  After the Andi Gappa motion of
the N.I .T. Parli ament in December 1949 fai led to bear frui t ,  the Prosperity 
Committee of the RI S Senate of 27 March 1950 passed a resoluti"op urgi n g  the 
Government to resci nd the deposit regulation .  I .P. 1950, Pa 107; er; Chapter
XVI • 
. ,_ :..-_ftnal ly a new regulation was i ssued under the I\Jatsir Cabi net effective 
20 November . For goods which had a ready world market, the deposi t  was reduced 
to 150%; for certai n goods with a ready domestic market , only a certi ficate from 
a local economic official was necessa ry; other goods were exempt from both re­
quirements. "Keteran gan Dr . Sumitro , Menteri Perdagangan d an  Peri ndustrian 
tentang tindakan2 permulaan untuk mempergiat dunia perda gangan nasional " ,Ich­
tisar -I n donesi a Sopck�n, 13 1,rov. 19.50. li.ndi G�pp� {'t-1ho joi ned J.io.sjur1 i) thcrc­
Dftor rcpc�tedly attempted to have the dopoait requirement completely aboli shed , 
but 1rithout_ success. Cf. il. P. 1952, pp . 139-141, 146; I. P.1953, p .  7990 
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Before 19$0 only two small Indonesian shipping corporations were in 
operation, both operating out of Sulawesi. Originally half owned by the s.o.s. , 
then Pepuska, then the Indonesian Government"., and the other half by private 
Indonesians"., these were completely private operations. 1'Tocemo of lVienado, which·­
had been operating upwards of eight chartered vessels, under Chairrr.an Max Bastiaan 
TUMBEL (member of the Menado municipal assembly} bought the harbor ferry service 
at Menado in 1951 and its first vessel (of 100 BoR.T. )  the next year, when it 
employed over 1100 persons o . In 19-53, its · pa-id-in capital - was increased five-
fold to one million rupiah, and it Indonesianized its name to P.  T .  Pelaja1'an • :. .  
Rakjat ,Indone�ia (Perindo -- Indonesian People 's  Navigat�on, Inco ) o  Its sister ·
company., M.K.s .s. · of Makassar under Chairman Andi Ronda that same" .year increased 
its capital similarly and became the P.T,  Perusahaan Pelajaran Sulawesi Selatan.-;• 
(P c,p  .s .s � - South Sula1resi Navigation Co 0 ) 
•102 
· 
The first new Indonesian shipping corporation in the new era was the -
N,V. Djakarta IJ.oyd of Djakarta., the charter for which was drawn". up on 18 August 
1950·. It was a subsidiary of the Bank .Negara Indonesia".; and although its au- .. _ 
thorized capital was Rp. 30 million"., by some legal juggling only t wo .percent of 
this sum was paid-up when the company was established. · Shortly afterwards the -: 
Government advanced ·the company thirteen million rupiahs, and by 1953 B.Nel o 
loans to it had"·" reached Rp. 42,000,000. Despite the Government • �  direct and in� 
direct financinp., the Djakarta Lloyd was intended to be operated"- essentially as 
a private commercial company. Darwis Djamin was appointed its president., 
Mr. R.  S�doro_ BUDHYARTO Martoatmodjo,  its vice-president, - -and ·Cha-irman Kusuma . .  
Atmadja of the· Supreme Court accepted its board chairmanship."_ The company 's  
chosen field was the operation of ocean freighters. Its .operations, which 
1025. See �barters 571/1953 and 36/19545. Nocemo annual report for 19525. 
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commenced in February 1951, however, were not successfu l. It  purchased two 
old "Liberty" ships, which proved to be unseaworthy, one of which never was to 
sail under its own power. By 1953; when its losses had risen to Rp. 45 million, 
it was on the verge of bankruptcy, as a result of which its management was re­
organized. Nevertheless, the company' s poor condition was first aired in 
Parliament only during debates over the budget at the end of 1953.
103 
The first company with a valid claim to being the first private Indonesian 
shipping corporation in the Unitary Republic was INACO (referred to above) .  Its 
establishment was delayed somewhat by the restrictions put on Pepuska's  finan­
cing powers, and so its charter was not drawn up until 28 October� It was 
unique in being a corporation whose initial stockholders (numbering 164) --
who according to the charler had to _'q� ��tizens of Indonesia or organizations 
controlled by them -- represented businessmen, politicians, and other public 
leaders from much of"·Indonesia (especially Java, Sumatra, and Kalimantan) .  
lfevertheless, all these could provide only one million rupiahs at the outset . 
-- ten percent of the authorized capital. The balance was advanced it by the 
Government. Mr. Teuku Mohamad Hasan ( non-party,. Chairman of · the Trade and 
Industry Committee of Parliament) became INAC0"1 s" president, and Mr.  Tadjuddin 
Noor (of the Communications and· Transport Committee), one of its vice-presidents. 
Dasaad, the leading stockholder, became board chairman. INACO began operations 
in mid-1951, intending to move into the hadji-pilgrim trade of the Dutch 
103. See Charter 571/1951; Java Bank Report, 1951-1952, P• 193; Speeches 
by Mr. Burhanuddin (non-party),· and Bebasa Daeng Lalo, 15 Deco, I .P. 1953.,
P• 121.5, 1221. The line ' s  one operating vessel, the 8850-ton "Djakarta Raya" 
had breakdowns on several of its voyages. Its "Djatinegara" gradually rusted 
away in Tandjong Priok harbor. It also chartered vessels. R. Achmad KOSASIH 
became the company' s new president. 
Mr. Budhyarto, lawyer and politician (first Indonesian Residen of Besuki ), 
was active in a number of business ventures. 
. .  � . 
. . � 
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"Kongsi Tiga" ( the "Three Companiesu ),104 which had a virtual" ,monopoly in 
.that service. It was not successful in its first year, but in 1952" chartering 
ships .. from Kongsi Tiga and with its own vessel, it transported two thousand · 
out of thirteen thousand pilgrims.  Some of the ships, however, suffered" · 
·mechanical"· troubles. The next year, rNACO was assigned to carry over half , .­
( 7500) of the fourteen thousand pilgrims. "- However, more '"problems were" encourit­·
ered, and because of a shortage of ships ··to charter and a shipboard fire, the 
departure of many pilgrims was delayed. Since between pi·lgrimages INACO"' s ·· · · 
fortune waned, and" •its losses mounted, in February 1954 it also had to have �a 
management reorganization.105 
The disappointing developments in pilgrim shipping in 1953 led the Indo­
nesian Hadji Committee soon to urge the Government thereafter not to turn 
.pilgrim transportation over to any shipping company which did not already have 
. . .
adequate ships. Shortly afterwards, on 6 October 1953, the hadji· committee 
set up its own shipping company, the N .  V .  Pelajaran lvfuslimin Indonesia (:t1Musi" )  
·especially f'or the transport of pilgrims� The committee"1 s deputy chainnan, · 
104. The three steamship comp_anies were the "Nederland" , "Rotterdamsohe-.
Lloyd", and 110ceaan11 • 
-· . . 
105. See Charter 412/1951; Java Bank Report, 1951-1952, p. 193; Lobo 
speech, 9 June., l.111Po 1952, P•  . .. 676. Half of the mernbers of the Communicatio�s. .
and Transport C6mm:lt�eeof Parlia�ent were INACO stockholders. At the time of
its reorganization, Mr. Jusuf Wibisono and Abikusno Tjokrosujoso ,became , members 
of its emergency advisory coITlllittee. 
INACO' s  fleet consisted principally of "Bintang Asia" (Star of Asia) and 
·11 B1.ntang Samudera11 ( Star of the Ocean), chartered from abroad,., Bt.tt her 
pilgrim transport problems in 1953 were cl�_maxed by fire which broke out on" .
her 11Seven Seas" in Tandjong Priok harbor right after 1280 passengers had 
boarded. Consequently, all had to be put off again while a K.P.M. vessel was
hurriedly sought. See Report of Education,- Religion, and Health Committee of
Parliament ( read by Ibnutadji Prawir(?sudirdj.o ) ;· 14 Aug., I .P. 1953, pp. 687, · 
691; cf. also "Pioneer Aviation Corporationu, above. 
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Kijai Hadj i 1-'loham�d Dachlan (Nahdlatu.l Ulama ) became company president ."· Sub­
sequently, before the 1954 pilgrimage, Minister of Religion Masjkur (N.U . )  
awarded a contract to "Musi" to carry 6450 pilgrims as well as one to the 
"Kongsi Tiga 11 to carry 3650. Since the former had no ships of its own, it 
arranged for the Kongsi Tiga to carry its quota too . These developments 
brought a protest from Asrarudin, who charged the Ministry of Religion with 
interference in the affairs of the Ministry of Communications". Observing 
that more foreign exchange was expended if all the transport was provided by 
foreign companies, he declared that he failed to see hew national shipping 
could develop as a result of such action ."106 
The Government had other kinds of shipping contracts to award to national 
shipping _lines and thus help in their development.  In November 1952, such 
lines began transporting rice from other countries of Southeast Asia. In 
June 1953 ,  when the 11 Kongsi Tiga" contract to ship copra from Indonesia ex­
pired, national shippers began to carry it."107 Scrap iron for Japan was also 
assigned to such companies. 
The only other Indonesian shipping line to operate on the high seas 
during this period was the Maskapai Pelajaran Nusantara (M.P .N .  -- Archipelago 
Navigation Compaey) ,  which started in mid-1950 as a small passenger shuttle 
operation between Pasar Ikan (the small-craft port for Djakarta ) and southern 
·Sumatra ." Although it failed initially to get Pepuska to participate in its 
capitalization, two years later when it incorporated, it secured forty-five 
percent of its capital from Pelni (see below) . Then in mid-1953 , with chartered 
106. lbnutadji report, op . cit., p .  691; Asrarud in speech, 26 Mar . ,  
I . P .  1954, p. 228. Asrarudin charged that "Musi" had not yet been recognized 
by either the Ministry of Communications or the Ministry of Justice. He erred 
on the latter point . (See Charter 169/1954) .  
107 . Pedoman , 26 Mar. 1953 . 
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vessels, it extended its passenger servic•e · into the hadj i pilgrim field and · 
·· Carried one-seventh ·of the pilgrims ."108 
A nwnber .of other Indonesian companies· · displayed initiative in coastal 
and related interinsular shipping."· Besides the . Kalimantan line .at Bandjarmasin, 
the large island also had the P.A.  Mahakam Shipping Company Ltd .  operating out 
of Samarinda . Sailing· from Surabaja was the P .T .  Perniagaan Pelajaran Indo­· 
nesia"· (Perpelin --- Indonesian Commercial and Shipping Co. ) ,  whose board chair­
man· was Dr. Ateng (P.N . I . ,  later Vice Chairman of Parliament ' s  Communications· 
Committee ) .  other Indonesian companies arose on other islands, while Chirie·se 
vessels continued to operate out of West Kalimantan and Sumatra ."109 
The problems ·of new private shipping operator·s led Tumbel of Nocemo and : 
August Bawolje DAUHAI'I of Mahakam (both Menadonese) to form at Djakarta in 
·March 1951 a shipping association for the mutual interests of its me1nbers , the 
Dewan Pelajaran Indonesia. In"·"October this was changed into Uni Perusahaan 
Indonesia (UPP! -- Union of Indonesian Shipping Companies ) ,  which most of the 
108. See Charter 35/1954; I.P .  1953, p. 691.
One company set up especially to handle the hadji pilgrim trade failed 
to achieve its goal, being virtually stillborn. The Red White Star Lines of 
Djakarta was organized in late 1951 under President Frits LAOH {P .R.N. Member 
of Parliament with long K .P.M. experience) and Board Chairman KASMAN Singodi­
medjo (.Masjwni Member of Parliament) ,  with the expectation t�t the Government 
(Pepuska) would join in its financing . When the Government rejected its bid.,
over halt of its fifty-two •�founders" (mostly merch·ants) pulled out of the 
company". See Charter 141/1953 .  
109. Kalimantan, one of the more active •Of the new companies , had parti­
·cipation by peranakan citizens (of Dutch, Indian, and Chinese descent) in ::·­
addition to indigenous citizens". Although its charter originally required 
all officers, (managers and the board of d-irectors ) to be citizens of Indonesia, 
its legalization was delayed until it was amen·ded to reqt\lire all stock-
holders also to be citizens ·of Indonesia. See- ·charter 579/1952 . 
See report on shipping for R�u {principally·: Chinese companies operating· 
out of Singapore) by Mohamad NOH, 25 Jan. , R.P.  1951 pp . 3870-3872 •1. ., 
private Indonesian motor sh ipp ing companies operating in domestic waters joined". 
AUS Suriatna (an M.P,N. manager) was chosen Secretary-General . Early in 1955, 
a new organization was set up to promote national shipping , Persatuan Perusahaan 
Pel ajaran Seluruh Indonesia ( Perpepsi - All Indonesia Union of Shipping 
Companies ) .llO 
The tonnage of national shipping lines g radually rose .111 The number of 
ttnationaln shipping companies rose even faster . By 1955, sixty-five were 
counted , of which twenty-five were reg istered , However,  only five were consi­
dered to be ope rating on an economic basis ,"112 
Since few of the national shipping companies .rere p rospering , some of them 
were tempted to d ispose of their vessels to alien companies.  In order to pre­
clude such ,actions as far as possible , Ministe r of Communications Gani decreed 
on 14 June 1955, that all sales or transfers of sea vessels of companies of 
Indonesian national ity to alien companies for use beyond one year could only 
take place with the Minister 's permission.113 
Th is regulation ba rring de-Indonesianization of vessels and the low ratio 
.
of successful operations were ind icative of"the fact that p rivate Indonesian 
shipping �till had a long period of g ·rowth ahead of it before it could be 
llOo Nocemo annual report for 1952 ; Sank Indonesia Report 1955-19$6, 
p .  157 . A contemporary of UPPI was Koordinasi Pelajaran Indonesia (Koryi -­
Indonesian Shipping Coordination Bcard)e
Perpepsi 's purpose was to secure all inte rinsular and coastal shipping for
Indonesians as early as possible , and it urged the Gove"rnment to p rovide it 
with all possible facilities o 
ill". A survey ea rly in 1954 recorded a tonnage of 72 ,500 B.R.T. , d istribu­
ted between Pelni, 28,400; Dja karta Lloyd , 20,000; Inaco , 15,000; Perindo,2000; 
M.K.s.s . ,  1800; Nusanta ra, 1800; Kal imantan, 1000; Maskapa i Pelajaran Swan Liong 
(citizen ),  1000; Maskapai Pela jaran Kok Gie"., 1000; and Perpelin., 500. Asrarudin ·
speech , .I "P. 1954, .p . 228. 
112 . Bank Indonesia Report 1954-1955, p .  152 . 
ll3.  "Keputusan Ivienteri Perhubungan }To e, }vI 26/3/12" ,  Tam bahan Lembaran­
J\Tegara R �I .  No . 832 " 
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. ' . . 
,,
considered t o  play a really si gnificant r ole in the ov erall tran sport picture 
of Indonesi a 
p.�1n1 
The priv ate Indonesian shipping companies that had been newly set up had 
their share of pr oblems of which money was only one .  Although they mi ght comp et e 
,, 
where I . P .M� service was lacking, they often lacked harbor facilities and 
agencies out side their home port . Finan ci al and other assi st ance fr om the 
GQvernment vi a Pepuska was necessarily limited because of budget ary reason s ,  
yet the com�anies  envi saged a wide field for expan si on in vi ew of the Govern­
ment ' s  ann ounced policy of gradually replacing the K . P.M. virtual monopolyo 
It therefore came as a gre at shock when in April 1952, barely three weeks 
aft er the Milopo Cabinet took offi ce , P.epu ska-- the organi zati on set up 
to promote priv ate Indone si an shipping-- became co-founder of the P .T .  Pela­
jaran Nasional Indonesi� (�elni -:- Ind onesi an Nation al Shipping Co ol) and turned 
all it s asset s over to the new companyo Ri ght afterw�rd s Pepuska was de clared 
li quid ated , and Pelni was de si gnated li quid at or o Mr . R .Moehamad MA 'MOEN 
Seema Diprad ja (Seni or Offici al of the Mini stry of Comrauni cati on s )  became 
• ' •4 
pre sident and Soenar (fr om Per)uslca) vi ce-pre sident . Mr R .  KOESNOEN 
Tjitroward ojo (Chief of the Mini stry1 s Public Shipping Secti on ) be came bo�rd 
. .
chairman .  Out of an authorized capit al of Rp . 200 milli on , Pelni"1 s initi al 
• ,, 
capit al con si sted of Rp . 49,1001000, all--save the Government t s  Rp . 100,000 
. . . . 
· ·in cash--con sisting of pr operty from f>epu ska� .. iriclud ing twelve ships.  After 
Repu ska 1 s li quid ati on . 
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· 114 
the Indonesian Government became sole oWPer of Pelni. 
It had been genet'ally known, of course, that the Goverrunent was intending 
to set up a shipping company of its own as heir apparent to K.  P .  M. in the in­
ter-insular traffic, but few in private shipping circles or Parliament i,,rere ready 
for the manner in which the Government company (Pelni )  made its entrance. The 
subject became a leading issue in the deb2tes over the program of the new 
Wilopo Cabinet . First to air the matter was Mochran (who had interests in both 
ItJACO and Kalimanta..'1) , who described the happiness of private shipping circles 
when Pepuska was first set up, then their gradual disillusionment climaxed by 
Pelni I s replacement of Pei1uska. Noting that priva-h national shipping com1Janies 
had been invited to discuss their shipring role with the llinistry of Communi-
. . . � 
cations only after Pelni had already been set up, he urged the Government to 
reconsider Pelni"1 s intended monopoly in interinsular shipping and allow existing 
115
national companies to cooperate with it in enqing the K.P.l,i. monopoly. 
The Government, in reply, denied that netional shipping companies had 
suffered large losses as a result of Pepuska"1 s policy or that Pelni was a re­
placement of Pepuska, and referred to preparations for a state shipping co1npany 
114. See Charter 620/1952. Although legalization of a charter by the 
lvlinistry of Justice usually followed a time l.ag running into months, F:elni t s  
(like GIA"1 s)  occurred the same day. At the end of .1952 Mr. Koesnoen left the 
lv'Iinistry of Communi"cations and soon thereafter became board chaiman of :tviad.ielis 
Perniagaan Indonesia di Eropa (MAPIE)-- Indonesian Chamber of Commerce in 
Europe ) .  
The other Pelni directors represented the Ministry of Communications (Mas
Pardi of the Department of Shipping, one of the company' s  planners), Finance 
(}1r . Soegiarto ) ,  Econornic Affairs (Sardju Ismunandar ) ,  Java Bank (Mr. Loekman
Hakim) , and private business (Ir. Soearto Sosrohadikoesoemo) .  Dr. Ateng became 
s�cond vice-president later and following Pelni ' s  change of officers, its 
president"o 
115 0 Mochran speech, 16 May, I .P. 1952, p 410 
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since tho RIS period. Declaring t:":at 11.the Govc"rruaent docs not into•d to intE:"r­
fere 1,,ri th already existing national shippin;-; companies" , it offered to cooper­
.at�". with t'l1 em by farming a coord.inati , ,n board. The Government also rnade the 
first complete statement of transport policy. In sea transport, it dE:clared 
that its policy had not changed from that ·"announced by the Natsir Cabinet and 
continued bv the Sukiman c abinet, i.e .  that intcrins11lar shipping had to be 
' , 
:controlled and lareel"r owned by the Lrovernmer1t, while coastal and ocean s . 1ipp-
i�g could be left to the initiative of private national enterprises, with assis­
tance or, if necessary, participation by tl1e GovcrnmE:nt. It then annouriced .
' '
that in its plar1s for establishing an interinsular shipping cnmpany it had earl-· 
±er in the year ordered forty-five vessels from abroad, delivery of -which was 
r·xpected in 1953 •116 The Government avoided H1entioning that tl1e forty-five 
' , ' 
were small vessels anpropriate for the coastal sl1ipping sector of private enter� 
prise, not medium-sized ships suitable for replacing the more important part of 
K. P ,  r1I. ' s  inter insular traffic.  
' ' '
The Gov1:�rnment I s reply failed to stem criticism. f� srarudin charged- that 
.. . ·. • '' ; ;•.
the GovE:rrunent had nehlected national ·private shi ,·,ping and tree.ted i 't in a:s· 
.
negative a fashion as alien shipping while concentrating attention · on its own 
' ,
pr.ojected · comp.any. He q11estioned the circumstances of the founding of Pelni 
· ··and asked on what grounds the Gov�rnrnent had liquidated Pepuska -- set up to 
ai:d pri yate . :. shipping -"".' ·and brought ·it into a · state 
.. 
shipping company. He sub­
·mitted a score of other questions and urged that·"proper"coordination and 
, - ' 
116. Written reply by Government, 3 June, I .P .  195.t:, pp. 578-579. Tr1e 
Government also noted that it had only recently b.egun plans for river transport 
becana:ec:,a£ the great shortage of ?Xperts in that field. 
According to an agreement between the Ministers of Economic Affairs and of 
Communications, the orders for the new vessels . were ,pu"·ced only with those 
shipbuilding companies abroad which were represented in Indor1esic3: by Indonesian · ·nationals. Cf. I .P. 1954_, P •. 216 . 
assistance be provided for private national shipping and that it be allo1,ved to 
operate at least twenty-percent of interinsular shipping and thereby help 
check the K.PoM• monopoly.117 Lobo continued the attack and questioned the 
i1inister of Communication ' s  authority to set up such an important enterprise 
on the basis of a past cabinet ' s  decision whereas Article 88 of the Constitu­
tion specified that basic regulations .  for transport would be made by statute"o 
He charged, moreover, that Parliament had been excluded from deliberations on 
this matter, and that a conference which the Ministry of Communications had 
planned (before Pelni ' s  arrival) to hold with national shipping to hear their 
needs -- which the Communications Committee was to attend -- had never been 
held. He declared that the circumstances around the setting up of Pelni had 
undermined the people ' s  faith in Government decisions and criticized the Govern­
ment for being unable to use the people ' s  initiative for national development."llB 
The timing of the remarks during the second round of debates,  which were 
usually answered by the Government in a perfunctory style, brought from the 
Government only a suggestion that the matter be discussed on a different 
occasion.119 But Asrarudin did not let the matter drop. From his vantage point 
as chairman of the Communications Committee, he sent a list of questions to 
Minister Djuanda on 3 February 1953 . Some of the answers .in the }tinister ' s  reply 
on 17 March gave detailed information; others were evasivee When a sked the 
grounds for the liquidation of Pepuska, he replied simply: the oaMbli�:rt of 
Pelni. When a sked for reports on the finances and operations of Pepuska and 
Pelni, he demurred saying they 1vere not quite ready. The Committee asked why 
117. Asrarudin speeoh 6 June, I . P. 1952, pp. 6Jh-6J5.., 
118. Lobo speech,9 June, I.Po  1952, PP• 673-67L, 6760 
119 0 Keterangan dan Djawaban Pemerintap"- atas Program Kabinet Wilopo, 
p.  210. 
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7.�he Government had devi ated from the ·Minister 's Decree No . 1 of. 1951 which 
.stated that Pepuska Is _-sole"•purpose was to serve private national shipp·ing, :
from which it inferred t hat i f  Pepuska were li quidated its assets would f.O to 
private national shiP,ping or the Government . Djuanda denied that there had 
been any deviation , . for according t·o Pepuska rs charter its assets p assed, to 
the Government , ap.d hi � decree was µiplemented in that charter .  To. the qttestion 
whether . a ny of the forty-five coasters which the Government ·had ordered would ' . . .  
be ._ available to national shipp�n g· companies ,  Djuanda replied that they would 
all be turned over to felni". Nevertheless, he gave assurances that the Govern­
m�nt wou ld continue to provide". assistance to private national shipping.120 
During the debates on the program of the first Ali Sastroami djo jo Cabinet , 
B. Sahet apy Engel broached again the subject of Pep usk� and - Pelni, and Bebasa . . 
J?aeng Lalo urged that a broad field of operations should be open to private 
nat��nal shipping, which he felt ought to be allowed to obtain some of the 
�orty�five coasters"o121 The Government replied merely that it might give some . 
consideration to Be basa 1s suggestion , but it"- again postponed discussion of 
. . i . t . 
122
its two shipp ng  organiza ions.  
.
120 0,"I �P. 1953, pp o 672-6750 Questions about details of the ships ac­
qui re.4 RY Pepuska from the R IS  Government or S.G.Sci: . and those su bsequently 
bou ght by Pepuska or the Government went unanswered"o 
121. Engel and Be basa speeches,  28  and 29 Aug . ,  I.P� 1953 , PPe 733 , 755.
Rangkajo Rasuna Said suggested that Pelni be allowed to sell stock to th� .... . 
_ ; _p�blic in ord�r". to help provide badly needed funds fo� �the gove"rnment under-
. taki n g o �peech , 5 Sept o , ·I o P �  1953 ., p .  807 o The Government promised to cohside, 
the matter". ·. 
122 .  Government replies ,  2 and 10 Sept . 1953, I oP ,  1953, pp . 782-783,




Indonesiart waters through a 
gentleman 's agreement u ntil the Gove.rnment could take over
the Government would ende:av·or that 
.. 
such transport . 
·entirely, Prime Minister Ali declared that ·
ttnational shipping n ,  meaning 
· . 
all shipping in Indonesi a would be handled by
Government and/ or private shipping. • .
952 
· Final ly, in the budget messages of December 1953 and February 1954, the 
profit and loss statements of Pepuska and Pelni were revealed to Parliament. 
Although from the figures it was difficult to ascertain the amount of Pepuska ' s  
loss, Pelni ' s  losses were found to be sizeable. Pelni, as a new shipping 
company, had not escaped the problems which had confronted earlier and smaller 
pr:ivate companies, inc luding the lack of haz·bor facilities. But unlike them, 
it did not lack capital .  Besides having access to the forty-five coasters, 
valued at Rp� 180 mil lion, it reportedly received in loans from the Government, 
Rp. 32 million during 1952 and Rp. 57 mil lion in 1953 .
123 
However ,  many of 
the new coasters were not built up to specifications, and most were delivered 
late c Furthermore, Pelni ' s  losses instead of decreasingJ continued to mounto 
In view of the company ' s  continued poor showing after two years of operation, 
the long-awaited budget debates brought no stil ling of the complaints against 
Pelni ' s  operationso Bebasa blamed the shortcomings on lack of coordination 
between the Ministry of Conmrunications and its Department of Shipping, on the 
presence of Dutch personnel in Pelni ' s  Technical Service, and on a German 
adviser to the Ministry.124 
Soendjoto found the possibility that Pelni might suffer an additional 
loss of Rp. 85 million during its second two-year period of operation in­
congruous with its position as a Government enterprise, which had far more 
123 .  Cf.• I aP .  1953, PP• 1220-1221; I .P "  1954, PP• 136-137 o In the first 
eight months of its operations (1952 ).,l- Pelni reported a loss of Rpo 8.. million; 
in 1953, Rp. 10 million. 
124. Speech,  25 Mar., I oPa 1954, PPo 214-216. Supervision over the"oon­
struction of a majority
.
of the coasters had reported;J..y been assigned to the 
father of the German adviser referred to, although the father had no office or
organisation. 
Bebasa 's  proposed- remedies included the establishing of a Directorate of
Shipping for coordination and screening of a+ien adviserso 
. . . . . � . . . .. �- .. . . .. . . . . . .. � 
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facilities than private Indonesian companies. Consequently, he declared that 
Pelni had to be reorganized so that it could operate". with a profit, like . the 
K. P.M. In case it could not be reorganized into a sound enterprise, he re­
commended that it simply be closed down ."
125 
Nevertheless, loss or no loss, 
the Government was committed to a policy of developing Pelni into a replacement 
for K.P.M. , and finding no ready alternative, it determined to improve the 
company ' s  operations, rather than shelve them and embark on a new project. 
HarQor Facilities 
Although harbor warehouses had been subject to licensi�g since 1935,  after 
World War II the warehouse regulation was loosely administered and a surplus of 
warehouse organizations sprang up around the major port areas. Most major 
facilities continued to be Dutch-owned. Most of the smaller ones, many of 
which were relatively new, were., Chinese-owned. Related enterprises, such as 
stevedoring and harbor transport, were likewise largely in Dut_ch or Ch.i.nese 
' . 1  • ... .. 
hands. Consequently·, there were not infrequent occasions when the newly
.. . 
emerging Indonesian shipping companies felt that their acces·s· to". such.; facilities .. 
was no� so ready as it might have been were they owned by compatriots. . . 
This situation, where a major industry lay largely outside Indonesian 
hands, did not escape members of Parliament. Dl•ring the"· debates on the Natsir 
Cabinet program, Margono Djojohadikoesoemo ( PIR , and President of Bank Negara 
··Indonesia) ·asked _that -the Govern"ment supervise closely the ownershi-q ,of :w�re-
..... . 
: ., . .. . .
houses so that the large c ities ( princ ipally the ports) would not a....,pear to"-be 
126
owned by aliens. Mr. Iwa called for control of everything in the harbors 
127
as a condition for maintaining the country ' s  independenc� •" . During _the. 
. .. .., . .. . .. ..... . . .  � .. ,,•.• --·•,. .·· ·  ..•...... _ .. . •.. ,. .•.. ' . -- .. . ..... .. 
·debates on the Su�iman Cabinet ' s· Program, r,'..,a r'eop�ne�· ti·ie"' _subject. He cited ...•-· . . ...• ... . ' 
125". Soendjoto speech (read by Sugih Tjokrosumarto ) ,  25 Mar. , I .P·� 195&, 
p. 213.
126. Speech, 29 Sept.", R . P. 19�0, pp. 888-889. Margono resigned from PIR
(and became an Independent) in March 1951. �runi PerkP-nalkanJ ,  p. 101.
127 . Speech, 18 Oct. , R . P. 19�0, p. 1977. 
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instances whGn Indonesian ships had to give up ·1-1ar space to K .  P .  Ni . and 
foreign ships, and expressed regret that there was only one Indonesian ��re­
house in Tandjong Priok. ;�srarudin, also referring to wharf probl{,ms of 
Indonesian ships, con1plained that ninety-five of the vvharves and ninety-tv10 
percent of the warehouses in Indonesia "vVere in alien hands, and c alle d  for a 
redistribution of Vlharves and warehouses  in order that national shipping in 
its fo:rmati ve stage 
128
could be protec"ted. During the debates over the VJilopo 
Cabinet I s Program a year later, he asked i,vhat the Government ivas doing about 
wharves and warehouses while making plans to operate a state shipping compan y 
and to aid national shipping.129 
Meanvvhile, among the pioneers in the field of Indonesian wharf and ware­
house companies was N.V. Veer.i Djav,a Madura of Djakarta, founded in 1949 by  
R .  Pandji SJOERD .Abdoeldjalal, who was co-president with ivlr. R. iv1". Hadiono 
Kusuma Utojo. This company subsequently set up subsidies in other Java ports 
and liakassar.
130 
One of the few such companies in the outer i slands \Vas 
'N . V .  Perseroan Dagang JSD!\, which Tengku Bacharuddin had founded originally 
as an import company, but had converted into a v-1arehousing company to serve 
national importers. The company had a liberal labor policy and encouraged its 
128. Iwa and Asrarudin speeches, 1 and 2 June, R,P.  1951, pp. 4441-4442, 
4544; of. report on inspection of congested harbors by Gusti Djohan, 13 June, 
R.P. 1951, PP• 5058-5064. 
129. Speech, 6 June, I .P.  1952, P• 6)4. 
1)0. See Charter 164/1954. Pandji Sjoerd was also President of 
P. A. 1[askapai Pel aran Indonesia Lloyd, a small shipping"· company which the 
government had helped finance.  Kusuma tojo, who had been founder and chair­
man of the Sarekat Buruh Kapal & Pelabuhan (S.B.K .P. -- Ship and Harbor VIorkers 
Union ) ,  vvas Chief of the Labor Mediation Service of the l�inistry of Labor at 
the outset of the Unitary Republic.  
employees to acquire its stock.131 
In the absence of constructive suggestions, the Government did not take 
decisive steps in the field of port wharve s and warehouses until drastic 
changes were planned under the stewardship of Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo, Minister 
of Economic Affairs in the first Ali Sastroamidjojo Government o At first the 
new Government merely indicated that it would aid national warehouse companie s 
•., 
by storing goods with them.
132 
Not long afterwards a leading Indonesian ware-
houseman · with Communist connections became associated with the P.N.I. (and 
obtained a bank vice-pre"sidency). A year later, the Regulation concerning 
the Handling of Ship Cargo was drafted, and on 15 December 1954 (after Iskaq"1 s 
resignation) it was promulgated. 
The new regulation, following the example of the Regulation Restricting 
' , 
Rice Milling and Polishing Enterprises·, took its authority., from the I:pdustrial 
Control Ordinance of 1934. Supersedinr. the 1935. regulation· for wharf enter­
prises, it·"required that all stevedoring;"harbor transport, and warehousing 
enterprises be licensed. ·. A section which appeared to have some double-talk, 
stipulated that a license application could ·be rejected as "contrary to the 
economic interests of the State" , if granting such license would be : (1) 




or (2) contrary to the development of a 11balanced" middle-class (,Art • ..7. _., Sec . 1.
/ J .� ..::·... 
.... . . 
' .. :,• J'. ,. ;-,
The "Elucidation•� '.•po·inted out that the regulation had been necessita,t�·d by the 
disorganized situation characterizing warehouses in general thr.6ugno11t the 
. ' , . , . 
country and the fact that most were owned by aliens. This condition was callee 
.. 
ncontrary . to the national economic policy which requires that enterprises 
131. See Charter 791/19.52; Tobing Suma:tera Utara," pp. 193, 203-206.."
132. Prime Minister Ali statement, 2 Sept . ,  I .P. 1953, p .  779. 
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handling sea cargo not be controlled by persons 1vho are ci ti z·e� other than 
citizens of Indonesia" , (i .e . ,  by alien Dutch and Chinese ) .  Consequently, 
old or  new license applicants were required to meet the following re quirements e 
(Art .. 9 ) :  
a. the entrepreneur must be a citizen of Indonesi a; 
b. if the entrepreneur is a leg al entity, it must be leg ali zed 
according to Indonesi"an law, and its stockholders must be 
citi zens of Indonesi a; 
c .  the enterprise capital 111l1St consist of the property of citi"­
zens of Indonesia and may not be controlled by persons who 
are citizens other than citizens of Indonesi a fj,ic?; 
d .  any right concerning the enterp ri se -- complete or p artial, 
direct or indirect -- may not be held by persons who are 
citizens othe r  than citizens of Indonesia /iic7,5133 
In vie w  of the period of grace permitted , there was virtually no Indo­
nesiani zation in the secto r  of established enterprises before the general 
elections. In p reparation for the future , howeve r, many new Indonesian ware­
hou se companie s were set up , involving both well-known businessmen a.na many 
new faces.134 
The sphere of t ransportation experienced more types of Indonesiani zation 
that virtually any other in the country's economy. The State took over opera­
tion of the 11vital" enterprises in aviation , railways, and shipping"o In most 
instances these had passed throug h a form of 11joint enterprise 11l, or there 
1330 11 Peraturan Pemerintah file, 61/1954" and 11 Pendjelasan 11 " The Reg ulation 
went into effect at once for new enterprises. Existin g  enterprises were 
allowed a period of grace in which to adjust themselves to the new require­
ments . Enterprises handling less than fifty tons of freight monthly (which 
forme rly were exempt from licensing ) were allowed nine months"e Enterprises 
possessing old licenses and those operating warehouses solely for their own 
freig ht (which formerly were exempt from licensing) were allowed fifteen 
months. 
The somewhat awkward phrasing of the final cl�uses in section c and d 
above are literal t ranslations.  Cf, 11 Peraturan Pemerintah No . L2/19.54" .  -
s immediately following., arrangements we-re made where by 
the new Indonesian companies did t ake over most of the large alien enterprises. 
134. In the year_
,.· . 
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had been plans for such a form. State Indonesianization was least complete 
in the field of shipping. In highway motor trans
.
port,; · other shipping,_ and ·<. -
harbor facilities, private (''national" ) Indonesian companies 1?ere promoted� 
In vievJ of the capital"· investments involved, hoi-Tever, private Indonesianizat:ion 
·(by no means total) appe�red successf�"::during this period only in the high-···"· 
way transport sectora 
Where both government and private Indonesian cap.ital operated in related 
fields, it was evident that' one did not flourish, depending on tlie·· scope 
allowed private initiative 
. . 
or the protection and assistance offered by the 
Government. Thus, on the one hand, the State ' s  entry in the field of high"t-ray 
transport could not have survived private competition without heavy government 
subsidies. On the other hand, the Government's  primary concern with its own 
monopolies ( ;r potential monopolies) in aviation and shipping gravitated agains ➔ 
the flourishing of private Indonesian companies there." · • 
The guiding hand in Indoriesianization of transport had"- been the long- . 
term incumbent of the Communications Iviinistry, - Ir & Dju.anda. His ·policies· · : - . 
had struck principally at the interests of alternately the Dutch and the Chi'­
·ne·se. Even citizens of Ch1nese descent appeared to have bee'n discriminated� : -. 
against(\ Ho1-rever, the latest"· principal measure during this period, a regula.:.. 
· .tion of harbor facilities which was a product- of Economic Affairs Minister - · 
_ ·Iskaq, was the first to"· affect major numbers of both the Chinese and the ·. ·"
Dutch simultaneously. 
Before the war Indonesians had been active only in the perahu and high-
1vay passeng-er sectors of transport. Yet by the"_ time <;>f the genera�_ �lections 
because of pressure for Indonesianization in every one of its sectors, trans­
portation was the sphere of the Indonesian economy to show the most progress 
towards Indonesianization"o 
.C-· . P ' . ' : FINANCE_ .. � l. _._..,. XXIII 
I:ndonesianization of Java M officers 
After the transfer of sovereignty, De Javasche Barne (henceforth the 
Java Banlc) which had been the circulation bank and also the principal com­
mercial banking institution of the Dutch period, continued to serve these 
functions in the new federal state. Despite the existence of an Indonesian 
member on its board of directors and a large Indonesian majority on the 
board of directors of its main branch for East Indonesia, the Java Bank 
remained essentially a Dutch owned and staffed corporation c Not only were 
the top executive positions of the bank's  main office at Djakarta staffed 
virtually entirely with Dutch personnel, but all branch chief agents were 
Dutch. 
During the RIS period there were few changes in the Java Bmk person­
nel picture. In April 1950 the first Indonesian appointment as head of an 
operating division of th6 bank occurred when Mro Ro Bo Gandasocbrata was 
appointed Acting Chief of the bank 's  Foreign Exchange Fund. Then on 19 May, 
. Mr. Loekma.n Hakim (Minister of Finance of the Republic at Jogjakarta) was 
appointed the Government Commissioner of the Bank; and on 8 July, Iro R0 M0 
T o SARSITO Mangunkusumo (former Superintendent of the Mangkunegaran fund) 
was appointed to the Board of Directors of the Bank in the vacancy left by 
Ir. Darmawan (the first important Indonesian appointee)"0 
1 
The first Indonesian members to be appointed to top executive positions 
1.  Berita-Negara RIS1 1950, Noo 27; 11 Putusan Presiden RIS No "  1741 1 ,
19 May 1950, Berita-�egara RIS2 195Q, No.  40; Java Bank Report, 1949-1950, 
· PPc.135ff. ;  Java Bank Report, 1950-1951, p .  118 . Cf. Chapter XVI. 
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were:, }fr. IndraKasoema, effective 15 August 1950, and i'1ro · Loekman . Hakim., , · . 
effective 11 September., as Vic e  Presidents o-
2 
Th e Natsi r  Cabinet d eclared" · 
th at thei r  appointments as well as that of Indon esi ans on the board of 
d irectors holped guarantee that th G bank worked in the int erests of the 
Indonesian nation"., The Government th ereforG took issue idth the implication 
by .Member of Parli ament Margono (himself, President of the Bank Negara 
Indon esia) th at a state bank would be p referable to a privat e .. .bank in safe­
guarding the country's interests_o Asserting that the polici es"· of the Java 
Bank did not impin ge on th e Government 's freedom t·o act like th at of a 
soverei gn state, the Government declared that nationali zation,  w.i:t hout guar­
antees that the work and responsibi lity were really performed by Indonesi"ara 
themselves, would possibly only slow down progress . Th erefore, the Govern­
ment gave priority to Indonesi ani zation of th e bank 's personnel as a pre'- · 
requisite to carrying out nationalization �3 
The Government policy expressed above was th at of !1inist er of Finance 
Sja!ruddin". When subsequently his p arty colleagues, Dr. SUKlMAN· Wirjo�iarid jojc 
·anq_ Mro Jusur lrfIBISONO., app eared to neglect this advice ·and to push for 
immedi ate nationali'zation, the former minist er·, who had been an authority 
, ..: ···. . 
2o u Ptlt usan Presiden R IS  11 , 14 Au g o 1950,.. B��i ta-Negara RoI .,, . 1950, No . 
61. IndraKasoema had been RIS Commissioner for Negara - njai-1a Timur� The tl\u 
Indonesi an appointees became respectively the fi fth - and fourth-ranking exec­
utives". 
3 .  GovGrnment Reply 11 Oct •., Ris.alah Perundingan 19509 PP• 18l4_-1816. 
Arud ji thought the Government h ad confused th 0 two terms and rejiac�,od 
·th e idea that Indonesi ani zation must come first ,". recalling the lack of.,'.. phange 
followin g · -'' �donesi ani"zation If of the civi l  servi qe d,uring  the Dutch pGri6d0
The Gov(311Yrine:nt then clarifi ed its vi ew: "Nationali zation of a new· ent e�­
prise will achieve the most complete results>.if th at enterprise can com­
pletely-from its top lead ership to th e bottom--be operat ed by Indonesi ans 
who are really expert and experi"enc"ed." R ePol950� pp . 2129 2225 •". 
L ., 
9�: 
s·in co early R epublican_ d ays on pers·onnol affairs, issuocl· ,:·a ·pamphlet lvhich 
bold ly took· i ssue with those who apparently favored II patriotic :�sentiment 
and".numbers" i n stead of ration alization in government personnel policyo 
Sjafruddin was not happy with d emands for immedi at e  n ationalization of t he 
Java : Bank, for he feared that its existing efficiency and contri bution to 
the count1·y's good international _credit r ati.ng might suffer as a result". He 
warned . . against making "nationalization" a dogma., something which regard less 
of its effect had to be impl6mcnted , declaring that it  was only on e way for 
speedi ng up the achi evement of the goals of happiness and prosperity for 
the people . Consequently, he ag ain suggested that it would be bett er to 
continue Indonesianizing the personnel of the Java Bank before n at ionalizi ng"e4 
When the Sukiman Cabinet announced plans for n ationalizing the Java 
.Bank without consulti ng its president, Mr. A. Houwink, t he latter"·resigned"o 
Accordingly.9 the Government appointed as new Presid ent, effective 15 July 
1951, Indonesi a 's leadi ng fi n anci al authorityo The t ask of leading the 
Java Bank d uring preparations for n ationalization , while Indonesianization 
of t.he personn el was speed ed up, fell to Sjafruddin himself o.S Nevertheless, 
the number of Indonesi an person nel ski lled in banking was so small that the 
•.
Menado ag ency was to be the only branch of the Java Bank to be headed by an 
Indon eijian before the bank 's li quid ation �  At the stockh�lders meeting on 
.-
4c Sjafruddin" Indon"esia dipcrsimpangan D.ialan ., (Djakarta :  Hid up., 1951) , _.
PPo 32-340 Sjafruddin proposed that the Dutch personnel, being human beings 
wit h  feeli ngs like Indon esi ans, not just be turned out ,  especi ally before 
there were _adequate In�onesi"an replacements o He did not _consid er hiri ng 
other ali ens as replacements to have anything in its favor" He_ urg ed t l1at ..
necessary preparations be taken before n ationalization .lest" Indonesi a "twist 
the n eck of t he chicken that lays the golden egg s & II (sic) . _ _ 
5o Java Bank Report, 1951-1952, pp� 11� 2110 
24 !1ay 1952, I ndonesi"ans .for tht:. .first time acqui red a majority on t he 
board of directors, and Ir"o Sarsito moved up as bogd chairma n .  Then on 
4 September 1952, the two I ndonesi an vice presid ents moved up to take 
over tho t wo positions of executive vice pres:id ent"e No further major per ­
son nel changes i n  the direction of Indonesi ani z ation took place until the 
. 6
bank had been replaced by the Bank I ndonesi a. 
Nationali z ation of the Java Bank 
A number of politi cal parties of the old Republic had programs call­
i n g  for n ationali"zation of several important sectors of the economyo In1· 
the resolution of the fourth Masjumi Con gr ess at Jogjakarta i n  Dec ember 
1949, only one economic i nstitution was desi gn ated for i mmedi ate n ationali"­
zation --the circulation bank. It was no coi ncidence, consequently, that 
t he first major economic institution i n  soverei gn Indonesi a to be nation­
alized was t he Java Banko 
The prime mover behi nd n ationali zation of the Java Bank was Mr"0 Jusuf 
Wi bisono 't-1ho on 30 April 1951, three d ays aft er assuming t -he portfolio of., 
Fi nance i n  the Suki man Cabi net , announced that t he Government i ntended 
shortly to n ationali ze the Java Banko A month later as t he Sukim an"·"Govern-
ment explai n ed its program to Parli ament , it  noted t hat almost nowhere i n  
60 I bid., PPo 2llff. ;  Java Bank Report, 1952-1953, pp . _ 207, 215-2171. 
Gand asoebrata moved over to head the Men ado  br�nch for a year ; his ·replace ­
ment was also an Indonesi an"e Loekman Hakim and I ndraKasoema took over t he 
bank 's num ber two and thr�e executive positions, _respectively. Dr 0 SUMITRO 
Djojohadikusumo and Mr.· Sutikno Slamet (Treasurer Gen eral) were respectively 
the Government Cormnissioner for"· the bank duri ng :'�ach o:f its last two years 
of exi stence o _Mro Wilopo served on  t he Board of"
.
Directors (i n the Polaupessy 
vacancy) for eleven d ays before receivi ng the Economic Affairs portfolio i n  
the Sukiman Cabi net .  His successor was Iro Soearto Sosrohad ikoesoemo, i n  
private life top executive ( alo n g  wit h  I r .  Sarsito ) of No v. I ntraport 0 Ni.ti




11.. 1 1e -!orld · ·erf circulatl.on banks still private institutions, L-; nce thE 
latter cot.ld 11ot , ·ork co1n1,lf tely in tile ptti· lic interests . Consequently 
i11 orc ' er that t'.1f cj_rc·ulati.on bank cou.lc! 1-rork solely in tl1e public in­
terf.'st and in kePpi 11[_ r •ith 11hat had teen expressed at the Hacue conJerence , 
·t; ·te C.:overnmE'.nt felt that the Java Banlc shovld be natio11alized. 7 
The Government I s annol·nceme11t regardini the Java Bank 1raD ,-.rell 
received, even by the comm�ist groups in the 01)position, wi1ich, ho1 f·ver, 
exprFssed a hope that nationalization 1-rould not stoi::1 1-rith the Java Dank. 8 
�Janai- �ophiaan expressec1•. the approval of th.e P.r t .I. , 11itl1 tl1e stipulation 
that the bank come Uiicler a s·1 pervisory council consistinr of the Prime 
1v1inistP-r and tiinisters of Economic .J-:.. , .·fairs and of Finance, so  tl1at there 
1vould pe a "hf'althy coo1-e:r ation 11 beti-rer n  their ministries and the bank·. . 
7 .  Java Bank Re·! ort, 19Sl-1952, p .  11; Government statement, 28 r-\ay., .:.L. P.  
1951, p.  4184. 
, 8 .  R.£ l�pp.4306,". L!-446, 1!1.92. liaroeto i-fitimihardjo, t•rbo hoped 
that the nationalization of the Las and electric cornpanies v1ould not 
b_e overlooked, t-Torried about the effect of Art. 19 of the Financial and 
F.conomic lcreement at The Harue, t •hich reqt1irf'd that the Republic first 
discuss t·1ith the :Netherlands Covernment t,efore cl1angin6 the Java .Bank la1-,. 
Spef'ch, 1 Ju.ne, R.P. 1951, p .  L.39L.. The Government rer.1inded him tl1at it 
.r-1as· not o1)lieed to reacl1 an acreement 1,rith the Dutc:h Government in its 
bankinc discussions". Statement, 7 June, R. P .  1951,'lp.  L.67L.. 
rir. ·Tadjuddin 1Joor sa1.r tl1e nationalizE;l.tion of the Java Fank as opening 
the 1 Ta�, to the maximum possi1)1€' aid to the national economy from the center 
to tile villar.e and. t11us to creating a real l·alance beti-1een tJ1e various in­
t�rest { .rou.ps . 0peech, 2 Jttr1e, R.P. 1951, p. L.507 . 
�a:n-,ono � S .  Soetart�jo, Sumatran conununist l-:110 _declared l1ir1se1.-r for the 
P. I( .I . , callecl· tl1e attitude of liinister 1 ·irisono concerni·ng the nationaliza-
tion of the:- Java Dank, a brave on�. Lased on llonesty and .patrioti sm. Speech, 
2 June,  R.P. 1951, P• L.577.
Soemardi (l-'.K.I . )  ur£ed that all other credit banks besides the Java 
·Bank be nationalized. Spe€ch, 2 June, R.P. 1951, p .  L.555. .Tl1is recalls 
the demand of his party collea6ue, Achmad Soemadi, for the nationalization 
of t!,.e big � ,anks . Speech, 4 Oct. ,  �l. P. 1950, pp. 1620 ff. 
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•prPs1. Icent .J.n carr'll·,1c. ut1.t n _.,inancial rolicy basect on tl1e peorle"' s 
nro<:'nf'rl y uJ
J , (.. • 
The Uoverrunent ci�clare< ! th�1 t tl·!f' n1anncr of carryin[ out the nation­
aliiatio11 1 ·as then undc-r :-:: tud,:r an.ct that a na.tio11alizati.on lav! nnd a r1etr-r 
r.ircu.lation bank le.rt' ·tiere t 0inr. (r{.u,..ted". 1:1hen th.ey Wf>re ready ·"or sub-
rnj ssion to Parliament, it continued, tl1e necessar;l details -r,,roulcl be read;r 
and the mPmbPrs of tl1at l'"lody lTOttld 11a,;e full 'Of>portuni ty to contribute 
·tl .·1e1r d.1. eas . 10 fTutomo Suparc an ("P.K."r � member of the Parli"arnent•"s 
Finance Committee) ,  }101.•ever, pressed :'or rao1·e l)articulars such as the 
time anc1. Jllanner of nationalizing, ctnd i11,1uired �,•he ther the Government 
mirht follol-1 the examJ)le of· tl1e nationalization of De lJederlandscl1e 
Bank or thf' J�ank of f;ngland."11 The follo1-1ing day the Finance ComrnittFe 
announcf'd that it too l)ror,osed thut tJ1e Java Rank be natio.nalized at  once."12 
1, rithout delay, on 19 June 1951, four clays after the �-ukiman Cabinet 
rer·eivf•d. its vote o.+· confidence, it apJ ointecl a six-man State Commission 
·. -for the Nationalization o::"' tn.e Java �:ank, l1eaded y � ecretary-General 
f.cc1iono of the l"linistry of Economic Affairs . The Commission decided tl1at 
the Government should first purchase shares of Java Bank s tock on .a volun-
tary Lasis.  /iccordingly, on 3 11.U[ ust Iviinister of I?inance 1 i bisono announced 
tl'lat previot1s to tl1e la1rr on tl1e nationalization of the Java P.ank, the bill 
. . . 
9 .  Speech, 1 June, R.J; l9$1, p . L,.321 .  The P.N.I.  faction also recommend-
ed tt1a t tl1e :Foreign Exchanf·� Institute � ;e placed under a foreign exch.ange 
council consfsting of  the same three ministers, 1-rhicl1 v,ro1,1ld determine 
forPifn exchanee policy. In reFlY, tr1e Government merely dre1., the speaker ' s  
attf'ntion to the exis ting tiupervisory Council o.f' the Foreirn fxchange 
Instit'l1te. 
10. Government reply, 7 June R.P .  1951, PP• 4674-4675 . 
11. Sr)eech, 12 June, R.P. 19.51, l)P • !�892-4894. 
12 . R.f'J )Ort, read by r� oendjoto, 13 June, R.P. 1951, 1)• h9t)4. 
fo:r 1 · ! 1 ich '•'i::!.,'. s · oJ·tl;v to bf' Sf'nt to Parliament, stockholders T•o 1_i.ld ·",e 
c�sh at 120 r,ercPnt of pc...r in Dutch c1 1.r-rency or t1 ,ricE' that in rupiahs . 
Sh:· rEC s not ctCC(L:ireri b1r the hepublic in this r1anne:r· t..rol:lu . e expropriated 
l•';1en t.he nf'l.' nci tio11a.lization lc.11-1 'f •ent into e., ·feet •"13 
-·i r'1f f.  8 .  f ; .  million o : the f .  S' million o . the ank I s ca1 ital t;tock :1adt · : .1 
hf'en sold . to ti·:F Republic . Thr J�va · ank i fationalization net l "as s1 . ortly 
thPrea ,'ter pc-lt.sed 1�y Farliamf'nt anc1•_ T·a.s proclaimed in c: -f' ·ect as of 15 
I.Jee ember. T;�e ju.sti_.-:-·ication ci te(t · or the act T-'as that the ltepuJ;lic as a.n 
1inc epenc�f'nt and soverPii n state had to have a Cf'ntral ,. ank t,•itl1 a national 
cl1aracter and. that to 1. uarantE'E: the f;u.t.lic interests the Lank had to Le 
o"neti by thE stdte. The atlth.orization cited the Constitutio11 (1.rticlr s 
27 and ({9) and the Finaricial and r::conomic .,1.Lreement o_;· The Ha{:_ue (Articles 
3 and 18, Section 8)". The act provided that outstandin: sl1ares 'T-'ould be 
exprorriateclj_rnmeciiately, and pa;'Tilent made at the above rat.fs--·witl1in , 
three :;rears to those residint abroad. Former stockholders dissatisfied"· 
13. Java Bank Report, 1951-1952, pp. 11-12; 11Pengumuman Pomerintah", 
3 P.ugust 1951, Tambahe.n LemLaran-l'Jer;ara R . I. l,fo. 192. Other commission 
merriter-s � �ere Trf'asurer GPneral Soetikno �- lamet; l overnment Commissioner 
of the Bank, Dr. � oernitro; Tei1fku Radja Bahaudin b.a. ARu:,IN, Director 
o:f' the Foreic n Exchance Institute; Drs. A.  Oudt, General 1-1.dviser of 
thP . ·inistry of Finance; and Drs. Kl�0' 1 1l Rian Tie, General Adviser of 
the l''linistry of r;comonic Aff"airs. 
Forf'ign resicl�nts of' co1u1tries ot1!er than the 1\Tetherlands 1,'."ould 
recE_:ive payment in tl1eir c-:.1.rrenciPs at the T .T .  sales rate on 27
Julv.,, 
� . 
·with th€S€ ratr--s co11lc} ap�:•eal to an Tndonesian court b y  15 r,�•ebruary 1952.14 .. 
Pank Indon�sia 
11b.e nationali"zation of th.E' Java Bank � 1as tl1e :r ·irst juridical step 
J.n tl1e Indones j_aniza tion of tl1e country ' s  ce11tral bank, �:·or 1-rhich the 
nf'tv name 11 Pank Indo11es i a" 1-ras chosen . The seconc: 1 Tas to cl1an6e the 
central bar1k act, rer·,lacini the Java Bank Statute of 1922. J..J lth.ou[h 
PrFsicl.ent Sja:?rud.din orieinally questioned". th.e cori1r)et€ncy of tl1e State 
Commission for tl1e 1,Jatio11alization o.�:o tl1e Ja·va :Cank to undertake also 
the draftini · O)� such a lavr, l'lir1ister l,ril,isono confirmed the Commission I s 
interpretation of its broader av.tl1ority."15 In  the ci.iscussions bet1-Teen 
the Cor,1.mission and the I-ank ' s o ".> · ic , ·rs, Sjafruc1clin ex11resscd a.n emphatic 
Ol)inion on t1,10 rnajor issues .  Conc£r11inc · the relationsl1i1) bet11een tl1e 
G·overrunent a11d t}1e Central Bank, fja: rt1ddin , 1 °hile - aclcnoi::rledr ine tbe 
Bank ' s  oblie:ation to cooperatE with the a·ovf'.rnment, urged t11at the Bank 
r, tain a decree 04 · autonomy to insu.re tl1at p11blic confid.ence in the value 
of the currency he maintainecl . Thus he likened. the Central Banlc to the 
-Government ' s  financier rather than cashier. To settle di.Cferences of 
.opinion i,rJ1ich rnight arise bet1rreen the tl!O parties ,  he recommende0 tJ1e 
estahlisl'unent of a Coordination Council- composed o? representatives of 
tl1e Government and of th.e Danlc manateme11t •16 
14. 1 1llndang2 }.Jo. 24/195ln , and "Pendjelasan"., T.L.. Ir• .  ll.I .  1,Jo . 192. De­
srli.:te tl1� Re1)ubli c 1· s acqt1isi tion o/ the 01i-er1.rl1elmin t, majority of tl1E' bank ' s  
stock be.:· ..·ore the natioi1alization lai,r i,ras proclaimecl, it did . .  not tecl1nically
·control the banl( until 15 Iif'cember ,. >ecause accordinr to the Cornmercial Code 
each stockl1oldcr 1las allo1,rec� a mmcimum oJ six votes at stockholders '  · meetinr,:s 
Under th� la.1,r orlly appro:>r:imately f.1,0 ,ooo 1,Tortl1 of stock 1-ras turned in �­
It �1as asswnecl that rnost of tl1e � :9-lance of around_ f . 50 ,ooo had been lost. 
I\Jo one t1tilizec1. the orr:ort�nity - to appeal the an1ou11t of conqJensation . 
Java Bank Re1 ,�r_t, 1951-1952, p.  12 • 
. .
lS. Java Panl<; ReEort, 1951-1��, p .  12; Indonesian Revievr,I (1951) ,p.279. 
16. Java Bank Rer)ort 1951-1952, pp. 1.3-19. -· --- ------




." . . .. , The Java Bank at the ti1,1e of natioi1ali"zatio11 still had a t1 ;o-fold . 
unction: the ·, . of c0ntral (ar1r circ 1 , lat:i.on) barlk, arid that of thf co1;_ntry' s 
lc'.'r; f8t cornrl1€rcial bank. Thf're l··as e : ro�:inr_ dernand that this latter 
f1 nction i_-f' retioved from t. ··.E tasks of the country ' s  central 1 ank. .Sjafrud.din, 
,a1 reei11t 011 this as an tiltirnate t oal, uri"e< th.at the se1')aration of funrtions 
not LE? "hurried throurb i;-rith undue haste li. :{is reasons l'f re that 110 mone,r ,, 
and cai ,ital m£: rket of any sibnificance existec' in t�e country and that 
ape rt from the fe1�1 fore irn · arll�s therr 1-rere no su .'ficiently capi talizf'd or 
�xperi r--nced pri vatc I11clonesian Lanks, 1- ,hile t1�e other state · anks 1·1ere riot 
yet technically in a r,osition to take over the Java rank I s commercial 1-rork. 
Both thf' r1.Fvelopme11t of th.e Incionesia1J. ·, .usiness courr-1uni tJr arid of the otl1er 
Stnte-01 1ned 1. ·anl�s 1 rovlci. , -e faci"litated,. ]1e believed, if.. the Central F:ank 
1·as not · ·orced irnrllf'cliatel;r to give up its coinercial C'epartment but lTould 
Le rr-q1.-ired. by thf:' netT la1"1 to proi:-iote the h< althy de·velOJ)ment of r1ati"onal 
.· •·" . 17crf'dit and banl(in'. a., ·"i airs. 
LiF rore tl1e l ill rer,ula tint t/le fanl<: Indon€sia could : 1e presented to 
Parliament, therr- 1 Tas a cabinf't cha.ill,e and fumitro (F.�.I. ) took over 
tl1F ?inance portfolio from 1 il isono. �incE: the dEcision to rf'})lace the 
old Java Bank ._ tatttt� 1-1as not at issue, the- matter attracted little attention 
du.rinc the d,bates over the i ilor ;o Cabinet ' s  procram."1f\ 
17. Ibid. , PP• ly-21 
18 . Ichtisar Parlernen 1952, PI) • 1·36-437, 4YC, �;:;2. I-Itltomo Sup,'irdan, in
reference to the nc1,.r banl<ing bill, dropped t11e P .K .I. insistence on national­
ization of alien ba1lks, l. ut hf' recoFunended that tl1eir field of opFrations be 
lirnit€d and Sl'.pf'rvised ' y the Go,,ernr11e11t. ArPdji, corr1plaininf because the 
Java . � anl� 1-,as closf'd on the ·, irtl: ,.day of th€ Dutch queen ( the Head of the 
lTnion) , urcect that not -only the name of the i,ank · e chane:ed but that it t,e
imbued l 1ith a real national si .irit • .  
The Gov£>rnment on 3 JunE" 19"' 2 ai1nou.nced. that it 1 1as studyine:: the 
circulation l. arlk bill and i:r�uld :"or1-1ard · it to Parlianient as · soon as possible. 
• • 
In mid-19.52., Minister Sumitro"- presented the Bank Indo .nesia bill to the 
Wilopo Cabinet, which approved it after several changes. In September, it 
was sent to Parliament. The bill provided that the Bank Indonesia, serving 
as the central bank, would gradually focus its operations on the functions 
of a banker ' s  bank a.nd give up its commercial work. The Bank was to, be 
managed by a Ma .naging Board headed by a Governor, and it would carry 
out polioy determined by the Dewan Moneter (Monetary Board),  consisting 
of the Minister of Finance ( as chairman)"., the Minister of Economic Affairs·, 
and the Governor of the Bank Indonesia. All members of the Managing and· 
Monetary Boards had to be Ind·onesian citizens. An Advisory Council was 
also to be appointed to serve the Monetary Board.19 
The bill as originally presented to Parliament intended that the . 
Bank Indonesia be a corporation and so a continuation, under a new name, 
of the Java Bank. During the section (bahagian) discussions on the bill,"•. · 
some members expressed the view that the corporate form (perseroan terbatas) 
was inappropriate for a state institution since they associated profit­
seeking with that form. They accordingly proposed that the bank be a 
legal entity regulated by its own statute. The Government, however, pre­
ferred the corporation form, which was popular at home and abroad for 
large enterprises, and"_"was recognized in the internationa1·" world. Moreover, 
retaining that form would facilitate continuity for the ba .nk and avoid 
19, • Warta Ekonomi u.ntuk Indonesia, V (19.52), P• 609 . It was also 
planned to move the Foreign Exchange Institute into the Bank Indonesia 
and replace its old Supervisory Council with the Monetary Board. 
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the trouble of transferring assets and work and liquidating the old enter­
prise. 20 
The Government"1 s bill followed Sjafruddin• s  suggestion that the Bank 
Indonesia retain its commercial banking functions for a transitional 
period. Some members of Parliament, however, felt that such functions 
should be tenninated at once, and several of these reconnnended that such 
functions be transferred to the Bank Negara Indonesia. The Government 
demurred, following Sjafruddin ' s  argumentation. It preferred not to 
stipulate a specific time limit for the tra".nsitional period, and while 
acknowledging that the time should be as short as possible, it suggested 
that commercial banking be channeled to the B.N. I. only gradually and 
taking consideration of the latter bank ' s  capacity."21 
Debates on the Bank Indonesia bi]] opened on 27 March 1953. The 
text of the bill had provided that the Advisory Co'Wlcil memhers would be 
chosen from "leading persons in business circles , management organizations., 
20. 11Memori Djawaban Pemerintah mengenai Laporan Bahagian11•, I.P. 1953,
pp. 436, 442-443. The Government denied that there need be a correlation 
between profit-seeking and the corporate form. It also rejected a charge 
that it retained the corporate form in order to facilitate the bank"1 s 
return to private hands. 
21. Ibid. ,  P• 442 . Other members of Parliament suggested that an 
omnibus banking law should be considered at the same time, that too much 
authority was given to the Monetary Board, and that the amount of advances by 
the bank to the Government be specifically limited (there was a suggestion 
of setting the rate at 20 percent of the state 1 s annual revenue) .  The Gov­
enunent replied that it had drafted such a general banking bill"- and would 
submit it shortly. It cited measures for assisting the bank 1 .s governor · 
should he find himself in a minority on the Monetary Board over an important 
issue. (He could appeal directly to the Cabinet, and, if still not satisfied, 
air his views in the Berita-Negara, the state gazette. ) The Government 
opposed a specific l:imitation on advances to it, considering the necessity 
for the annual budgets to be ratified by Parliament as sufficient ties.
Ibid. ,  PP• 440-445. 
and labor organizations" . Masjurni memluer Wibisono (former minister) did 
not see any benefit from such a council since it lacked financial and 
banking experts. Inchi Abdul MOEIB (P.N. I. spokesman) ,  like Wibisono, 
noted a redundancy in the first two categories of members of the 
Advisory Council. Since Indonesia was an agrarian state, he proposed that 
the text read: 11leading persons in business, agriculture, and labor." 
Although Minister Sumitro announced the Government ' s  acceptance of this 
change, · since some feared that the council would provide lectures instead 
of skilled advice, he urged that the words "leading persons0 be replaced 
by "experts". It was finally decided to use both terms."22 
Wibisono questioned the wisdom of the requirement that all members 
of the Bank ' s  managing board had to be Indonesian citizens. Agreeing that 
ideally all personnel of the Central Bank should be citizens of Indonesia 
(he would not discriminate between indigenous and non-indigenous) ,  he 
wondered whether there were sufficient candidate members--should those 
in line for the top positions vacate them-possessing the t hree necessary 
qualities: Indonesian citizenship, a record as a pure Republican fighter, 
and expertness of an international quality. Feeling that expertness 
should be given priority, he recommended that an escape clause permit the 
appointme.nt of a non-citizen expert. Pellaupessy (Demokrat} ,  however, 
felt that the original text should be maintained. Should it later occur 
that no citizen was expert enough to become a managing director, a supplemental 
bill could be submitted to Parliament in order that the citizenship require­
ment could be waived., he suggested. Minister Sumitro"., who indicated that 
22. Debates on 27 Mar., 2, 7 and 10 Apr. ,  I.P. 19531 PP• 446, 449, 
463, 466, 472, 474-475. Cf. Art. 32, Sec. 2, Bank Indonesia Act. The
final version was "experts and/or leading personalities in business, 
agricultural and labor circles."  
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the Gover.nment did .not doubt that there were qualified c�tizens., leaned 
towards Pellaupessy ' s  views. Declaring that foreigners might well serve 
as assistants, he asserted that persons holding high offices with great 
responsibility in important institutions had to be Indonesian nationals. 
He defined the Government ' s  qualifications for members of the managing 
boa� as citizenship, expertness, and integrity .23 
Concerning the legal form of the Bank Indonesia, Mr. Tadjuddin Noor 
(PIR) , Kiaji Hadji TJIKWAN (Masjumi) , Subadio Sastrosatomo (P.S . I. ) ,  and 
Mr. Tjoeng Tin Jan (I{atholik) backed the Government f or retaining the cor­
poration-form. Hutomo Supardan thought that the b ank should remain a cor­
poration for a transitional period of one year. Wibisono championed the 
public corporation form over the private, joint-stock corporation, since 
private stockholders were not allowed and the possibility of bonuses for 
the officers might encourage larger profits. Siauw opposed the corpora­
tion form, insinuating that it had been urged on the"_ Indonesian Govern­
ment by the Dutch Government. Maruto insisted that the ba.nk be a legal 
entity regulated by statute. Minister Sumitro, denying that the Nether­
lands Government had any direct voi�e in drafting the bill, repeatedly 
upheld the corporation form as best. He finally agreed, however, that 
whatever Parliament decided on the matter would be acceptable. A proposal 
that the bank be given a "public-law form" passed 62 to 10. When the 
Government then revised the draft to call the bank simply a "legal 
entity'', Wibisono and Iwa called that insufficient. Accordingly the t�t 
23. I.P. 1953, PP • 447, 450, 464-465. · Cf. Art. 27, Sec. 7 of Bank -•
Indonesia Act. Sumitro declared that his Government had no intention of
discriminating b�tween indigenous and non-indigenous citizens and �hat 
he hoped that subsequent cabinets would act eimilarly. 
--
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1-!as r1acl.e to rf'ad: l1The ar1k I11ddntsi  a is a state�ot-•mecl let"al entity11 • 24 
The ! overnr,ent hacl · ir1c:icated in its el1-1cidatioh to tJ-,e : ill that o. 
rene:ral tra< inr ank (l:'C'fer1·int, td tl1e B , i-Ti I . )  }1ad to · e ,u:llt up and the 
commercial tasks graduall�r turnec1 over to it. I .l\. i":oeis, '! rho in vie1,,r of the 
·1l1ork and manaeement o:- tJ1e ) . I\J.I.  considerE'" it un"it to recei,,e the J3ank 
Indonesia ' s  co1,unercial functions, misread the elucicl.2.tion to mean that a ne11 
orr anization callee? th.e ( E'neral Trading- · anlc 1rould event11ally be ectal·lished 
to talce over such tasks via the F. l'!. I.  He pror)osed th.at cucb. a · ank l.:,e 
st,lfff'o. 1,rith personnel . ro1n thf· cornr1ercial department of the Java � ank in 
orcler that. it cot1lcl (.).ssurne such 1,,rorlc 1-ritl10.ut 1 clelay, anq. that a .t.ransitional 
article in the, law provide that it l. ·c SE't u.p 1y 31 December 1953, after 
II I \. a . 
1,rhich the commercial 1-rork of tl1e ·. ank Indonesia lTould l>e transferrecl to it. 
. . . : 
In reply, r ;inistP.r Sumitro, 1-rhile indicatinr that the Go·vernment mi: ht 
acrf·e if 1--'arlinmPnt specified"· a lir11i t to tl1e transitional period, pointed 
out the I ioeis misconception and"· asserted that the Oo·verrunent 1,rould perfect 
its existine banks and not create a ne1,r one . ltccordingly, l ;oeis offered as 
an amendment the rrovision tl1at functions ot1tside tl1ose of a Cf'ntral or 
circulation bank 1,roulci l�e delegated to otl1er l anks to be designated t·y la1-r bJr 
31 December 1953 at the latest. This an1endment 1-ras acceptal'lE' to tl1e Gov-
•' 
ernment, 1tJhich already l1ad in cl.raft form la1,rs d.Pfining the 1:rork of its other 
state 1 .. anks • 25 
24. f ebat·es on 27 i'iar . ,  2, 7 ,  10 Apr. ,  I .P .1953 } p .  l tL7, !153, L5S ,  464-469, L.71, L74-!,.75. Cf. 11.rt. 1, E1ec. 2 of ·=- ·ank Indonesia 1-'..ct. Since the Bank 
i.ras not a private corr>oration, it l�as au.tl1orizecl to operate uncler adat la1r.r 
as 1-!ell as EuropE'an civil and cornrn.ercial la1,r. Cf • .,-1rt. 2, Sec. 1 and 2 .  
25. Vebates, 27 1 :ar. , 2 ,  7 ,  10 Apr . ,  I. P.1953, pp. 449, 4<:.0-461, 467, 
409, l!72-!, 73. Cf. l\rt. 36, �ec.  2 o·'"' �Jlank Inc�.onesia J\.ct. 
In addition to the above, several other featt.tres o·: · thf> 1:,ill 1:rere c1.e1jat­
ec1 , ,v.t beinc o/ a financial-technical naturr: tl1e:r 1.1acl no political overtones. 
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Th.e Bank I110onesia ., .ct 1 1aE -+:11c11 aIJfr-o,red 1 y Par liarnent on 10 iipril 
1953, anc it 1-rent into effeet on 1 Ju ly 1953. TlJe era of r-:oocl feelini in 
1 1hich tl1e act i ras arr-roved soon soured , anc1 . the i- ·ilor)o Ca1)inet 1-ras out or 
�Jot.1er. Since tl1e A li Cabinet did not SJ)ecif}r a successor (namely the �\i\J . I . ) 
to take o�r- tl1e conrr,1ercial functions o., thP- Bank Indo:r:if'sia, , the pr()vision - ·-
for ,,rhich I.A.  I. :oeis had lal,orf'd 1,ecarne a cl.eacl lettf'r, ai1d the central 
·bank continued as tl1e country' s  principal cornrnPrcial bank. 
In accordance l-Ti th tl1e la,.,r, 011ly Indonf'sian citizens 1,rere appointed 
to the hank 's  l ,anar ement J1oard. In accoroance l•Tith the hank act (Art. 38) , 
Sjafruddin became bank Governor ancl. Loelcrnan I-Ial<im and Inrlra Kasoema became 
l1epnty Governors (and l\1anac_-inr Directors)". On 1L l11ovember 19� 3,  tl1e nine 
members of the Ad.visory Council � 1ere appointed, chosen principally from po-
litical parties supporting the Ali �astroan1idjojo Cabinet and headed b3r Rl1. 
ICoesnan {l).:d .I . ).  Since the banl{ a.ct a l lo1 1ed for t�ro r·1ore managing directors, 
Ir. Darma:tran r1ianr,oenkof's"oerno and Director Sabarudin of the Foreign Txchanre 
Insti"tute (t-mich ,-ras broll(::ht into the Pank Indonesia on 13 i\.arcl1 ,1954) i-:r_ere 
appointed to these positions effecti,re 1 t,Iarch 19� 4. The incumbents of ·
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that day remained in office for the period under review. 26 
Bank Negara Indonesia 
At the time of the establishment of RIS, the B.N.I. , which had been 
set up in mid-1946 as the Republic's  bank of issue., no longer had its 
original function to perform, for the RIS Constitution provided that there 
would be only one circulation bank, and that was the Java Bank. During 
the Hague Conference Indonesian officials had decided to reject the plan 
for participation with the Netherlands Government in the joint reconstruc­
tion bank which the latter had been planning since 1948. The Indonesians 
instead hoped to convert the B .N. I. into a wholly Indonesian reconstruction 
and development bank. However, the B.N.I . ,  which entered 19$0 with offices 
only in Djakarta and Jogjakarta., had lost its capital during the second 
military actio.n. Accordingly, the RIS Ministry of Finance on 28 March 
19$0 provisionally provided it with ten million rupiahs as initial capital 
for financing projects pending its legal reorganization as a reconstruction 
26. Bank Indonesia Re ort 19 1954, pp. 12"., 168; Bank Indonesia. 
Re ort 19 • 9 , P• 1 o. Loelanan Hakim and Indra Kasoema were reappointed 
or f ve year terms as First Deputy Governor and Second Deputy Governor, 
respectively, effective 1$ August 1955. Ir. Darmawan gave up  his position 
as Director General for Foreign Affairs of the Ministry of Economic Affairs" . 
when he entered the bank • . Sabarudin, who retained the position as head of 
the Foreign Exchange Institute, required Government dispensation from the 
provision (in Art. 25 of the .Bank Indonesia Act) against members of the 
Managing Board being related within the third degree. He was related by 
marriage to Governor Sjafrudd�n, a reason why his appointment (as well as 
that of Ir. Darmawan) was delayed about !'our months. 
Other members of the Advisory Council were A.A. Achaien (N. u. ) ,  I. 
Tedjasukmana (Partai Buruh) , and o. Rondonuwu (Progresif) ,  all members of 
Parliament, and Ir. s. Sosrohadikusumo (formerly on the Java Bank" :'Board 
of Directors) ,  s .  Gondokusumo (Parindra, founder of the Bank Nasional 
Indonesia of Surabaja--the first Indonesian banking oorporation) , ". M. I. 
Dauley (P.R.N. )"., and Soele (Pm). An important exception from the re­
quirement .that an Advisory Council member be a supporter of the Ali Cabinet,
was the selection fr(?m the Opposition of Wibisono (Masjumi) ,  who, of course, 
had spearheaded the nationalization of the Java Bank. 
p. 279. 
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bank a .nd the Government I s participation therein. The Republic Ministry of 
Finance at Jogjakarta provided 7,500,000 rupiahs."27 
During the RlB period, in preparation for the B . N. I." 1 s reorganization, 
a new legal form was given consideration. Although some groups thought 
of converting the B .N.I.  into a foundation (jajasan) the prevailing view 
was originally to make it a corporation28 somewhat along the lines of 
the plan proposed by the Dutch for the joint reconstruction bank. The 
new institution would be capitalized at 200 million rupiahs, and the RIS 
a .nd the Jogjakarta Republic were to share equally in its priority stock, 
while one quarter of the shares were to be sold to the public. After the 
formation of the Unitary State, it appeared that the new government would 
take up all the priority stock by itself, possibly with funds from the 
E.C.A .  Counterpart Fund. The matter was dropped, however, when plans 
were embarked upon for forming a reconstruction bank separate from the 
B .N. I� Then in 1951 as the Barik Industri Negara was set up, an emergency 
law was drafted to reorganize the B.1'J�I• and aut}:lorize it to function 
as an ."import and export bank."29 However, another four years were to pass 
before the B .N.I .  was legally recognized. 
27. A .  Karim;, 11The History of the Indonesian National Bank", Ekonomi 
dan Keuangan Indonesia, VII (1954), pp. 243-245; Panggabean, Menudju Bank
Nasional, Po 94; Sclieffer, Het Bankwezen in Indonesi�, p. 121; Java Bank 
Repo�t,-1949-1950, p. 42. See Chapters XIII and."XVI • 
. 28. Unlike the private corporation, the a ·asan (as an entity outside 
the Commercial Code) did not require a fixed capita" , at l9ast two" . stock­
holders and shares of stock, and ratification of its charter" .by , the Minister 
of Justice • However, it would have been subject to unlimited liability. 
The private corporation could not acquire realty subject to ad.at law. 
29. Scheffer, op� cit. , pp. 121-123; Indonesian Review, I (1951), 
, 
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· In order that the B .N.I .--still pending its transformation into a 
reconstruction bank--md.ght receive proper instructions on how to provide 
credits with the funds presented it by the Government, RIS Minister of 
Fina.nee Sjafruddin on 4 May 19$0 appointed a sevee-man Credit Commission 
headed by Director Sabarudin of the Foreign Exchange Institute,"30 Although 
it was originally believed that the B .N. Io would. be concerned equally with 
the rehabilitation and development of industrial and commercial concerns, 
its first general task assignment was to provide credits to Indonesian 
importers ("newcomers" ),  which were experiencing much difficulty with 
regard to purchasing foreign exchange certificates that had been required 
since March 1950. Accordingly, in order to make more funds available, 
. .
the RIS Government in mid-July provided forty million rupiahs in notes 
to be used by the Java Bank as security for loans to the B . N. I. By 
the beginning of August the B .N. I." ·" had begun taking over from the 
Algemene Import Organisatie the task of financing Indonesian importers."31 
However, the demand for credits by the newcomers was so great that the 
B .N. I.  soon exhausted its resources and was borrowing from the Java Bank 
without security while at the same t:i.me" · rejecting many credit applications. 
The situation B .N. I. President Margono likened to that of the cook who 
had been instructed to prepare dinner for a large number of guests, yet 
30. rrr{eputusan Menteri Keuanga .n RIB Nr. 88973/U.U�",  4 May 1950, cf. 
Scheffer, op.cit. , pp . 198-199. Three members were from the Ministry of
Finance (General Adviser Oudt, Treasurer General Soetikno Slamet, and 
Di�e9'tqr. :e:. T .  Kuiper of the Bureau for Reconstruction Financing) ;  two from 
the Ministry qf Prosperity (General Adviser Darmawan and Chief Suria Atmadja 
of the Department of Organizations Development); and one representative from 
·DEil' (R. Koesmoelj ono) .  . 
31 . La uran Ba .nk Ne ara Indonesia 19 0-1951 (Djakarta, 1952) ,  p .  15.
The B .N. I. took over Rp, 2 million wor h of credits previously" . granted by
the A•  I.O.  
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by the time they were beginning to arrive, money for rice had still not 
been given. The situation ameliorated somewhat as one of the last Govern­
ment Regulations of R1S added a further increment to the bank"1 s working 
capitai."32 
To make it possible for the B .N.I. to work effectively in the field of 
forei$n trade, it was designated a "foreign exchange bank" on 15 September 
1950--the fir�t Indonesian-owned bank to achieve this position . The bank 's  
activities quickly mushroomed, and in late 1951 it began opening up branches. 
By 1954 it had thirteen branch offices--the same number as at the height, 
of its activities in 1947 , But only six of them were reopened offices, the 
other seven being established in new cities. 34 During 1952, the bank 1 s 
provisional capital, provided by the Government, was set at Rp. 100 million. 
In addition, the Government by the end of the year had provided a total 
of Rp. 240 million to the bank in advances, and it required several semi­
governmental institutions to keep deposits in the bank."35 With such 
resources, plus private credit balances, the B .N. I. was able to grant 
. 
32. "Peraturan Pemerintah No. 1"311 and 11 No. 19", 1950, Lembe.ran-Negara 
RlB, No. 42 and 55; Margene speech, 29 Sept., R.P. 1950, p. 88$.
The Government expressed sympathy for Margonofs feelings, saying that he 
in turn should understand the Governrnent ts  feelings when it finds the cash 
box empty. It requested that impossible hopes which might have been raised 
would not be repeated. Government Reply, 11 Oct., R.P. 1950, p. 1813. 
33 , 11!.AAPLN Pengumuman A No. 30", 1.5 Sept. 1950c On 7 November 1952, 
the B.N. I .  was designated as a depository for foreign securities. "Pera:turan.
Pemerintah No. 48/1952" . 
34. Except for the Jogja branch, that which reopened at" .Sqlo, and that 
which newly opened at Bandung, all B .N.I.  branches were in seaports-befitting
its new function as a foreign trade bank. Other old branches in the interior, 
which had operated when the Dutch regained the port cities, were not reopened,  
Seven of the branches were on Sumatra , one in Sulawesi (Makassar) .  
35. Java Bank Report, 1952-�953, P• 19; Nota Keuangan 1954, Table VI/III. 
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credits on an ever incrF"-asin;:_ scale. }\.t the end of 19:,;1, after t1-ro years 
·o.f the :: . ;·! . �i . •  1 s rene'! red exi ste11ce, .ou.tstandii1, credits totallecl approx-. , 
imatelj' Rp. 250 n-1illion . I:.:1 an.otl1E'r tt,,ro years, i .e . ,  · -:r tl1e end of 1953, 
cred its ot1tstand.inr rose to i1y; .522 r11illion •" . Therea��ter, J>artly as a 
result o." tl1.0 C0llntry' s recE:ssion, the increase 1:-as at a reduced rate 
so that l:y thf enc.1• of 1)1;.:5 tl1E:: a111ount _outst.anc1.in[ 1 ras Ry.: .660 r1illion". JC,. 
But t}1e J · • N.I .  1 s appr arance in the fielcl o::· commercial bankin, , 
esj ,e:,cially in . �inancinr importrrs r;1ost of ,-.·•hora �·rere ne.1 · to t' ·e ir business, 
or to anj' v siness · or that rr1atter, r,1et ,.-;ith its sl1are of pro· lerns. Its 
; ·"irst importer crec1.its tr�rf' issuec1 . t1.nder terms--appro,red y . tl1e 1 :inisters 
of J�inance and rrosperity--1-rhich A.•i'!.. 1icl1sien (I1asj1 ri1i) , one of the fe�-r 
1--usinessmen in Parliament, . callec1 or,pressive, e specially since the 
"protected" importers had ., irtually no freedom of action in cl.etern1ining 
1,1l1at f·oods tl1ey 1• rould. import. 37 Later, a · ter tl1€ e stablishment of 
Gapinc�o, the .. . • , ! . I. cl1a11neled most o.f its in1port creclits tbrot�&;h that 
organization (1-rhich in t11.rn c1 istri· uted tl1ern to its Iilembers) uncl.er far 
more lax repayment tE'.rm_s. The arrearaleS o:' · tl1e B.lr . r . , as a result, tre1r.r 
far in excess of th.ose of r11ost commercial banks. liany of tl1e nevT l>_orroi:-rers, 
reported Margorie, considered f; . N . I .  loans to : e cifts, and. i-rhen reminded that 
. . 
repayment 1-ras expected; they frequently". co1.·,plained that the bank l-lras 
colonial. 38 J�  mid-1951, }·lr . I1-ra l(usuma. Surnantri, 'tv'hO only eicht months 
36. Karim, op. cit . ,  p .  2L�L.; Pank Indonesia Report, lo53-195L., p.67;
Bank Indonesia Report, 19S5-1956, P• BO . l'�t the en�;·; ·of 1954, on the eve of
its reoreanization, B . 11. I .  outstanclin[ credits amounted to Rp.610 million. 
37 • Speech, 29 .Sept . ,  R.I> . 1950, pp. 898-899. The repayr11ent terms to
�-Thich Achsien objected. 1-rere: 1/6 imrn€diately, 3/8 1-;rhen the 1·,ill of lacling
·arrived, and tl1e balance in 45 days. 
JL . Cf. Sche/fer, op.cit. , p.  140 . Concf'.rninc Capindo, see Chapter XXIV.- - ... 
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before had proposed that a l l  foreign excha11t1e be administered bJr the 
B.fl . I . ,  was demanding a house-c leaning in the banl<: . He not only dis­
approved of its credit po ltcy (which he a lleged caused the loss of 
funds provided b�r the Government) ,  but a lso of tts persorli.1el po licy, 
1-1hich he considered to b2 based on f riend and fam-i . ly- ties .3
9 As a 
result of contmued defaulti11g hy importers, tl1e B. ?.J . I .  was co1i1pel led to 
reduce its scale of financing them durinr:, 1951, at the end of 1.nrhich year 
half of the Rp. 180 mi l lion in credits exta'1ded to impcrters 1,1as sti l l  
in arrears". 
40 
&J 1952, hov1ever, the hank v:as again busy serving importers, 
for having introduced more busmess-like methods :in providing loans, 
it received a large infusion of C£1.pita l from the G·overnment. 
In its po licy of helping "Indonesian" irrrrorters, the B.}J . I .  lir,1ited 
its c redit extension primarily to ''" indigenous" companies. This quickly 
drew an attack from Siauw Giok Tjhan (Chinese mmority) , a 11arxist and 
a principal promoter of hate campaigns acainst foreign _ capital ( so long 
as the term was not construed to apply to Chinese capital) .  Siauw 
ca lled this practice evidence of the c rimirna l �'asli" (indigenous) po lic)'· , 
which violated the Constitution.
4
i 
39. Speech , 1 June, R .P. 1951, p. 4446; cf. speech, 3 Oct .  1950 , 
R.P. 1950, p .  1269.
The Government replied that it wou ld seek improvements , but v1arned 
that strict measures a[;ainst debtors shou ld not run contrary to its .
intention that an Indonesian businessmen' s  group be developed .' ltep�r,
15 June, R.P. 1951, p.  5100e. 
40 . Lapu.ran Bank Nega:r§.. Indonesia , pp• .15-175. 
·"41. Speech, 18 Oct .  _,j,1. P� 1950, pJ.91.S. - Si.am,r suggested that a person 
with a name like "Sidin" , who might have once been an agent for the ·  
Dutch military- intel ligence and a traitor could get a B .tJ . I .  c redit, 
vrhereas···a person named "Tan" who rr1ir:ht have served with the Inqonesian 
arrried forces could not". 
c17n 
/ / 
The iic..tsir Govor:uaerit 1�plied 1r.i.tl1 a series of rl1etorical questio�1s 
which sci.id in e.ffect that per1dmL the end of the period for rejecting 
citizensr1ip (27 Decern.ber 1951) , it 1-.ras difficrtlt to differentiate betvireez1 
citizens ar1d non-c itizens in the c:1inese trot1p; tr1at the C· inese Lroup 
held an important position in the economic ar1d financial field, and that 
the Ch 
. 
l d many oppor uni ies ou si  t . d .e I3 n ... • T. • btam ere . 1inese 1a t . t . tl1e , to o d . t , 
which 1.-1ere closed to indigenous c itizens; and that funds available to 
u T. 1  . • .  the ) ··T '. •  vlere · ery lirr.ited in an1aunt 1t,1hereas alien ban](s hact far greater 
financial resources . It sugr.'..estecJ that tl1e B.  · .  ·� . c redit polic;y- ,, as 
determined by difficulties and. practical considerations a11d 1·1as not 
int8r1ded to discrirnina te bet1r1een j_11digenous and. 11on-i.vidigenotlS ci tize11s". 42 
The five-} ear terr1 of the 13. :t '  . I .  o� ficers e:zpired in mid-1951, but 
since a reorgan:i_za tion was still pending , they were allo11ed to retain 
their positions". The first major personnel r�organization came under the 
Ali Sastroamicljo jo Cabinet, 1,-rhe11 effecti·,,e 1 No�rember 1953 , the leader­
ship of the D . :d . I. and the B . I .  1 .  1r1ere shaken"_ up . i 1are;ono 1r1as appoin�ed 
chairman of the -1 . ,  r .  I . "' s Supervisory Council, leav:i_ng the t·Jay clear for 
First Vice President !· bdul KHrir.-t to mo· e up as Actin[; .?resident.  On 
1 J;rarch 195lt , he ·uas made full Preside11t . r tear1'while, Gond.osuw:Lrjo 
n1oved 11p from Second to First Vice President," and from outside". the. 
bank r·ir . f?. .i . . Iladiono K11sumo Utojo was chosen as $econd Vice .President.  
Al.though the change in officers 1rr2.s not so dra"stic· as that of the Bank .
i , 
Industri IJegara, i t  ,,ms still eenerally consid.ered as another move to 
42 . Government 'teply, 25 Oct . Il.P. 1950·, pp . 22l
r/-2218. 
9Go 
strengthen· the position 0f the ;., • !. : • I .  in bankinL circles1:-J 
i rThe "emergency" lav-1 reorgan i z inr, the .., . . . , t-1hic)". had 
1for four · ·ears, \-rai · finally promulgated in Februar:·. 1955, retroactive to 
the beginning of the )'ear. The 1955 i3ank lie[ :ara. Tndonesia Lmere;ency 
Law rescinded t:ie 10L{ charter, decl[l_rir1r; ti1e .- ;.i : .  I .  to be a State­
owned banl{ and a lei;;; 1 entity authorized. to perform -Lts task on tl"ie 
basis of tha.t la\-r". It defined tl1e task of the :aa�1k as "to help promote 
the prosperit:y- of the Y"leople and nationa.l economic de,,elopment in the 
field of com.Tflerce in e enerc' 1 and the impart 2.nrl ex�rt tracle in 1Jarticular .  1 1  
lhe capital was set at 1p . JOO million (a fi; ;ure lln. 55 - ,illion less 
than the \-Torkinr; canital t-rhich. the Go· ,errunent had up to then ::,rovided). 
·The new lall provided--like the 1946 regulation and the : �nk Indonesia 
lStatute--that t1e executi··1e officers had to be citize11s of Indonesia 
and could not be related ,1ithin the th:i rd 0.e: ··ree . Those then in office 
. .
retained their positions, but the Su ::ier·visor:.' CoW1c; 1 was revi sed so 
. .
that the Treasurer General became ex-officio chairman.44 
. ,. 
' .  
tJ. "Keputusan ?resoiden R.I .  r,ro. 95� 2£ i.ta.y 1953, 11i\Jo. 183",  31 Oct.
1953; and "No. 6L1J 10 liar. 1954. KusUl'TlO Utojo, v7ho had been the first 
chief of the Ie.bor l1ediation Service of the i ;inistry of Labor,"· resigned
as vice f\,esident of Veer.i Djavra Madura ll. V. to accept this appointment .  
He, like Abdul Karim, were P.1-T .I. members. .Abadi,  23 Oct. 1953.. .
Subsequently, Jari Daniel 1,1ASSIE (of P.R.N.), a B.a.r. inspector, 
l-ras raised to the position of Deputy Vice ?resident ( retroactive to 1 
tTo�mber 1953) and to (Third) Vice Presiden t on 1 l-Tarch 1954.
:rKeputusan Presiden R.I. l1o. 209,"  28 Dec. 1953; 11J1To. 88 11 , 2'9 liar. 19SL, . 
44. 11tJnd�"lg·-undang Darurat Po. 2/1955" , Lembaran -1'Tegara R.I. 1955, 
:-ro .  5. The law ' s  elucidation said that the corporation form had been 
rejected for theo- B.N . r � - because there was only one stockholder ( the State) 
and 1dlereas the Government' s  task was a social one, corporations were 
individualistic"-capitalistic. As a legal entity established by statute-� 
like the B.I .. N·. and Bank Indonesi.a-;,,.it could work freely in the field of
European and adat law. 
By a coincidence the only two ex-officio members specified for the
Supervisory Cotmcil in the lat! vrere P .1-T .I. incumbents, namely the
Treasurer-General (l1r. R. Soegiarto) and the Secretary-General of the 
1 iinistry of Economic Affairs (1Ir. Soerna.rno)". 
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Now that it was legally a commercial bank instead of a bank of 
·issue , the B .N.I. , opened its first forei
.
gn ' branch, in Singapore , in 
.
November 19 5 5, thereby becoming the first ·'national·"· Indoensian bank 
with an office in that important port • .45 
B.N.I.  Subsidiaries 
.,The 1955 B.N.I.  Emergency Law prohibited the bank from participating 
in the capital of enterprises, unless such was ;'necessary- and good for 
the development of the State and national economy"" ·"or by permission of 
. '
the Minister of Finance. In effect, therefore, the B .N.I.  could con-
tinue to participate :inro11corporations, as it had been" doing since 1946 , 
first on a slight scale , then since 1950 (when it essayed development 
work ) on a more significant scale. Moreover, it continued financing 
many operations outside the field of foreign trade , which field, despite 
its constituting by far the largest part of the bank 's  work , seldom dur- · 
ing its first five years of renewed existence accounted for more than 
half of the outstanding credits.46 
In 1950, the B .N.I. was the principal founder of a shipping company 
and an insurance company.47 Although by then its principal task has be­
come the financing of Indonesian newcomers in foreign trade , and one 
B .N.I.  subsidiary--C .T.C.--was developing as a leading Indonesian 
national company in foreign trade , the B.N.I. establishe_d another 
45. "P�ndjelasan"a , Tambahan Lembarari-Negara R. I .  No. 749; Bank
Indonesia Report, 1955-1956, p. ·80. 
46. Karim, op.cit. , p. 244; .Bank Indonesia Report, 1955-1956 , p.
80. Outside of trade , the B.N. I. had provided credits to companies in 
industry, arriculture, transportation, and publishing. 
47. See N.V. D,iakarta Lloyd in Chapter XXII, and " Insurance 
Companies", infra. 
commercial subsidiary in October 1950, N.V. Perser.oan . Dagang aPu tera". 
Putera's establishment--although it  had an initial",.paid-in capital of 
only Rp.20, 000 , it  was soon importing many government· orders--was n ot 
l ooked on with favor by some politicians, since it was suspected to be a 
P.S.I. firm an d one of its fou n ders a n d  eventually its president was 
Drs. TAN Goan Po, crony of l1inister Sumitro, and the head of its Board 
of Directors was Mr. R. SOEDIMAN Kartohadiprodjo (P.S.I.).48 
In  1952, having made most of the preparations, the Bank Negara 
In donesia acting through Putera join tly financed with the B.I.N. the 
establ"ishment  of the N. V. I ndonesian Service Compan.v, which operated an 
assembly plant at Ta ndjong Priok an d on the board· of which Tan served.49 
Minister of Defense Hamengkoe Boewon o subsequently was taken to task by 
some members of Parliament  for allowing his ministry to purchase tires 
through Tan. The minister denied the charge of Ir. Sakirrnan (P.K.I.)  
that there was something wrong with the transaction an d pointed out that 
the tires had merely been ordered through Pu tera (of which Ta n happened 
to be president ) ,  which was the representative of the manufacturer in 
the Netherlands. Nevertheless , one"· of the points cited by Zainul · 
Baharuddin ( non-party) in the justification"-of the motion of· n6rt� 
confidence in Minister Hamengkoe Boewon o proposed on 23 September 1952 
remained the allegation that prominent  members"- of his ministry ha d 
48. See Charter 76/t9.51 •": Iwa wondered whether the Governmen ·t had 
approved the B.N.I.9s investing in an other import-export company while 
its money was "badly needed by In donesian businessmen"". Quer.r, 4 Nov. , 
I.P. 1950, P• 582. 
49. See Chapter XIX." , The Putera· charter indicated that it was to
participate in a nd  manage in dustrial en terprises. The I.s.c. had Dutch 
vice presidents. . The other two members of its boar d  of direc·tors were ·"
represen tatives of the B.I.N. an d B.N.I . ,  respectively. 
- -
. �- . 
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designated "certain organizations" to undertake purchases for the entire 
·anned ; ·f't>rces, · which · ·stteng·thened the". charge that this provided material 
profit to a "certain grouprt/£he P.s.1.7. He elucidated on 1 October by 
citing the intermediacy of Putera and I.S.C.--in both of which Tan was a 
principal officer and Dr. Sumitro was alleged to be the adviser--in the 
purchase of over Rp. 8 million in tires for the Ministry of Defense."SO 
The Zainul Baharuddin motion and its attack on the two B.N.I. subsid­
iaries did no .t come to · a  vote, since the "October 17th Affairn 
- . .
intervened. Meanwhile, Putera , like its sister company--the C .T.C.--
flourished in the importing field and became active in exporting • 




Bank Rakjat Indonesia 
Of all the Indone·sian state commercial banking institutions only one 
twice went through the experience of Indoensianization: the Bank Rakjat 
. .. · •· · : ·. 
Indonesia."51 The B.R.I. had been originally organized out of the Syomin 
,' ' •t ( 1 






. . . : ( 
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Volkscredietbank. However , with the return" ·of Dutch control over parts 
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branch offices operated ' by the B .R.I.  Since during late 1949 B .R.I.  
. .... . · . ·· ·� . 
branch offices in the Jogjakarta Republican area were re o�ned, Indonesia 
. .- . .;·; 
SO. I.P.  1 2, pp. 769, 782-783, 81.7, 835. Co-signers of the motion 
were Kobarsjih Partai Murba) ,  Bebasa Daeng Lalo (P.R.N. ) ,  A .B .  Mohamad 
Jusuf (Partai Buruh) , and Rasuna Said (non-party).  
51 .  The postal savings bank, the Bank Tabungan Pos, went through a
similar experience as it replaced the."Postspaarbank for a second time. 
·Its first Indonesian: _pr�9ident , R.S. na+mosoesanto , was reappointed to
·that po'sition early "in 1950. 11Undang2 narurat No. 9:1 , 13 Feb. 1950 ; 
"Putusan Presiden RIS No. 200'' , 23 June 19.50. 
after the transfer of soverei gnty foun d itself with two vers.ions of a 
state bank for agricultural and m iddle-class credits , one with he ad­
quarters at Djakarta and the other at Jogj�arta.  
Shortly after the establishment of RIS ,  the name of the A.V.B. was 
changed to Bank Ra.kjat Republik Indonesia Serikat (BARRI S--People 's Bank 
of the Federal Republic of In donesi a ) .  The name change di d not en d 
confusion , for those branches under the B .R.I .  retained its name , an d 
some of the branches were not sure which set of instruct ions to follow. 
Then by decree of RIS Min ister of Prosperity Djuanda on 16 l1a,rch 1950 ,  
Presi dent Harsoadi of the B .R.I". was name d  Presi dent of BARRIS ,  while 
the outgoing head of BARRIS was designated advisor for BARRIS.  Two weeks .. . 
later , on 30 March, by joint announcement of the two bank systems 
BARRIS was redesi gnated ''B.R. I .  (A. V.B . )  :, and each system was assi gned its 
own territory. Those branch offices of BARRIS within the area of the 
Republic at Jogjakarta were converte4 into B.R.I.  offices • The . B.R. I. 
. . .
continue d  operating under the 1946 government regulation which . . 
establishe d  it , while the B . R.I . (A.V.B . )  operated un der the 1934 
ordinance which had set up the A.V.B. 52 . . 
The rationali zat ion of the B .R.I .  systems , which operate d 101 
.branch offices at the outset of 1 950,  went on slowly before and after" ,
the formation of the unitary state". A reason for this was that many"·of 
the Dutch personnel in the former A.V.B . system applied for home leave 
and remained in the Nether lands , while trained Indones_i a.n. replacements 
' . 
52 . Scheffer , op.c it . ,  pp . 127-128. Although the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry at Jogjakarta provided fun ds to be channele d  to small
in dustry through the B.R.I . ,  reflecting  its original agricultural stress
the bank was put administratively under the Ministry of Agriculture". 
"Peraturan Pemerintah No . 6", Jogja, 21 Feb .  1950. 
were not ·always immediately available. Dutch personnel remaining on the job 
had a higher pay scale than the Indonesians. of the original B.R. I. offices, 
which caused some dissatisfaction among Indonesian personnel. 53 
It was not until April 1951 that a new regulation was proclaimed for the 
B. R. I. , which had absorbed the B. R.I. (A.V. B. ) system. The principal purpose 
of the new"·"regulation was to define the tasks of the bank, which,"it had long 
since been decided, would emphasize credits to "middleclass" businessmen rather 
than to farmers as c1uring the Dutch period. One of the justifications c.ited for 
·the new regulation was to aid in carrying 011t the Government ' s  economic plans, 
principally tl1rough granting credits to the "middle-class". Among other pur­
poses specified were handling funds of the autonomous regions, accepting savings 
from the public, and providing advice and aid to rural credit organizations and 
cooperatives. The B. R. I. was authorized to conduct general banking and to 
grant loans to grot.1ps other than the "middle-class" so long as other credit 
bodies were not able to meet their demand satisfactorily. A provisional article 
provided that sn1all-scale credits and supervision of village banks. and rice-sheds 
would gradually be turned over by the B. R. I. to an organization specified by 
the iViinister of Trade and Industry. 54 The bank operated as a semi-autonomous 
body within the l·Iinistry· of Trade and Industry. Since the A. V. B. l1ad been 
created by ordinance, the Government in March 1951 submitted a bill to Parlia­
ment for its abolition, and it 'tvas passed later in the year •.55 
53. Laporan Bank Rakjat Indonesia, 19.53, PP• 20-22. 
54. 11Perat11ran Pen1erintah lio. 25, n 21 Apr. 19.51. The· Department of
Cooi.:,eratives was st1bsequently designated to tal�e over craduallJ- the small-scale 
and rural services of the bank. 
5'.J. "Undang-undang No. 12, 11 29 .Aug. L951 The B. R.. .I • . was p�t in charge 
of the liquidation of the A. V. B. 
! � . . . •• .  
The c apital of the B.R. I. was not fixed at a s1.,eciiic sum by its n 3w 
• : _  . . ·:
regulation , and the s ize of the loans it g ran ·ted was th. s det,en dent ,. .pon·
c ont ributions which t he Government mac�.e to the bank. Tl1ere 'was a"•.•n e  ·,ulous line 
betiveen those cont ributions lvhich were c apital increr.1ents and those which were 
advances of working capital. Start ing vritl1 a "capital" of 9.5 rni.llion rupiahs 
after the t ransfer of sovereiunty, t l1e B.R.I. received another- Rp. 17. 8  million 
from the C'r0vernment Gurin g 1950 an d took over assets of t l1e A.V. cl. a• ;1.o unting 
t o  Rp. 39 million . In 1951, the Government cont rib11ted fc.p. 15 inillion , and in 
1952, anothe r  Rp. 150 million (t1io-thiros of which was earr,1arked for middle­
class loans) .  Other 1-1orldng c apital was d rawn from savin"t" s  and other deposits , 
which exceeded Rp. 200 million in 1952.56 
As Table 43 ind icat es , t he B. R. I. ' s  business c-:>nt inu all;y ex1Janded during 
the period under review except for t l1e recession year ·of 19.54.- Tl�e expansion 
was only partly attributable to inflat ion . Its p rirnary cause ivas in creased 
act ivit�, by small
. 
busines.;:;.57 Arrearages , hov-1ever, continued at a high rate, 
amountin g  to fou"rteen percent in 1954.58 JJ. t hough su ..ch 
56. Laporan Bank Rakjat Indonesia 1953, PP• 19, 100. About Rp . 20 1nillion
in cash and Rp. 19 million in securities was t aken over from the 1�. V. B. By
t he end of 1952, according to the Government 's ac counting,  its "ad vances " to the 
B.R. I. tot aled Rp. 169 million . i\1 ota I(euangan 1954, Table VI/III. 
57. La u ran Bank Rakjat Indonesia 1953, PP• 17 , 61�. T he number of borro·w­
ers rose from 3 ,  ,000 in 19 O to c�OS,3 in 1952,  bt1t fell to 663,838 in 1953
( because of the reduced n umber of ru ral clients) .  The average loan rose from
Rp. 329 in 1950, to Rr-1• 6�3 in 1952, an c� Rp. 1287 in 1953. 
- . . . . ' . .. .. 
5J. Cf. Statistik 1956, P• 170. .Arrearages-: 'clropped from 16% to 11%





high rates reflecte� _somewhat the continued relatively unstable 
� t·..,}.� . . ,. • . : . 
..., .
economic conditions and (in places)  local insecurity, the Bank ascribed· ; them 
also to the reduced·
. .
moral level among many borrowers, as evidenced in a lack·
of any feeling of an obligation to fult.ill their business contracts, which was 
a consequence of the long years of war and deprivatio�.59 On the other hand, 
because of the short-term of most B .R.I.  loans (usu ally under one year),  which 
often needed to be repaid before their benefit had been · fully felt, many . 
borrowers made a concerted effort to avoid arrearages by repeatedly applying 
for additional loans in order to pay off earlier ones .60 
As Table 44 shows , the share of credits outstanding ( as well as extended) 
in the "middle class" category rose continually, in keeping with the change in 




Year Loans granted Loans repaid Loans outstanding Arrears 
1950 109 81 . 28 62 7 · 
1951 310 236 74 135












Source: Statistik 1956 , p .  170. 
59 . Laporan Bank Rakjat Indonesia 1953, pp. 38-40, 83-87 • 
. : 
60. Finance Committee Report ( read by Soendjoto) ,  26 M ay, I . P. 1952,
pp. 498-499.  
48 43 
1953 94 13 
67 
988 
Table 44: B�a�·1 .  Credits Outstanding, by Category of Borrower, 1950-1955 
(in miJ.Jlons of ru1Jiahs) 
. .
End of Agrarian sphere Fixed income persons Jviiddle-class, etc.





6 ---a 22 
58 
1951 65 12 9 58 
21 9 148Dec. 1952
Dec. 








68Dec. 1955 106 18 84 14 L16 
Source: Laporan Bank Rakjat Indonesia, 1953, pp. 26, 102-1075. 
�anK Inaonesia Iieport, !955-19$6, p .  81 . 
emphasis of the bank ' s  duties. Although the "middle-class" category was used 
by the bank to cover many groups besides local businessmen,- credits to business­
men have not unexpectedly shown a tremendous increase, from Rp.18.4 million 
during 1950 to Rp.224. 7 mi�ion during 19.55.61 -
It  would hardly be expected that a large state organization with branches 
scattered throug�out the country in". virtually _every kabupaten could be entirely 
free from politics. The B.R. I .  was no exception. Late in 1953, its central 
management headed by President Harsoadi (P.N. I . ) ordered the transfer of 
. ... , • '' 
Rulanana and R. Djumarma (Masjumi) from the posts of head of the B.R. I .  
Bandung branch and head of the important West Java inspectorate, respectively, 
to less important posts. The reason given was that the Bandung branch had 
granted loans in excessive amounts without proper security and without clear--1· 
ance from Djakarta. After attempts were made to get the management to revoke 
�l. Statistik 1956, p. 170. The B.R. I .  financial statistics were con­
tinually subject to revision and the sub-categories of borrowers were often
grouped together in different categories .  Consequently, the · data presented 
in the first B.R.I .  report and in Bank Indonesia reports as well as the 1956
volwne of statistics seldom contained identical figures.  
its order·, D'jumanna and· the· heads and sta,t'fs .. of ten branches in West Java 
threatened to resign. Then on orders .from -11inist.er Iskaq, Djumarma and Rukmana 
were suspended. Still recriminations flew back and forth between Djakarta and 
Bandung. Suddenly, on 17 December 19.53 , 11arsoadi, who had. been with the A.V. B. 
since its founding and had , held the top B.R.I. post for over seven years , 
resigned. Since the two vice presidents refused to act in his place, Mi_nister 
Iskaq appointed Chairman Soeria Atmadja of the B.R.I. Supervisory and Aid 
Council to act as president. Weeks late.r a special government regulation 
legalized this move. Meanwhile, a three-man commission investigated mistakes 
in the personnel and credit policy of .. the B.R.I. management.62 .'When no c;,ther 
suitable candidate was found, the hard-working Soeria Atmadj,a was appointed 
B.R.I. President, rel·inquishing his .position as Chief of the Directorate of the 
(Smallholder) People.t-s Ecpnomy in the Ministry of Economic -Affairs • . 
Jajasan I{redi t 
Those Indonesian businesses already established and operating had relative-
ly little difficulty getting some kind of credit from the B.R.I. and after 
mid-19.50 from the B:N.I. so long as they had sufficient property to post as 
security. However, the would-be entrepreneur wishing to start a .new business 
and lacking the capital therefor, seldom could obtain a loan from either the 
state or the private commercial banks. To overcome this problem, several 
-
62. Aoaa.i, 10 Dec. 19.53 ; Antara, 17 Dec. 1953 ; "Peraturan Pemerintah No . 
8" ,  9 Feb. 1954. Harsoadi had also been Chairman of the Supervisory Council
of the Bank Tabungan Pos. The impartial commission consisted of Mr. R.A. Karta­
djoemena (Director General for State Revenuer in .the Ministry of Finance) ,  
M r. Sukasno ( B.I.N. ),  and Gondosuwirjo (B.N.I. ). Second Vice President Pannin 
M artokoesoemo resigned and became head of the Bank Umum �asional,. infra. 
,.,
ad?pinistrative offices in the �inistry: of Trade and Industry undertook to 
provide commercial credits. Since new problems of · ·administering such credits 
arose, Minister Sumitro on 28 November 1950 decreed�"that a Jajasan Pemusatan 
. .
Djaminan Kradit Rakjat (Foundation for Centralizing Guarantees for Popular 
Credit)"should be set up . Three days later by notarial act such a foundation, 
or Jajasan Kredit for short, was set up l\·-t th Soeria Atmadja (Director of the 
People' s  Economy and its creator) as Chairman."63 
The Jajasan Kredit1 s purpose was to help develop the people ' s  ( smallholder) 
economy by making credit available to smal l businessmen and cooperatives which 
could not otherwise obtain credit through existing banking institutions be­
cause of lack of proper commercial security. Although the foundation itself' 
screened all its credit applications, it operated by charmeling funds {which 
it had received from the Government) to the B.R.I .  and B .N .I . ,  which in turn 
on the basis of these ""guarantees" made the necessary loans. Eventually funds 
were channeled through the Bank Industri Negara and private Indonesian banks 
as well". 
Despite the foundation ' s  complete name, the process of centralizing the 
source of Government credit assistance did not immediately occur since 
separate government departments still provided credit individually, with much 
duplication and overlapping of work resulting. Consequently, a new charter 
was decreed by the Minister of Economic Affairs on 4 June 1952 which limited 
participation by government departments to an advisory role·" and provided that 
the foundation would be financed by the Java Bank under Government guarantees. 
Since the money available to the foundation was not unlimited, it was decided 
to restrict its scope to providing credit for "productive" purposes .  Con­
sequently, it no longer considered applications from purely trading concerns". 
63. Soeria Atmadja, "Jajasan Pemusatan Djaminan Kredit Rakjat" , Batik 
(Djakarta) ,Aug. 1955, pp . 4-9; Java Bank Report, 1951-1952, p.  87. 
- . 
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At the same time the actual administration of credit guarantees was to be 
decentralized by setting- up a Jajasan Kredit Daerah (Regional Credit . 
Foundation) in certain provincial, c,apitals.64 
Since the Jajasan Kredit took over from government departments operations 
which fell within the scope of their welfare plans and officials of such 
departments served on its administrative boards, strictly commercial consider­
ations were not always used in approving credits. Since credits .also went 
only to clients who could not qualify for them from the regular banks, the 
rate of arrears was extremely high. Many of the borrowers considered such 
credits to be gifts. With its capital quickly dissipated, the foundation 
adopted much stricter measures of administration. In the meanwhile a 
commission set up by decree of the Minister of Economic Affairs on 6 March 
1953 considered ways of reorganizing the foundation· and its operation . 
Gradually, in line with the commission ' s  findings, grew sentiment- to changing 
the foundation into a credit guarantee or insurance body .-a�<:J. to". providing . 
that the banks themselves screen applicants lacking sufficient security and 
grant loans from their own capital under guarantees from the foundation .65 
64. Panggabean, op.cit. , pp . 67-72; Java Bank Report, 1952-1953, pp. 82-
85; Warta Ekonomi untuk Indonesia, V (1952), p .  411. Two new organizations 
of smallholder farmers, Ja asari Tebu Rakjat (Jatra) f .or sugar cane, and 
·Ja asan Perkebunan Repub i n onesia Perrin for tobacco" were the largest 
orrowers. 
' ' : ' ' . . ' 
65 .  Bank Indonesia Report, 1953-1954, pp. 72-73;- . Bank Indonesia Report
1955-1956, pp. 87-88". Early in 1956 the Jajasan Kredit was reorganized
following the above principles and renamed Jajasan Lembaga Djaminan Kredit
(L.D.K.--Credit Guarantee Institute) . 
Cf . I .P .  1954, pp. 1058-1059 for a breakdown of credits extended by the 
Jajasan Kredit between 1952 and 1954 by sector and by channeling bank . 
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Private Indonesian. �·Banks 
At the time of the establishment of RIS, the four private Indonesian banks 
which had been set up in territory under Dutch military control continued 
operations without undue difficulty". The picture was different for thoee 
established on Republican territory, only the Bank Soerakarta emerging in 
1sovereign Indonesia relatively unscatheci .• 6S All Republican banks , capitalized 
with Japanese or ORI rupiahs, had to reorganize their capital. Since the 
three Sumatran banking corporations and the B.T.C. with their several branches 
and unremunerated services to :the govern.,ient had suffered great losses during' 
the revolution, their reorganizations were quite difficult.67 The Bank 
Indonesia, which was reduced to its head office at Palembang, began reorgani­
zation in late·"1950. Since .its name had been chosen for Indonesia' s  new 
central bank, when the Palembang corporation completed its reorganization 
in 1952 with a loan from the Bank Industri Negara, its name was changed to"· 
N.V. Bank Ekonomi Indonesia. 
66. Scheffer, op.cit . ,  pp. 107-109 . 
67 . Qf . Antara, 29 Aug . 1952; Report of Finance Cimmittee of Parliament 
( read by Soendjoto) , 26 May; IP. 195Z pp
.
•501�504, concerning Bank Indonesia; and: :· 
Yamin speech, 26 Mq, I .P. 1952, pp. 505-506, concerning Bank Nasional N.V.
The Bank Nasional Indonesia N.V. of Surabaja, Indonesia'a  first national
banking corporation, had. its demise early in the Revolution • .  
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Small private Indonesian banks soon began appearing during RIS and the 
Unitary Republic , but few showed appreciable prog·ress. President Sjafruddin 
of the Java Bank, who considered the development of Indonesian private banks 
essential for the economic development of the country, repeatedly reminded 
the new bankers that developing a bank was a slo w  process of gaining the con­
fidence of the customers, especially since Indonesians showed little incli­
nation at that time" to entrust their money to banks. It was necessary that· 
the banks exercise initiative and attract private funds for working capital, 
he preached, rather than expect advances from the Government or the Central 
Bank { which many of the new bankers sought) . Once such.' a bank" was soundly ·"
.
organized with sufficient capital, he suggested, the" Central Bank could · 
assist it with rediscount f acili'ties. 68 
Nevertheless, the new banks often relied heavily" ·"on non-private resources 
for their working capital. The N.V. Kalimantan Banking and Trading Corpora­
tion of Samarinda, the first bank set up during RIS, was once presented with 
a letter of commendation from the Residen of East Kalimantan. Yet for its 
working capital it depended largely on the B .  N .  I ., which loaned it Rp .1.., 500 :,; �"00 
,•
· · { thrice its own paid-up capital)". It reported that if the Government 
would provide it with more funds, it could meet all the credit in the 
karesidenan.69 In Jogjakarta, Rachmat MULJOMISENO� . President of the defunct 
B .T .C . ,  took his personnel and in 1951 set up a new bank, the Indonesian 
Banking Corporation Ltd., with himself as pres±clent. Hq�ever, the bank ' s  
6U. Java Bank Report, 1951-1952, p .  78; Java Bank Report, 1952-1953, p . 78 .  
.
69 . Cf . I .A .  Moeis speech, 21 May, I .P .  1952, . pp. 485'.:466. 
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capital came largely from the Republic of Indonesia Pension Fund. Subsequently, 
under instructions from Finance Minister Sumitro the I . B.C .  was provided with 
Rp.  35 million, and the Kalimantan with Rp. 5 million in assistance. 70 
By mid-1952 the number of private Indonesian banks carrying on business 
reached fifteen. Within the next twelve months , five out of seven new banking 
corporations were established by Indonesians. In subsequent years the rate 
of establishment increased, so that by the end of 1955, approximately seventy­
five private Indonesian commercial banks were in existence.71 
In m:1.d-19.53 a number of these "national" banks formed an association with 
the name Perhimpunan Bank-bank Nasional Indonesia. Muljomiseno became its 
chairman • One of the first resolutions passed by Perbana was that the Govern­. 
ment transfer its deposits still in. alien banks to national banks. Without 
reference to - that resolution, ,  certain cabinet ministers did undertake to do 
just -that. A Perbana conference on 24 April 1954 called on the Government to 
pass laws to protect national banks, to strengthen their capital, to distribute 
the work of the Commercial Section of the Bnnk Indonesia among them, and to 
channel funds for its projects through them". It also urged that alien bank 
operations in Indonesia be restricted."72 
Meanwhile at the outset of the Ali Sastroamidjojo administration, the new 
government indicated that it would give attention to national banks. While 
suggesting that their facilities should be expanded in order that the Govern-
...... 
?o. Statement by Minister of Economic Affairs Iskaq, 20 Apr. , I . P. 1954,
p. 316. The N.V,Bank Dagang Nasional Indonesia of Medan received government
assistance at- that time of Rp. 3 million. 
71."Java Bank Report, 1951-19.52, p. 78; Bank Indonesia Report, 1955-1956,
p. 82; a survey of bank charters by the writer. 
72. Cf. Tjikwan speech, 6 Nov. , I . P. 1953, p .  1049; Pedoman, 26 Apr. 1954;
Bank Indonesia Report, 19.55-1956, p.  83 . Perbana, with 13 members in 19.54 and 
17 by l955 , also conducted banking courses for personnel of its member banks. 
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rnPnt could better serve" ·"national enterprises, it" felt" ·"that gradually such 
.
banks· should amalgamate" in order to conserve capital and personnel so that 
there might be several strong and sufficiently large national banks."73 
What the burgeoning national banks lacked was a system of standards to 
guarantee their healthy development. Although the central bank since 1932 
had supervised savings banks and. obtained information. on a voluntary basis 
from most connnercial banks, it lacked effective supervision over the�. As 
early as the Sukiman Cabinet a draft banking law had been shown the Finance 
Committee of Parliament. Two years later, when the Bank Indonesia act was 
under" . consideration, some members of Parliament, feeling that a general banking 
law first be considered, suggested that such a law should especially regulate 
alien banks in Indonesia. The Government repl-ied that such a bill was in 
final draft and so could soon be presented. It urged however that the B.I .  
bill first be considered so that the Monetary Board would be created. It 
could then subsequently compel private banks to operate in line with the govern­
ment ' s  monetary policy.74 
Finance Minister Sumitro on 2 April 1953 expanded on the general banking 
bill which he hoped to have before Parliament within six weeks . The bill, he 
explained, would authorize the Monetary Board or the· Government to limit 
operations of "alien and other private banks" in metropolitan areas and to in­
duce them to expand business in outlying regions. The proposed law would grant 
73 . Statements, 25 Aug. , 2 Sept. , I .P.1953, pp. 722, 779 . -
74. Indonesian Review, I (1951) ,  p.  279; 111\llemori Djawaban Pemerintah" ,  I.P.
1953 , pp. 440-441 . 
> • 
99(. 
auth9rity for deterndning credit policy as well as categories of credit needed 
and groups to receive credit; it would." even give authority for shifting 
. .
credits "from one group in the community to another."" ThG lQ'!: �rot1ld als::, si)eciiy 
a liquidity percentage to be maintained by private banks and contain provisions 
on setting up new banks, both by domstic groups and by foreign interests. 
Such regulations were necessary,"- continued Sumitro, to prevent any group wanting 
to speculate from setting up something and calling it a "bank" , which would 
endanger the public ' s  faith in existing bona fide banks ."75 
As already noted, the fall of the Wilopo Cabinet precluded an early 
consideration of the general banking bill. Finally, almost two years later, 
> • ' 
pending the statute (the acceptance of which seemed again a long way off),  a 
. 
, ; .  
Government Regulation was issued authorizing the Bank Indonesia to supervise 
credit affairs. The general purpose of the regulation was twofold: to promote 
a sound money and credit system in Indonesia, and to promote the development 
of a system of national banks. Effective 4 February 1955 no institution could 
be founded and call itself a commercial or savings bank without a license 
granted by the Ministry of Finance after having heard 
tl1e , views of the i"ianaging Board of the Bank 
Indonesia. To qualify for such a license a commercial bank had to have a 
75. Minister Sumitro statemen'I; I .P. 1-953 , pp. 459-!�60. Sumitro disclosed 
that the Govermnent had not allowed new foreign interests desiring to set up 
banks in Indonesia to do so until provisions for them to fulfill were con­
tained in a statute". 
Hutomo Supardan (P.K.I . ) whose party in 1950 and 1951 had been calling 
for the nationalization of all banks, merely suggested that the basic banking 
law should set conditions to be met for establishing new private banks (owned 
by citi"zens or aliens ) ,  set condition s· for pri ve.te 1Janks 11hic11 existed bafore 
tl1c tr.:i.risfe:-c of soverei[,nty, specify :?ield. of ope:i.·ations for tl1e re·spe·cti ve 
·banl:n according to tl1eir specialization, anc� deterLd.ne tl1e · relations of all 
ba.11lcs lTitl1 ·t11e bro11,eI·G I bnnk {lrhicl1 sl1otudr. have access to 1)an.1c sec1..ets ) .  
Speecl1, 7 - 1�:')r. ,  I.P. 19.53, i_) . L�6C . U:1der a diffe::·e11t �ove:c11111ent a yea:" late1", 
"'ho11eve�, a .pa:i.'ty comra(le (Scl{irrimn) "::'"� calling' fo:i. the n at i on alization of
banks of 11l ax-e;e foreign capit al11 • Speecl1, 20 lti)r. , I.P. 1954, p.  349. 
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paid-in capital of H.p. 2, 500, 000, and a savings bank, of Rp . 500,000; they 
also had to 1neet prov!�ions set by the f·1onetary Board. Existing banks :had 
to apply for a license within three months. Should banks (especially national 
banks) not qualify immediately, they might be given a provisional permit that 
would allow them up to two years to meet the conditions specified. The Bank 
Indonesia in its turn was authorized to collect a wide variety of data from 
the banks and to issue instructions which they 1:"...ad to follow. For failure to 
comply with the obligations specified by -the regulation, the institution con­
cerned, instead of being prosecuted, would be subjected to the sanction of 
publicity� The Bank Indonesia was authorized .to publish in the official 
gazette any advice which had not been honore�, and if the l"Iini"ster of Finance 
revoked a .,bank licen:se , his decision was also to · be so published."76 · 
Bank Umum Nasional 
The great majority of the private "Indonesian" banks had unspectacular 
historie s. . l'"'Iost of them found the trail of development a slow one fill·ed with 
the risks inherent with new national compani�s which seldom had clients of 
means ." Although political personalities supported certain banking corporatio'nt. 
most of the banks could not be given a party label. Then on 24 November 1952, 
seven years after the chartering of the first Indonesian national bank which 
was to survive, a charter was granted to a national bank that was to stand out 
from the others". 
The P.A. Bank Umurn Nasional of Djakarta was the first bank of significance 
to be founded exclusively by a political party. Its President".was $oewirjo,  
First Deputy General Chairman of the P.N.I . ;  its Vice President was Dr. Ong 
Eng Die; the Chairman of its Board of Directors was lVIr.  Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo , ·"
76. 11Peraturan Pemerintah No . 1/195.5 11 and "Pendjelasan".  
and tha other four directors were P.N.I. members mostly prominent in business ,  
· namely, Dr. A .K.  Gani, dr. Soeharto, Notohamiprodjo, and �loha1i1ad Said. The 
bank ' s  nominal capital was Rp. 2 ,500,000, of which one-fifth was paid in at 
its founding.77 
The next year I skaq and Ong resigned from their positions and sold their 
stock on appointment as Minister of Economic Affairs and Minister of Finance,  
respectively, in the Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet,"78 soon after which Soe�rjo 
was appointed President of the Bank Industri Negara. Despite the loss of 
these key men as officers, the bank continued to thrive under President PAHMIN 
.. 
Martokoesoemo (from the B.R.I. ) .  In late 1953, Minister Iskaq after consul­
tation with r1inister Ong, ordered the Government' s Jajasan Persediaan Bahan 
Perindustrian (J. P.B.P. --Irtdustrial Material Supplies Fund) ,  which had acquired 
sizeable profits from its monopoly on imports of cambrics and cloves for the 
batik and kretek cigarette industries, to deposit Rp. 6 million in the Bank 
Umum Nasional. Soon afterwards the Jajasan Administrasi dan Organisasi 
( successor organ·ization to the A .I.O. ) was instructed to deposit Rp. 4 million 
in the Bank Umum Nasional. Then on 2 March 1954 on instructions of Minister 
of Finance Ong Rp. · 20 million of funds under the control of his ministry in 
the Bank Indonesia were deposited with the Bank Umum Nasiona1."79 
77. See Charter 235/1953. Among the many other P.N .I .  founders were 
Members of Parliament Drs. Yap Tjwan Bing, Jr. Ateng Karta.nahardja, and Sarine 
Mangoenpranoto. The bank ' s official En�lish equivalent (virtually never used 
·in practice ) was "National Universai Bank."  
78. Suluh Indonesia {Djakarta),  9 Feb. 1954. 
79 . Statements by I�inister Iskaq, 2 Dec.,I;. P. 1953, p. 1175, and 20 Apr., I..L;1954 
p.  316. The J .P. B.P.  was sometimes referred to as the J. B .P. (Jajasan Bahan 
Perindustrian). See "Batik and Kretek", Chapter XXIV. 
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The apparent partiality of Minister Iskaq for one private bank over the 
many others which had been operating long before· it was one of seven reasons 
cited by K.H. Tjikwan (r1asjumi ) when he proposed an interpellation of govern­
ment econornic measures on 20 October 1953 .BO J. B.A.F. I•iayor Polak (P.S.I. ) ,  
one of the signers of the Tjikwan Interpellation and Hadji Farid Alwi Isa 
(1'1asjumi ) asked on what grounds Minister Iskaq had funds provided to the Bank 
Umum Nasional and subsequently to _certain other banks. Mayor Polak suggested 
that i .f his measures were designed to help develop the banking system, such 
a task lay more in the ·jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance or the Bank 
Indonesia. "81 
After the first financial assistance to the Bank Umum I\Jasional · had brought 
political reactions, j\1inister Iskaq ordered the J.P.B.P.  to depos'it surns" •in 
certain other ban.ks, namely Rp. 1 , 750,000 with the Bank Surakarta, · Rp. 1 ,$00,0C 
with the Bank Timur, and Rp. 1, 000,000 with the Bank Perniagaan I·ndonesia. 
. ·•, 
Iskaq was quick to point out in his reply to the interpellation" �t.h�t banks. ' . .• ( · •. .{/; ,I�..
other than the · Bank Umum Nasion al. had also received J.P. B.P. deposits. There . · . ." 
was nothing illegal in these measures, he declared. Furthermore, the· private 
banks paid the same 3 percent interest to the J.P. B.P. that the . Bank Indonesia 
·" 82did. 
80. For other details of the Tjikwan Interpellation and Motion , see the
following cha�ter. When the interpellation was drawn up only the J.P. B.P. 
contribution to the Bank Umum Nasional had occurred. 
81. Speeches, 20 Nov . ,  I .P .  1953, pp. 1117, 1124 . 
82 .  Iskaq statements, 18 Nov. and 2 Dec . ,  I .P. 1953, pp. 1108, 1175. One
of the founders of the Bank Timur had been 1"1r. R •" . Soegiarto, a P. N. I .  member 
(in 1953 Deputy Treasurer General ).  The president of the Bank Perniagaan
Indonesia,. R. Kusmu"ljono, was also a P.N.I. member, although he declared his 
bank to be non-partisan . Pedoman , 20 and 30 Nov . 1953. -
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Tjikwan and his associates were still not satisfied with i1inister Iskaq' s 
manner of providing aid aiming at the development of national private banks. 
They consequently listed this as one of the five justifications for a motion 
of non-confidence in the i1ini ster ofEconomic Affairs, lJhich they subrni tted on 
5 April 1954.83 In explaining this point, Tjikwan referred to the additional 
sum which had been provided from the State ' s  own funds.  Minister I skaq, noting 
that such aid had in fact been granted under the jurisdiction of the Minister 
of Finance, pointed out that the Rp. 20 million thus given to the Bank Umum 
Nasional was only one of four grants so made to private banks. He suggested 
that such Government deposits could hardly be considered as arbitrary since 
Rp. 43 1nillion in similar aid had been provided under the past 1/iinister of 
Finance ( Sumi tro) to three other banks. 84 
On 1 December 1954, the Bank Umum Nasional acquired another special 
status. On that date it became the first private Indonesian naticLal bank 
BJ. Speech, 7 Apr., L£ 195L, pp. 276, 2795. Hutomo Supardan expres_sed approv­· ·
al of I skaq1 s depositing funds with national banks. I . P. 1954, p .  245. 
84. Statement, 20 Apr. ,  I .P. 1954, p .  316. Iskaq pointed out that on .
18 Feb. 1954, the Government had depos!ted Rp. 2 milli"on with the B8.nk Kese­
djahteraan Pegawai, and subsequently an additional Rp . 5 million to'"the ·"Bank
Timur and Rp. 2 million more to the Bank Perniagaan Indonesia. The first narned 
bank, established in 1950 to provide financial assistance to civil servants, 
was founded by Mas Soetardjo Kartohadikoesoemo ( of the Government party, FIR). 
By early 1953 it had four offices in Java. Panggabean, op . cit . ,  .p. 11. 
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to be designated as a foreign exchange bank. It was the only private 
Indonesian bank of its kind so honored during the period before the elections.BS 
Stock Exctenge 
Shortly after the installation of the Sukiman Cabinet, Finance Minister 
Wibisono announced that the Government favored the early opening of a stoc·k 
exchange in Djakarta. 86 Accordingly, by emergency law on 8 September 1951, 
the 1"1inister of Finance was authorized to take steps to set up, to license, 
. . 
and to supervise a stock exchange . On l November Minister Wibisono decreed 
the establishment of the Perserikatan Perdagangan Uang dan Effek2 (Money 
�d Securities Trading Association) to make the necessary preparations for 
opening the exchange . Then in March 1952, the association ' s  officers were 
selected, with R.M. Gondosuwirjo ( of B.N.I . ) as Chairman. 
·Finally, on 3 June 1952, the Stock Exchange (which had existed before the 
war )  was officially reopened. Aliens who were experienced in trading securities 
were allowed to become members provided they agreed to train young Indonesians 
in the business. The new and growing r.ole of Indonesians" - on �he exchange 
was a significant step in the direction of Indonesianization."· But· whereas 
the exchange did a brisk business in government bonds, its ·attraction of new 
capital to national companies was virtually non-existent, partly because the 
• < 
. .
85. "LAAPLN A No . 60", 26 Nov. 1954. The Escomptobank, founded with Dutch 
capital during the Dutch period, was the first· private :bank domiciled in 
Indonesia to be designated a foreign exchange bank. Until 1954, the other six 
private banks with that status were all established abroad ( two Dµtch, ."two
British, and two Chinese ) .  In february 1955, the Great Eastern Banking 
Corporatio� of Djakarta (founded"' orily a . few years- ;earlier) bt3_came the only" · 
bank domiciled in Indonesia and established by Chinese capital to acquire the 
status of foreign exchange bank . 
86. Government statement, 7 June,R.P."1951.,. w. 4675-4616; -Indonesian Review,





necessity of registering the shares of national companies reduced their 
negotiability and primarily" -because national :entrepreneurs sought their capital 
vi.:-. bank credits or loans. Consequently, most of the stocks on" · the· exchange: 
and most of their _s_ubscribers remained associated with the European community. 87 
Insurance Compani�s. 
At the time of the establishment of RIS the Maskapai Asuransi Djiwa 
"Boemi-Poetrra 1912" of Jogjakarta was in its thirty-eighth year of operation 
in the field of life insurance. In the field of fire, marine, and casualty 
insurance, however, there wer�- no �ompanies operated by Indonesians. In 
comparison, aliens operated approximately 110 insurance companies in · rndonesia.  
Then on 2 June 1950 the N.V. Maskapai Assuransi "Indonesia"  was set up in 
Djakarta as the country's  first "national" insurance company in the non-life 
fields. All issued shares save one were taken by the Bank Negara Indonesia ,  
. ; .,
and Victor Bernhard TU111IBELAKA, who fonnerly worked with a Dutch fire insurance 
company, became company president."88 
. . '
The B.N.I. was able: -to channel much insurance business to· "Indonesia" • 
. .
However._ , it was not long . before other Indonesian insurance :companies and new .. . 
incorporated . ins,_µ-ance sgen<iies and reinsurance companies were being set up, 
frequently with Dutch technical assistance and Chinese capital � During the 
. , . . 
twelve-month period, roughly equivalent to the term of the Wilopo Cabinet, 
ni·ne new insurance companies were incorporated in Indonesia,  all save two 
87. See Java  Bank Report, 1952-1953 , pp. 86-8·7J ·"Undang2 Darurat 1'1o. 
13/1951", Wart-a· Ekonomi untuk Indonesia, V (1952 ) ,  pp. 202, 437; Bank Indonesia 
Report, 1955-19�6, pp. 88-89 . 
83,SeeCharter 415/1950. Although the company' s  nominal capital was Rp. 2 
million, only Rp. 220, 000 was initially paid-in. Cf. Tumbelaka, "This vJay, 
Please" ! " ,  IDdonesian Review, I (1951 ) ,  pp. 296-298 . 
----- -�- -
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controlled by indigenous Indonesians.89 One of these was N.V. Maskapai 
Assuransi "Murni" ,  again with the B.N.I •. as majority stockholder and Tumbelaka 
as President. Other Indonesian businessmen, including the Big Three (Dasaad, 
Laoh, and Sosrohadikoesoemo ) he.lped set up other such companies, and one man, 
Benjamin Thomas Philip SIGAR, participated in an insu rance agency, an insurance. 
.
company'; and a reinsurance company. Many of the IIldonesian companies joined 
together in . a Kon{i te �Iaskt1pai2 As�ansi ' ·Indon�i� (Committee of - Indonesian 
Insurance Companies) .  Then, following the advice given in May 1953 by the 
Ministry of Finance, several of the Committee ' s  member companies formed a 
reinsurance concern, the P .T .  Maskapai Reasuransi Indonesia, with Sigar as 
presiderit.90 
·" ·The" · burst of · new Indonesian insu rance companies (which did not slacken)  
··was largely given impetus by government protection measures. By decree of; the 
Foreign Exchange Institu te on 12 September 1952, it was declared that foreign 
exchange"- for payments of premiums of marine insurance on imports wou ld cnly be 
issued i f ' "foreign insu rance rates were really more beneficial than domestic 
rates. ·The:•: justification given for the measure was to. conserve foreign . 
.
exchange.91 While '!Indonesian Gompanies were aet up to take advantage of _the 
measure alien :."irisurance companies operating"· in Indonesia were hit, for many 
. .
of them were branches, subsidiaries, or sole agents for companies established 
abroad . Howeve�,"tl:ere was still the possibility that foreign companies- would 
89. Survey of corporations made by the writer. Foreign insuran:ce firms 
reportedly were requested to cede 10 percent of their business to a new compan; 
sponsored by the Government. Meek, The Government, and Economic Development in
Indonesia, 1950-1954, p .  204. 
. . : ,, . 
90. See· comp·any charters. Three of the stockholders of "Murni" were
themselves direct or indirect subsidiaries of the -B.N . I .  --C. T . c .  · ·( trade) ,  I .S .  l
(industry),  and 11Dj akarta Lloyd 11 ( shipping) .  The specified purpose of "l"lurni" 
was the same as that of "Indonesia"". 
91. LAAPLN Circu lar C No 261, 12 Sept. 1952. 
lOOL: 
offer· more  favorable rates". This possibility ended, and Indonesiar! companies 
were given further protection, when effective 19 August 1954, it was declared 
that all transport insurance on imports had to be covered in Indonesia."92 
Company Tax 
Of all the pieces of tax legislation, the one which from the outset most 
affected large corporations and subsequently was revised to discriminate in 
·favor of "newcomers" { principally companies of Indonesians·) . over"· older . · 
established companies (princip?lly owed by aliens ) was the padjak perseroan 
(company tax ) .  
The company tax before the war had been a uniform ten pe reent of net 
profits. During the subsequent emergency periods, the Netherlands Indies regime 
had levied annually a surtax of 300 percent, which raised the effective tax 
rate to forty percent. Although tax measures had to be determined by statute, 
several days after the RIS Government began functioning it issued an emergency 
law continuing the surtax on the company tax at JOO percent.93 A bill con­
firming this measure was then sent to the RIS Parliament. There it did not 
get beyond the section (bahagian) stage of discussion in the House of Represent­
atives, where it elicited from several members such comments as the feeling 
·that it was too great a burden for small companies and the suggestion that it 
be made progressive. 94 
· 
92. LAAPLN Circular C No. 312, 19 Aug. 1954. Because of Indonesia' s  
falling foreiB?l exchange position, this measure too was meant as much to con­
serve exchange as to protect domestic companies.  
93. 11Undang2 Darurat No. 3/19.5011 • 
9h. Some members suggested that the company tax not be collected from 
cooperatives lest the ideal of working to build up a national economy be killed 
(sic ) .  I . F .  1950, p. 11�3. 
lUCJ� 
·Later in"• 19.SO, the Gov:�r,nment set up a Tax Commission to revie1,v existing
tax legislati�n and to recommend changes. Pendl.ng its report, the"· Gov·ernn1ent : 
maintained the ·" existing company surtax and · issued another emergency law 
continuing it for 1951". Again the two emergency laws did not progress beyond 
the sections in Parltament, where a few members proposed that there be a 
differentiation on the tax on ."small and large companies and· warneci· that the 
size of the surtaJC might . injure newcomers. The consensus". expressed on 16 Decem­·
ber 1950 was unsympathetic to the second emergency law because members felt, 
.,.
"\ f
inter alia, that" . it meant. a continuation of the colonial ·"admini"strative system. 't:. 
Late in 1951, Minister of Finance Wibisono had a new emergency law drafted 
which abandoned" the past method of calculating surtaxes. In place of the old .
ten percent tax plus surtu, a new forty percent tax base was decreed. Since 
the State 's  deficit had been increasing and there was growing support for a · 
progressive tax rate , the new emergency law limited the ro·rty percent rate to 
profits under Rp. 500,000, and added 2½ percent on each profit increment of 
Rp.  500,000, to a maximum ·of 52½ percent on profits c"ler Rp. 2 ,500,000. This 
· new emergency law commenced in 1952.96• 
Meanwhile early in 1952, the sections of the Parliament again discussed 
the two previous emergency. laws . In addition to repeating earlier comments, 




5-.-,",Und-an-g2 Darurat ilo . 35/1950" ;  I .P .  15'50-19)1, p .  656. 
The suggestiono in sectiori I'Oi)Oi"ts 1rerc 
li sted anonymously, but sometimes the members repeated them in the plenary 
sessions. 
96. "Undang2 Darurat No . 2/1952'' , and "Pendjelasan " .  .. 
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companies and lowering it for small ones ( especially for corporations of 
Indonesian nationals "which were more cooperative in nature" ) .  Some called 
for protecting the new national businesses, and differentiating between 
Indonesian companies, alien companies, and Indonesian fronts for alien companies. 
In reply to these and earlier comments, the Government disagreed that there 
should be discrimination between treatme�t of companies for tax purposes. It 
also felt that the". tax did not injure newc.omers, for these which suffered 
losses automatically were exempt frQm it.97 
The repeated cabinet falls delayed plenary debates in Parliament on the 
company tax bills. The debate schedu led for 11 December 1952 had very few 
participants. Rangkajo Rasuna Said wanted the company tax revoked, terming 
it a". creation of Dutch infiltrators in the Ministry of Finance and charging 
that its implementation wou ld cause many small Indonesian companies harassment 
by tax officials and force them to close (because of the }ugh rates) ,  which, 
she alle_ged, was just what the "Big Five" were waiting for. Finance Minister 
Sumitro reminded her that the group she attacked would benefit most from 
revoking the measure. Peria Pardede ( P�K.I . )  declared that his party felt 
that national capital was still simply organized when compared with alien 
capital, which was a part of world monopoly capi.tal, Q!ld that the Government 
was obliged under Article 38 of the Constitution as well as the 1945 indepen­
dence struggle to end the monopoly control of the latter. Therefore, he 
proposed, national policy had to differentiate between large alien capital and 
97. One member of Parliament declared that to avoid the heavy company tax
burden Indonesian businessmen tended towards individual entrepreneurships,  
which in turn were weak in competing with foreign capital. I. P.1952 , 11p. 9L�9-955. 
On 15 May 1952, Saroso Harsono ( P.R.N. ) pubicly called for taxing companies 
with alien capital at a higher rate than those with national capital. I .P. 
1952, p .  367. 
�/' 
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national capital through a heavier tax burden on the former and a lighter one .. 
on the latter. 1•,finister Sumitro replied that the effect of the ?-Inplementation 
of the existing tax system was not much different from what Pardede desired, 
for those hit hardest by the tax were large companies which were mostly financed 
with foreign capital. The Government felt, he continued, that should national 
capital threaten to attain a monopoly status it too might expect similar 
treatment. The tax emergency laws for 1950 and 1951 were then ratified.?8 
During 1952 the Indo�esian Government took two steps to improve its 
assessment and collection of taxes from alien companies. By statute, effective 
12 August, the company tax law was amended so that companies were required to 
keep their books in the Ind.onesian language and to use. Latin letters and the 
usual (Arabic ) numberals. This act was primarily aimed at Chinese companies • 
.'. 
Four months later an emergency law was issued further amending the company tax 
law so that companies operating in Indonesia  had to maintain accounts in 
Indonesia for such operations, and the accounts had to be kept in Indonesian 
. ·, ' . . 
currency. This act was aimed primarily at companies with headquarters in the 
. , .. 
Netherlands .99 
Djaswadi Amendment 
The Parliamentary sections did no� get around to discussing the new 
company tax scale for 1952 until a fortnight before the year 1 s end. Although 
three of  the six sections announced majority approval· for the bill to ratify 
98. I . P. 1952, pp. 964-968; "Undang2 No. 23 and 24/1952".  Pardede cited 
recent prof'its by several large Dutch companies in his speech (repeating
virtually the same · "data Djoko Sudjono of SOBSI had used seven months before ) ,
but the Government noted that since the companies cited operated in several
countries, it was difficult to determine the portion ascribable to operations
in Indonesia. 
99 .  11Undang2 No. 9/1952";  "Undang2 Darurat No . 11/1952" • . The latter law
included the text of the earlier amendment and further authorized the Minister
of Finance to grant specific exemptions from the requirement to use the
.:Indonesian language . , · ·· 
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the rate�, in most of the sections were some members who recommended that, the 
new tax progression be extended downward for profits under Rp. 590,000 in order 
to protect the newcomers. One member - declared that the Government should 
balance its policy of accepting alien capital with protection for national 
capital. Someone proposed one or two years"• exemption from taxes for national 
companies. One member suggested outright that alien capital be di�criminated 
against;," and another suggested that the maximum rate be increased to". sixty. 
percent".since this increase would principally affect alien companies."
100 
The Governraent, declaring that it always tried to increase receipts with­
out losing sight of equity or hampering economic development, rejected the 
suggestions for continuing the progressive rate below forty percent because of 
the disastrous effect it would have on badly needed tax revenue. The most. . •. 
equitable type of -tax collection it said would be one calculated on the �er­
centage of the profit based on the size ,�f"the capital . The Goverru-n0nt ci d not . 
favor it, howeve:r., because of the shortage of tax experts and beca,J.se many . . .. . . 
national businesses with little capit� �eeded an opportunity to increase their 
capital through high rates of profit. On the other hand since a huge 
corporation with a profit of only one percent of its capital could still be 
subject to the maximum tax rate, while a small company with a 400 percent 
profit might come under the minimum rate, the Government sought a middle course 
by having a progressive schedule with a small difference between the maximum 
and minimum percentages .  Increasing that difference, it warned, would wipe out 
. . . . ' 
any desire for large-scale investment in the country, which the coun�ry badly 
needed. The Government, asserting that a policy of fiscal restrictions against 
alien capital in line with restrictions in commercial policy was contrary to 
international �sage, noted that the existing law neither strengthened the 
position of alien capital norweakened that of national capita1. lOl 
100. I .P .  1953, pp. 116-117.
101. Ibid. ,  pp. 117�118. 
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The section reports had:" given notice that some merooers of Parli��ent did 
not approve all the features of the company tax rates set by the Government. 
Nevertheless, the Government, foreqasting that total State revenue during J953 
would fall from the 1952 level, submitted a bill setting the same tax rates 
for 1953 as contained in its emergency law for 1952. Debate on the new bill 
and the bill to ratify the emergency law setting the 1952 rates opened on 
2 February 1953". 
. .. : !
Djaswadi Suprapto, speaking on behalf of the P.N.I.  said that his faction 
felt compelled to accept the 1952 company tax bill as a fait accompli. Never­
theless, it considered the existing rates contrary to the party ' s  views on 
the matter,  for the P.N.I. desired that the Government emphatically protect the 
interests of national businessmen, who in general had little capital and 
: .
experience and were weak in competition with giant capital in alien corporationc 
In answer to the Government' s  statement about international usage, DJaswadi 
"declared that his party considered the Indonesian State still was adolescent 
and needed to seek a synthesis between international custom and national factort 
The national government automatically had to give attention to national inter­
ests and should not be reluctant to" - carry out a policy of restriction and 
discrimination between national and alien capital. Accordingly, the P.N.I .  
could only approve the bill on the 1953 tax rates with an amendment which was 
intended to protect national businessmen with small capital, he said. The 
amendment proposed three tax ·"1evels on profits below Rp. Soo,ooo.l02 
-102 . Djaswadi speech, I . P .  1953, p. 125. �pe motion would assess profits
up to Rp. 100, 000 at the rate of 25%, from Rp . 100,000 to Rp. 250,000 at 30%,
and Rp. 250, 000 to Rp. 500,000 at 35%. 
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Tjikwan (Masjumi ) declared that despite faults in tax collection", he could 
appro ve both bills . Mr. Burhanuddin (non-party), however , took sharp exception 
to what he termed were desperate Government e fforts to find more revenue while 
'' ' 
it was slow in reducing expenditures and was establishing more special corp­
orations ,  although there were already hundreds in existence". He also blamed 
the Government for giving licenses and cred its not only to genuine n ational 
companies but also to their sometimes numerous subsid iaries. He consequently 
armounced his support of the Djaswadi motion ."103 
Hinister Sumitro protested that compared to rates in other countries, the 
minimum o f  40 percent was very low. He also declared that the amendment 
discriminated against sing le entrepreneurships and partnerships, which had to 
pay taxes at rates higher than those proposed by Djaswadi , and that it might 
induce corporations to split up into sections in order to come under the lower 
rates . Still, Djaswadi pressed for discrimin ation in favor of national com­
panies until they were able to compete with alien companies.  Suggesting that 
alien companies were more skilled in hand ling their accounts and writing off 
sums in order to reduce their book profits, he added that it was not fair to 
put simple and honest Indonesian n ational businessmen on a par with alien 
companies .  Should the forty percent tax minimum be maintained , n ational 
businessmen would be induced to copy aliens in juggling their books, he warned . 
T jikwan , who felt that Gove rnment protection should best be channeled through 
. ;·. 
commercial policies, wondered whether most o f  the profits under Rp. 500,000 we re 
103. Speeches I .P. 1953 , p.  126. Burhanuddin cited a rep9rt of the Aud it 
Bo�rd which dealt with gove rnment waste of funds .  
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·really made by national companies, · for he knew that since 1951 most national 
companies had suffered losses. Sumitro declared that it was not a question of 
protecting national businesses but one of '(IIJhether it was proper for forty per-. 
cent of net profits to be assessed for the state while protection for national 
companies was provided by other sectors of government policy."104 
A vote was then taken on the Djaswadi amendment. Although the vote was 
38 to 35 in favor of the amendment, the 11pro" vote was 17 short of the number 
needed to carry, since only one-thiru of the active members had cast their 
ballots. Consequently, a second ballotting was r equired. The session, how­
ever, went on to approve the bill ratifying the 1952 tax rate by acclamation.Ir 
Two days later as a second vote on the Djaswadi amendment was being 
. . .
considered, former MinisterWibisono, who had been originally responsible for 
the new tax rates, took the floor to explain the views of the Masjumi in  the 
matter. He declared that the Government had taken into consideration the 
• <
status of the newcomers, all of whose profits were under Rp.  500,000, when i�i . 
had drawn up the nevr tax schedule. Therefore, it had only raised the rates .. 
on profits over Rp. 500,"000. He noted that the way the amendment was worded 
it unintentionally would benefit alien businesses since the companies with 
profits over Rp .  500, 000--most of which were controlled by aliens--would pay 
lower taxes on those;"in�rements of their profits under Rp. 500, 000.  If the 
•.
proponents of the amendment wanted to realize their· goal, he advised them to 
formulate it so that only companies of Indonesit.n citizens be assessed taxes 
- 104. I.P. 1953, pp. 127-129". 
105. Ibid . ,  p. 129; "Undang2 No. S/1953" .  
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according to their tariff. But such- discrimination based on nationality he 
felt would lead to a further growth of the strawman system. Still, Wibisono . ... 
questio�ed whether the protection sought by the amendment was urgent since the 
Government had provided protection in.:"its commercial policy, since most such" . , 
newcomer corporatiqns consisted of only one or two persons, and since newcomers 
which had net lasses _4id not have to pay any tax. He also suggested that many 
who felt the tax to be too heavy were too lazy to go to a tax consultant for 
advice.1O6 
In rep�y,_to a req�est by Wibisono, Minister Sumitro reported that sixty . . 
percent of tax rece.ipts came from companies with profits under Rp. 500, 000 • . .O.f 
this group at most half 'tiere companies of citizens, covering both the" indigenous . 
and the non-indigenous.". Despite this knowledge, Parliament went on to pass . 
the Djaswadi amendment by a vote of 59 to 41, with the P.K . I . ,  PIR, Nahdlatul 
Ulama, and the S.K .I .  joining the P.N.I .  in favor, and Masjumi, P. S.I. , Parkind� 
Kathol�k, and �ome Demokrate opposed. Then at the request of Sumitro it 
agreed �o postpone consideration of the bill until the matter had been 
discussed by the Cabinet.107 
100. Speech, 4 Feb. I .P .  1953 , pp. 130-131. 
The P.S. I. press criticized the support given the amendment by the P.N. I .  
(which called itself based on "marhaenism" ) and the P.K.I .  (which called itself 
the defender of the oppressed classes), pointing out that the amendment by .
favoring a relatively few newcomer corporations in effect discriminated against 
the millions of single entrepreneurships, which in comparison were the real" .
economically weak masses. Pedoman, 4 Feb. 1953. 
107 . Proceedings, 4 Feb.,I. �1953, p . 131. The vote in favor of the 
amendment was four above the minimum necessary for passage. 
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Prime Mini ster -Wilopo took the· action by Parliament philosophically, yet 
many in his Government were in a quandary, for--as Wibisor10 warr1ed--if' its 
bill with the Djaswadi amendment were passed it  would re sult in consequences 
quite different from what Djaswadi and his colleagues had intended.  All 
corporations, not just weak national companies, would benefit from it. It 
wculd also �ean a loss in state revenue of Rp. 100, 000,"000. Consequently, the 
Wilopo Cabinet after reconsidering the matter did not press for passage of the 
bill. This lack of action drew complaints from Djaswadi . However, the Ali 
Sastroamidjojo Cabinet, in which the P .N . I .  w·as the principal party, after 
reviewing the matter withdrew the bill . Pending action on a new law, in 
which i t  was hoped that protection to economically weak companies could be 
provided through lowering their tax rates, the r1Iinister of Finance decreed"·"· 
that a company tax of forty percent would be collectect.103· 
Finally a compromi"se solution was worked out whereby there would be two 
tax schedules.  A general schedule retained the rates used in 1952. However, 
for corporations and silent partnerships set up after 1 January 1950 a special 
schedule was applicable to profits during the fir-st five years of their exist­
ance. Thi s schedule was the same as the other for· profits over Rp. 500, 000, 
..'
but for profits less than that sum four lower rates were specified beginning 
.with 25 percent for. profits up to Rp. 100, 000. Since the Government· found"it 
.· ... ' 
difficult to provide legally for "national enterprises which are weak" , it  
found it  more practical to consider the criterion of age of a company. The 
108. -. ,I . P.-19�3, p .  1191; "Keputusan 1vrenteri Keuangan No. 82065/I . t�. " ,  
11 iviay. 195L. , and "No. 226849/I". N . " ,  27 Oct. 1954. 
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ne1•i re gulation also be came an 'indu cement for inve sting capital in new compani e s ,  
i-11:ti.ch was considered important for economi c deve lopment in Indone si a.  .Fi nally·_, 
on 24 lJoverr.ber 1954, Parli"ament approved the compromise amendment to the · 
comp any tax law whi ch fixed permanent tax rates ,  thus ending the need for 
annu al enactments ."lOS' Although the changes l1ad been induced by efforts to 
protect n ati cn al business, the "newcomers" 'l'trhi ch actu ally benefi tcd from it of 
. . llOa so inc u e some 1 ·cou"rse 1 l d d a 1en comp anies • .  
•During the half dozen ye ars bet1--1een the transfer of sovereignty and the 
.
general e le ctions,  the scope of Indonesi an business activity in"the fi eld of 
finan ce gradu ally expanded". The first half of the period was marked by Indo­
nesi ani za tion of the state banks ,  and the se cond half found new acti vi t;y ·by 
private Indon esion banks . The scale of ope rati or1s of  su ch banks operated 
by indigenous citizens ,  however, remaine d belovJ that both of the State bar1ks 
1C9. 11Undang 2 No . 36/1954" . The new law added a tax level to those pro­
p osed by the Djaswadi amendment in orde r to make a smoother progression . "· Other  
new regulations p revented the new tax bene fits from accruing to corporation 
subsidi aries set up possi bly to take advantage of the low rates to newcomers .  
The re was virtually no de bate over the new bi ll. Djaswadi for the P.N.I.
and Hutomo Sup ardan for the P .K .I .  annonnced thei r approval sin ce the bi ll 
cont ained the spi rit and intention of the Djaswadi .Amendment .  Wi bisono for 
Masjumi announced his accepta�ce since the new bi ll d evi ated far from the 
original Djaswadi Amend ment .  I . P .  1954, pp . 1167-1172. 
110. On 2 Iviarch 195!�, the Gove"rnment beg an imposing a surcharge of 66 2/3% 
on transfe rs abroad in payment for most invi si bles--the T � P.T·. Thi s allege dly 
was to match the import surcharg es--the T.P .I". I mportant exemptions ,  howeve r, 
were extended for transfers of funds". •from alien employees working in companies 
i n  Indonesi a and for transfers of income from industri al enterpri se s  set up 
during 1954 or afterwards .  Because of· the low level ·of the foreig n  •exchange 
reserves, there had up  to then be en limitations on the amount of profits which 
could be transferred abroad . l�!ith the new regu lation ,  hoi-1ever,  i t  was again
possi"ble to transfer all profits after taxes.  "Und ang 2 Daru r.at No . 5/195L." ,  · 
"Peraturan Pemerintah No •" .11/1954" and 11 ::.in. 46/1951.i . "  . Cf. I-.P. 1954, pp. 812-
816, 861 ff. 
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and the long-experienced branches of foreign banks, and only a few were able 
to compete ,d th banks of resident Chinese . In the insurar1ce sector, too, rnan:r 
Indonesian companies sprang up, receiving protection principally in the marine 
field. 
lVJ.any Indonesian enterprises, however, carried accounts with alien banks 
or insurance companies. Consequently, the financial measure which had · the 
most widespread effect on the growing IDdonesian businesses was the cornpromise 
company tax la�. However, unlike the protection extended by the Government 
in banking and to a lesser extent in insurance, it  did not directly discriinina· 
in favor of indigenous citizens. Although, like most "progressive" tax laws, 
it protected the "economically weak", it also favored the "newcomers" regard­
less of national origin--and as late as 1955 not a few of these were still 
resident Chinese aliens. 
Chapter XXIV: TRADE 
. The term 11 Indonesianization" used iI.l an econon1ic frame of referer�ce 
usually evokes thouchts about the de·ielopment of the .:. ·-_--11rting trade, which 
has probably been ana lyzed as thoroughly by competent writers as ar1y other 
sector in the �ntire economy.l Their treatment has been concerned primari ly 
with the effect on the economy in genera l, and the foreign exchange position 
in particular, . of government controls over importing a�d the use of foreign 
exchange". In view of its general scope1 this present work eschews review� 
ing all the individual import control decrees and related measures of foreign 
exchange control which, at least indirectly, might be construed to have had 
some effect on Indonesianization, for which, indeed, a separate volume would 
be necessary. Rather, those measures-in other commercial sectors as well 
as importing-are surveyed, the principa l purpose of which was to redistrib­
ute income in favor of (indigenous ) Indonesian businessmen, which especially 
aroused reactions in the political arenas"o Accordingly, new semi-private 
foreign trade monopolies are included in this review, but not most officia l 
or semi-official trading monopo"lies, which were intended prunarily to main­
tain the smallholder farmer-the backbone of the old, indigenous sphere of 
1 .  For a recent specia lized study of Indonesianization in importing, 
see Nan Amstutz, Development of Indigenous Importers in Indonesia 1950-
1955 (Ph.D. thesis, Fletcher School, in process). At the time of writing, 
the University of C a lifornia••-Universi ty of Indonesia Economic Project of 
the Institute for Economic and Social Research of Universitas Indo11esia 
was undertaking a similar study. 
1016 
1017 
the waning plural economy. 2 
Benteng Importers 
At the time of the establishment of RIS an estimated one hundred· 
Indonesian importers (termed "nei-1comersn by the Dutch) were activ�f;, ,--han­
dling approximately ten percent of the import trade .3 In the federal 
republic., foreign trade came under the jurisdiction of the RIS Ministry of 
Prosperity, whose head., Ir. Djuanda, had led the Republican dele-gati•on in 
the Financial and Econornic Affairs Committee at the Round Table· Conference. 
. ..
In that earlier position, he had been instrumental in drafting:·Article lJ_· 
of the Financial and Economic Agreement in which it was agreed that RIS had 
the right to make 0 such regulations as are necessary for safeg·uarding nation­
al interests or protecting econo1nically weak groups o II Consequehtly; in line 
with that clause Minister Djuanda in April 1950 announced that Indonesian 
importers would receive government protection."so that they would be enabled 
to compete with foreign importers". 
Protection was to be provided by reserving certain categories of goods 
. . 
2 .  E .go , Lembaga Urusan Kapok, Badan Urusan Tembakau, etco On 17 April
1952 the Kapok-Centrale was reactivated and two years later renamed the L oU oK .
The Krosoiccentrale was reactivated on l Ja"riuary 1955 a.nd renamed the B 3U. To, · 
for instead of being financed solely by cesses on the export of leaf tobac-
co produced by the local population (thus 11.k·rosok" ), the ·cesses were extended 
to cover all exports of tobacco including that produced on estates". Since . .the ·B .U .T. also promoted the"production of �Virgmia tobacco fur": domestic
consumption, effective 1 J�e 1955, the larger cig�rette �roducPrs (pos­
sessing m achines with a capacity ·of at least',r5·:'·million per month) were also
required to contribute .  "Undang2 Darurat No. 12/1954" and "Undang2 l)arurat 
. · . .,.- _; _; :- · · 
. ·No. 10/1955" o . · ,  . 
3 a  .Amstutz, op.cit o, oho II. l\1uch of the information ip _the following 
paragraphs, unless other sources are cited, may be attributed to Mrs"o Amstutz 1 s 
monograph. 
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(which became known as 11benteng" 4 goods) solely f9r Indonesian importers, 
and by providing credits (which subsequently were channeled through the 
B . I-J.I. ) . To qua lify for such protec tion, a trader had to be a 0 new Indo­
nesian importer" and a lega l entity such as a corporation, silent partner­
ship, or partnership, and possess a minimum working capita l of f e l003 000, 
an office large enough for 11 severa l full-•time employees" , and offi�0rs with 
previous business experience .  A furthe� qua lification was that a t  least 
seventy percent of the capital had to come from indigenous Indonesians 
(bangsa Indonesia asli) ,  while aliens could possess at  most thirty perc ent":, 
Curious ly, there was no reference, not even for minority participation, to 
non-indigenous Indonesians". 
The qua lific ations prompted Siauw Giok Tjhan (Partai Sosialis and repre­
sentative of the Chinese group) of the RIS Parliament to ask the Government 
what it meant by " indigenous " ,  and to suggest that racia l discrimination 
was contrary to the nationa l ideal of every c itizen of foreign desc ent of 
becoming a genuine Indonesian patriot and democrat as s tipulated in the 
manifesto of 1 r�ovember 1945 . He asserted that such discriminatory meas­
ures would hamper hea lthy cooperation between fellow citizens and lead to 
a system of fronts at  a time when a l l  the capita l and energies of Indo•• 
nesian citizens were needed for nationa l economic reconstruc tion�.5 Thus 
Siauw began his endless campaign to prevent e�onomic discrimination between 
Indonesian citizens-at least where those of Chinese descent were adversely 
involved-with a persistence of determination which  was matched only by 
4. Benteng: lit e , a citadel or protected spote 
5" RIS Dewan Per1-1akilan Rakjat, Pertanjaan Anggota dan Djawaban
Pemerintah, II, (Djakarta, 195l )i PPo 102=1030 
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that of his  campai gn  in favor o f  disc :rimL1ation a·gainst aliens ('t-1hile 
attempting to avoid linking Ch i11ese "tr-1ith th is"· group ) .  
In reply., 1'1inister Djuanda gave"· an elucidation of the C-ovPrnment 1 s 
position concern ing protect ion for indigenous Indonesians : 
The requ irement tl1at 70 perc ent of  the capital must be held by ind i g­
enous Indonesians is based on the Go vernment 's  view that althou gh it 
does not pract ic e rac i al discrim ination, it has fu ll ri ght to make 
regulat ions to protect economically weak groups (see Art". 11 of the 
·�Financial and Economic Agr eement ) .  As is known, ind i genous Indonesian 
nationals as a group are included in th e economically weak. Of course , 
a few· indigenous Indonesians are economically strong, but most of them 
are economically weak. Nationals in this country who are not indigenous 
· Indonesians form the economically strong group .  Of Qourse, in that 
group t here are also economic ally weak persons, but these are only
· . exc ept ions while most are .in an ec◊nom ically strong po sit ion. By pro­.
viding an opportunity for the c apital o f  other than indi genous Indo­
nesians to  participate up  to 30 percent � in Indonesian importing com­
panies, the Government feels that su fficient oppor6un ity has been given for .healthy cooperat ion betwe�n fellow c itizens • • •  
Thus · Indonesian citizens o f  fore i gn descent were gi ven notice that they were 
not to exoect in this matter treatment more favorable than that given ali ens . 
r 
Since the Natsir C abinet in the Unitary R epublic in general continued 
-
the RIS fore i gn trading polic i es ,  during the debates o ver its pro gram, A .A .  
' . 
. .
Achsien (Masjumi ) 1 one of  the few businessmen in Parli am ent, point ed out 
the lack of consistency between the Government ' s  warning against throwing 
out forei gn capital and its subjectin g Indonesian compani es to scrutiny and 
r ebu ffing them if they d id u se fore i gn  capit al. Such actio11s by the author­
.
ities, he asserted ,  induced Indonesi"ans t o  use forei gn capital"while making 
• 
·it appear · to b e  Indonesian. Ach sien also . charged · Indonesians . with often 
.' ' 
acting. ch ild i sh ,  for if they did not succ eed". at something, they. would blame 
6. Statement in Parli ament, 25 July 1950, Pertanjaan Anggota dan 
Djawaban Pemerintah, II, PPo 103-1040 
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foreigners, who allegedly exploited the economy a Since economic law did not 
consider nationa lity, he declared, those who were active, smart, honest, and 
diligent would succeed in their efforts, and if great profits were distrib­
uted among Indonesians without their having to work, when free competition 
returned, they would falter. Consequently, he advocated protection in the 
form of training for the day when Government protection was no longer needed.7 
In reply the Government said that giving ample freedom to whoever was 
energetic, smart, and honest 11 ends with the suppression of the weak by the 
energetic, smart, and dishonest"". It presumed that Achsien did not mean to 
urge the Covernrnent to create capita"lists-even though they be Indonesian 
capita lists-with state money. It then declared: 
• -� o the Government , does not object if an Indonesian organizat::i.on or 
person receives credit assistance from a foreign person or organiza­
tion, but it would object if Indonesians give or se ll their names to
alien enterprises�"8 
A few weeks l ater, however, Minister of Trade and Industry Sumitro, 
while describing new facilities to the 0 economically weak" , declared that 
it was not the intention of the Government to enrich persons while they were 
1 .s eep1.ngo9 
By the end of 1950, new Indonesian importers-who came to be known as 
11benteng importers" since 11benteng goodsn were reserved for them-numbered 
7 .  Speech, 29 Sept. ,  Risalah Perundingan 1950, PP• 896-897, 900 . 
Achsien was joint manager of Perseroan Dagang ntvaras" of Djakarta, a 
nbenteng11 company. He also cited occasions where 0 protected11 national 
importers instead of being allowed to choose their commodities freely were 
often allocated by the C�vernment goods which turned out to be unsa leable . 
80 Government Reply, 11 October, R .P a  1950, PP• 1816-1817"0 
9 .  Ichtisar Indonesia Sepekan, I (1950) ,  20 .o 
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250.10 Duri ng 1951 l:unitations  on the numbers to be recog ni zed in each 
port were re111o ved , and by April 1952-when the \rJilopo Cabi n et took office­
the number of benteng -importers had ri sen to 741. The i n creased activity 
by i ndigenous Indonesians duri ng  the Hatta (RIS ) ,  Natsir ,  and Sukiman admin ­
i strations had been astro nomical. Nevertheless, their number vias s ti ll a 
fraction  of that of other importers, namely 3ll9,  and these too (the great 
.
majority of which were Chi n ese)  disp layed a si zeable gai n "over the total 
number of irnporters-•2202-before the war"o 
11 
National Importers 
Early in 1953 the granting of recognition of importers was suspended 
pending prep arations for the re-registration of all importers ol
12 
Then o n  
30 May 1953 the Department of Trade an nou nced that " Indonesian �trading 
comp anies11 were allowed two months to app ly for reco gnition as importers.  
Among the requirem ents were that· they be legal entities with charters 
(si ngle entrepreneurships and fou ndations were excluded ) ,", and"· p ossess their 
own office sp ace and tl1ree full-time · The lead i ng ..officer : oremp loyees". •
p artner cou ld not hold a similar positio n i n  another importing company • . The 
fi nanci al requirem ents were raised from tr1ose · of  three years ear.1:iei-;·-.·· ··Paid­
i n  capital of. the company had to be at least Rp .250, 000 or its . .wealth 
(kekajaan ) had to be worth at least Rp . 1 mi llion .  All ·stock i ssued by the 
·
• 
10. Indonesian R ev?,e°o/,,J I (1951) ,  p .. '.36� 
.. . 
11. R Q I� :  Kotapradja Djakarta R aja, p �  347 . Data o n  di stribution of 
the new Indonesian importers are fragmentary. (Djakarta claimed seventy 
percent of all tradi ng offices ) • . .  North Sumatra .reported 17 benteng.,,.lirnporters 
at the end o f  1950 and 58 a year later . R � I . :  Prop insi Sumatera Utara, PPo
623�624. Sulawesi had 35 at the end of 1952". R . I � :  Propi nsi Sulawesi , p .
40le 
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importing compar1y had to be  held by " Indonesian nationals" (bangsa Indo­
nesia), and the company charter had to specify that such stock might not be 
sold to other nationals . Prospective importers also had to maintain current 
accounts with some bank, and their officers had to have some business experi­
ence"o13 Soon afterwards, many o ld importers and potential new importers 
amended their charters to meet the capital and stockholders"' nationa lity· 
requirements., and most of these specified that 
0 a l l  stockholders must be 
citizens of Indonesia."11 14 • 
The Government' s  announcement had referred to Indonesian trading com­
panies and ownership by Indonesian nationals.  However., there was some 
ambiguity in the terms". Consequently, the signer of the announcement SARDJU., 
Ismunandar., Chief of the Department of Trade., sent Minister Sumanang a memo 
on 18 June 1953 asking for c larification of the terms, poi11ting out that a 
difference had always been made between indigenous citizens and those of 
foreign descent, who had been treated as alien im�orters"o As a result of the 
announcement, however, many Indonesian importers of foreign descent were 
seeking recognition as nationa l importers in order to take advantage of the 
privileges accruing from such recognition.1-' 
The memo brought a reaction from Mr.  Tan Po Goan (P.SQI. and represent­
ing the Chinese minority)"., charging that the discrimination against non­
indigenous Indonesian citizens practiced by RIS Minister of Pro�per��y 
·.· 
13 . I.P. 1954, P• ,·3·22 .  
14. Survey of charters by the writer . 
15. Amstutz, opocit� 
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Djuand a 'trJ'as still going on .16 However , Prime Min ister Ali , who had taken 
o ffic e  shortly after the deadlin e  for applying for the new recognition ,  
denied that the CbvPrnment d iscriminated against non-ind igenous citizens, 
and agreed that there  was only one (kind of) citizen . Neverth el ess., h e  ·: 
explained , in  that period the Government felt that · it  -was proper to have 
,... ·• ' ,  . . .. . ":. . .
separate treatment in ord er th at a h armonious commerci al middle class could .".·. , ... 




'"'' ;  ...... ·;
During its first months, the Ali Sastroamidjojo Cbvernment interpreted 
. . . .
the nationality stipulation for recognition as nati onal importers to mean 
that at least one h alf of  the c apital had to be pro vid ed by indigenous 
Indonesians and the balance by Indonesi an citizens of  for eign d escent.  Then 
. ,
after more  complaints by Chinese perariakan citizens of .Indonesi·a, includ.ing 
• l • 
· rtai .. K ath olik), 11ini st er IskaqSiauw and Mr . Tjoeng Tin Jan (Pa
.
.on 2 December 
' . 
.19-�3 gave assurances that such di scrimination vJould stop," and busin esses 
owned entirely by Ind on esi an 'citizens rega'rdless o f  national ori gins. would 
. .  
be treated as nat ional compani es . He added th e remind er , however, that the 
Go vernment still intend ed to pro vid e a proper plac e for th e g roup formerly 
. . 
c alled (by· th e Dutch ) " Inlanclers" (natives ), so that a harmonious comrner ei pl 
· · 18mid�le cla�s" w�uld be realized"ol
.,,,,, ··, i••,•·•.,. ;
There retnained ,  however, ·
. 
th e problem o f  d etermining whether applicant:� 
of Chinese (and other forei gn) d escent for r ecognition as na��Q�?.l. importers 
. . .  . .. ...... 
·were ac tually citizens of Ind"o11esia or ali ens .  Consequently, in January 1954· ., 
· . . 
16. Speech, .29 August, I .P. 1953, PP• 751-752 . ;Si auw, too, complai"ned 
of the discriminationo Spe�qijJ 31�.A:ugust, I oPo  1953, Po 765 0 
.-·· . 
17. Government Reply, 2 September� IoP• 1953, p. 7780 
18. I oP4 1953, PPo 1172-1173� 
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the Department o f  Trade announced that national import ers had to have their 
r ecognition renewed , and stockhold"ers or business partners, if  n ecessary, had 
to prove their Indonesian citizensh ip . This meant that p eranakan c itizens 
had to display their citizenship certificates . Such measures,  including the 
stipulat ion that 11 for the records" the p ercentage of  shares owned by indigenous 
citizens had to be noted ,  aroused r esentment among such citizens . Moreover� 
although o fficially discrimination against non-ind igenous citizens in im­
port i n g  comp ani es h ad ended , i n  practice there remained si gns that such 
discrimination had not disappeared"o 
19 
On the otl1er hand , the new measures 
r epresented an important step in confirmin g further d iscr:uninat ion against 
aliens". 
So that all Indonesian import"ers would conform to a un i form stand ard, 
in March 1954, the Department of  Trade announced that benteng import"ers 
previously recognized also had to re-re gister and me et the r equirements for 
national import"ers which went into e ffect in June 1953 and January 1954�
20 
The new requir ements for quali fying as a national import er brought pro•­
t ests from many indigenous Indonesian businessmen who had unt il th en quali fied 
as benteng importers o Two members o f  the Economic Section of  Parl i ament , 
who had been presidents of benteng companies, added their vo ices to the com­
plai nts, despite the fact that they were members o f  Government part ies o 
19. Amstutz,  op 9cit ft 
- The new reco gn it ion code numbers 6ave a rough estimate of the ant i cip ated 
ratio of importers by nat ional ity. For Indonesian ( 11national11 ) companies.,
L.500 numbers were reserved ; for Chinese, 1800; for 11East ern Aliens"· (Ind i an 
and Arab), 900; and for "Europeans" (primarily Dutch ) ,  800" Oth er numbers 
wer e allo cated for compan i es wh i ch operated principally outside of  the import"­
ing sector but whi ch carried on their own import in go Kantor Pusat Urusan 
Impor Circular Po No . 6, 27 January 1954. 
20. Amstutz, op ocit . 
... . ' u • • • 
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Saroao Harsono ( P"'R.No ) of N. Vo Sedjahtera Trading Company · of' Semarang pro­
tested that although the requirement of a capital of Rp o 250,000 might be 
fair for companies subsequently established., the increased capitalization 
•' 




A number of benteng compar1ies l1ad experienced healthy cooperation 
. ' ' . .' : ; 
'between Indonesian citizens and aliens . The requirement that old benteng 
•
•
companies (a large number of which had been set up with tl1e assistance of 
,. . .
alien capital) rid themselves of any alien capital was thus considered gross-
ly unjust by A .  A .  Achsien, who in addition to his various business  interests 
was also Chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama Economic Section. Although he too 
could accept such stipulations for the e stablishment of completely new 
importing companiP-s, he doubted vJhe-ther the Goverrunent had the authority to 
force an alien who was formerly permitted to be a shareholder to sell his 
,,
stock in a concern that had been in existence many years, or to compel a 
bent;ng cor!lpany to modify its charter (1 22 
In reply., Minister Iskaq agreed that the Government had no authority to 
compel a company to change its charter or to force \alien stockholders· to 
sell out. Of course, he observed, iack of compliancef 'would ' only mean· that"· 
the 11 £acilities11 which the Government extended to national i.rnporters would. . . . . ..... . 




The screening in mid-1953 had reportedly resulted in halving the number 
... . _. . 21� Speech, 20 April., I o P o 1954, PP"@ · 354-355.  ' He also objected to the 
recent prohibition against the practice of naccommodati'9n'' ( in which new 
·importers used the services of older experienc�d companies). 
22 . Speech, 20 April, I.P.  1954., pp.· 350�352". . . .. 
23. Statements, 20 and 29 April, IoP o 1954, ·pp . 356, 410� 
102� 
of recognized importers fran around 7000 to J.500"., Out of the latter number., 
Iskaq reported that in September 19.53 at the beginning of the Ali Sastroami­
djojo administration, approximately 1500 national importing companies were 
accreditedo 
24 During Iskaq I s incumbency as I�Iinister of Economic Affairs, 
while some indigenous Indonesian merchants let their importer-recognition 
lapse, many others flocked to set up importing companies, and many citizer1s 
of Chinese descent were able to secure "national11 recognition. As a result, 
by the time of Iskaq 1 s resignation in November 1954, the number of national 
importers had risen sharply to a reported 2211."25 
From the time that new Indonesian importers had first begun to receive 
protection by the Indonesian Cbvernment, some of them la ck ing capital or 
business experience of their own participated in certain business practices 
which, when it did not violate the letter of the law, did affront certain 
ethical standards. There were, of course, a number of ne1-1 importing com­
panies which represented a bonafide cooperation between indigenous Indo­
nesian manpower and alien capital. On the other hand, there appeared to be 
far more concerns which could hardly qualify as 11bonafide11•• Prospective 
indigenous importers and Chinese businessmen set up 0Ali-Baba0 concerns 
24. Iskaq statement, 18 November, IoPQ 1953, Po 1107; cf. Antara, 7
August 19.53., After the screening., Surabaja ·reported 60 11 Indonesian" im­
porters and 200 alien importers, which figures were also half of those 
reported respectively before the screeningo
Although it is possible that the number of recognized importers was 
arbitrarily halved, it is not clear how the halving was carried down to
the division between Indonesian and alien importers, in view of the fact
that many former " alien" importers were now combined with benteng importers 
to form the· "national" group. 
25. Antara, 2 November 1954; Amstutz, op.cit. A variety o! estimat�s 
were issued during this period., 4300 being one of the most common� The
variation might have been caused by ambiguity in their use of such terms as 
"national importers" , n Indonesian importers" , and II importers in L""ldonesia ." 





·(from "Ali11 , the i:ndigenous businessman., and "Baba" , the Chinese peranakan). 
Shotgun weddings between the Indonesian newcomer (often a "briefcase irn­
porter11) and the old alien importing companies took place with increasing 
.
... . .. .  
regularity under various forms such as fronts and st,rawmen, license-selling 
and accommodations"o Sometimes the Government acquiesced in such practices; 
at other times, it frowned on them. Under some circumstances it was often 
..
difficult to draw the line between healthy cooperation and disapproved 
·practices . Such malpractices had existed ever since 1950 . However, their 
festering reached its greatest proportions during the Iskaq incumbency.26 
.
The head of the Central Office of Imports early in 1955 estimated that 
.there were only fifty bonafide national importing firms and another 200 con-
in the borderline area � The unsa'lutory effect of :the :un-which werecerns 
·· ·porting structure on the country' s  mounting inflation"· had reached ·such 
p;oportions that on 6 December 1954,: within a month after t aking over · the 
.. . ' 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, Roosseno ordered a new screening (of the bank_ 
accounts) of importers, in order to reduce the number of national importers 
by half. He declared, in fact, that sixty to seventy"- importers would be really 
·.. . ,. .sufficient for Indonesia"s Coincidentally, shortly"after the new screening 
had begun, Roosseno announced that only ten percent of 600 importers already 
screened w�re c�n�idered bonafideo"27 
, . •: ··i. ' . ' r I .,  · · ·The screenin'�( .begun in January 1955 wasaa time-consuming process and 
. .
-'"�as not sched�l�d to be completed until September. However, by mid-August, 
··th�l Bo
.
�rhah��:di� Harahap Cabinet had been installed vJith two planks of its 
· 
27 . Amstutz, op
i
�cit • ," ch. II. 
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platform promising efforts to erad icate factors creating inflation and wi ping 
out corrupt ion,  two phenomena  closely t ied to the fo rmer import ing structur e .  
Foreign trad e  procedure was devised by the I11'Ionet ary Board consisting of 
Minist er of Finance Sumitro, Min ist er of Economic Affairs Kasimo, and Bank 
Indonesia Governor Sjafrudd in 9  On 1 S ept ember 1955, the Government announced 
new measures aimed at "natural screening" of national import ers by requiring 
them to d eposit before h and the rup iah equ ivalent of the land ed import price 
(plus th e import surcharge )  wh en applying for import licenses . Among nat ional 
import ers so qualifying, for eign exchang e permit s wou ld be issu ed to those 
offering the most favorable bids ( th e "free fight" syst em ) o Many art ificial 
means of restraining trade, includ ing the government found ation with monop"­
oly controls o ver certain imports (the successor of the J oPoB .P. ) ,  were 
abolished". In the simplified trad ing atmqsphere, while the Cbvernment con­
t inued to provid e  facilit ies to national import ers, it was hoped that those 
of su"b-marg inal qu alificat ions would be weeded out as banks would choose 
only to finance bonafide trad ers and as free compet it ion free of polit ical 
or personal favoritism was allowed among nat ional import ers o28 
While on the one h and a healthy national group of import ers was being 
cult ivated , on the oth er h and most stringent measures were applied to alien 
import"ers"o In order to cont"inue to import � they were required to maintain 
a deposit of Rp�5 million as a guarant ee for prepayments . Thi s financial 
burden was so great that only two percent of the 1613 alien import"ers pre-. 
viously recognized , or merely thirty-six, were able to qu alify t wo months . 
28.  K et erangan Pemerint ah t ent an g  Pro gram Kaoinet , (Djakart a :  Kementer ian 
Penerangan., 7 Oct � 1955), pp . 20-22"0 Since 12 July 1954; a 100% prepayment 
for an import license h ad been required for most imports"o 
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after the new regulations went into effect e 29 The major Dutch and Cl1j_nese 
importing concerns were virtually unaffected, but the hundreds of mediUln and 
. .
small alien importers (principally Chinese)-those who had formerly competed 
most directly with national importers-ho"wever, were virtually removed from 
the scene by this process, thus providing new freedom of action to the nation­
al companies o Nevertheless, many "national" companies-those predominantly 
indigenous Indonesian-were reluctant to compete with many other national 
companies-those predominantly controlled by Chinese peranakans. Conse­
quently, the period under review did not close with the beginning of an era 
of good feeling free from partisa� strife. Indigenous Indonesian businessmen 
more and more began clamoring for discrimination against their non-indigenous 
30brother nationals"e
Po 41 and the Distribution of Exchange 
From the time of the transfer of sovereignty, there had been a conflict 
between Government measures to increase the share of Indonesian businessmen 
in the import trade on the one hand and the capacity of Indonesian ir11porters­
regardless of their numbers-to handle new imports in general and the more 
complex and technical commodities in particular o Where the capacity in­
volved financial resources, as it often did, Government fiscal measures to 
29. Djawaban .Pemerintah Boerhanoedin Harahap. o . , (14 Novo 1955) ,  p "  51.
By the end of January l956, when all alien firms which had not made their de­
posit lost their recognition, out of 1696 alien importing companies only 46
had qualified by paying their deposit. Amstutz, op o cit.
Two of the 44 alien importers recognizea at the end of 1955 were Chinese;
42 were "European"". de Neuman, "On the promotion of indigenous Indonesian
industries • •  o11 , Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia, IX ( 19 56) ,  701op o  
30a Amstutz, op�cit". Also at the end of January 1946, the deposits for
Indonesian national importers were set at Rpo 500�000� Many loopholes, how­
ever, were provided. 
.' ... .. 
J.•· \ :-.\., 
conserve forei gn exchange or to increase revenues (including prepayment re-
q11.irements for :.rr;.p0rt pe:,•mi f:. s )  oftei.l ap�;eared to limit that capac·ity a11d 
consequently hamper increased importing by Indonesian businessmen". 
Consequently, each new mea sure from the revaluat ion of the cu rrency 
and introduction of foreign exc hange cert ifica tes in March 1950 on , evoked 
protests from the growing vested interest of Indon esi an import ers and from 
politicians speaking in their beha lf, who usually charg ed that only alien 
companies could overcome the increa sed financial bu rdens". The Government 
in reply would enumerate other measu res  it practiced to protect the L�do­
nesian import ers, inclu ding channeling Government orders through them �31 
Not until 1953, however, d id such Government mea sures reach the stage 
of provoking a mot ion in Parliament ., The Government I s practice of decree :i.ng 
ma jor tax mea sures in the importing fi eld without following the constitut ional 
procedure of bringing them into effect by statute had b ecome increa singly 
irksome to members of Parliament". After new :i.m�ort surcharges were  �nposed 
in Ja nuary 1953 by t he Supervisory Council of the Foreign Exchange Institute 
(headed by Ir. Djuand a),  most of the Economic Committee joined tog ether in  
submitting on 10 April a motion to require the Government to submit a bill 
to replace the new import regulations .  The motion wa s sponsored by the 
I
committee"s new cha irman,  Kiahi Had ji TJilGiAN (Masjumi , himself a business� 
man ), wl10 wa s to attain in t he pre-electi on period a stature a s  a committe e 
chairman equalled only by that of Asrarud in of the Communications Committee. 
However·"· befo r e  the Tjikwan mot ion came  up for d ebate, Mohamad SADDAK (Pm).,l
on 18 May introduced a more stringent one that would call on the Government 
3lo Cf., Pertanjaan Anggota  dan Djawaban Pemerintah, II , 79-81; R oP.  
1952, )68-424; IcPo -�952� 934-9390  
��:)�rno11·i:,l1s:. .()f -. . ' . 
1031 
,.... :. .. :.: .:..:\.:
t,o 0f:i.,co¼e ·: itn iI1 pox··� su.rcl1�i'3c l1er,ilatio11S a11C. to p�1ovidc ns r:1t1cl1 1.1oral 
nncl. mnt,c:ciaJ. a:i.d o.s :10s a:i.blc to national b'll.sinessr1en., t,110:re b�/ e�1·a:Jl.i:1�: t·i10r.1 
.T 
to__a_j_m,rovc their status and to co11tl'•i butie to i,110 c:ovclopmc11t of tl1e 11at:to;1-
al economy. . Dobat,c opc�1c(1. 011 t�1fJ t1rentic·iil1 a,1<.l coi1tinuecl a 1recl-:: liJ:tcr. Iiot-1-
evc4", 1.,I1e11 the Saddal, 1notion crone to a voa-'�c., ai't,cr llinistcr Sur.1iti:.o l1acl de-
clar·ed t,l1at t,l1c Govo1·rlli1Cnt v.te�·red it, as 0110 oi' no con1ic1.c11ce i-.1 i·ts policy, 
it failecl 2rl to 58. 1110 lot1n oti"i:.1g0n·t Tjila-ron i.1o·tion ca.1"riccl 9'/ to o. 32 . ' . . 
Follo1·r.t�·1:; trtc S,ttcqeso ir1 tl1is 1,1ot,ion 'i'jii·:tra11 lTOttl.cl 
I 





Dul.":tnc t!1e pro-fcdo1 ..al porioc.l, the A. I. o. ·. reqo11·c-od.ly rescrvo<.J. t��irt�r 
porccnt ofa. tl1e . :i.l11p9i
1't, c:�clH�11gc fol." . ne�1coi;1crs , · :l-1l10 pi·ir1ro1:tl,f 'lJOcausc of a lack: 
, . ... . 
of capital, �Jere at ti1.1cs able to 1itilizc 0111� ... sovo11 ::_Jc1·ccrrt. 33 J,lr:Li.1g 19;;2, 
t,110 sha,�� . .of Ind.onos:ta11 ir1\,ort,c::.:·s rose to !�2. 7 percent • 
.' , • . . .· . �' 
., tl1e lJCrco:rtar.•.,;c d.i1)pcq. to 37.9. ,• ., �Jut c.luri11e ti.·10 ,:ollo�-r:i.�1e foui
1 
. ,, 
-1_0.nister of ::;co1101nic /'>.fi ..a�rs . J:�1re.q t·rns 11o·e, sD.t,isficd. t-rlt::. t.!:10 conti:1t�e,l 
·yo1·tc.rs 41.. . .. . .He .accqx•tlj:�:-i�lj,. a.et,c:i:·L1i11ed. _to take GtOi)S t<) il1crc �sc t}1a·i:, nl1n.:-cc . . . ' . 
, . ' .I ; 
.. . 
33. Cf. I-:-rn �(USU1i1asurr1antri S�)cccl1., 1 J�e, R. P� 19;;1., l)l)• }.il+J9-lJ1',.l. At 
t!·1a·� t,i1.1c I,-rc. callecl £or an o:, d to D. co�·,:: 1iasipn t-1:1:tcl1 ach.dl1iat,crcc.l rcs·i:,itutior1 
or �l'..1tios ; :9aicl 011 goods irttported £01 .. rol1abilitat,ing alion cor.1_;,a1lics, cvc11 . .:.. .:..
·;;,hou.gl1 tl10 cor:1r:1ission providecJ. tl1at Inc�o:1osian co1,1panies might handle t} drly 
·�1"ce�1t of Sttcl1 ihlflOl"tS • 
J!i. Isl�aq st,ll�OT,10lTli , 18 l,Jov.a, r. P._.,J9,53, :O• 1102; Ams·tiutz, Ol)e ci·(,. ,  cl1. III. 
·Tl1e al:i.en sl111x·e o:;: :lri1por.·i:,s in 19�2 (57. 3;j co�1sist,c<l of 30. 7�-; ·l;o ,;�uropeansa., 2}. .i. J,.; 
·to Li· "'114a1"cso -�'-•" ""nc·l 2 . 2r-1 to ot·"o"" ' "'i· ans r.11 •11.e C
11
1·).;\·1c�o �  ""O'J, ,..i..1:uion r'"'"'o vu•·• +ov t"l9 2'r.:; • ;:, ·' a.�t1.,....;•1 ... •• 1. ['.1 c;i ./J J.,. J.- .·1.0 •




would be reserved for national importers"o This decision was announced in 
Circular P. 41 of the Central Office of Imports on 8 September 1953 .35 
This important decision, involving as  it did distribution of foreign 
exchange, had been taken without clearance from the Monetary Board. Accord­
ingly, Bank Indonesia C�vernor Sjafruddi n, considering that reserving a 
large portion of exchange for national importers beyond their capac ity to 
handle it properly would only stimulate the growth of briefcase importers 
who existed by selling their licenses, obtained 1\1:inister Ong' s consent for 
the I•1onetary Board to rule that the circular be r evoked. Thus, on 12 Sep­
tember, i·iinister Iskaq announced its ·withdrawal, vJhile declaring that such 
action did not mean a reduction of the policy of developing national im­
porters.36 
There ensued a public debate"o IKINI chairman Tabrani objected to the 
withdrawal of the c ircular, asserting his association ' s  feeling that all 
imports should be channeled through national importers o DEIP declared that 
the import sector should be Indonesianized regardless of transitional diffi­
cultiese Gapindo chairman Kosasih rejected in.formation from Bank Indonesia 
37officials (headed by Sjafruddin) supporting the withdrawal of the circular"0
35. The listed categoriesj including such groups as all textiles, all 
small wares, flour, cement, glas� stationery, tires, etc"a , comprised about 
forty,.. fi ve percent of all imports o 
36 0 11Kementerian Perekonomian1> Bagian Pewartaan, Berita No. P/14.511 0
Iskaq subsequently removed Mr.  Arifin Harahap, Head of the Central". Office 
of Imports and one of the key officials in his ministry, allegedly for pub­
lishing his decision without authorizationo 
37� Amstutz, op.cit .., 
� ' . : 
'� . .  
• 
. ' '•, . . .• ,• .. ;..... .� . .  : 
. �· �. .,. . . 
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Chairman Tjikwan of the Parliament :�.conomic Committee sought· and re• 
. .
ceived explanations from l-finister Iskaq .a . . However, since the ir1formation 1-1as 
confidential and since other economic measures of questionable w1sdom had 
come to light, on 20 October he submitted a ·aresolution for an interpellation 
on the Government ' s  economic policy, listing the 11  P. 41 affair" as the first 
justification �nd dec.laring . that such measures- were not based on any plan 
for attaining a _ ahealthy national economic policyo38 
On 10 �eptember, before receiving a vote of confidence, Prime Minister 
Ali Sastroamidjojo had declared that his Government aimed to ·change the 
.existing "colonial economy" into a genuine national economy •39 Miriister .
. · ·Iskaq . during the interpellation, declared that to implement this
. 
policy
• • I 
• 
in the import sector, it had been decided to channel as many :import;;:: as.. . 
I ' •  . ·  • 
·possible via national importers, by (a)  reserving certain categories of
. 
im.:. 
•. .. �\ '·• • •  I 
ports for them, and (b) giving priority to their applications concerning 
- . • 1 ,
other commodities . He emphasized that the authority for distributing for-
· 
. : . . . 
eign exchange lay in his .handsa. That the public withdrawal of P,," 41 had 
• 
• • • ! • : •\ •: a 
no effect 
.
on this policy, he then proved with figures showing that since the 
. . .. . ..: 
beginning of September.,. _ national importers had received 76ao2 percent of the ., . 
���rt exchange.�0 
38  . S�atement., 6 Novo , IoPo 19.53, pp. 1035., 1046-1047 o Tjikwa11 charged
that various economic measures had caused unrest among national businessmen. 
During the last quarter of 1953 Teuku Hasan was reelected chairman of the 
Economic Committee, but from January 1954 onward., Tjikwan held the coveted 
posa.., I) 
390 Government statement., I.P.  1953, Po 831. 
40 o Minister Iskaq ' s  statement, ;LB Novo, I.P. 19.53., po  110.3 ,, See' · ·also · .. 
·0 Tjikwan Interpellation" ., infra. r.
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Debate on t he subject o f  Pa 41 ended ( in so far as it affect ed the size 
of  the share o f  foreign exchange to be allocated to nat io n al importers ) .  
St j]l there was general recognit ion that the portion given nat ional importers 
was o fte n more t han they could themselves handle, as a r esult of which they 
and alie n  companies were forced to resort to illeg it imat e practices"e On 20 
April 1954, Ir. Sakirman (P.K.I. )  made some proposals to solve t his quandary. 
If t he Government r eally insisted o n  following exist ing foreign exchange 
regulations, he suggested, e ighty p ercent o f  t he import exchange ought to be 
allocated to nat ional importers . Then ,  while urg ing that import exchange be 
distributed o n  a just and honest basis without differentiat ing between party 
or ideolo gy, he calle d  for distribution to "progressive and trustworthy 
businessmen" and action to prevent "large alien capital and its accomplj_ces11 
from thwarting t he Goverrnnent"1s measures e However, since these measu res 
would stjll allow alie n  c ap it al to control twenty p ercent of t he imports 
while most o f  Indonesia's exports were in the hands o f  "export monopoly 
capital", Sakirman preferred measures which would re duce alien  p art ic ipat ion  
in both the import and export sectors to n il. Thus he cal led o n  the C,overn­
ment to set up its own import and export ent erpr ises and also help national 
businessmen to set t hem up . On the other han d, he r econnne nded that exist ing 
importing and export ing companies o f  alien capital be allowe d three to five 
years to continue operating, under restrict ions, after which the Government 
would nat ionalize t hemo 41 
There were no further debates o n  the perc entage of  imports to be 
41. I�Pn 1954� PPo 348-349. Iskaq promised that the Government would 
give its full att€nt ion to these proposals . Statement ,  29 Apr o,  IoPo 1954, 
Po 4l.Oo 
1035 
reserved for national- importers, for Iskaq1 s New Deal in distributing the 
:large majority to national importers was generally accepted, if for no other 
reason than that of  fait accompli�42 
. ·Gapindo 
During the debates over the program of the· Natsir · Cabinet, Mr ,. ,Harinani 
(Pm.) urged the Government to stimulate imports and exports by Indones .ians 
.. and to protect Indonesian importers in- the · way the Dutch administration did 
for Dutch importers in Indonesia after World War II. Citing the numerous 
official and unofficial organizations which had been set up to support" . 
Dutch • i.rnporters in previous years, he proposed that an Indonesian organiza­
roion be set up (or Gindo reformed) ,  which would be kept free from the tutelage 
of." the old1 large importers and be given a sufficient share of the imports 
so that it. might open b·ranches throughout the country as well as purchasing 
offices abroad.43 
Harmani"1 s hope for an Indonesian importers organiza tion was anticipated 
by events . Both Gindo with its 105 member concerns and Perssi with its num­
ber reduced to fifteen in the old Republican areas had been operating in a 
fitful manner on into 1950. Then, a fter preparatory arrangements in August 
under the auspices of the Department of Organizations Development, on 18 
·September 1950 the two . bodies merged and formed :the Chbungan Pembelian 
Importir Indonesia ( Gapindo-Indonesian Irrporters Purchasing Association)"0 
42. The Harahap Cabinet subsequently declared that its policy. was to 
�:�llocate over 80%.-: of  foreign exchange to·· ·national :irrr:1orters n Amstutz, op .cit. 
43 0 Speech, 29 Sept., R .Po  1950, PPo 782, 785-7860 
10.3� 
Gapindo was organized as a cooperative association with membership open 
· · .only to importers who were Indonesian nationals (bangsa Indonesia ) who met"
the requirements set by the Chvernment . Its declared purpose was to pro­
mote the joint interest and knowledge of its members in domestic and foreign 
trade"ct Mr. R .  "'fohana;md KOSASili Poerwanegara was chosen chairman of its 
managing board. 44 
Since the B�N.Is,  the govermnent agency" · for providing credits to Indo­·"
nesian importers, did not have the staff to process adequately the large 
flow of credit applications, it arranged originally for Gindo and then for 
Gapindo to channel most of the credit available from the bank on to the 
association1 s members . Since most new Indonesian traders had no relations 
abroad, Gapindo set up three purchasing offices abroad to facilitate the 
purchases of goods· to be imported into Indonesia by its members , 
Because of its superior organization, Gapindo itself also undertook 
importing, usually on the basis of 11 accommodating1 other Indonesian importers, 
which turned o ver to it their import licenses. Such a procedure was approved 
by many persons,including Mr. Iwa, who recommended that the former practice" · 
of joint purchases abroad carried out by the old A .I.Do be copied in order 
to assist �ational Indonesian companies with weak capital and organizationo 45 
others �eplored it, however, like Goesti Djohan (Masjumi"), who found it con­
trary to Minister Sumitro"1 s declaration against enriching the sleeping man __ 
44. See Charter 17L/1951� Kosasih had been RIS Minister of Social Af­
fairs o The other two managers were WoS o T o  Pondaa g from the "benteng'1 Firma
Dja'suka and PoJo Barbiers, a former G.i.ndo manager"o 
45. Questions, 4 Nov., I. P. 1950, Pl)• 53?.-583. 
... . , ... . : � ·.. 
·!- �- \.. . 
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and injurious to those companies which had develo1)ed their own relation� . 
abroad� He also objected ·t'o the near monopoly"._ ; ,osition of Gapindo in chan� 
11eling credits for benterig importers as a result of which very few non�mem�ers ·
· . 46had access to the funds provided by the GovPrnrnent o On the oth�r hand JI a 
number ·-of Indonesian importers found alien companies more reliable as accom­
modation partners than Gapindo.47 
By the end of 1951, outstanding- B.N�Io credits to Gapind.o and its mem, .. 
bers amounted to Rpcll7 million, of which Rp�l02 million was charged . to 
Gapindo 1 s own accou..�t o In ·view of": the ine.xr>erience in importing of many of 
.the Gapindo members and"the fact that credits had been provided them often· 
without adherence to customary strict terms for credit". �xtension., most Gapindo 
m�mbers subsequently defaulted on their payments to the bank directly or via 
. ,,
Gapindo� The careless way in which the Government had allowed credits to 
these and other b�nteng importers became repeatedly�"a point of censure by' 
Mro Burhanuddin (non-party)., who had earlier been Chief of the Department": _of.
Trade o 
48 
Since Gapindo' s· own efforts to - get its members to clear up their,
� • · • • • I 
arrearages met with little success., early in 1953 the Ministry of Economic ,. 
Affairs after consultation with the Ministry". oft. Finance dec�qect,. ,t-q t_�l<e, di� 
rect action against the .Gapindo memberf) number.·ing 141, still. ,i.q.�--.a;r;.r;,e,ars"o In 
March reminders were sent them of their debts, and they were invited to sign 
•-h .,_ • • 
• -,,..... . . .... H _,,. .. . 
agreements for paying off the debts"' in installments. Then on l . July those 
, . . 
. . . 
• 
, . 14_6 • .. Questions., ;LO Jan? ., Ichtisar Parlemen, 1951, p .  703 1)\• f • • ' . . . . . 
47Q C f., RI: Propinsi Sumatera Utara p. 625. ,
I ., 
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concerns which had ignored the reminders entirely or which did not fulfill 
their debt repayment agreements were refused further issuance of foreign 
exchange. Those which continued to refuse to make any effort to s ettle · 
their accounts were taken to court."49 
Such stringent measures were not well received by those affectedo K �Ho 
Tjikwan, Chairman of the Parliament ' s  Economic Committee, questioned the 
wisdom of the sanction of withholding foreign exchange, since he felt that 
such action would prevent a newcomer company from continuing operations �nd 
so obtaining the means for eventually settling its debt. He consequently 
added the subject to the list of justifications for his proposed interpella­
tion of Government economic matters which was submitted on 20 October 1953 � 
In explaining the interpellation, he suggested that there migh't be other"­
ways of bringing about a solution of debts instead of withholding foreign 
. 50exchange, a measure which he thought could stunt the growth of newcomers"o 
The subject, however, turned out to be probably the least controversial of 
those: introduced by the Tjikwan Interpellation, for after Minister Iskaq 
had eJ<piained the series of attempts to settle the debts of the Gapindo mem­
bers-withholding foreign exchange only as a last resort against those not 
wishing to cooperate-and published a list of the"·"forty-seven companies still 
490 Statements by Minister Iskaq, 18 NovQ and 2 Dec., Io P. 1953, :;�J•. 1107-
1108, 1175. The debts of Gapindo members directly to the B cNo io had been 
reduced from Rpol4.5 million at the end of 1951 to Rp.9.9  million when the 
Government began to intercede directly. · · · · .".. · ·  · · ··· 
' '  
50» Tjikwan speech, 6 Novn.1, I('IP. 1953, PPo 1035, 1049 . See also "Tjikwan 
Interpellation" , infra. 
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in ar�ears, 51 the matter was dropped. 
'-" .:· During the above period Gapindo was able to settle over half of its 
huge debt to the Government (via thea• B.N.I.)ao The unfavorable publicity 
which it had received was so great, however, that President Kosasih re­
signed on 7 November , He was replaced., on 23 February 1954, by Mr. Assaat 
(non-party member of Parliament ), who eight and a half years b.efore had 
been a promoter of the PoT.E. 
The r1oscow Economic Conf erenae and BAKUNA 
In the importing fielda· as in other sectors. of ·business where indi.genous 
Indonesians were becoming active, numerous tradea· associations were set up fl 
- Most were nonpolitical and arose on a geograph:i,c:al basis with their in- . 
fluence limited principally to their own port ora-provincial area, although 
Gapindo-the lar·gest such organization (DEIP being an economic ass·oQ:!ation 
covering a number of economic sectorsa)-had acquired a nation-wid�_.- scope. ·
' • 
During 1952, however., · .the world of Indonesian national busineas be­
latedly experienced a ·phenomenon which in the labor and far�ers.1 · ·sectors 
had taken· place in the ·early part of the Revolution, namely the rise o·f .a. 
central organizat.io.ns oriented to certain political movements o But the 
process was unlike that in the other sectors ,..rhere rival political move­.
ments, havitig struggled for control of the one ... tme . relatively uiiif·ied labor 
and farmers organizations on Java and Sumatraa., set up separate organizations 
.51. Iskaq· , statements., opoc it .  · Four of the 47 companies with arrears 
totaling Rp o7 ol million at the end of November had debts of over half a mil­
lion rupiahs apiece (and two of these were from Bandjarmasin). Significantly, 
only two of the 21 companies with debts exceeding Rp olOO�OOO were from · 
Djakarta (one of which was the company of ·Gapindo vice· president Pondaag)a. 
Seven were fromaBandjarmasin, four from Palembang, and two from Medano·
Djaswad·i Suprapto observed that 95% of the names on the list were not 
P.N.I� membersa. I.Po 19.53, P• 11850 
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of their owno For DEIP (the p rincipal central business organization), 
unl:L�e the BoB.I. and subsequ ently SOBS! or the B�T o I. , remained relatively 
nonpolitical, and the new business associ"ations set up in 1952-while r i­
valling Gapindo-were not comp letely antagonistic to it . 
The two new org anizations were founded at a time of a new d evelopment 
in d cmestic politics, namely the shifting of g eneral election arrang em ents 
into low gear after over two years of promises and cursory preparations. 
The Wilopo Cabinet succeeded in drafting and approving a general elections 
bi ll, which was introduced into Parliament in November 1952 0 On the othe r  
hand , the establishment of one of the business organizations, besides having 
a domestic political asp ect , was not unrelated to developments on the int er­
national political scene as well� 
Early in April 1952, an II International Economic Conference" was held 
in !1oscow, originally under the auspices of the "World Peace Counci l" headed 
by Professor Juliot�C".lrie .
52 
It was subsequently d ecided not to associate 
the conference publicly with the 111"1orld Peace Counci l" but to ascribe the 
initiative behind the conference inst ead to  a"Preparatory Committee "  which 
was se ated in Moscow (after a cu rsory stay in Copenhagen) .  The purpose of 
the conference, it was proclaimed , was to find a way to improve the stand ­
ard of living in the various countries and to normali ze economic relations 
between countries regard less of their different economic or political sys­
tems . At the Conference the chairman of the preparatory committee empha­
sized that it was intend ed to promote trad e  between the "West" and the "East 11 
52 . Letter to the Economic and Finance Committees of Parliament from 
Ir .  Setiadi of the "Komi te Pusat Pembela Perd amaian Duni a untulc Indonesi a" 
(Central Committee for
.
the Defense of World Peace for Indonesi a),  6 Mar., 
I�PG 1952, pp . 187-1880 
· lOLJ. 
and between the economiqally weak countries and those industrially strong."53 
Following an invitatior:i forwarded through the II Indonesian Peace Com�t­
tee11 seven members of several Parliamentary committees were teritati vely ., 
chosen to attend :the conference-but as individuals, not as representatives. 
of Parliament or of any party. However, the matter was dropped after both 
the ."Sukiman-Su wirjo Cabinet and the plenary session of Parliament declined . 
to provide funds for the seven."54 Nevertl1eles�., a private . delegation of 
thirteen "businessmen, technicians, labor and farmers• leaders" . as  i·1ell as 
correspondents. ., technically headed by Suchjar Tedjasukmana (Cha.irman of 
DEIP), did make the trip to Moscowo55 Other than the five businessmen 
(four of them from DEIP) and." three correspondents, the Indonesian .visitors . . 
to the economic conference included a leader of Partai Murba and. f•our oth�r 
Copununists or pro-Communists ( who subsequently identified themselves with 
tlle P.K.I. ) .  
At the Moscow Conference most of the work was performed by three commit­
tees," and_ so· . only. three Indonesian� played any real role in the conference •· 
. .. . . •·. 
· ·Besides Tedjasukmana on the International Trade Committee, ther� was ' Ferc;linand 
53� Report by Suchjar Tedjasukmana, Antara, 22 Auge 1952 : Adam Malik)
Sovjet Rusia sepe.rti jang sa ja  lih•at, {Djakarta:  Endang, 1954}, pp . 9-10, 42 . 
54. I.P. 1952, PPo 187-191, 198. Parliament rejected sending a delega­
tion by a vote of 27 .to 43 0 Althou gh four of the seven selected were from · 
.the P.N.I., no members of that party cast votes f�r sending the delegation o 
. . . -
55• A•ntara, 20o,,2l, 26 Maro 1952;  Adam Malik, op .cit o .,  Pw 11. Gapindo.
he other principal business association ) was represented by its head, Mr .
Ko.s;1sih Poerw�negara. The principal businessman associated with Partai
(t . · 
�rba-:Ad$11 •Ma;l,;;ik-himself attended as a correspondent (he was manager of 
Antara News �gency) o The "farmer' s  representative" was Hartojo, Secretary
General of R�kun Tani Indonesia, the P.K.I. farmers' front. ________...,,._
Tedjasukmana created a disturbance among some of the Indonesians in 
the group when he once suggested that some members from large Dutch companies 
in Indonesia join the group. 
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RUNTURAMBI ( from the SOBSI Central Bureau ) on the Economic Cooperation Comrnit-• 
. tee, and Ir.  s .  Purbodiningrat on the Backward Regions Committee. At one 
time the Soviet delegation expressed a willingness to buy tin and rubber 
from Indonesia at above prevailing world prices«::-which 11 offer" was subse­
quently well publicized in Indonesia-but Russia later made it plain that 
she wanted only high quality ( estate) rubber and rejected the low quality 
rubber of the Indonesian smallholders. The delegation reportedly most 
interested in trade with Indonesia, however, was that from Communist China"o 
Many of the Indonesians returned home apparently impressed with the idea 
that by developing trade with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and mainland 
China through Indonesian national traders the Indonesian economy would be 
56greatly strengthened"o
In August, scarcely four months after the Moscow Economic Conference, 
Hungary sent a trade delegation to Indonesia & Besides holding negotiations 
56. Tedjasukmana report, op .cit.; A.  Malik, op Qcit"o, PP o 47-49, 52, 57-
&J e The conference set up a "permanent" Commission to Develop International 
Trade, on which Tedjasukmana was designated to represent Indonesia, and a 
contact bureau to facilitate relations between businessmen of the various 
countries". 
Before departing from Indonesia, Adam Malik had been approached by Min­
ister of Economic Affai rs 1"1ilopo to look into the possibility of assistance 
from Russia for Indonesia"1 s badly lagging industrialization program. How­
ever, Malik received only ambiguous replies from Russian trade offic"ials, 
who on learning that the Indonesians were not official representatives of 
their government, refused to discuss the matter further. 
Thereupon Adam Malik half-owner of the 11 Tjihuni11 plantation ."and rubber .,
company, offered on behalf of his company up to 20,000 tons (sic ) of small­
holder rubbero He was quite taken aback, however, at the abruptness of the 
Russians' reply. They told him that they had no interest in low quality rub­
ber since they had to consider Russia ' s  interests, and that i f  smallholder 
rubber was poor, it was his job to s ee that its quality was improved. Malik
wrote that he had learned a lesson that propaganda is not always in line with
reality# and that there was a "Russia-first" spirit of nationalism which was 
both shrewd and callous � 
Next, oblivious to the U.No embargo towards Communist China, Malik signed 
a provisional rubber contract with the Chinese delegation. Back in Indo­
nesia, howev1-= r, the Government refused to allow it to be implementedo 
. � . '.
with an official Indonesian delegation, it also met with Indonesian busi• 
nessmen to apprise them of the way to trade not only with Hungary but �Tith 
51other Communist countries of Eqstern Europe as well. 
International activity was matched by an artful campaign at home"G 
Back in June 1950 Ir. Sakirman (then". still technically with the P"oB�I�) had 
. . . ' 
laid down the line that Communists should appear to favor the growth of "na-
. . 
tional capitalism", and four months later he brought his rump party into the 
P.K.I. and then became its parliamentary faction chairman. Early in 1951 
' ' 
D.No Aidit�who months before had returned from a loJ:lg st·ay in the tt.People' s 
Republic of Chinatt -....became First Secretary of the enlarged P�Koio, and the 
Muso-Maoist 0New Path" was resuscit�ted for the party o 
58 
. The establishment . '' 
of the Wi�opo Cabinet the next year brought a lessening of pressure against
. · 
the p��ty� �hus, in a speech commemorating the thirty-second anniversary 
of the founding of the P.K oio, in May 1952, Aidit gave stimulus to the new 
campaign along the "New Path0 and formally called for th_e foundation of  a 
"national united front" not unlike the National Front which had b•een envisaged 
57. Antara, 3, 16 Sept. 1952 . 
The Coninunist Bloc trade campaign cont
.
inued at the ttAsian and Pacific 
Peace Conference" at Peking a month later. Suroto (of Ant�ra News Agency)., · 
head of the Indonesian Delegation, was chosen to report on the �growth of
economic relations at the conference o Citing the Moscow Cpnf.�_rence, he ;_-· .· ·
called for developing international trade and condemned the U.N. resolution 
for the economic blockade of Communist China resulting from its aggression · ·"
in Korea ., Antara, 9 Oct . 1952 . · 
58 . Aidit.., 11Membolsewikkan P �K·or.n , Bintang Me-rah; VII (1951), - PP o 129-
134 0 As
."the title of his article indicates , Aidit considerec;l the 11 New Path" 
to 'be the first step in l3olshevizing the PeK� Io, wr1ich ultimately would be­
come the totalitarian party of Indonesia similar to that created by Lenin in
Russia. See Chapter XXV. 
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u nder Muso"1 s lead ership in August 1948 .59 
To complem ent th is national u n ited front of  pol itic al parties ,  Aid it 
recommended th at ther e  also be set up i n  various s ectors of  the society 
"u nited fronts 11 :-between "members and followers o f  the P .K.I. and members 
and followers of other p arties ." Call ing for such fronts among workers., 
farmers,  and intellectu als was noth i ng new. However, promoting a u n ited 
front among businessmen was somewhat u nique for a mo vement wh ich termed it­
self th e protector of  the working class against " explo itation"  by the busi­
n ess class and which was ded icated to th e ultimate erad ication of  private 
enterprise and busin ess i n itiati ve .  Evad i ng the Marxist-Leni n ist tenet that 
there would be no place for businessmen-natio n al or otherwise-in a state 
controlled by a Commu n ist p arty once it had r eached the "socialist" stage, 
·and evidenc i ng a des·ire to m ake use of th e national bus i nessmen, Aid it ex-
. .
plained that his p arty's "present  pro gram"-the "p eople ' s  democr acy pro-
gram"-d id not intend that they be  liquidated ,  for th ey were need ed to en­
larg e the productive cap acity of the commu nity i n  ord er to facilitate ar­
riving at the social ist commun ityo Aid i t  e ven took a page from Mao Tse-tu ng 
and conced ed ,  for the time bei ng, that not only workers, farmers, and in­
tellectuals were encomp"assed by the term 11 People11 -who were entitl ed to 
some democratic rights-but also the "petit bourgeoisie" and the " national 
590 D .N.  Aid it, Menempuh Djalan R akjat (4th ed o ;  Djakarta :  Pembaruan 
1954) .  Th e reprintings were accompanied by small chang es i n  the text. Aid it  
ended h is sp eech with the cry: "Long l ive _Comrade ·Stalin, ·champ ion of  world 
peacet" 
• • 
bourgeoisie . 1160 
On 21 August J.952 , Suchjar Tedjasukmana gave a lecture on the r-Ioscow 
Conference before a fu ll ses�ion of DEIP. In the ensuing discussions, there 
were suggestions that Indonesian national businessmen needed to develop 
. 
trade with Russia and Eastern Eur6pe .61 Only a week later, on 29 August, a 
new business united front was established in Djakarta with" · the r1ame Badan 
Koordinasi Usaha Nastonal (Bakuna-National Businesses Coordination -Board) .  .
Its stated purpose w�s to coordinate the activities of Indonesian national 
enterprises within the framework of an overall national economic ·9nd in- · 
dufltrial program ( which program was unspecified) . Chairman at the founding 
' 
session was RACHMAD Kusumobroto, Vice President of N. V. f>erseroan Dagang -
. -
11Arus1162 of Surabaja, �ho became later Bakuna Vice Chairman. Subsequently, 
600 Ibid., PPo 15-16, 24, 26-270 During a �peech at P9lembang in." July, 
Aidit, repeating the P oK g io 1 s desire to work together with all parties in a 
11National Front" , declared also that his party was prepared to work together
with "national businessmen" who were convinced that an " imperialist economy" 
would not benefit them. Antara·, 27 July. 1952 . 
· ·SOBSI-which was again primarily under· the" control of Communist officers 
who had end�a_yc>��d to have it toe the P .K . Io-Muso line in 1948-opened a · 
· nati·dnal conferehce in Djakarta in late September as part of the campaign 
to promote . ·• of the P.K o i o ·the " National United Front" under the control" and, ,,,. .. r • · � ·, • • r ••
· specitida·11y· ·to promote a 11Labor United Front" under its own control. In
or�er t o  present ,a more attractive front to the average worker, _ SOBSI de•­
cided .-,lunariimously11 to shelve the term "people t s  democracy" and substitute 
as the immediate _goal in its program n full . national independence""· t.o .  ass·ure
·-the ··speedy growth"· of an n Indonesian national economy. 11 Similarly, 11 social­
ism" and 11 class struggle" were temporarily dropped from its charter and pro­
·gram. At the same time its foreign program called for tightening the bonds
with the W.F oT"aU. in .order to promote something called ..a. -0 De1nocrat,ic Front11 
for Wor·ld Peace. Antara, 24 and 28 Septo, 8-9 Oct. 1952. 
•• • .,l. : • j � 
62 �;; Ant'ara, 30 Augo ' 1952. Besides his position � -N.V. Arus, R.achmad·:
-became president of another import concern with Chinese . participat�'j.ori�-· N·�-v: 
Sura ( 11Arus11 spelled backwards )., and Vice Chairman· of the Indones ian�zecho­
slovakian Friendship ."Society. 
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Mohamad Saleh , Manager of R aya Trading Company of Djakarta was named ch air­
man of the front, R .  A .  Saparno Setyopati SUR JONEGORO of No V. Bumiaju of 
Surabaja, Bakuna Secretary-General,  and A. M. Hanafi, Vice President of D�S o 
Soese no N.V. of Djakarta, as Chief of its Information Section . "63 
Although business representi ng a wide vari ety of i nterests had been 
invited to participate, and Baklma immediately announced a membership of 
sixty-five, reportedly because of the front's  political orientation an� the 
fact that Chi"nese capital played an important role i n  many of the " benteng 11 
companies  which formed the core o f  this "national busi ness organization" ,  
most of the more experienced and reputable Indonesian busi nessmen who had 
been invited to joi n d ecided against such action . Bakuna subsequently issued 
various public statements which on the one hand called for aid to Indonesian 
national busi ness and on the other exhorted further trade relations with the 
Soviet Union and the II People Is Democracies _," 
IKINI 
On 6 July 1952, the P.N.I . Executi ve Council met with its Parli amentary 
faction and its ministers to discuss subjects i ncluding internal policy and 
preparations for the general elections camp aign. 
64 
On 2 September, members 
of the P.N�Io Executi ve Council and its Parliamentary faction, and PeN.I . 
business leaders  set up the P.Ao Bank Umum Nasional in  Djakarta with P oN . I o  
63. Hanafi> whose compani es were also largely Chinese-fi nanced , had 
been an associ ate of Aidit early· in th e Revolution and held a comp arable 
po sition in  the Information Section of Pesindo in  1946-1947, when that Marxist 
youth front's publications wer e calli ng for a union of the three nproletarian­
socialist-communist" p arties (Partai Sosialis.., P.K.I •., P.B .I � ) .  Cf. Aidit, 
opocito, Pe 2; Madjallah R evolusioner, 17 No�. 1946 and 27 . Jan ." 1947; Char-
ter 467/1950. . · · . · 
Subseque ntly - Hanafi was to become a p romoter and the Secretary Ge�eral · 
of the National Front organi zation ,  th e Konggres R akjat (People 's  Congress ) .  
64. Antara., 5 July 1952". 
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First ·Deputy Gener al Chairman Soewirjo as President, Dr . O ng  F.n g  Die, as 
·Vice President , and Mr. Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo ., C hairman of the P .I-J .I.  Surabaja 
Regional Cou ncil,' as Chairman of the Bo ard of Directors ."
65 The latter two, 
who · a year later were appointed Ministers o f  Finance and of Econ omic Affairs, 
respectively.,,_ in the Ali Sastroamid jo jo Cabinet ., also became members of the 
p artyfs 'election c amp aign fund committee wpich was formally established in 
66
December 1952 ·at · ·the party1 s Sixth Con gress in  Surabaja. 
Meanwhile, · there were sig ns of activity in busines� by ri val political . . . .... 
-groups .  By the.. :end of Au gust, Bakuna  had b��n fou nd ed ,  but P.N . I. business­-
men had refused to join it . There were also rumors circulatin g  of favorable 
treatment for businesses associated with the P �S . I. i n  securin g  government 
orders from the Ministry of Defense.67 Besid es such politi�al developments, 
on 14 Au gust 1952 the Government had introduced a new system of import sur­
c har ges ., which effect·ively raised the domestic cost of' many kinds of im­
ports., and a fortni ght".later another regulation requ ired importers"-to pay 
forty p ercent ·of the land ed price plus all of t he import surcharge before a 
. .
permit for import exchan ge would be issued". 
Only the import measures were cited as a reason for the establishment 
of"a new business· associ ation on 13 September by persons assoc iat ed with ,the 
P.N .I.  The Ikat an Importir Nasional Indonesia ( IKINI-Indonesian National 
,. . 
. . . 
65. See Charter 235/1953 and "Bank Umum Na'sional" i� - Ch. XXIII. 
66. Feith, The Wilopo C abinet, 1952-19535: a Turnin g  Point in Post­
Reyolution ary Indonesia,  pp . 186-187 . 
; 
67 0 These allegations were used in justifyi n g  t he motion of no confi­
dence in Defense Minister Hamengku Buwono ,  which was submitted on  23 SeJ>t". 
1952 by Zainul Baharuddi n .  See "B.N.I.  Subsidi"aries" in ch.  XXIII, and
" Parties., lmportin g, and the P.S .I.11. , infra.  
Importers League ) stated that its purposes were ( a )  to execute govern-
ment orders; (b )  to manage goods and materials for government stockpiling; 
and (c ) to handle orders of private organizations and enterprises. Mem­
bership was open to importing companies established in Indonesia and le­
galized by its authorities, which were considered to be " Indonesian national 
enterprises0 regarding their capital as well as their officers 4' Mohamad 
Tabrani became IKINI Chairman and Mr .  Rufinus LUMBANTOBING, President of 
The Tapanuli Indonesian Corporation of Djakarta, its Vice Chairman. Mohamad 
Aminoedin PANE, President of N. v. Perusahaan Dagang " Pasuma" of Djakarta., 




Batik and Kretek 
The Indonesian Government like its predecessor operated a variety of 
controls over the importation and distribution of special commodities, often 
through the medium of special government agencies set up for such purposes". 
The middle of the period under reviow brought a new phenomenon, however, 
namely the designation of "single-buyers" and affiliated distributors, which 
consisted of private organizations that were respectively importing corpo­
rations and their parent associations . Such organizations operated under ·"
68. Sin Po, 13 Sept . 1952e. On the IKINI Executive Board were such
P .N.I.  prominents as R .  Hoesein KARTASASi-'IITA, President of N.V:1 Dewasa 
Trading & Industrial Coy Ltd. of Djakarta, and DR. R .  Soeharto, President 
of Phannasi Indonesia N.Vo of Djakarta, both with interests in numerous 
other businesses . 
Soon afterwards IKINI was j oined by an association for exporters, 
IKENI. IKENI officers were: }1ohamad ARSJAD, President of N .  V .  Handel :f.1ij . 
11 Indonesia Timur" of Makassar (a  leading Indonesian concern in foreign · 
trade), Chairman; Jaconias Benoni TITIHERUW, President of P oA.  Maskapai 
Dagang " Djawa-Maluku0 of Djakarta, Vice Chairman; and Amir SONDA Daeng 
Manrapi (active in half a dozen Djakarta and Makassar companies) ,  Secretary. 
These three businessmen originated from eastern Indonesia� 
· . . . . . '• . .  �.. . . . . . -
l01J9 
Government control in ord er to stabilize the prices of the pr imarJ r a,;-1 
..material of two of the l eading Ind on esian industries, �fhich 1-1er P concen­
trated on". Java and which had been exp eri encing a business _crisis:.,." . 
Durin g 19.50 the smaller Indon esian kretek producers had enter ed a 
depr ession following L�pl ementation of the new for eign exchange rei;Ulations 
(which discriminated against :un1)orts in favor of exports ),  the pl acement · 
of cloves (the princip al material in the kretek cigarettes"_. : alon g �-J"ith tobac­
co ) on the im:port free list, and"· the o'J.tbreak of the Korean 
1,-Jar ( which had 
·
· -
an infla,tionary effect on primary commod ities ) .  tfuere as Kudus ·..;.;..the original 
home. of the kretek-h ad been the site of the Indonesi an "kr etek king" before 
tl1e war"., by the time of the Un itary R epubl-ic ·one C hinese factory called 
:Nojorono accounted for three -qu arters of the city' s kr etek output  and ind ig--
enous Indonesian plants only fifteen p ercent .  By the time of- the estab­
l ishment of the tvilopo Cabinet, th e kretek indu stry had deteriorated further 
so that a r eported 140"of the 200 kretek cigarette factori es in East Java"· · 
had .closed . Thi s  continued state of affairs led A eA .  Achsien (N.U . )  of 
the Pari.iament 1 s Economic Committee to demand on 5 June 19.52 that the Gov­
ernment .take action on behalf of its"· brother nationa·ls . 
69 
The Min istry, of Economic Affairs,  howey��" -lJa·d _: �lready begun to take 
·action". Dr . Saroso, h ead of the Directorate of  Trad e and Industry,L had" · · 
worked out with leadin g kretek producers a system by which cloves would :be 
imported on a monopoly basis under the sup ervision of the Government .•. ., . .On. ..... . 
, 
69., I• .i.:. 1952,l)P• 607--608. A year earlier, Achsien had reported o·f h is 
. . . 
inspection trip �aken in late 1950 that the Indonesian kretek manu facturer s  
felt hop el ess .  �P. 19$1, . j.):). 5051�..._50;;5. · <:: • 
.Emon Bratawictjaja (Partai Buruh ), also of the Economic"··"commit·tee, fol­
lowi11g hi s inspection trip, r eported many closings of kr etek concei,n s:� ·in 
Centr al Java . R eport, 3 July, I. P� 1952, ,. 710. 
. t · 
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3 June the Government announced that it was doing everything possible to 
lighten the burden on the kretek and batik industries .  Then on the fourth, 
the P.T o  Pusat Pembelian Tjengkeh Indonesia (P.PoT . I�-Indonesian Clove 
Purchases Center) was set up in Djakarta with its Rp .2,506,000 paid-in cap­
ital apparently at the ratio of slightly under 51:49 Indonesian and Chinese, 
principally from kretek manufacturers of Kudus and Semarang, who were mem­
bers of the Gabungan Perserikatan Pabrik Rokok Indonesia (Gappri-Associa­
tion of Indonesian Cigarette Factory Federations )Q Franciscus SUHARTO 
(Partai Katholik) of Kudus became company president, while a majority of 
its vice presidents and board members were Chinese. The P.P.T . I. immediately 
thereafter became the sole importer of cloves, which it then distributed 
among the kretek factories with the assistance of Gappri and other c igarette 
assoc1a ions.70 
The batik industry had similarly been suffering from spiraline prices 
of cambric s through the first quarter of 1951 and then from wide price 
fluctuations ,-1hich accompanied speculation as d ozens of companies partic­
ipated in the importing and distribution of cambrics .  After discussions 
in June 1952 between the Ministry of Economic Affairs (again represented 
by Dr. Saroso )  and the Gabungan Ko-operasi Batik Indonesia, the country' s 
leading federation of batik cooperatives (whose members were principally 
indigenous Indonesians ) ,  the single-buyer formula was introduc ed in the 
70. See Charter 225/;I.9.53; I. ?. 1952, Po 572 ; ltJarta Ekonomi untuk 
Indonesia, V (1952 ) ,  4Ll-442; Abadi, loMar"o 19531e The proportion of shares 
held by indigenous Indonesians fell off sharply after the charter was legal­
izedo
R.  Suliantono SULAIMAN, brother-in-law . of Dr. Saroso, wa s one of the
P.P.T . I. vice presidents. Antara, 6 Sept. 1952 . See " Importing and the 
P.S. I.", infra . 
• •  
. . � .. 
---� · . 
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import of cambrics"o The G.K".B.I. 1s .forei gn  trading subsidi ary, N� V. Batik 
Trading  Comp �ny, then managed by lvias SARvJONO Sarwoh ardjono, was designated 
I 
to  ca�ry out the importing, using the services of its branch office in 
• ' \ I -•. .. • . . . 
�ap��• . Reducing its name to  just N .Vo Batik, it und ertook t he cambric i m-
• • • ,I 
porting and sold t o  batik coop eratives whi ch p erformed th e wholesaling ol
71 
Despite the private nature of the two importing monopolies, their • 
transacti"ons were stri ctly controlled by the Cbvernment, initi ally by the . ... . 
Jqj_a�an Administrasi dan Organisasi (the �ransformation of the A.I .o.) .  
I , • 
To administer the imp ortati on of these key industri al mat ertals , on 22 
. . 
October 1952 the Jajas an Persedi aan Bahan Perindus_trian ·was set up , yet it_ 
was several months before it was ready to begin full op erati on . Meanwhile, 
during March and April, N. V .  Bat_ik  also took over th e wholesaling of cambi";ics 
to  the separate cooperati ve associ ations . In :tviay the J .P.B.P.  itself be­
came the imp orter, and NoV.  Batik and the P.PoT .I . - acted as _its handling _ _ ; 
_
.. 
agents .72 Thanks t o  its monop oly position in supplying".materi als upon wh ich 
-hundreds of small and medium-sized industries d epe· �nd ed ,  by November the . · 
J.P.B_.P. had banked over Rp.64 million . 73 
The G.K.B.I . eventually d ecid ed that it was able to p erform th e func­
tio�s of its incorporated subsidiary itself, and so on 25 August 1953 it 
belatedly registered itself with the Department of Coop erati"v.es. Having
.. ..  
beco�e a legalized entity in prep arati"on for replacing N.V. Batik as the 
71. Saroso, Ko-operasi dan Masalah Batik, pp . 68�69, 130-131·. 
· The  Economic Committee of Parli"ament on 3 July had urged the government 
to control strictly the pri ce of batik mat eri als. I.r. 1952, pp. 717-718. 
72 . Saroso, op.cit ., pp . 130-132. 
73. Iskaq statement , 18 Nov.,, I.P. 1953, p .  1108. See "�ank Umum 
· ·Nas iona1n; Chapter XXIII . 
Government' s  handling a�ent in the import sector, it then arranged for the 
liquidation of the subsidiary to be effective on 15 September .
74 
However, the G.K .B . I."1 s ambitions were not to be  fulfilled, for a new 
cabinet and �.inister of Economic Affairs had in the meantime been insta l led. 
Consequently, the monopoly status of N.V. Batik as J .P.B .P. handling agent 
was ended on 9 September and that of the P .P eT o I� in October". Furthermore, 
to indicate that it no longer held the c love purchasing monopoly, the P .P .T .I .  
was c ompel led to change its name; it chose P .T. Perseroan D�gang "Kretek" . 75 
Although the II single-buyer" systems were ended, the re lative freedom in 
c ompeting for orders of  cambrics and c loves that existed before mid-1952 
was not restored. A form of monopoly importing was retained, but severa l 
different " nationa l" importers came to be designated as handling agents 
for the J.P .  B •P. 
Importing and the P �s·e I .  
During the first three years after the transfer of sovereignty, spe­
c ifica lly during the Hatta RIS, Natsir, and Sukiman Cabinets there was 
frequent criticism of the methods the Government used to promote the growth 
of national importers, including charges of an insufficiently forceful po l­
icy and waste in the distribution of import credits. The politic a l  atmos­
phere, however, was relatively free of charges of politica l favoritism. 
New importers were arising with a l l  kinds of party attachments (a lthough 
few were associated with the extreme left-wing which was still ideologically 
antagonistic to businessmen) ,  but . the party preference of their officers 
74. Berita-Negara R o I. 1953, No. 86; Saroso, op.cite,  p .  134. 
7Sc Bank Indon·esia Report 1953-1954, p.  134; Charter 587/19$4. By the
time of its reorganization, Chinese merchants had acquired a large majority 
of the shares of the P .P .T . I. 
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usually had rio"· effect on th eir treatment within th e group o f  protected 
national imp orters\. Th ere were even a number o f  compani es set up in which 
several politic al leaders from different parti es were ac tive. 
The era of good feeling, however., began ·.to deteriorate �1oticeably in 
19.52 when preparations for th e coming elec tions began to increase th e polari"-
zation of the parties which had more moderate and app arently not too incom­
p atible economic i deologic al tenets . At th e same tim e  a number of companies 
h eaded by p ersonalities closely associated with c ertain p arties were set up 
or became more ac tive, some of · which were developing bonafide business repu­
tations of their own .  
During 1952, two new national c omp anies whose presidents were associated 
with ·the P .S .I. became  ac tive: 1�Jibowo Corp oration l\J. V. -and N .  V. Perusahaan . :.: 
Dag�·hg "So,edarpo Corporation", founded resp ec tively by Wibowo and SOEDAJiPO • 
Sastrosatomo . On 23 September, when for perhaps the first time the ac ti ons 
of specific national importers WPre c riticized in a plenary session of 
Parliament, the two"· ·companies became involved in the ·mo tion o f  no confidence 
in Minister of Defense Hamengkoe Boewono (non-party) su.bmi tted by Zai11ul 
Baharuddin"e One o f  the justific"ations given for the motion was"· th e attitude 
of th e Ministry of Defense in appointing certain o rganizations to undertake 
purchases for th e entire Armed Forces,  which app eared to confirm the charge 
.·that Juch" measures gave"material profits to a 11c ertain group" (the P .S o I. ) . 76 
. .
P�:rt of the charges 1r1ere direc ted against two B .N ._I. subsidiaries in 
which Drs . TAN Goan Po was an offic er and Dr. Sumitro was alleged to be th e 
"7'6.·-'charters 690(1952 and 421/1953; I eP·. 1952, pp . 782�783. o '.I'_h e motion .·h ad its orig in in differences over military p ersonnel p olicy. C f .  "B .N.I. 
subsidiaries" in Chapter XXIII. 
1054 
advisor"e Zainul Baharuddin and BEBASA Daeng Lolo (P.R.N. ) ,  a co-signor of 
tl1e motion, a lso asserted in explaining the motion, that Sudarpo and �-.Jibowo 
had been permitted by the ministry to be its " sole purchasers" of munitions 
abroad."77 In reply on 1 October, Minister Hamengkoe Boewono denied that the 
two businessmen had ever made purchases for his ministry."78 
Criticism of P .S . I. ac tivities in business was not stilled by the 
Sultan' s  denia ls. True, most of the officers and members of Parliament of 
the P .S . I. (see Appendix vl) ,  following the r1arxist-Lenini�tradition of the 
party, abstained from direct intervention in private enterprises. Neverthe­
less, there were a number of persons conspicuous in business (in addition 
to the examples cited), who were brothers, brothers-in-law, or otherwise 
c losely related to P oS o io leaders. Their being associated with the party 
was not inconsisten� of c ourse, with the goa l of the 11 mixed economy" which 
it had c ome to accept. However, knowledge of many of these relationships 
was common in Indonesian business and politica l circles, and sometimes it 
appeared to them that government a gencies unduly favored companies c lose to 
the P .S.I. 
At this time a certain P.S . I. member held a most strategic position in 
the bureaucracy administering economic affairs. It might be said that RIS 
Minister of Prosperity Djuanda (non-party) was the initiator of the modern 
policy of Indonesianizing trade (principally the import sector) and that 
Unitary Republic l'-iinister of Trade and Industry Surnitro (P.S o I . ) was -i_nitia­
tor of the modern program of industria"lization. The top officia l b�low the 
77. I.P. 1952, PPo 769, 816, 835. Ir . Sakirman (P.K.I� ) charged that 
arms had been bought abroad through Soedarpo and Idham. 
78 . I.P. 1952, Pa 816� 
.. � . .... : . 
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J!linister to coord inate action in these two sectors was_ Dr . SAROSO 
Wirpd ihard jo, a close relati ve of Surnitro and former school mat e  in the 
• 
• :. 
' I • ; • • o 
Ne_t _J:;lerlands, 79 who held the title o f  Chi ef o f  the Directorate  of  Trade and . 
Industry. 
In view of the above, when Minist er Iskaq (P .N.I . ) took office in the 
first Ali Sastroam idjojo Cabinet, since the P.s . r. di d not support the 
cabinet { the P .s . I. faction ha� abst ained from the vote to permit .".it to 
carry out its program ) ,  he be g�n housecleanin g by removing Saroso from �is 
post". Shortly afterwards h e  fo�nd an excus� to remove Mr. Arifin �arahap 
from the key posit.ion of Chi ef of the Central Office of Imports .  
80 
From that t ime on, there would be no occas ion for charging a branch 
of t he government with favoring a company which was close to the P.� . I. 
On the c_ontrary, the P.N. Io itself undertook to dispense political favor­
itism in the ec.onomic sectors . P.N.Ie follo't1ers subsequ ently just ifi ed 
such largesse as me rely a continuat ion of the " P  .• S .  I .  sp oils. syst em." Yet 
in all fairness it should be stated that-in contrast t o  lat er developm ents­
favoritism by P.S . I .  offici als had app arently not bee �_ very �idespread •" . 
N. v. Suez 
1vlinister Iskaq' s action in appo inting two 11national1.1 companies to t ake 
over N.V .  Batik' s importi n g  monopoly instead of approving the intent ion 
of the G.K .B . I .-the fed eration of  virtually all indigenous Indonesian 
' .• .,
·batik. :pr.o ducers.�to replace its subsid iary, touched, off one o f  the mo st . . . ; : 
. ·.· .. .
h eated d ebate.s in the Indonesian Parl"iament during the pre-election era". 
' . 
79. Saroso was brother-in-law of Sumitro 1s father, R .Mo Margono". pjojohad j 
koesoemo {non-party), who was head of the B.N. I. and Bank Industri  Negara. 
80. Saroso was kicked upstairs to draft n ew econom ic laws". Arifin Hara­
hap was rep laced"· for allegedly h avin g  leaked t-rit:1out autilorizc,·jjion tl10 
inntruotion th...'1t became P. 41. 
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For in September 1953, he designated The Suez Trading Company N .  �,. of Sura­
baja and N.V� Handelmij. Goenoeng Perahoe of Djakarta, companies for which 
tlr . Iskaq and Mr .  Sunario (then Minister of Foreign Affairs) had previously 
served as attorneys, respectively .  
The action drew charges in the press that designating the two new com­
panies was an example of gross party favoritism. Especially "indigenous" 
Indonesians felt affronted, for Mohamad bin Abdullah ALA�10EDI, President of 
N .V. Suez was an Arab merchant who as a peranakan had acquired Indonesian 
citizenship in a passive manner. 
81 
At the height of the commotion Minister 
Iskaq announced that the role of cambric irn-:~• orters would be rotated among 
national companies, and designated five other coripanies to i mport during 
October .82 
Nevertheless, Tjikwan considered the problem of the designation of 
Suez and Cbenoeng Perahoe as cambric irnnorters sufficiently imr,>ortant to 
make it one of the justifications for introducing his interpellation"o 
Pointing out that over a hundred companies had submitted offers after 
learning that the N .V 4 Batik monopoly would be ended, he asked on what 
grounds the two coi:1panies s11ecified by T-Iinister Iskaq had been chosen". He 
wondered if Suez had been designated only because of Mr. Iskaq t s  long personal 
81. The debates later brought out the fact that Suez ' s  debt to the 
B .N . I. via Gapindo (Rp.592,467 at the end of November) was the third largest 
arrears in that category.  It may be recalled that the llfinistry of Economic 
Affairs had th�eatened to". bar defaulters from access to import exchange un­
less an agreement to clear up the arrearages were made . Cf. Iskaq statement 
and annex, I., P� 19.53, PPo 1JD8, ll76� 
82 . Each company was to import one million yards of cambrics" Other.
con1panies were then chosen for November.  
---
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relation with it .
83 
. Iskaq".replied that ·he had ended the N.V. Batik monopoly because some 
other importers had received offers of  cambrics from abroad at prices below 
those quoted by N.V. Batik. Declaring that it had been his intention all 
along to rotate cambric importing among other :importers, he denied that the 
five companies had been designated for October only after public reaction to 
the September appointment of N.V. Suez and Goenoeng Perahoe. The two com­
panies had been chosen first, he explained, because "when the J.P.B.P. took 
over the cambrics mo.nopoly the two corporations had future. deli very contracts 
and had thus suffered a loss or at least had receiv-ed less profit-. n I-fore­
over, Suez had over· a .hundred cooperatives behind"' it. Thus it was . not true 
that- ·this company had been chosen only because of · his long personal con-
nect·ion with it. 84 
The"·"debate continued on 20 November. Margono Djojohadikoesoemo ( non­
party), who had one of the lo11gest records of  service to Indonesian coopera­
tive mo vements of  any former civil servant, deplored the fact that the long­
established central association of Indonesian batik cooperatives (to which 
over 7000 batik producers belonged)., the G.K .B . Io, as a "democratic" repre­
sent·ative of producers., had been replaced by an ordinary company of traders .  
Declaring that N •V .  Suez probably did have over a hundred cooperatives among. 
.83 • . Speech, 6 ·Nov., · I,. ..P,1953_, pp.l035�l049o Isk-aq had practiced law in 
Surabaja before his appointment as minister. 
See also 11Tjikwan Interpellation" , infra. 
84. Reply, 18 Nov., IoP. 19.53, PP• 1106-1107 •" .Underscoring __ inse·rted 
by present writer. 
its customers, he expressed a doubt that there were such a number "behind 
it.11 85 One of the co-sponsors of the Tjikt-1an Interpellation, J .B.A .F . 
Mayor Polak (PeS .Ia ) ,  considered the designation of the two importing com­
panies a mistake since the G.K .B .I. represented -both a development towards 
a modern industrial group as well as a cooperative in harmony",with Article 
38 of the Constitutiono It appeared to him that the Government considered 
importing only from the angle of "How do we divvy up the boodle?" Concern­
ing the alleged future delivery contracts, he wondered whether only the two 
com1>anies had them and whether it was · not customary for such contracts to 
be taken over by the subsequent monopoly importer.
86 
Mr c Mohammad DALIJONO (Masjumi) was more direct." · He charged that the 
real reason for selecting Suez and Goenoeng Perahoe had been that of party 
interests of the P.N.I�,  s eeking funds for the election campaigna 87 Finally, 
Hadji Farid Alwi Isa (Masjumi) ,  who had formerly been a merchant near 
Surabaja, made a number of observations in the form of questions to the 
Government . He noted that the list of eighty trading companies i"1hich had 
imported cambrics during the six months previous to invoking the govPrnment 
monopoly did not include the name 0Suez" (or " Goenoeng Perahoe") .  He de­
clared that it was not true that Suez and Goenoeng Perahoe had suffered 
losses because of future delivery contracts "when the J.P.B oPo  took over 
the cambrics monopoly" , for it was the Batik Trading Company which had 
originally been given· the monopoly (the J.PGB�P• did not operate until half 
. 
-856 I.Po 1953," pp. ill4-1116o 
860 IoPo 1953, PPo 1116-1117. 
87. I.Po 1953, P o  11180 
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a year later), and it had · bought up the outstanding cambric contracts.  
Farid too wondered whether the alleged hundred plus batik cooperatives be­
l1ind N ..V. Suez had been recognized by the Department of Cooperatives. He· 
also questioned the wisdom displayed by the minister in his alleged policy 
of guaranteeing uninterrupted deliveries of cambrics, for two of the five 
importers suddenly designated in October had ·"declared that they were unable 
to handle their assignment s .88 
Two members of Parliament counter-attacked during the ·"debate. Djaswadi- .. 
Suprapto (P.NoI.) ·observed that the Economic�_ ·Committee in principle had • .... ' 
approved the ending of the cambric importing· inonopoly following an investi­
gation report made by Mr. Assaat and Siauw. Ir. Sakirman (P oK . I. ) charged 
that the 11 P.S .I.-Masjumi regime11 had misused its authority.:. by implementing . :._ ., . 
a policy which had enriched a few persons at the expense of the state and 
people, and he called, for an inves•tigation of the profits obtained by the 
G.KgB .I. as the former instrument for carrying out the single-buyer and 
single-seller policy. · · Such a system of .
. importing cambrics and cloves, · he 
continued, suffered from"· the 11 clicque system'' -,: for in• the corporations set 
up as the instruments of such a system: • s'at many memb·�rs or supporters of the 
89 · . d . J... ·• d 90..P.,s .r. Farid Alwi Isa answere J.n-"l\.,J.n & . , , · 
In presenting the Government's  Reply closing the debate, Minister Iskaq· 
88�. I,,P. 1953., PPo 1123-1125. 
89t,. Sp�eches, 20 Nov.�, I,,Po i953 pp·. 1120-1121. Sakirman alleged that 
one mari �ppointed as an officer of one 
., 
of the corporations in vol ve·d pad be­
come tli�1: -orr6ther-in-law o·,f the "champion of the single buyer and single
seller policy11 (ioe �., of Dre Saroso). 
900 Statement, 2 Dec�, I.1.:P(' l.953, P o 118$\t He charged that the presi­.
dent of N .V ,, Suez had been a traitor to the revolution during the Battle 
of Surabaja. 
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on  2 December 1953 noted that the G.K .B . I. had remai ned the distributor of 
the imported cambrics under the supervi sion of the J .P .B .P.  Si nce h e  had 
appoi nted not just two importers aft er the N . V. Batik monopoly e n ded i n  
September 1953, he did not see why questions were still asked about why 
N .V .  Suez and Goenoeng Perahoe had been designat ed first". Such desi gnations  
di d not represent mi stakes which i n  his opi nion had to be answere d for �  He 
di d not feel , he decl ared, that it was necessary to go i nto the reasons for 
appoi nting Suez first because such a matter was too "silly" to be debated i n  
such an august body as Parliament, which debate h e  feared would lower the 
prestige of Parli"ament . 91 And with that th e debate on the N . V. Suez matter 
was closed. 
Tjikwan Interpellation 
The Tjikwan Interpellation has already been alluded to in connection 
with a number of policy i ssues arisi ng shortly aft er Mr o Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo 
became Mi nist er of E conomic Affairs. E arly in Sept ember 1953 it 't-Tas re­
ported that a license had bee n given to export 15,000 tons  of rubber slabs 
o n  a consi"grnnent and p arallel transaction basi s (a procedure which had been 
stopped si nce the beginni ng of the year) .  It was rumored that thi s had 
resulted from the wish of two mi ni sters-one of whom was closely related to 
the party to get the lic ense -that such an export license be given  to "a  
·91. I.P.  1953, PP• 1174, 1178-1179.  -Iskaq appended a li st 0£ the 
"organizations" (not "coop erative organizations" as in hi s first r evelat ion ) 
behi nd  N. V. Suez, which had formed the Pool Batik "Suez"". The list i nclude d  
a Chi n ese batik coop erati ve (of 112 member-e nt erprises), an Arab batik 
cooperative (or5·no enterpri ses ), two indigenous Indonesian cooperatives of
Ponorogo ( with 84 and 31 members, respecti vely), and 45 i n di vidual batik 
ent �rpri"ses (of whi ch at l east 33 were Arab and 8 Chinese ) .  Subsequently 
the pool i s' name ·"was chang ed to Koperasi Batik Central (Central Batik Coopera­
tive ), with Alamoedi as treasurer. 
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certain group"". Shortly thereafter it had been announced that the license 
.. ; 
bad been cancelled. Tjikwan accordingly asked for an eJq:>"lanation, charging 
that such actions" . had an unfortunate effect on the rubber market.
92 
Iskaq replied that the measure had only been intended to aid the 
Djakarta Br�nch of Persatuan Peladjar Demobilisan _(Union of Demobilized 
ptudents ) ,  which had requested such a license in order to obtain funds for 
rehabilitating its members and enabling them to return to a normal way of 
life. The actual consignment would be carried . out for them by six Chinese 
merchants who .had on hand supplies of slabs. Although clearance had been 
.. 
obtained from other offices concerned, the Monetary Board had cancelled 
the measure on ll September.93 
Then Iskaq 1 s party colleague., Djaswadi Soeprapt_o . asked that for the 
purposes of comparison a list of the companies which. j_Ii the past had exported 
. ,  . 
rubber on such a basis be given to Parl�apient". Iskaq ppliged with a list 
. .
\ '.. . . . .: 
of 4,4 exporters which had shipped 65., 900 tons of rubber.
94 
Although split
.. ··, .. 
. .: . . 
rat�t?r e.y�nly between indigenous and Chinese cornpanies., the list showed .. . . . .  
nothing conclusive regarding political distribution. 
Another issue �aised by Tjikwan concerned the granting of rubber export 
licenses to "certain m?rchants" accordi.ng ___to foreign exchange contracts 
92 . I.Po  1953, pp. 1035, 1047-1048. See also 11 P. 4l and the Distri­
bution of F.xchange" , 11 Gapindo" , and "N. v. Suez", supra . 
93 � Statement," _ 18 N�v:o," . Ii.P. 1953 t>q . 1104.., 
94� IoPo 1953, pp. 1120, 1173, 1177. The largest shipment, 13,100 
t9ns, was licens�4 by _ N. V. �ipra, wbose P�esigent Ijan SORPAR�JAN h�d been.
·reportedly close · t o  members · of PoS ;;t°o , "· �114 whose Vice President, KHOUW Kim -
Eng, in 1955 became involved in the so·;.;c·alled "Hongkong barter scandal." 
�ee footnote 19, Chapter XXVII. )  The second largest shipment, 5000 tons, 
was licensed by a PoNoI(\ company, N. V� Dewasa •" . t1r. Tan Po Goan (P uS eI .
member of Parliament) shipped 1000 tons. 
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apparently lower than the current market prices., as a consequence of which 
the shipper acquired foreign exchange abroad"ol
95 
In his explanation, Iskaq 
pointed out that such 11moedercontracts" had been authorized at the end of 
July (thus during the last days of the 1rJilopo Cabinet) in anticipation of 
a falling  market and were only allowed to " exporter-producers" ,  i.e. export­
ers which had their own smoke houses., remilling plants, sorting enterprises, 
or estates". 
96 
Tjikwan also  complained that foreign exchange for imports appeared to 
be distributed without recourse to any systematic plan . Observing that in 
recent months (since the installation of the Ali CabinGt ) hundreds of im­
porting companies had been recognized as "national importers" , he charged 
that such newly recognized " Newcomers" were receiving special consideration 
concerning import exchange., whereas the 11 0ldcomers11 received very little."
97 
Declaring that it was a tremendous task to distribute relatively little 
import exchange among the several thousand L�porters, Iskaq acknowledged 
that the two new terms had arisen among businessmen, but denied that the 
newest "Newcomers" were receiving special allocations."98 
In addition to the exchange of opinions on specific economic issues., 
the Tjikwan Interpellation brought out expressions on a subject more basic . 
The interpellation proposal submitted on 20 October 1953 had charged that the 
• 
950 IeP• 1953, PPo 1035, 1048. Such a practice apparently violated __._....
regulations requiring residents to turn their foreign exchange over to the 
Foreign Exchange Institute. 
96. IoP• 1953., pp. 1104-1106., lll6. Mayor Polak condemned such specu­
lation on a bare market by the Government. 
97 . I.P .  1953, PPo 1035, 1049 0 
98. I.P. 1953., Po 11070 
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sundry economic measures did not appear to be based on any economic pian 
aiming at a" . healthy national e9onomic policy, and so it asked to learn the 
99contents of whatever plan was being- implemented-if there were anyo Iskaq_ 
replied simply that the GovPrnment wanted." to change the colonial economic 
structure into a national one. Nevertheless, he admitted that the specific 
foundations, principles, organization, nature, and pattern of an Indonesian 
national economy could not yet be clearly defined, nor could the term 
11colonial economy11 easily be explained.
100 
The sub-ject of the national economy elicited various opinions from 
members ·of· Parliament . Margono was disappointed that the large coopera­
tive of batik producers (G.K.B o :l:.• ) ., which had taken de.ca des to reacfh the 
position of cambrics importer., had now lost that status, yet . the GQv:ern­
·ment ·talked about changing a colonial economy to a" national one. Since the 
terms were confusing the population, he requested a definition of just what 
was·· a ·  "national economy0 o a "colonial economy11•, 0 ,indigenous0•, and 11non­
indi•genous11 •" . -He hoped that the meaning of n nationaln would not be tied to 
the nation ··or a race, but only". to the country; e og., anything pro .d�ced 
within the country, and the capital and resident there, . were to M�r goµo :
11 n�tionaln •
101 
Mr. Mohamad Oalijono ,.rentured a definition of .•ci national 
". 99., I.Po · 1953, PP• 1035-1036.  .. 
100. Staterr�nt., : 18 Novo.ii IoP. 19.53, p .,  11030 . : \ .. . . .. . . . 
· 101. Statement, 20 Novo., .:.I.,P. 1953., PPo 1114--:1;116. Margono reminded 
his audience that many of them preferred certain hospitals and hotels which 
might be termed 0colonial11 (built by the Dutch) . What was important was not 
11colonial" or "national", but a 11 democratization of the economic apparatus" , 
e o g• the shouldering of the responsibility for .. .tpe development of production 
and trade on a "business group", such as the centralization of distribution 
in the hands of the G.K.B .o I.. The question for him .was .neither a national one 
nor a colonial one but a universal one, one· of humanism"n · 
-- --
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economy: 11an economy for and operated by us" (national p erson s ) .  Siauw., 
attacking the Government 1 s II ind igenous policy", asserted that every measure 
expressly aimed at l iquid ating the colonial economy had only strengthened 
the position o f  alien monopoly cap ita l.  Tjoeng warned that th e harmonious 
middle class intended by the Government would not result from discrimina­
tion among the cap ital o f  citizens.
102 
Sakirman strongly criticized the "Dr .  Saroso and Minister Sumitro era " ,  
when allegedly measures taken in the Ministry o f  Economic Affa irs were 
solely based on the interests of  the PeS .I. For h im  and the P �K 6 I. the 
current Go, ..ernment economic and trad e measures approxima ted a "ra th.er pro­
gressive and d emocratic policy11 o Wh-ile still containing some weaknesses 
and shortcomings, they were in g eneral I I firm and d aring" Yet he  felt 0 
further measures necessa ry, such as compl ete state control of  "vital im­
porting enterprises" wl1ich bring in the basic consumer goods o f  the Govern­
ment and people. Also, each national businessman had to be given opportun­
ities freely to obta in foreign exchange, wh ile a special foreign exchange 
pol icy wh ich was not injurious to the national economy h ad to be implemented 
·for e nterprises o f  "alien monopoly capita1.0
103
For Mr. Soejono Had inoto {PoNo I.)., as in h is book four  years". earl ier, 
both a liberal, cap italist, free economy with the slogan "la issez fa ire,  
laissez passer"11 , wh ich resulted in domination by the economically strong ., 
and a total itarian state economy based on. d ictatorsh ip and wh ich thus was 
anti-democratic and contrary to the fundamental rights o f  man, were to be 
102 . I.,P°' 1953, pp � lll8-lll9o  Cf. " I�ational Importers",  abo ·ve . 
103 0 Statem"ent, 20 Nov • ., I oPo  19531 pp Q 1120-11210 
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opposed. Instead, he chose a planned, 11 socialist11 , guided economy, the 
middle-way, which respected individuality while relating it to solidarity, 
thus a " symphony of individualities. "  On another subject, he explained the 
resentment existing in every part of the country towards the very strong 
economic status of the citizen of Chinese"- descent. The citizens together 
had to seek the best possible solution to this problem and to achieve a 
citizenship full of the feeling of national unity, he urged.104 
Minister Iskaq, while repeating that it was difficult to define a 
national economy, declared that efforts should be aimed at the country's  
prosperity in the broadest sense. Approving Soejono Hadinoto ' s  description 
of the past and present condition of the economy, he repeated the statement 
of Prime Minister Ali on 10 September, that the G:>vernment did not discrimi­
nate against non-indigenous citizens, but that nevertheless, separ�te 
treatment was necessary in order to reach a harmonious commercial middle 
class .  
10, 
The sponsor of the interpellation, Tjikwan then voiced his views on 
the subject. He felt that efforts to change the colonial economic structure 
to a national one had started with the proclamation of independence on 17 
August 1945 and had been going on for years although slowed down by the 
104. Statement, 20 No v., IaPo 1953, pp. 1122-1123 . He des·cribed the 
three-level social-economic pyramid inherited from the Dutch colonial period, 
with the Dutch and other whites on top, the formerly-designated "aJ.-,_ien" .
Orientals" in the middle, and the "natives" on the bottom. In the , ·ecoriomic 
sphere at least, there had been no fundamental change, he asserted.
1953, P• 1183. 
IePo 
105. Statement, 2 Dec �, I .Po  1953, pp� ll72-1173. On this occasion, 
Iskaq announced that for purposes of classification there would only ,be 
"national" and n alienn companies and that all citizens regardless of descent 
would be placed in the first category. See "National Importers o11 
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action of  the coloni al power dur:i.ng the R evolution .  . In r eply to the Govern­
ment Is lack o f  a · defi nition,  he described the basic feature of  a colonial 
economy as dep endence upon that o f  another country, whereas a national 
economy in essence had a structure that could stand by itself. And the 
economic structure outli ned i n  Articles 37 and 38 o f  the Constitution for 
Tjikwan was a guided, socialist economy. In the import sector, he con­
tinued, i ncreasi ng the percentag e o f  foreig n exchange allocated for national 
busi nessmen di d not represent a fundamental change .  Merely changing hands, 
i n  view o f  the various deficiencies among national busines,smen , had not yet 
brou ght the changes expect ed, an d the markets continued to be controlled 
by alien businessmen . This was so because pl aci ng a burd en o n  a p erson who 
was not yet able to shoulder it meant gi vi ng him cause to ask help from 
another • . The fundamental measures requi red had to be co ntained i n  an order­
ly plan aimed at meeti ng Indo n esia 's n eeds throu gh its own production or at 
least reduci ng the size o f  imports through i ncreased domestic production . 
Similarly i n  the export sector Tjikwan recommended maximum domestic pro­.
cessing o f  Indonesi an p roducts (for domestic consumption as well as exports ) 
and direct shipments to the consumi ng cou ntri es. He concluded his remarks 
by o ffering a motion based o n  the i n formation aired duri ng the i nterp ella­
tion,  the pri ncipal portion  o f  which woul d  call on the Government to formu­
late its conception of the national economy and to p re_pare a p lan for". 
changi ng the.coloni al economic structure to a national one."106 . 
106. Statement1 2 Dec.,  I.P. 1953, PP• 1179-11821. Co-sponsors were 
Amelz ( non-p arty), Mayor Pol ak, Mo hamad Noeh (P.S.I.5), all co-sponsors o f  
the interpellation proposal , and H. Farid Alwi Isa .  
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Tjikwan l\1otion and Special Licen�es 
Debate on the T jikwan }1otion submitted on 2 DecembPr 19.53 tvas pof?tpo!'\ed
. . .. ' . 
. . •' ..
f6ur months. In view of the Government's  economic measures during the -
interim, on 5 April 1954 the text of the motion was changed into one of 
disapproval of the policy of the Minister of' · Economic Affairs { Iskaq ) .  
When debate commenced two days later, much of it touched upon questions 
broached during the interpellation., such as aid to private banks and per-_. , 
sonnel changes. An important part of the motion was concerned with the 
apparent lack of any plan for changing the colonial economic structure into 
a national one. 
Tjikwan, regretting the Government's  continue� lack of definition of 
··- ·either term, reemphasized that the mere transfer of- .enterprises in several 
economic sectors to national businessmen did not make a national economy. 
1'1oreover., in making provisions for -such chang-ing of hands it wa3 .. neces_sary 
to define who were entitled to be; called "national businessmen" and what 
was meant by "national capital., 11 · and this required that there first be a 
citizenship law and a law regulating and differentiating between national 
and alien capital. Since a number of economic sectors still had a colonial 
structure., Tjikwan felt that a plan providing for stages and indicating 
which sectors would be converted first., had t o  be made. 1-
07 _In similar vein., 
Mayor Polak, who protested the way import exchange was. distributed, declared 
that even if -it were distributed equitably to national :importers the process 




107. I.Po 1954, PP• 276-277. 
108. I.P. 1954., PP• 280-281. 
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Replying on 20 April, liinist er Iskaq said bluntly that even thou gll i : 
... .. . .  
there was no cl ear definiti"on, 0 everyone already knows what is meant by a 
nati onal economic structureln Then he passed on t o  e:xplain what the coloni"­
·al economy was that h ad to be chang ed and noted that among th e col onial 
vestiges that had to be  erased was alien proprietorship of most trade (in­
cluding small-scale trade ) ,  of some communications (especially int erinsular ) , 
of most mineral extracti on, and of l arge and important factori es . He con­
cluded by assuring the motion' s sponsors that hi s ministry was working hard 
to  change the economic structure according to  a d efinite and ord erly plan.
109 
The reply fell short of what Tjikwan considered adequate.  
Wibisono, citing the prid e of some of the Government 's supporters in 
the 0 daring and radical" measures towards liquidating the col onial economy­
.specifically the granting of import licenses to  national rather than alien 
import ers-pointed t o  their consequences which injured the state and the 
common people, wh ose int erests it was said the Cbvernment wanted to prot ect . 
Such measures, he charged , h ad l ed t o  sales of import licenses and the 
growth of a class of parasites .110 
As the d ebate grew warmer and charges of corrupti on came in quicker". 
succession1 charge and count er-charge flew back and forth between Marxist 
and ·?J',asjumi members of Parliament . Siauw (now with the S.K .I. faction) 
asserted that in previ ous cabinets the Masjumi h ad joined in the nbooty 
pol icy" of h and ing out licenses to their fri ends.  Wibisono reminded him 
·.' r..
109. I.P. 1954, PP• 306-307, 309. One of six. points I�kaq listed - for 
the Govermnent•s  export policy was to  guide national ent erprises so that a 
national export apparatus could be d eveloped". 
. . 
uo. I.PG 1954, PP• 340-JLl. 
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that in the p eriod since the transfer of sovereignty and before the Ali 
Cabinet no Masjumi member had held the �conomic Affairs portfolio, whereas 
the PoN.I� had held it three times .111 Iro Sakirman ., who expressed a d esire 
that ther� be closer cooper�tion between the Working Committee for Export 
·and Import Affairs and the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and who in general 
approved Government m easures for imp:l.ementing what he called a - "transitional 
economic structureu between_" a "s�n1i-colonial capitalist economy" and a 
·"11socialist economy""., cha-rged that p ast 11 JYiasjumic;oP GS .r. Cabinets" always -- , 
operated a policy that was p arallel with that of "Dutch and American coloni-
al capital11•• 
112 
Tjikwan termed this 11pickpocket strate gy" (the pickpocket 
yells 11pickpockett11 to divert attention ·to another p erson )"9 since .the move­
. ments of the opposition pa:r:ties had no qonn ection with such capital, but ' 
tpe movements of the P.K.I. were closely connected with those promoted by 
the "proletarian _ -113 1ivibisono c :::illed Sakirman"1sdictatorship" in .Moscow.
. . . . '. . 
cl}arges and the pose of Indonesian Communists as the best p atriots a " broken 
. record0 ��de in Moscowo Citing the secret instructions of the _"Front 
Demokrasi R akjat made early in 1948, which c alled for infiltra;tip.�_ . _o;f.. sectors 
qf the society and c arrying out instructions in accord"ance with the strate gy . . 
·of the Soviet Union , Wibisono declared that the P.K.  I" covered ' u1'.?. �ts own -
crimes by charging other persons., a .tactic often used by Hitl�»_.."
114 
'rhe primary specific issue raised by the Tjikwan J\1otion was that of 
lll. Wibisono speech, 20 Apr .,". IePo 1954, P•  342 • 
112 . Speech., 20 Apr .1 I.Po 1954, pp . 346-348. Concerning the Wo�king 
Committee-, see "Other Commercial Indonesiani zation 11 , infra.  
113 . Speech, 29 Apr .1 I.Po 1954, Po 401.  
114. Speech, 29 Apr ., IoPa 1954, Po 406. 
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special licenses (idzin ist:i.mewa) for :imports, which instead of being issued 
by th e regular channels, i .e .  by the C entral Offic e of Imports without re­
ferral up to superior administrati ve or !)olitical positions, were provided 
pers onally by I'1i nister Iskaq. Tjikwan., i n  explaining his motion, noted 
that althou gh the cou ntry's forei gn exchange reserves had been falling, :i.:i 
one month (March 1954),  r eportedly Rp .200 million i n  exchang e h ad been 
allotted to around 100 imp orters while over a four-month p eriod about four 
thousand importers would have to compete for Rp .397 million. This gave rise 
to suspicions that the Government had divided importers into " favorite child" 
and "step child" categories .115 
Hadji Farid Alwi Isa (t1asjumi ) also suggested th at the sum in volved i n  
special licenses (approximately Rp .160 million ) ,  apparently had been distri­
buted among companies which were "prop er" i n  the view of th e leadership of 
the Ministry o f  Economic Affairs . 
116 
Mayor Polak compared the amou nts of 
such special lic"enses , a few of which approach ed Rp"olO million apiece, with 
the customary maximum amount issued over a four-month p eriod to an imp orter 
of Rp o2001000o He reported having h eard th at duri ng the first three months 
of the year Rp .300 million in special lic enses h ad been issued to about 150 
comp anies .117 
Iskaq r eplied that the special licenses had been issu ed sp ecifically 
in order to meet needs for the comi ng Lebaran . Since there were still many 
• 
115. Speech , 7 Apr ., I .P. 1954, PP• 278-279. Tjikwan noted that within 
weeks of this occurrence, the Central Office of Imports had four successive 
heads � 
116. I.P� 1954� P• 280. 
117. I.P. 1954, p. 281 
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11,strawmen" among national me·rchants, he explained, he had taken it up�n". 
himself to determine who would:"· get such licenses, with the intention that 
.
the merchants chosen would be bonafide., would"not be"used by alien businesses.,·"
and would themselves realize the foreign exchange allocated to them. In­
si'.stin-g that " objective" factors had been used., . he . rejected the charges of 
step-child treatment., or of arbitrary distribution of· l·icenses solely ac­
cording to personal feelings. He then submitted a list -of 93 importers. 
which had received Rpo167 million in special licenses., two-thirds of which 
were for textiles. However., he suggested .that if the motion' s proponents 
wa·nted to know which importers received how much exchange for all kinds ,of 
imi)orts throu·ghout the first part of the year, all the archi·ves of the 
Central Office of Imports would have to be brought to the session-some-
thing which he hoped was not intend�d.118· 
Nevertheless, Wibisono asserted that reports which he had repe.i ved 
indicated that the policy of Minister Iskaq was to change th� coloni�i econ­
omy -into not a 11 national11 but a " national party" (read :  P.No·Ie ):: ·econorny. 
Cons·Etiuently., he doubted that the Go vernment really 1r1anted .to wipe· �o\lt the". 
practice of licens·e-selling (despite its stated intentions ) because- the · 
. .
victims would be certa·in · parti.es · ·which no longer tiirould get assistance 1£ro1n 
such special national irriporters-o
119 
Saroso Harsono · (of the Government party., 
• 
118�· Statement, 20 ..Apr., IoPo 1954, PPo 311-312� 327-328"s Leb·aran was 
the holiday when the population customarily put on new clothes or gave 
presents of textiles"a
Although admitting that there had been less exchange available for a11· 
·imports than in past years., Iskaq explained that annually 5% of exchange
allotted was not used and that special licenses were issued on the sum antic-
ipated for 19540 �
The largest allocation was received by the Nirwana company of Semarang 
(Rpn9 million) o At least one of the top three was associated with an !KINI 
officer. 
119. IoP• 1954., P• 341. 
1072 
P.R.N. )  inquired whether the spe�ial licenses had also been issued i n  19535. 
Citi ng Iskaq1 s statement that special licenses had been given to bonafide 
m erchants, he i nquired whether the Minister kept li sts of bonafide and non­
bonafide importers ,  and asked why such licen"ses had not also been gi ven to 
the other bonafide importers o120 Iskaq merely answered that since special 
licenses had been gi ven i n  early 1954 for importing goods for Lebaran, none  
� ,.,1had b een issued duri ng the last part of 195310�� 
The debates over the T jikwan rlotion attracted widespread public i nt er­
est . In Djakarta a group of busi"nessmen set up a Committee to Defend the 
National Busi nessmen ,  which expressed strong ob jections to Mi nister Iskaq 1 s 
polici es of  special licenses, in other field s as well as importi ng and 
exporting . As I'-lr . t-Jibisono emerged as the chief protagonist i n  the motion 
of no-confid ence i n  Mi nister Iskaq 7 s polici"es, he was flooded with evidence 
on  the subject of  special licenses"o From such informati on, he d educed 
that only t en percent of  the companies on the li st released by Iskaq were 
bonafide and that the rest were simply 11 briefcase importers" who existed by 
selling licenses . Furthermore, he report ed that such importers, for the 
privilege of  obtaini ng special licenses, usually had to make an extra "de­
posit" equal to ten percent of the value of the licenses, which went i nto 
the election campai gn fund of a "certai n party" . Although Wibisono made 
such charges outside of the chambers and immunity of Parliament, and it 
was a public secret that they referred to the P.N.Io , no official denials 




. .  
were forthcoming.122 
When debate resumed 
. .oii 29 April, Tjikwan, too, analyzed · rskaq 1 s list 
of importers which had received special licenses. Citing the qualifications 
given by Iskaq for receiving special licenses, he wondered"· whether" . a 
Chinese firm listed was a genuine "national" importer and what were the 
criteria for determining whether a company was bonafide or capable of 
nrealizing", itself, the special license granted it o Citing ·Wibisono, he 
charged that the main qualification for getting such a license was to fill 
the treasury of a cert a in party ( the P_oN o Io )  in preparing for the election 
campaign. He also wondered about the statement that the special licenses 
had been given to provide goods for Lebaran (which was to fall early in 
June) ,  whereas investigation showed that some would not be delivered until 
July or August. Furthermore, he described as a "public secret11 that special 
licenses had been granted via two ·channels, although in both cases the Mini-
. . . .' . � :· .
ster himself selected the importers, namely via the Central."Office of Imports 
(which list had been submitted to Parli�ent) and also directly by Minister 
' . .
Iskaq 1 s 
. 
own harid. He asked why a list of the latter type of special permits 
had not been submitted. 
123 
122 •" . Abadi, 23-24 Apr. l954e Wibisono declared that some of the"_"n�es 
on the list of 93 were government officials. He charged, too, that special 
licenses led to rises in the prices of imports since they included the 10% 
·· · · ·· · · 
11 deposit11 • 
. . 
123. I.Po 1954, 400. Tjikwan also wondered why the allotment to one P o 
company was up to forty--five times as great as that to another-., why the .
allotment to a la�ge and long established company was smaller than that of
a much smaller importer, and why certain well-known bonafide n�tional
companies had been omitted whereas ·many which could not be regarded as real 
�nporters had received allocationso Furthermore, he reported that some of 
the companies on the Minister's list denied the data shown or denied ever 
having received such specia l licenseso 
l07!i 
Alwi Isa declared that he had true information that in addition to the 
Rp el67 mjJlion in special lic enses admitted by Minister Iskaq, there was 
another Rp .88 million which had been issued on the advice of businessmen 
who had been c alled in by him especial ly for suc h  matters . This was further 
proof, he thought, that Iskaq I s actions instead of being based on regula•• 
tions had depended only on his personal desires .
124 
Mayor Pol ak reported 
information that reg arding the second c ategory of special licenses , Rp .60 
million had been acquired from unused allocations at the end of 1953 and 
Rp .20 million from the alloc ation for industrial imports .125 
Iskaq in re turn continued to deny that p ersonal preferences had governed 
the issuance of such  licenses, declaring that "it may be said" that he did 
not know p ersonally the presidents or managers of the resp ective comp anies 
on the list he had submitted". He sugg ested ,  however, that some mistakes 
in .the d istribution were unavoid able . In reply to the requests for lists 
.o:f other special licenses, he declared that there were no other special 
licenses, there were only supplementary stuns given to a number of importers .... -
who felt that the original d istribution had been l ess than what th ey had 
c alcul ated -after further inspec tion was made .126 
These and other replies of Iskaq to the Tjikwan r-Io tion appeared to be 
sufficient to backers of the Ali Sastroamid jojo Cabine t  in Parliament_,. for 
124. IcPc 1954, pp $ 401-402 . 
125. IoPo 1954, P• 403e. 
126. I.Po 1954, P• 4040 ·
------
� . 
. � � . . . . . � 
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127
the motion failed 6o to ioi.
PoT -� Interkertas 
Much attention during the debates over the Tjikwan t--1otion against the 
policies of Minister Iskaq (P.NoI. ) was centered on the case of P.Ta Inter-
kertas � This new corporation's charter was drawn up on 2 December 1953, 
.'. 
showing that its capital of Rp o500,000 was distributed among thr�e stock-
. . 
holders., half to SIDIK Djojosukarto ( General Chainnan of the P.N.I" ) and. ., 
a quarter each to Mr �  R.  Sundoro BUDHYARTO Martoatmodjo (a lawyer and leader 
of SOBRI, the labor federation following the tradition of Tan Malaka)., and 
Mr . R.  Achmad SOEBARDJO (Advisor General to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
who had disaffiliated from the Masjumi)"o Budhyarto was named President, 
and his wife and Sid�k, members" . of the Board of Directors . The new corpora­
tion' s  stated purpose was to trade in all kinds of paper and paper products, 
. . '- ..  
to import all kinds of . . paper, and to produce all kinds of paper
ci128 
. . 
. : ._ ; . 
127 .  Of the ten Parliament factions r�presented in the Ali Sastroamid­
jojo cabinet, only three mustered up all their members to defeat the motion 
against Minister Iskaq' s  policies," : namely the 5-man Partai Buruh, the 4-ma� 
P.S . IG ie, and the l•man B�T .I. factionso A oA o  Achsien, chairman of the N.U. 
faction refused to atte11d the session that evening. Nine m�m,bers, repre­
senting five different Government factions., abstained from votingo The
principal supporter of the Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet not represent". ,ed in it.,
the P.Ko I$., mustered 16 of its 17 faction members to vote approval f'or Min:�•
ister Iskaq"1 s policies o . _ , .: · 
"Pak Djenggot" (a gossip column) reported that at a meeting of a certain
Government party council, 5 of its 7 members in Parliament . insisted that ." .
·they would back the Tjikwan Motion. This allegedly caused the party bosses 
to make them all kil1,ds of promi�es in an effort to get . the,�_. to vote against..the motiono Abadi., 28 Apr o 1954. (At· that time, P"RoNo had 8 active mem­
bers in Parliament; N.Uo and Parindra., ·" 6 £3.ach . ) 
128 0 See Charter 250/1954� Budhyarto• s  brother, Dr"Q Boentaran, was 
rchairman of the Persatuan Progresip (United. Progressives) fcctic,rl'" · in Parlia­
ment, whose representative in tpe Governm�nt was Minister of.-, Deferl$e ·i:wa··Kusuma Sumantri. Late in 1954° Budhyarto· ·himself replaced Iwa in Parliament.
During the Revolution Budhyarto and Soebar�jo served sentences for t�eir 
role in the attempted coup d 1 etat, the 11 July 3d Affair" , in. 19460 
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The matter associated with this company was broached by I"1r. Jusuf 
Wibisono (Masjumi) in his speech concerning the growth of parasites on the 
community among certain nationa l importers who without hard work or experi­
ence could make huge profits because of special treatment.  He reported 
that the extreme shortage of newsprint in many of the cities then was said 
to be connected with the fact that on the initiative of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs a new paper importer had been establishad that received 
very specia l treatment. Although new importers usually had to wait months 
for recognition, this one had received it within one weeko Moreover, 
whereas other natio:ia l importers usually received a relati v·eJ.y smalJ_ allo­
cation of foreign exchange for importin g  paper, the new company had received 
over one hundred times the customary amount. Since the new importer was 
brand new and not yet operating smoothly with a wide distribution apparatus, 
.. 
Wibisono felt these circumstances might have had some relation to the dis­
turbed newsprint supply . Wibisono further declared that he had heard that 
the same special importer had received in an unusua l procedure " extremely 
satisfying11 orders from the Indonesian Election Commission worth tens of 
millions : of ri.lpiahs . fle accordingly asked the Cl:> vernment to c larify these 
. . . 
reports"o 
129 
Later that same day, Minister Iskaq limited his r�marks to providing 
figures intended to prove that there was sufficient newsyrint in the 
cou.T).·tiry and to axplainir.g that the c losing down o.f one newspaper had been 
for financial reasons.
130 
However� Dr. D.  s.  Diapari (chairman of the pro-
129. Speech, 20 Apro9 IoPo 1954, p .  341� 
130. IcPc 1951.i, PP• 355-3560 -· ---
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Government S .K .I. faction) called Wibisono ' s  allegation that the Indon��¼�n 
Election Commission had ordered ,hundreds Qf tons - of paper from a distributor 
which had received special treatment 11 a complete lie" .
131 
The subject did not die then, however. For on 23 April the Djakarta 
daily Sumber reported that the importer which had become the subject of 
much speculation was P.T"o Interkertas, which"_ allegedly had received recog-. . 
nition as an irnporter from the Ministry of E.conomic Affairs on 16 December 
195.3 and further"- recognition as an importer of stationery goods on 9 Feb­
ruary 1954. The paper also reported that Interkertas had received import 
exchange not only for 600 tons of paper as reported earlier, (wh;ch was just 
an initial order)., but for 2000 tons., which represented . an  order from the 
Indonesian Election Commission."132 Reporting this news when debate resumed 
on 29" April., Wibisono also took note of Diapari 1 s remarks and the sha�p 
public denial by S o  Hadikusumo (P.N.I o ) "J, the Commission Chairman, that." his 
comm-ission had ordered paper from a special importer The }1asjumi" parlia­o . 
.
menta·ry 1:eader then asserted that he had heard that the �r�er., invol �ng 
·ab·ol,· .t Rp.6 million� had been given without taking bids according to the 
procedure which was customary for all Government purchases •" . Wibisono also 
reported that l�inister : ,Iskaq. _himself had asked an alien bank in Djakarta 
to ·grant an import credit to · Interkertas for Rp"c lO million., and he suggested 
131. I�P. 1954, P •  3530 
• 
132 . · I oP •  19541 Po 405. Sumber reported .�hat Interkertas had received
legal recognition as a corporation from" . the Mini_ster" . of Justice on 8 De.cem­
ber - '1953 o·  However, the corporation" charter indi;cfates". that the applic_ation.
for legalization was not dated until 9" - February 1954 and legalization did not
take place until 17 February -:1954. Thus the Ministry of Economic Affair·s 
had granted two kinds of reco-gnition to this national importing concern 
before it had become a · legal entityo 
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that the bank h ad been ord ered to violate a r egulation agai nst granting 
import credits � He acc ordingly demanded an explanation  for so much special 
133
treatment to Interkertas". 
Interkertas was soon  to have comp any, for on 28 April, the Djakarta 
daily Pedoman reported th at three other speci al pap er importers h ad joined 
it i n  a Government ord er for 1000 tons  of paper at a price several thousand 
dollars above th e offers of other importers. Wibi sono, noti ng that Iskaq 
h ad declared that he  had i ssued speci al licenses i n  connection with Lebaran, 
asked if these oth er special licenses were also connected with Lebaran, 
134
and if not, then for what reason "o 
In his reply that eveni ng, Mi ni ster Iskaq fi nally e:,p lai ned that the 
Government had ordered 5000 tons  of pap er from fi ve importers, half of it 
(2500) from Interkertas. Of thi s total, 3000 tons were to be used "for 
meeting th e future r equests of the political p arties" during the general 
election campaign , a nd the balance was for stockpilingo Only fi ve importers 
had been cho se n,  h e  explained further, because th ese had supplies  abroad 
and were ready to make direct shipment whereas the general d elivery picture 
abroad was otherwise u nfavorable". Interkertas h ad received r ecognition 
within a short time, Iskaq went on to explai n, because it gave evid ence of 
11complete preparations" and it h ad its own building. Thus the r-fi nistry of 
• 
• 
, 1340 _!c P o ]_.?_54� pp0 404-405. The oth er three special importers listed 
were Gapura� Salom, and Unitra o A member of th e board of directors of one 
of these was a top officer i n  IKINI; a top office·r of another was associated 
with the PoRoN.,  the p arty of Mi ni ster of ·Justice Djody Gondokusumo ; and the"· 
third was a Jewi nh company with an indige nous Indon esian li sted as president .  
Cfo Pedoman, 28 Apr . 19540 On the whole, however, these oth er companies 
..
were old er and experienced"o 
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Economic Affairs had been confident of its soundness and felt obliged to 
give support by granting recognition as quickly as possible . The providing ·
of credit by an alien bank was not" ·"contrary to regulations, he explained., 
because for each bank there was specified a general ceiling to cover the 
sum of the loans to its clients, and a new debtor was allowed so long as 
the total ceiling was not exceed�d. The fact that P.T . Interkertas received 
. . '
this credit he felt was evidence of the strength of its credit standing. 
Thus Iskaq rejeo-ted vlibisono ' s  charges that the insufficient newsprint 
·supply was connected with the granting of a special license to ·an inex-
. .
perienced importing concern. He further expressed a doubt that the orders 
from the Indonesian Election Commission could actually be termed " extremely 
·satisfying" (Wibisono' s  words).,· since it had purchased rrom Interkertas 
only because the latter could meet its obligations .
135 
Exit" . Iskaq 
·Despite Interkertas and the special licenses"., after the Tjikwan Motion 
had failed, it appeared that the seat of Minister of Ecoriomic"·" Affairs Iskaq 
was again secure . Nevertheless, in July, less tha·n two months after the 
vote on the motion, the N.U. publicly expressed its concern over the" · 
economic and personnel policies of the Government. Shortly afterwards, 
135 . I.P. 1954, pp. 407-4081 4140" . Besides Interkertas and the three 
other companies reported by Pedoman (each of which received a special license
for 500 tons of paper) there ·awas a 
-fifth company, Interocean, which had 
__""!.___received an order for 1000 tons ,following a reportedly bonafide offer.
Iskaq also submitted a list of the 31 newsprint import ·"allocations"·, granted
through usual channels (for 5775 tons) ,  2465 of which came through four 
long-established alien- suppliers and 1500 tons via four of the five com-
panies which got the special paper licenses. .. 
· In July it was repo·rt·ed that t1inister of Justice· Djody himself was 
allowed by the Cabinet to select a company to import paper at above the
market price . Pedon1an, 19 July 1954. 
lODO 
Pm. (the second major party in the Ali Cabinet), began to show evidence 
of dissatisfaction with the Cabinet' s  economic and financial policies. 
Next, in September, the P.S.I.I. decided that it could not be responsible 
for the policies of the Ministers of Economic Affairs, of Finance, and of 
the Interior. 
In October, Pm at its Congress in Solo decided that it could no 
longer accept joint responsibility for the Ali Government' s  economic and 
financial policies, and so on 23 October it withdrew its ministers from the 
Cabinet. As a result of an intra-party struggle, nineteen of the twenty­
one Pm members in Parliament rejected Chairman Wongsonegoro and reorganized 
under the leadership of J.Vrr. Tadjuddin Noor and former Minister Hazairin� 
Consequently, Prime Mini�ter Ali was compelled to undertake to reshuffle 
his cabinet. The primary demand among the parties supporting the Ali Cabi­
net was that Iskaq had to go, and so he was allowed to submit his resigna­
tion, effective 8 November. Since it was also demanded that the P.N,I. no 
longer hold both the Economic Affairs and Finance portfolio� (and thereby 
a majority vote on the Monetary Board), "136 a candidate from outside the 
P.N.I. who was sufficiently 11 acceptable" to the other Government parties' 
was sought to take over the Ministry of Economic Affairs". Eventually, it 
was agreed that Ir .  Roosseno, who had followed Pm party discipline and 
resigned as Minister of Communications (but th�n remained with Wongsonegoro• s  
. .
rump party), had a sufficiently good reputation to qualify him for that 
. . 
· ·post. Among the other changes" in : _the" 11 reshu�fle", the P .No I. was given 
Roosseno • s  old portfolio, and Dr� A.K. Gani became" the new Minister of. . . . ... ."
Communications. Since the N.U. had to . give up the Ministry" , of  Agrarian 
136. Cf. Arudji speech, 9 Deco1 IoPo 1954, P •  1263. 
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Affairs in order to get the more important Ministry of the Interior 1 the 
:former portfolio was given to P .R•,.N. and I Gusti Gde Rake. 
Margono Resolution 
Early in 1954 the Indonesian Parliament passed a law authorizing 
itself to perform investigations"., Then on 29 April., the date the Tjikwan 
}lotion came up for a vote and failed, Margono Djojohadikoesoemo announced 
that regardless of the outcome of" · the vote on the motion, he would submit 
a proposal for an investigation commission since the problem at hand was 
one detr•imental to the country •137 When there was no sign of diminution 
of corruption in certain circles of the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
under Mr.  Iskaq, even after the warning provided by the Tjikwan Motion, on 
·1 October Margono a11d ten others submitted a proposal for an investtgation 
of the Ministry's work in the field of trade from January 1950 up until 
that time. Special attention was to be given to the system, regulations, 
and issuance of export and import licenses"o 
1?8� 
The explanatory note accompanying the draft resolution stressed the 
poor· state into l'tl ich the country' s foreign exchange had falleno Although 
it was necessary to encourage businessmen to :tncrease exports., it was 
asserted that domestic prices had often been higher than those on markets 
1a�road_, and measures of the Central Office of Export Affairs hac. frequently 
' .. . . 
led to unjust treatment and actions injurious to the country. In the i.mport 
.
137 . It,Po 1954, p• 4llo 
. ' 
138. r�P. 19541 p. 9190 Co-signers included a number of members of 
Opposition parties; Tjikwan and"• Wibisono (Masjumi),  Kasimo and Tjoeng 
(Katholik),  Lukman" _Wiriadinata (PoS�·to ) ;  Soemarto (Parkirtdo),  and Pellaupessy
(Demokrat) ;  other non-party members : Assaat and Teuku Hasan, and Sjamsuddin 
Sutan Makmur, who on 16 October joined Pm., which split during that month
and largely went into opposition. Later Mayor Polak (PoSoio )  joined as a
co-signer" 
1on2 
field, instead of a rational system of distributing foreign exchange and fai r 
procedures for iss1ling licenses, corruption at the Central Office of Import 
Affairs was found to be rife. From the doorman on through vi rtually all the 
desks concerned with issuing an i mport license it was necessary to pay bribes 
to speed up handling of applications or even to get any service.  As a conse­
q11ence persons entitled to receive licenses did not get them, those not quali­
fied did get them, and thus license-selling with commissions 11p to 200 percent 
had become connnon. Since the consumi ng public and bonafide importers were 
victimized, the proponents felt that an investigation was in order."139 
News of the proposed i nvesti gation of the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
was well received in many forei gn-trading circles. On 7 October, a giant 
meeting of national b1.1sinessmen headed by J. Moeli a  PAJIJGGABEAN (of Veem Nasional) 
passed resol1 1tions urging Parliament to approve holding an investigation and 
set up a cormni.ttee as a liaison body between national busi"nessmen and the 
Government, in order to assist in the investi gation. A majority of the 
speakers at the meeting strongly supported holding the investigation, although 
some felt that i t  should concern itself solely with econonrl.c problems and not 
involve itself with politi cs.140 
139. I . P. 1954, P• 1073. 
140. Pedoman, 8 Oct .  1954. Among the nine members of the Li ai son Committee 
(which had been the preparatory committee for the meeting} were N. F .  U mbas 
( manager of I PPHOS--Indonesi an Press Photo Servi ce Company Ltd. ) and Sidi Tando 
( President of N.V. Sidi Tando and N . \7 • Pabriek Tjat dan Tinta "Indonesi a" ) .  
Among those speaking in favor of the investigation were Ir. Omar Tustn, 
representative of DEIP, and Mr. Tjoeng of Parliament ' s  Economic Affairs Com­
mittee. Most outspoken opposition came from I-1.A. Pane ( President of N ,V .  Pasurna 
and Secretary of IKI1'JI) ,  who took exception to Panggabean • s  statement that even 
though he hi mself was a member of the P.N.I . ,  the investi gation would be for 
the benefit of all national busi"nessmen. 
lOGJ 
By 15 October, the Economic Affairs Committee of Parliament had submitted 
its report on the Margono Resolution. The majority of its rnembers approved 
the investigation resolution, although one or two expressed anxiety over action 
to be take:11 if most of the officials investigated were found to be c·orrupt. 
Concerning the membership of the commission, the consensus favored some kind 
of proportional representation which 1,,rould reflect the composition of Parlia­
ment . Although a few committee members urged that members with direct interest r 
in companie s  utilizing foreign exchange should not serve on the commission, 
there was also a suggestion that the commission have some expertise in the 
field to be investigated.t141 
In reply to these points, the resol11tion I s pl."oponents declared that the 
possibility that the import office ' s  employees might resign was no valid reason 
for not holding the investigation. Furthermore, they did not feel that pos­
session of direct interests in companies needing foreign· exchange had to in1ply 
wrong intentions concerning the inquiry, 'ttJhereas it was possible that persotis 
with no direct intetrests in such companies might still Wish to thwart the 
investigation. 142 
On 2 November l1inister Iskaq sent to Parliament a note concerning the 
proposed investigation. This gave a survey of differentt- procedures followed 
in granting import and export licenses and o bserved that each had its good 
141. I .P. 1954, pp. 1073-1075. One committee member reported that all the 
personnel of the Central Office of Imports had a compact to resign should the 
investigation be
f 
carried 0J1t� · Another repor:ted that if an imporler did· not 
include a bribE with his application his ·name .·twas put on the office·• s blacklist. .,
Another urged· that a basic economic law be created, the_ absence .of 1-1hich had 
made itt. possible for the previous excesses and arbitrary actions of a minister 
to take place .  . . .• . . 
· . IJjaswadi Sup;rapto · 1.ater expreesedt. his anxiety over l-rhat me,astures should be·t
taken towards personnel found to be corruptt. I.tP. 1954, p. 1098 • 
. - . .. .
142. ·r.P,. 1951!.;, pp, 1075-1076 .. 
and bad points . That corr1.1ption thrived on the system of distributing exchange 
was admitted . However, while ac lrnowledging that his ministry was aware of 
corruption, I skaq declared that it was difficult to get evidence. Nevertheless, 
it 1..ras alert, he said, and would call in the police or public prosecutor if 
signs of corruption turned up."143 
Six days after he sent his note, Minister Iskaq resigned . Nevertheless, 
on 9 November Parliament began hearing the views of the proponents of the 
Hargono Resolution. Margono, noting that Iskaq had acknowledged the existence 
of corruption, termed corruption the "consequence" not the 11cause"11 , and 
declared that in order to make improvements it was necessary to investigate 
the causes. In regard to inquiries about why the investigation was to be 
focused on the field of trade, he replied that trade was directly related to 
the everyday life of the people, and so attention had to be given not just to 
the interests of merc"hants but also to the very function of trade in the 
community. Citing examples where smallholder industries such as weaving mills 
were killed n.ot by foreign capital bnt by inefficient national importers, 
Margono also observed that in the rush to Indonesianize the import apparatus, 
the distrib�tion apparatus had been neglected .1.44 
Mr. Assaat (non-party) , another leading proponent of the investigation 
resolution, emphasized the need for an investigation in the field of imports". 
by describing the vicious circle whereby "national importers" c ould make 
tremendous profits with virtually no capital or risk only b:r selling licenses . 
143 . I . P. 1954, pp. 1077-1080. 
144. I . P. 1954, PP• 1080-1082 . In July, Sakirman ( P. K . I . )  and Sarine 
( P.t-J . I . )  of the Economic Affairs Committee had submitted a report blaming the 
"control of alien monopoly capital imperialists" at home and abroad for the 
hardships which the smaller textile enterprises had experienced. I . P. 1954,
p. 6731. 
lOC� 
Thus hundreds of applications were submitted by new companie s  for recognition 
as "national importers", and the 11fee 11 for recognition under"· such ci rcumstances 
sometime s exceeded Rp . 25,ooo. Consequently, the Government"' s  intention to 
provide national busine ssmen with an opportunity to become skilled importers 
was not s1.1cceeding, for who under s11ch circ·•unstance s:, Assaat asked, would 
bother to build up relations abroad or an efficient organi zation at home . 
With the employees of the Central Office of Imports aware of the easy profits 
available to such "importers" ,  he concluded, might they not think it orily fair 
that thes·e jmporlers share a part of such profit s  with them?145 
. . .
In the debates on the proposed }1argono Resolution, no one took a stand·
against it, although several recommended that the scope of the investigation 
be strictly·"lirnited. Sakirrnart (P.K.I.) blamed the corruption and foreign 
·exchange difficultie s  on "alien monopolists" and suggested that the condition 
might be ameliorated, if the Government controlled part of the export sectorJ 
by itself operating foundations or· institute s ( ja.iasan) for smallholder products 
. . .
and by "normalizing"· trade with the Communist countries. Sakirman admitted, 
·however, that merely estabii shing the system he favored ( a government trade 
·agency) was not in itself a g�arantee of benefit to the country, and that 
this depended largely on the skill and honesty of its personnel. Siau.:w 
.(S.K.I . ) ,  too, attacked the contro·1 of "alien monopoly capital" (as  was his"
fashion), but his target was also corruption, "bureaucratic capitali sm"', the 
ufalse" national economy, and the "indigenous 11 policy, as a re sult of which 
several thousand former members of the marhaen (i .e.  the "have-nots") had 
145. I .P. 1954, pp . 1082-1083. Assaat compared the selling of import 
licenses by national importers with the reselling of scarce flour by bakeries 
or of scarce cambrics  by batik factories, which profiteered through speculation
rather than production. 
- .. � 
become IPembers of the "haves'1 with fine bungalows. He expressed the hope that 
tt1e investigation would bring a unanir.ious desire for mobilizing all "natior1al'= 
energies and liquidating the colonial economy.146 
Especially during the second round of debates, when it was apparent that 
the consensus favored it, other members of Government parties announced their 
support of the resolution. One of the first to Sllpport the resolution publicly 
was Saro so Harsono of P.R.1'T . ,  whose party chief (I�rr. Djody Gondokusumo ) had 
himself issued a special import license (with cabj_net approval )  the previous 
July, 147 and who by the follo1r1ing l:1arch would leave the party. Jr. S. Dir,okusUJno 
( a  new member from Parindra) recited his views on econornic development policy 
while expressing approval of the resolution � Asrarudin announced Partai Buruh's 
support .  Although Te 1.1ku Jusuf 1-iuda Dalam (who had left the P.K.I. in 1953 and 
joined the P. N . I .  in 1954 and had business interests around Langsa and Iviedan) 
at first declared that a motion calling for improvements in the import and 
export sectors was preferable to a resolution for a full investigation, 
Djaswadi Suprapto reported the P .1.J . I .  1 s support after the scope of the investi­
gation had been narrowed down to the foreign exchange system. Sudijono, too, 
after first requesting the views of the resolution ' s  proponents on a national 
146; Spe ches, 16 Nov . ,  13 Dec. , I . P. 195h, pp. 1101-1103, 1313, 1315.
Note : Although the time lag in reproducing speeches in Parliament meant 
that minute;3 �for s�ssions · a"t, the end . of 1954 were a.ctually·'. published in 1955, 
11I . P. 19.54·tt: (Vol., '  V) is.zstii.11 cite� for·· speeches in 19.54 made after · 24  . . ·,
:November (pp. 1164 ff o. ) .  .- -· · . .  -. 
147. Pedonian, . 19 July 1954;: see note 135 .. 
146economy, annot1nced Partai l1urba I s S'lpport .•" . 
The l"Iargono Resolution was passed unanimously on 13 December 19S1i after 
several compromi ses. To inquiries about the possibility of defining rnore 
clearly the proposed investigation I s purpose, ·Mr. Assaat declared that it arose 
from Indone sia' s  poor fo.reign exchange position and intended to seek improve­
ments in export and import regulations so that .the sale of export products could 
be increased and so that there rni ght be some economizing in the use of foreign 
exchange. Minister Roo sseno, the new ?Jiinister of Econornic Mf airs, announced 
that the Government could agree in principle with the resol11tion, but since 
foreign exchange concerned a number of government agenqies, he ·urged that the 
text not limit the scope of the investigation to the work of the Vdnistry of 
:Economic Affairs in the field of trade. Siauw, meanwhile , offered to amend 
the text of the resolution so that the investigation comrnission would investi­
gate the advantage or lack thereof of maintaining the foreign exchange system 
based on the 1940 ordinance and would study the methods and efforts to obtain 
foreign exchange through promoting exports and the system of distributing 
foreign exchange permits to importers •" . The final draft of the resolution as 
1GB. Speeches, 16 r�ov., 13 Dec . ,  I.  P. 1954, pp. 1098-1101, 1104-1106, 
1313-1316. New member B. M. Diah (non-party but backi ng the Ali Cabinet), 
referring to the insuffici.e11t attention given to the distribution app,iratus 
(about which Margono had complaip�d} ,  declared that such was especially ·"true
during the period prior to the AU. Cabinet.
Co-signer Sjam"suddin Sutan".Makmur ( PIR) cited the huge profits from special
import and export licenses and the continued worsening condition of the people' s 
living despite their ha-rd 1111ork- ,:while the Ali Cabinet kept propagandizing its 
theory of changing the colonial economy to a national one, a s  reasons for hi s 
,joining in  sponsoring the resolution. ,.He charged that among its opponents were· 
tho_se who had received �pecial favors and opportunities to manoeuvre in the 
trading field behind ttie smokescreen called "national economy" . . 
-----
lon,,UL• 
accepted largely incorporated these modifications ."149 
The subject of tl1e comr,ositio� of the Investigation Commission also was 
debated. Although there was general consensus that the membership should 
reflect the composition of Parliament, there was a difference of opinion over 
the kind of qualities rr.ost appropriate for the members. The Communists 
( Sudijono of Partai Murba and Sakinnan of the P.K.I . )  opposed participation by 
anyone who was associated with any corporation. Djaswadi Suprapto ( P.N .I . )  
recommended that those chosen be persons who were expert, honest and objective 
but who had no direct interests in the matter (thus persons not associated with 
import or export corporations ) . 150 Minister Roosseno on the one hand urged in 
the interests of objectivity and efficiency that the persons chosen for the 
commission should not have much material interest in the subject of the investi­
gation bl1t on the other hand that the membership reflect the social groups 
which directly or indirectly were materially connected with the commission ' s  
work. ( sic ) 151 
However, Diab said what was in1portant was to choose the "honest of the 
honest" members of Parliament. And I-1r. Assaat pointed out on behalf of the 
prorjonents that the appointment of the party man ·who had no interests in foreign 
149. Statements ,  1 and 13 Dec. ,  I . P. 1954, pp. 1195-1196, 1313, 1316-1318e. 
The proponents accepted the revised terminology for the Margono proposal 
recommended by Abulhajat. Thus, instead of offering Parliament a "proposal
for an investigation" they presented a "draft resolution for an investigation" .. 
Abulhajat asked that the names of the sponsors be removed from the caption of 
the resolution since it was to be accepted by Parliament. Although the pro­
ponents originally demurred, when it reappeared for final discussion in 1955,
their names (l·1argono c .  s. ) were missing. 
l-finister Roosseno preferred the broader scope of the investigation partly 
to avoid casting suspicion on the employees of a '!certain agency.  11 
150. Speeches, 16 Nov . ,  I . P. 1954, pp. 1098 ff. 
151. Statement, 13 Dec . ,  I . P. 1954, p. 1316. 
.. .-•�-·•. 
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trading compa nie s wou ld give no assuran ce th at the work of the inve sti gation 
wo uld be fa cilitated sin ce he might try to cover up the mi stake s  of his party. 
Th us they opposed any move to prohi bit members in business from sittin g in the 
commi ssion and urged that emphasis be put on per son s who �rere "clean and 
hone st " .  152 
Finally, on 28 Jan ua ry  1955, a thi,rteen-man Inve sti gation Commission 1r1as 
set up ·representin g different partie s of Parli amentary factions .  It so happene( 
that a rr1a jority of  the members did h ave busine ss iritere st s  •"153 Hol-rever,  t l1i s  
first parliamentary inve sti gation commission , whi ch had been la unched with mu.ch 
fanfare, had an anti -climacti c life . Its  real rai son d 'etre--the incumbency of 
Nr. Iskaq as Minister of Economi c Affairs--had been removed even before it h ad 
been set up. Moreover, the e le ction campai gn and other politic al pro blems and 
the Band ung Conference were pushin g economi c problems into .a pla ce of se CO'!Jc};ary 
intere st . Accordingly, althou gh the commi ssion did submit an int erin1 report , 
it never completed its assi gnment . 154 
Other Commerci al Indone siani zation 
Importing, as the comme rcial se ctor mo st subje ct to Government contro ls 
and thus a ccessi ble to manipulation in favor of  national busine"ssmen , and, �s 
apparently the simple st of the more hi ghly developed busine"ss sectors, had 
15�. Speeches, 16 Nov. , 1 De c . ,  I . P.  1954, pp. 1104, 1196. 
153 . I . P. 19.55, pp. 23, 46. The members were Mud a Dalam (P.N.I . ) ,  T jikwan 
(Masjumi ) ,  Siauw (S.K.I . ) ,  Margono (non-pa rty) , Lukman 1i-Jiriadinata ( P.S .I . ) ,  
Di po kusumo (Parindra) ., Pella upe ssy (Demokr at ) ,  Hutomo Supa rdan· (:P.K .I . ) ,  T joeng 
(Katho lik) , Saro so Harsono ( P.R.N . ) ,  l1r . Burh anuddin (member of  N.u. , . effecti"v:e 
1 Aug. 1954), Abulh ajat ( Pro gresip) ,  and Ted jasukmana ( Partai Buruh ) .  
·"1.54. I .  Ted jasukmana interview, Ithaca , 5 Aug.  1958.
After the Boerhanoedin .Haraha p Cabinet was set up and . an offi cial exam­
ination of corruption be gun, ?1r. I ska q left the co untry "for rea son s of the
health of  a member of  his fami ly11 •  
155. 
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ever since the c reation of RIS attracted far more Ilew Indonesian businessmen 
and potential businessmen than eve� before. There was also growing participa­
tion by Indonesian retailers on a level atove that of small shopkeepers, and 
some of them thereby acquired the status of national "middle-class merchants 11 
and received protection throngh having a group of i mport artic les reserved for 
them. In Djakarta a number of these associated in the P. P.r1r .r . set up 
l'J .V. Usaha Daga..'1g Menengah Indonesia (N . V .  Udami ) with R. Soekardi as President, 
as their agent for importing and wholesaling."155 
For several years, however, there was little attempt by indigenous Indo­
nesians to match their inroads in the i mporting sector by competing with the 
well-developed Dutch and Chinese business enterpri"ses in the export and inter­
mediary trading sectors. In March 1950, DEIP had set up Persatuan Eksportir 
Indonesia ( PEKSI--Union of Indonesian E,cporters)."156 However, two years after 
the transfer of sovereignty, Tjikwan of Parliament' s  Economic Committee could 
declare that he did not know of a single Indonesian merchant who exported goods 
by himself from Indonesia. 157 1'Iot long afterwards, the Wilopo Gov.ernment 
Charter 776/1954. The Wilopo Cabinet announced that good relations 
would be sought between the importer, v-Tholesaler, distributor, and retailer, 
while protecting the econori1ically weak and seeking to end colonial vestiges in 
the economy. I . P. 1952, p. 2L8.
Confirming the fact that importers formed the group receiving most aid 
was its listing of assistance to national merchants: (1) guaranteeing a fair
profit to i mporter, wholesaler, and retailer (by decree of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs) ; (2) supervision against price manipulation through a decree 
requiring the use of invoic es; ( 3) reservation of "benteng" goods for national 
importers; (4) reservation of "middle-class" goods to be imported by "middle­
class merchants" ; and ( 5) financial aid according to banking and commercial 
principles. I . P; 1952, p. 570. 
156. Trade Directory of Indonesia 1954-1955, (Djakarta : DEIP, 1954 ) ,  p. lxv. 
157. Speech, 11 Feb. , R.P. 1952, pp. 391-392 . 
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announced that b�r pla cin g . !ndonesian merchants in to uch ·with prod"ucer organi za-.
. 158t .ions an d b y providin g credits, it hoped to d ev e1op some expo tr compaT1.1.es. 
Event ually a number of  national co mpanies d id call th emselves exporters, and 
some regional export associations were formed by Indonesians. Not long after 
the P.N . I .  set up IKINI in the importing field , it .was joined in the exporting 
field by IKENI". 
Yet by 19.54, one Indonesian official co uld name only fo ur". really a ci:,i ve 
Indonesian exporting companies: Djoh an Djohor,  Intraport, Central Tradin g  
Company, and N.v. · Soetan Sjahsam Corporation , all of Djakarta .159 The first 
started business d urin g the Dutch period and t he next t1vo d urin g the Revol u­
t ion,  and these were at least a s  active in impo rt ing as. in expo rting. Sjahsam, 
a coffee merch ant in the Low Co untries d uring the forties, ret"urned home to 
open his own company in 1951, which was to become the �a jor indigenous Indones­
ian
.
enterprise devoted exclusively to exports  (prima r.ily of rubber ) .  
In the intermediate trading sectors the activities of Indonesians were 
varied"e A unique company arose in this sector following .plans developed 
d u rin g 19.53 to control the smallholder r11bber collection business in the 
important slab prod uction center of So uth Sumatra o Lo cally the pro ject was 
' 




Trade. The new concern wa s on the one hand to buy from 
Indonesian slab prod ucers and th ereby guarantee them a fair return , an.d on th e 
other to sell to rubber rernillers in Indonesia (who wo uld then export rubber 
. .
"blankets" ) ,  th us guaranteeing them a' contin uing so"urce of slabs and insuring 
stead y mill employment . In Septern�r, the f.fonetary Board a pproved a d raft 
158. St atement , 9 �1ay, I . P. 1952, p. 248. 
159. Amstut z, op.cit . ,  ch . I .  
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budget for the agency, which was given the name Badan Penampung Karet Rakjat 
( Smal lholder Rubber Col lection Agency)". Despite some demands ( especially 
among some local farmers and political groups ) that the agency be a foundation 
total ly financed by the Government, there had been growing disi llusion with 
this form among official circ les, where it was felt that the Government ' s  
contribution might be considered merely as assistance and thus lost. Con­
sequently it was decided to set up a mixed corporation with a legal ly respon­
sible management, with 51 percent of its stock held by the national government 
and 49 percent distributed among the groups primari ly affected, such as the 
rubber farmers, merchants, and processors . 160 
The founding of the new corporation, which received the name i-J . V. Karet 
Sumatera Selatan (South Sumatra Rubber Corporation ) ,  was scheduled for 
15 December 1953 in Palembang, but had to be delayed a number of months because 
of financial apathy on the part of the Indonesian farmers. The rerni"llers, 
primarily Chinese businessmen, quickly subscribed to a majority of the shares 
reserved for the private sector, whi le m11ch of the balance v1as offered to the 
general public through newspaper advertisements."161 Final ly, in mid-1954, the 
166. John O. Sutter, "New Semi�Goverriinental Rubber Agencies", American 
Embassy Despatch No. 393, Djakarta, 10 Dec". 1953, pp. 2-3 : Pedoman, 21 JanQ"1954. 
The corporation was to have an initial paid-in capital of Rp. 10 mil lion ( one­
fifth of its nominal capital ) . Its purpose v1as a lso fiscal :  it would restrict 
exports of s labs in order that they be processed locally into blankets as a
consequence of i:vhich 8'.()Vern"ment revenue from exports would increase o
Three years earlier the Government had forecast that rubber export companies 
would be set up with its assistance and eventual ly become the property of small­
ho lder rubber cooperatives. Statement, 11 Oct . ,  H.P.  1950, p G 1829. 
161. John o. Sutter, "S:rnallholder Rubber in Indonesia" ,  American Embassy 
Despatch No . 10, Djakarta, 6 July 1954, pp. 9-10. Simi"lar corporations were 
original ly planned for North Sumatra, Central Sumatra, and Kalimantan, but
subsequently the plans were dropped because of popular apathy and increased 
e mphasis on production of sheets . 
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new corporation was launched . However, slabs being one of the lowest quality 
forms of nat ural rubber  brought .the fat'mer-prod ucer relatively little proceed"s.  
Conseq,lently, to enco urage the production of smoked rubber sheets,  which lvere 
far more valuable ,  a year later t he corporation"'s structure was modified for 
that purpose. 162 
Indone si anization commenced in the i ntermediate trade of another primary 
commodity, sugar, when the Persat uan Ped agang Gula Indonesi a ( P. P. G.I .--Indo ­
nesi an Sugar Merchant s Associ ation ) was set up with 1v1r . PRI Sosro atmod jo as 
chairman .  The associ ation began t aking over the domestic trade in sugar both  
163on Java and to t he outer islands"o 
Mo st interinsular traders for long after t he transfer of soverei r,nty, 
however , continued to be Chinese". Accordingly, to stimulate the gro-i-rth of 
Indonesi an enterpri se in thi s  sector, t he Government in August 1952 discontinued 
granting- recognition to companies owned by other than Indonesi an n ationals, 
which:· -led to complaints by person s of Chinese descent that in practice there 
was discrimination in favor of indigenous Indonesi ans."164 Subseq11ent ly, a 
screeni · · · place. tieverthe less, in most areas the ng of interinsular traders took
number o r  merchants recogni zed in this  category who were li sted as aliens 
(Chinese ) remained"· significantly greater th·an t he number of Indonesians • 165 
162, Djawaban Pemerintah • • •  Boerhanoedin Harahap • • •  , (14 Nov .  1955) ,  p .  56. 
·. : 
163. Bank :Indonesi a Report 1953-1954, p .  118.
Fri , who was active in a number of businesses, was chairman pf the 
Junior ,Chamber o f  Commerce for Indonesi"a. In IVIay 1954 he reported ly became 
the first Indonesi an" ·to pass the sugar merchants examination . 
164. Si auw speech, 31 Aug. , I .P. 1953, p. 765. 
165 .  However, by August 1954, the number o f  Indonesi an interinsular 
traders in 111Test Sumatra exceeded the number of aliens by 50 to 47• . Laporan 
T ahunan Sumatera Tengah 1954, p .  94• 
• 
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A related series of rrieasures attempted by 1'-tinister Iskaq in carrying 011t 
his policy of developing a nationa� economy out of the colonial one involved 
sole agencies  of fo reign manufacture rs on the one hand and distributorships 
of alien manufacturers in Indonesia on the other. These measures follot-1ed the 
setting up on 23 December 1953 of the Fanitia Kerdja Urusan Import dan :;Export 
(Working Committee for Imr,ort and Export Affairs ) by Iskaq expressly to provide 
liaison between the Government and importers fo r the purposes of determining 
its import policy. However, as its name indicated, the committee was also 
instructed to provide the 11inister with advice on e.,cport matters"o 166 
In April the 1/orking Cammi ttee decided to set up several committees 
entrusted with separate tasks. One was to attempt to solve the problem of 
administering import exchange bj,r requiring all importers to join the existing 
associations and them channeling foreign exchange to them via the organizations.167 
One was to endeavor to develop a strong national exporters class by uniting 
the efforts of national exporters.168 The results of these two committees 
appeared to have been quite negligible. 
Another committee of the \forking Committee apparently made recommendations 
which Minister Iskaq took greater pains to have carried out. It was to devise 
"practical measures"11: for placing the distribution of products of d,omestic 
industry--still handled by alien companies--into the hands of national 
""' .uusinessmen. 169 On 14 I�ay 1954, the 1'1inistry of Economic Affairs anno1mced 
166. I . P. 1954, p.  322. The heads of the Cent"ral Offices of Imports and 
of Exports were respectively chai"rman and vice chairman of the corrmittee. 
}1embers were renresentatives of DEIP, Gapindo, Bakuna, IKit!I, and Gabim. 
167. I . P. 1954, pp. 309�310; .Amstutz, op.cit. , ch . IV. 
168. I . P. 1954, p. 310. 
169. Iskaq statement, I . P. 1954, p. 310. As early as November 1950,
J1r. Iwa had recomrr.ended such measrtres. I . P. 1950, p. 583. 
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that it 1vas the Government"•s goal to have Indonesian concerns becom.e the 
distri butors of  the popular consumer goods from ' ali en factories in Indonesi a. 
There followed offers of inducements and threats of sanctions to en co urage such 
major fa.ctories to give up their usually long-esta blish ed and effi cient dis­
tri butors, most of 1..rhom were  aliens ( usually Chinese ) .  The process was slow 
and sometimes painful, accompanied by protests of  the distri butors  i n.volved 
(some of whom could assert that they too were citi zens),  and it was no easy 
matter to find already qualified , experienced Indonesi an national dist ri butors 
to t ake their place ."170 
At the same tirr.e a drive was undert aken to promote distri bution by 
Indonesi an citi zens of  leading consumer goods from abroad .  As an ir)i.tial 
step to assess the field ,  the Central Offi ce of  Imports an 11o unced on 16 Sep­
t em ber 1954 that impo rters whi ch were so le agen ci es had to register their 
commodities with it and supply appropriate evidence from the  supplier abro"act.171 
Th en on 18 Octo ber,  the Ministry of  Economic Affairs announced a measure, whi ch 
was expre13s·1y a st·ep ··in· ·t·he ·-dev�lopment". of a ttnation al busi ness group" as part 
of the program to change the coloni al econorni c structure into a national one 
operated by Indonesi an citi zens·. Consequent ly, the Governrnent , alle gin g that 
since it granted foreign exch ange it felt partly responsi"ble for the smooth 
ar�ival and distri bution of  goods,  ord ered the Chief of  the Department of Trade 
to desi gnate "so und and bonafide" national businessmen (Indonesian citi zens). · to 
act as the new ho ld ers of  sole agenci es.172 For some time previo usly 
170. Amstut z, op.cit . ,  ch . I :  l-1eek, T,he Government and Econor.:ti c Develop­
. ment in Indonesi a, 1950-1954, p. 171. 
171. Kronik Tindakan Ekonomi , (1954 ) ,  No". 16, p. 5• 
172. Ibid . ,  No . 17, P• 22.  
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Indonesian national i mporters had approached Dutch and sometime s  Chinese sole 
agents of popular trade-marked products to give them up, but with little 
success. Now that national importers were guaranteed the major share of 
import exchange and explicit Government policy was behind them, they were 
somewhat more successful, but since most ( like their colleagues trying to take 
over the distribution of domestic products) lacked any distribution apparatus, 
it was still a slow process."173 On the other hand, since trade with the 
countries of Eastern Europe blossomed during the first Ali Sastroarnidjojo 
Cabinet, many national importers associated with Bakuna easily acquired sole 
agencies for goods not formerly imported into Indone"sia. 
Pharmacies 
The first Government measures to facilitate gradual Ind.one"siani"zation of 
a specific segment of the distribution trade at the retail level, which 
occurred early in 1953, appeared in laws sponsored by the Ministry of Health 
to guarantee a suitable distribution of pharmacie s, especially in the more 
sparsely-populated regions of the country.174 The se laws would prohibit the 
opening of new pharmacies in specilied areas without a license from the Minis­
ter of Health and, for a temporary period, would authorize the Minister to 
license "emergency pharmacie s" headed by assistant pharmacistso 
While under discussion in the sections of Parliament in December 1952, 
the bill for opening new pharmacies evoked such suggestions as the following: 
(1) since aliens oi:-1ned most of the ninety-five pharmacies in Indonesia, alien 
enterprises ought to be prohibited from opening up any more at least in large 
·cities (profitable areas) ;  ( 2 )  since 1nost assistant pharmacists lacked capital, 
173. llmstutz, op.cit. ,  ch. VI. 
. .
174. The Ministry of Health was already authorized to control the 
locations where new physicians and dentists could set up practiceo 
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the Government itself sho tud set up pharmacies ·which later could be turned over 
to private busi ness;  and ( 3 )  the Governme nt sho uld give suffici ent_ help to 
natio_nal ph armaceutic al bu_si r1e sses by, for example ,  helpi ng ther.: to obtai n  
direct co n nections  wi th medicine factories abro ad". I n  the bill for ope ni n g  
emerge ncy pharmacies, the provi sion  th at assi stant pharmaci sts, i n  ord er to 
q�alify, h ad to h ave twelve years experi ence i ncludi �g three with the Govern­
ment, was viewed by o n e  member as di scrimin ation  agai nst Chine se. assi stant 
ph armacists, who worked only wi th private organi zations.175 
I n  reply to these vi ews the Governmen t  stated th at the two laws vrere 
i ntended to pro.mote private e nterpri se by i ncreasing the n umber and distri ­
bution of ph armacie s th roughout th e co untry. It  affirmed th at natio n al e nter­
pri se s i n  their i ni ti al stage were  given guid ance and support by th e Governme nt. 
However ,  i t  took i ssue wi th th e suggestion t-h at the prohi bition s  not apply to 
I ndonesian n ation als . Observi n g  that such a suggestio n viewed ph armaci es o n ly 
as •1'bniLin eroses", the Government asserted th at anyo n e  should be allowed to open 
a ph armacy who , besid es havi n g  eco nomic goals , also wi shed to joi n i n  the task 
of di stri buti n g  medictnes to the peo pleo Still, i n  c ase of competi tio� between 
stron g and we ak companie s, the Government always assi"sted "n ation al" busi nesses, 
which i n  ge neral were economic ally �reak, it asserted .
176 
' ) 
Debate on the two bills was opened i n  a plenary se ssion of Parliament o n  
19 January 1953. Drs .  YAP T jwan Bi n g  ( P .!�.I . ) ,  himse lf a pharn1aci st, took 
issue with those members of Parli ament who h ad earlier r epo rted th at there 
175. I .P. 1953, pp. 81-85. One member of Parli amen t  even sugge sted that 
the C�vernme nt set up i ts own ph armacies and th en require private ph �rmacies  to 
sell at pri qes ·t·hree times those of the Governme nt. (I ndi vid ual members are 
not identified i n  the section reports; cf. Musiri n speech below. ) 
176. I . P. 1953, pp. 85-88. 
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were only two academic pharmacists (\-Ji th degrees)  who were "Indonesian 
bationals " .  He asked how he could participate in that "supreme political oody"" 
( Parliament) if he were not an Indonesian national. J. P. Snel ( P.R.N. ,  repre­
senting the European group) took iss1.1e with the Government I s statement about 
supporting the "economically weak", since in practice this often meant that 
whoever had not the least econ(Jrnic ability and t.Jas neither thrifty nor eco­
nomical received the largest proceeds. He proposed, instead, that the Govern­
ment give credit to those who were "financially weak but economically 
strong. 11177 Siauw, noting that about ti-1enty-eight pharmacists were Indonesian 
citizens, attacked former Dutch policy for the shortage in the co'Jiltry. Declar­
ing that most medicine i mporting was in the hands of three Dutch companies 
which had virtual control over the majority of the pharmacies in Indonesia, he 
asserted that Government efforts to aid "newcomers" in importing medicines 
could not succeed because they had no guaranteed markets.  His primary interest, 
however, was in having the Government withdraw the provision of three years"' 
government service for assistant pharmacists wanting to open emergency pharma­
cies, since it had been difficult in the past for those of Chinese descent to 
get such work.178 
Several other members, ho1-1ever, were interested in protecting the "national'' 
character of new pharmacies. Thus Mas Soetardjo ( PIR) urged that a prospective 
,harmacy business should have a oharter specifying that at least 51 percent of 
177. R. P. 19.53, pp. 421, 423-425. The two "national" pharmacists 1r1ere 
officials in the Iviinistry of Health. Later one was removed for malversation . 
178. R. P. 1953, pp. 447-454. Although Rathkamp and Joan van Gorkom were
the two major pharmaceutical i mport and sales chains,  Chinese capital was also
active. 
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its c ·api tal · tvas "national capi-tal". 
179· · IBtJlJTADJI ·Pravri"rosudirdjo (P.•11. I . ) ,  
Chairman of the Ed ucation ,  Culture, Religion and Ifealth Committee of Parliament, 
while ·expressing his happiness at seeing the governn1ent promise protection -to 
the weak, asserted that protecting such national enterprises was an oblig ation 
for the n ation al Government. Thus ,  he urged that I ndonesia be declared , a 





·The P. K .I". position on the matter -v1as presented by l1usi ;rin Sosrosubroto . 
For immediate action"., he urged the C,overnment to abolish the "sole monopoly 
rights of gi ant alien capital" to rnanufacture and import medicines ·and to put 
''national newcomers" into direct connection with medicine factories abro ad". · 
over the long run., however., . he called on the Gov .ernment on the one hand to take 
over d irect · control of all medicine i mpo rting then being do ne by · pri '\Tate··
companies and on the other to convert private pharmacies into· official 
.pharmacies of the Goverrunent o 
181 
And thus the P . K .I • ., whic h d uring 19.52 
decided to take the popular tac k of anno uncing support of the private 
I ndonesi an businessman--who was threatened with extermination by "gi ant., 
mbnopdly alien capital"--perhaps inadvertently revealed that the private 
riational· ·businessman t-1as not to receive perpetual suppo rt but ·i--ras to be · perhaps 
only a tool in attaining the Communist goal of a wholly state (read : "party" )-
run economy. 
1-79. R .. P .. 19.53, p. 430. 
180. R. P. 1953, PP• 455-456 
181. R. P •. 1953., pp . : 431-441. Musirin cited a letter frorn tr1e Persatuan 
Ahli Pharmasi I ndonesia (Union of I ndonesian Fharmacists ) ., whic h urged the 
C-ovemment to support national importers so that they co uld i mport narcotics 
(thitherto only three alien companies were licensed for s uch  imports ) and
to purchase medicines, etc . from n ational importers . 
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Dr. J.  Leimena ( Parkindo), 1-;inister of Health, replied that e specially 
in importing 1nedicines  the Government gave its orders to Indone sian nei1comers, 
who in general were economically weak and who thus got di·rect connections with 
manufacturers abroad. As national importers developed their own distrib11tion 
apparatus, he pointed out, some of the existing monopolistic structure would 
be dissipated. But although the Government would provide all kinds of 
assistance, he declared, mo st important for national enterprises was "self­
activity" .  Answering Snel and Siauw, Leimena asserted that the Government did 
not differentiate between indigenous and non-indigenous citizens, for it was a 
national government which embraced all citizens, even those which Siauw had in 
mind. Thus the 3-year requirement was not c amouflaged racial discrirnination."182 
Then Ngeradjai Meliala (Demokrat) submitted an amendment which would 
exempt enterprises with national capital from the prohibition in the first 
bill, since a pharmacy was a business and not a social institution like a 
physician (whose sites  of practice had come under the control of the l-1inistry 
of Health) .  He reasoned that a doctor co11ld practice successfully anY1-1here, 
but a pharmac y, operating on a profit and loss basis, c oHld not long operate 
at a loss in a remote region. 183 The Government, however, opposed the amend­
ment, for in Dr. Leimena' s words there was already an e scape clause in the bill 
for the benefit of national enterprises, and moreover the national government 
182 . R. P. 1953, pp. 477-489, 511-515. Fl·iO?-J Bratadi1rridjaja ( Partai Buruh) 
had suggested that the state talce over the quinine factory at Bandung, but 
Leimena reminded him that the question of s11ch nati"onalization was outside the 
scope of the matter at hand. 
183. R.P. 1953, pp. 526, 528, 531. Meliala said that for him the capital 
of Indonesian citizens t.-ras "national capital" regardless of whether or not they 
were indigenous. Co-signers of the amendment 1...Jere Siauw, Maruto Nitimihardjo 
( Partai Murba) ,  Asrarudin ( Partai Buruh) ,  and Oto Rondonuwu ( Progressif ) .  
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had to act fairly.184 After some discussion over the meaning of  "national 
capital" and acting "fairly" ,  the amendment w2s defeated ( 56 to 76), and the 
bill was passed."185 
The bill for emergency ·pharmacies was finally passed after a compromise 
amendment o ffered by 1'Jj. SOEN1\RJO Mangoenpoespito (l1asjumi) was approved. 
This allowed assistant pharmacists to open such busi"nesses either after fifteen 
years of experience (aimed at those of Chinese descent) or after ten years of 
exberience three of which were in Governm"ent service (aimed at the indifenous 
Indonesian) . 186 
Jajasan Kopra 
An export enterprise which became quite involved in national and regional 
political problems was th� Government ' s  export monopoly for copra,"·"Jajasan 
. .
Kopra. After the formation of RIS, dissatisfaction with the operations of 
. .
Coprafonds in the leading copra producing areas, some of  wb.ich"· were· on the 
• '"'? •
periphery of the Indonesian state, had contributed to continued high rates 
·of copra smuggling. In mid-1950, a Copra Commission headed by I. J. Kasimo 
was set up to examine the copra problems and recommend improvements. Accord­
ingly,. Coprafonds relinquished the p,1rchases of copra from Java and Sumatra 
to private enterprise. Then, effective 1 December 1950, it was"."reorganized 
so that its economic task was complemented by the social task of improving 
tl1e lot of the copra producers, and its name was Indonesianized. As head of 
- 184. R. P. 1953, p. 527 • 
. 185. ·R.P. 1953, p. 563; "Undang2 1'1o .  3/1953". 
186. R. P. 1953, 535-540, 566; "Undang2 flTo .  4/19531 1 • The amendment passed, 
. ·94 to 38. A rival one ·bJr Ibnutadji .(and approved by the Government)' , which
would require a total of 12 years for those wi tl1 3-�rears government experience, 
·was voted down. · 
lJ.02 
the ne1-1 l'ianaging Eoard was chosen the busy Kasimo (then also Chief of the 
Department of Estates and lviember of Parliament") •
187 
During 1951, the Jajasan Kopra began spending some of its reserves to 
promote cooperatives among copra producers. Thanks especially to the Korean 
War boom that year, Indonesia exported 609,377 tons of copra and copra cake, 
its best year over the decade following World War I I  and close to its pre-war 
record. Thereafter, however, the world market for Indonesian copra continued 
to decline."188 Consequently, plans to convert the Jajasan Kopra into a Copra 
Central Cooperative., 89 J. were repeatedly shelved. 
In 1954, the economic problems of the Jajasan Kopra became supplemented 
by new political ones. The institute had been selling direct to the consumers 
abroad through its branch or a broker in Amsterdam. Early in 1954, 1Yfinister 
Iskaq decided, however, that national businessmen should be allowed to partake 
in this trade. Accordingly, he "recomr:ended" to the l1ianaging Board that it 
turn over the sales of upwards of 15,ooo·tons of copra to a certain "national" 
corporati_on, allowing it a commission of up to 2 percent of the sales price. 
Since it had been agreed that the jajasan ' s  own margin would not be affected, 
the Managing P.oard calculated that this one transaction would mean giving the 
company a present of Rp.300,000 at the expense of what the copra producers 
would net. Since if all the j ajasan 1 s sales abroad were similarly turned over 
- I - . ,  • 
157 . Pertanjaan Anggota dan Djawaban Pemerintah, II,  95, 98; F .  A. Pi.toi
speech, 30 Sept . ,- R'eP. 1950, pp. 1041-1042 ; "Keputusan 1·1enteri Perdagangan 
dan Perindustrian �Jo. 7820/1�111 ,  11 l�ov. 1950; Java F,ank Report 1950-1951, 
pp. 79-81;. Economic •Connittee report, 14 June, So P. 1951, pp. _  5053-5054; 
floverrunent ·stiltement._15_.June, R� P.· 1951,:.p• .  5026• .· .Tha� .a,ePa,rate. Coprafonds 
Oost Indonesib was also liquidated in 1950. See Chapter XVI . 
188. Cf.  Bank Indonesia Report 1955-1956,- p .  130. 
189. Government statement, 3 June, I . P. 1952, pp. 569-570 . 
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to n ational compar�es it ir-Jould result in a shift in income of about Fg:>. 3 rrdJJion 
annually from t he coconut farmers to a handful of businessmen , · ·the 1'1anaging 
Eoard did not follow the Mini ster's recommendation.190 
As a consequence, Kasimo ( Partai Katholik) was relieved of his position 
as he ad of  t he Jajasan Kopra Managing Board in mid -year, and Mr. R. PRATIKTO 
Sast ro hadikoesoemo ( P.I,f.I. ) ,  a jud ge of the court at 1'1alang, was appointed as 
his successo r. Thereafter, the jajasan"'s expo rts went vi a "national" compani es, 
most of whom accordin g  to Kasimo ,  still had to depend on ali en brokers . 191 
Because of this poli cy of Minister I skaq, maint ained by t he Ali Sast roamid jo jo 
C abinet , Kasimo joined with  ot hers head ed by Mr. Wibisono in sponsorin g a mat10n 
of no confidence in  t he reshuffled Ali Cabinet ,  ·whi ch 1rJas submitted on 
19 November, but which t he Government parties and suppo rters were able to 
vote down.
192 
Smugglin g  of copra abro ad had never been enti rely eradicat ed. }Iowever, 
d urin g  the second half of 1954 it flared up anew, especi ally out of  Minahasa, 
where there were held demonstrations against the Jajasan Kopra and its head 
offi ce in Djakarta. Some of the local mi litary and civil offici als played 
leading roles in thi s  extra-legal t rade with the knowled ge of Lt". Col. J.F. 
V 
190. Kasimo speech, 3 Dec., I .P. 1954, pp. 1209-1210. 
191. Kasimo speech, 13 Dec., I .P. 1954, p. 1306.
SoQn..aft.er Pratikto· ·• s . aPpointrr.ent.,. :the J-ajasan •Kopra Labor Union demanded 
his replacement . Abadi , 13 July 1954. 
192 . Cf. I o P• 1954, pp. 1107, 1198, 1341-1342 . The motion was rejected 
by 92 to 115. Again . Achsi en :was not present to vot e .  . .
In I•1arch 1955, the }·1inistry of Agriculture was divi ded into "di rectorates", 
but although Kasimo was the senio r offi ci al in the estates sector ( as ."Qh:j_ef
of  the Department of Estates )  , he was. passed over when the head of  the ne1r1 
Directo rate of Estat es
."
was named . 
WARUIDW, 
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Commander of the Military Territory of East Indonesia. This 111as 
the first major instance of a practice that was to grow ever more c ommon-­
the smuggling of raw materials from outlying parts of Indonesia under the 
auspices of the military authorities ostensibly to gain funds for local,  
social overhead purposes and in protest against the financial policies of 
the central authorities in Djakarta. 
As a consequence of the growing unrest among copra producers, a copra 
conference was held in Tugu (near Eogor) on 2 December and contin1.1ed in 
Djakarta on the fourth, �hich agreed on decentralizing and democrati�ing the 
Jajasan Kopra by including representatives of copra producing areas in its 
rnanagement. Another of its recommendations 't'ITas that national exporters of 
copra cease using alien brokers within one year. Then in January 1955, the 
Jajasan Kelapa t1inahasa (l-Iinahasa Cocon1-1t Fund) was set up as the first step 
in the decentralization of the work of Jajasan Kopra. 194 
During the years before the elections most attention concerning Indonesian­
ization of the economy was directed at the field of importing, where the 
indigenous Indonesian businessmen had become extremely active. Such Indonesian"­
ization was fostered and legitimized by the Central Government, which also 
had centralized foreign trade controls to such a degree that hardly any import­
ing concern of repute failed to have its main office or a major branch in the 
capital city. This process of protecting Indonesians in importing was directed 
against the alien businessman and apparently heralded the "normal" importing 
structure of the future. Contrariwise, the trend which belatedly appeared in 
193. In the midst of the controversy, Minister of Defense Iwa pinned a 
colonel ' s  star on �1arouw. 
194. I . P. 1954, pp. 1286-1287; Bank Indonesia Report 1954-1955, p. 125. 
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exporting did not then seem to represent any such potentially permanent or 
normal process. Recalling to some extent the blockade running in which some 
local authorities were active (especially on Sumatra) during the Revolution, 
such exporting was fostered by regional authorities and stressed the interests 
of the more outlying regions of Indonesia. Consequently, instead of being a 
reaction to what was conceived by some as the exploitative alien, it was 
directed against what some conceived to be an exploitative centralized govern• 
ment, despite the fact that this government was the motive power behind much 
Indonesianization, Ironically, such a trend in exporting was to play as great 
a role--if not a greater one than that in :importing--in the fortunes of the 
Indonesian economy and body politic in the immediately following years. 

